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Résumé 
 
       Depuis le début des années 1990, la recherche sur le développement régional a pris une 
importance considérable dans les disciplines de l’économie et de la géographie dans la plupart 
des pays. De nombreuses études ont été consacrées à ce sujet et l’on constate une approche 
analytique de plus en plus sophistiquée. 
Que les économies pauvres ont tendance à converger vers les pays riches, ou bien à diverger 
au fil du temps est une question qui a attiré l'attention des décideurs et des universitaires depuis 
quelques décennies. Convergence ou de divergence économique est un sujet d'intérêt et de débat, 
non seulement pour valider ou non les deux modèles principaux de croissance qui sont 
considérés comme concurrent (l’approche néo-classique et celle des approches de croissance 
endogène), mais aussi pour ses implications pour les publiques politiques.  
En se basant sur une analyse des politiques de développement régional et des analyses 
statistiques de la convergence et des disparités régionales, les objectifs de cette thèse sont de 
tenter de fournir une explication des différents processus et des modèles de développement 
économique régional poursuivis dans le cas de territoires immenses en utilisant le Canada et la 
Chine comme études de cas, d'entreprendre une analyse des différents facteurs et des forces 
motrices qui sous-tendent le développement régional dans ces deux pays, et d'explorer à la fois 
les réussites et les échecs apparents dans les politiques de développement régional en comparant 
et contrastant les expériences de développement régional et les modèles de ces deux pays. 
     A fin d'atteindre cet objectif, la recherche utilise une approche multi-scalaire et des méthodes 
de mesure multidimensionnelle dans le cadre des analyses sur les disparités « régionales » entre 
les macro régions (sous-ensembles de provinces) des deux pays, des provinces et des régions 
urbaines sélectionnées, dans le but ultime d’identifier des problèmes existants en termes de 
développement régional et de pouvoir proposer des solutions. 
Les étapes principales de la recherche sont : 
1. La cueillette des données statistiques pour le Canada et la Chine (incluant les provinces de 
Québec et de Xinjiang) pour une gamme d’indicateurs (voir ci-dessous).  
2. D’entreprendre une analyse de chaque dimension dans les deux juridictions: Population (p.ex. 
composition, structure, changement); Ressources (p. ex. utilisation, exploitation de l’énergie); 
Environnement (p.ex. la pollution); et le Développement socioéconomique (p.ex.  le 
développement et la transformation des secteurs clé, et les modèles de développement rural et 
urbain), et les disparités changeantes par rapport à ces dimensions.  
3. La définition d’une typologie de différents types de région en fonction de leurs trajectoires de 
développement, ce qui servira pour critiquer l’hypothèse centre-périphérie.  
4. Le choix d’une région métropolitaine dans chaque juridiction (province).  
5. D’entreprendre une analyse temporelle des événements clé (politiques, investissements) dans 
chaque région et les facteurs impliqués dans chaque événement, en utilisant l’information 
documentaire générale et des agences institutionnelles impliqués actuellement et dans un passée 
récent.  
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Cette étude a tenté d'expliquer les schémas et les processus des deux économies, ainsi que 
la présentation d'études de cas qui illustrent et examinent les différences dans les deux économies 
à partir de l’échelle nationale jusqu’au niveau régional et provincial et aussi pour certaines zones 
urbaines. Cette étude a essayé de répondre aux questions de recherche comme: Est-il vrai que les 
pays avec des plus grandes territoires sont associés avec des plus grandes disparités 
interrégionales? Quel est le résultat des comparaisons entre pays développés et pays en 
développement? Quels sont les facteurs les plus importants dans le développement économique 
de vastes territoires dans les pays développés et pays en développement? Quel est le mécanisme 
de convergence et de divergence dans les pays développés et, respectivement, les pays en 
développement? 
 
Dans l'introduction à la thèse, le cadre général de l'étude est présenté, suivie dans le 
chapitre 1 d'une discussion sur les théories et les concepts utilisés dans la littérature théorique 
principale qui est pertinent à l'étude. Le chapitre 2 décrit la méthodologie de recherche. Le 
chapitre 3 présente une vue d'ensemble des politiques de développement économique régional et 
les programmes du Canada et de la Chine dans des périodes différentes à différentes échelles. Au 
chapitre 4, la convergence des deux pays à l'échelle nationale et la convergence provinciale pour 
chaque pays sont examinés en utilisant différentes méthodes de mesure telles que les méthodes 
traditionnelles, la convergence bêta et la convergence sigma. Dans le chapitre le plus complexe, 
le chapitre 5, les analyses comparatives sont présentées à l'aide de données statistiques, à partir 
des analyses des cas régionaux et provinciaux retenus des deux pays. Au chapitre 6, ces 
dispositions sont complétées par une analyse des régions urbaines choisies, qui permet  
également des aperçus sur les régions les plus périphériques. Dans la recherche proposée pour 
cette thèse, la politique, la population, le revenu, l'emploi, la composition industrielle, 
l'investissement, le commerce et le facteur de la migration sont également pris en compte comme 
facteurs importants de l'analyse régionale compte tenu de la superficie du territoire des deux pays 
et les différences de population entre eux.  
Cette thèse a évalué dans quelle mesure les politiques gouvernementales ont réussi à induire 
la convergence régionale ou ont encore ont creusé davantage les disparités régionales, ce qui 
implique nécessairement une évaluation de la durabilité des patrons et des programmes de 
développement régional. Cette étude a également mis l'accent sur les disparités régionales et la 
politique de développement régional, les comparaisons entre pays, pour mesurer la convergence 
entre les pays et entre les régions, y compris l'analyse spatiale, d'identifier les facteurs les plus 
actifs tels que la population, les ressources, la politique, l'urbanisation, les migrations, l'ouverture 
économique et leurs différents rôles dans le développement économique de ces grands territoires 
(au Canada et Chine). Les résultats empiriques et les processus de convergence et de divergence 
offrent un cadre intéressant pour l'examen de la trajectoire de développement régionales et les 
disparités régionales dans les deux économies.  
       L'approche adoptée a révélé les différentes mosaïques complexes du développement régional 
dans les deux pays. Les résultats de cette étude ont démontré que la disparité en termes de revenu 
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régional est une réalité dans chaque zone géographique, et que les causes sont nombreuses et 
complexes. Les deux économies ont certains parallèles dans la mise en œuvre des politiques de 
développement économique régional, mais il existe des différences importantes aussi et elles se 
sont développées à différentes vitesses. Les deux économies se sont développées depuis la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale, mais la Chine a connu une croissance rapide que le Canada comme 
témoignent de nombreux indicateurs depuis 1980. Cependant, la Chine est maintenant confrontée 
à un certain nombre de problèmes économiques et sociaux, y compris les disparités régionales 
marquées, un fossé toujours croissant entre les revenus ruraux et urbains, une population 
vieillissante, le chômage, la pauvreté et la dégradation rapide de l'environnement avec toujours 
plus de demandes en énergie. Le développement économique régional en Chine est plus 
déséquilibré. Le Canada accuse un degré de disparités régionales et provinciales moins important 
que la Chine. Dans les cas provinciaux, il existe d'importantes différences et de disparités dans la 
structure économique et spatiale du Québec et du Xinjiang. Les disparités infra provinciales sont 
plus grandes que celles à l’échelle des provinces et des grandes régions (des sous-ensembles de 
provinces). Les mécanismes de convergence et de divergence dans les deux pays sont différents. 
Les résultats empiriques et les processus de convergence et de divergence offrent un cadre 
intéressant pour l'examen de la trajectoire de développement régionale et les disparités régionales 
dans les deux économies. 
Cette étude démontre également que l'urbanisation (les métropoles et les villes) s’avère 
être le facteur le plus actif et contribue à l'économie régionale dans ces grands territoires. 
L'ouverture a joué un rôle important dans les économies des deux pays. La migration est un 
facteur majeur dans la stimulation de l'économie des deux pays mais de façons différentes. Les 
résultats empiriques démontrent que les disparités régionales ne peuvent pas être évitées et elles 
existent presque partout. Il n'y a pas une formule universelle et de politiques spécifiques sont de 
mise pour chaque région. Mais il semble possible pour les décideurs politiques nationaux et 
régionaux d’essayer de maintenir l'écart à une échelle raisonnable pour éviter l'instabilité sociale. 
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Abstract 
 
Whether poor economies tend to converge towards rich ones or else to diverge over time is an 
issue that has attracted the attention of policy-makers and academics alike for some decades.  
Economic convergence or divergence is a topic of considerable interest and debate, not only 
for validating or otherwise the two leading and competing growth models (the neoclassical and 
the endogenous growth approaches) but also for its policy-oriented implications. The conflicting 
predictions of the two alternative theoretical frameworks (endogenous versus exogenous 
development approaches) have given rise to an explosion of empirical studies especially since 
2000. Significant progress has been made in dynamic modeling under the neoclassical model and 
endogenous growth models. The new economic geography approach, which emerged in the early 
1990s, has gained much attraction for its arguments on centralizing and decentralizing forces in 
geographic economic space, which could lead to convergence or divergence of regional incomes. 
A similar set of issues and questions have been posed in relation to patterns of convergence or 
divergence between different regions of a given country.  
Based on an analysis of regional development policies and statistical analyses of convergence 
and regional disparities, the research objectives of this thesis are to attempt to provide an 
explanation of the different processes and patterns of regional economic development in large 
territories (countries) using Canada and China as examples, to undertake an analysis of the 
different factors and driving forces underlying regional development in both countries, and to 
explore both the apparent successes and failures in regional development policy through 
comparing and contrasting the regional development experiences and models of these two 
countries.  In order to achieve this objective, the research uses a multiscalar approach and 
multivariate measurement methods in the course of investigating regional disparities across both 
countries’ macro regions (sub-sets of provinces), provinces and selected city regions.  
 The overall approach has involved: 
1. Gathering statistical data for Canada and China (including provinces as well as the selected 
provinces of Xinjiang and Quebec) for a range of variables (see below).  
2. Undertaking an analysis of each selected dimension in the two jurisdictions: Population (e.g. 
composition, structure, change); Resources (e.g. energy resources); Environment (e.g. pollution); 
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and Socio-Economic Development (e.g. development and change for key economic sectors, and 
rural and urban development patterns), and changing disparities on these dimensions.  
3.  Defining a typology of different types of region based on development trajectories that are 
used as the basis for questioning the core-periphery hypothesis.  
4. Selecting a metropolitan region in each jurisdiction.  
5. Undertaking a temporal analysis of major events (policies, investment,) and the factors 
involved in these events in each chosen region, using statistical and documentary evidence.  
This study has tried to explain the patterns and processes of both economies as well as 
presenting case studies which illustrate and examine the differences in both economies from the 
national to regional and provincial scales and for some urban areas. This study has focused on 
trying to answer research questions such as: Is it true that large territorial countries have larger 
interregional disparities? What are the results of comparisons between developed and developing 
countries? What are the most influential indicators (in a statistical sense) in the economic 
development of large territories in developed and developing countries? What are the 
mechanisms of convergence and divergence in large territories in developed and developing 
countries? 
       This thesis has assessed whether government policies have succeeded in inducing regional 
convergence or have further widened regional disparities, thus necessarily involving an 
evaluation of the sustainability of patterns and programmes of regional development. This study 
also focused on regional disparity and regional development policy, and cross-country 
comparisons, for measuring convergence between countries and across regions including spatial 
analysis, and identified the most active factors such as population, resources, policy, urbanization, 
migration, openness and their different roles in the economic development of large territories (in 
Canada and China). The empirical results and the process of convergence and divergence offered 
an interesting framework for examining the regional development trajectory and regional 
disparities in both economies. 
 In the introduction to the thesis, the general framework of the study is presented, 
followed in Chapter 1 by a discussion of the theories and concepts used in the principal 
theoretical literature relevant to the study. Chapter 2 outlines the research methodology. Chapter 
3 presents an overall perspective of the regional economic development policies and programmes 
of Canada and China in different periods at different scales. In Chapter 4, cross-country 
vi 
 
convergence between Canada and China at the national scale and within country provincial 
convergence for each country is examined using different measurement methods such as 
traditional methods, and beta convergence and sigma convergence analyses. In the most complex 
chapter, Chapter 5, comparative analyses are presented using statistical data, moving from 
analyses of the two countries to analyses of the broad regions and the provincial cases retained. 
In Chapter 6, this is complemented by an analysis of selected urban regions which also provides 
some insights on the more peripheral rural regions. In this thesis, policy, population, income, 
employment, industrial composition, investment, trade and migration factors are also considered 
important factors of regional analysis given the territorial size of the two countries and the 
population differences between them. 
       The approach adopted revealed the different complex mosaics of regional development in 
both countries. The results of this study demonstrated that disparity in regional income is a 
reality in every geographically large area, the causes of which are numerous and complex. Both 
economies have some parallels in the implementation of regional economic development policies, 
but there are important differences as well and they have been implemented at different speeds. 
Both economies have developed since the Second World War but China has grown faster than 
Canada on many indicators since 1980. However, China is now faced with a number of 
economic and social problems, including pronounced regional disparities, an increasing rural-
urban income gap, an aging population, unemployment, poverty and rapid environmental 
degradation with ever-increasing energy demands. 
        Regional economic development in China is more unbalanced. Canada has a lesser degree 
of regional and provincial disparity than China. At the provincial level, there are significant 
differences and disparities in the economic and spatial structure of Quebec and Xinjiang. Sub-
provincial disparity is larger than provincial and broad regional (sub-sets of provinces) 
disparities. The mechanisms of convergence and divergence in both countries are different. The 
empirical results and the process of convergence and divergence offered an interesting 
framework for examining the regional development trajectory and regional disparity in both 
economies. This study also shows that urbanization (metropolitan and cities) was found to be the 
most active factor contributing to the regional economy in large territories. Openness has played 
a significant role in the economies of both countries. Migration is a major factor in boosting the 
economy in both countries but in different ways. The empirical results show that regional 
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disparity cannot be avoided in either economy. There is not a specific universal formula and 
policy for every country and region. Regional disparities represent a development challenge in a 
large territory (or country). The persistence of large regional disparities may pose a threat to a 
country’s territorial integrity and affect its political unity. But it appears possible for national and 
regional policy makers to try to keep the disparity at a reasonable scale to avoid social instability. 
 
Key words: Territory, regional development, policy, disparities, convergence; evaluation. 
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Introduction 
  
The phenomena of regional development and regional disparities are of particular 
importance both to developing countries and developed countries. The trends of and 
the forces underlying regional disparities in economic development have been the 
subject of heated debate since 1950. Questions regarding whether regional disparities 
have been reduced or whether economic reforms have intensified regional disparities 
have generated considerable attention. The topic has attracted broad interest across 
several disciplines, notably from economics, geography, political science, sociology 
and history.  
 
I.1 Purpose and Objectives of this Study 
Living conditions, income, wealth and service levels vary among people, cities, 
regions and countries. Income and wealth distribution affects the allocation of scarce 
resources and economic growth, and economic growth leads to changes in the 
redistribution of important components of our societies such as investment, capital, 
human resources and technology.  
Substantial regional disparities occur throughout the world in terms of the 
amount of goods and services produced per inhabitant and in the availability of 
natural resources per inhabitant. The contrasts between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ regions have 
existed and been commented on for a very long time. The gap between rich and poor 
may also be viewed at the level either of single individuals or groups of people (Cole 
1981). 
     Regional development is related to the capacity of a region to produce (and sell) 
goods and services, and thus the capacity of its inhabitants to earn income. Regional 
development disparities thus refer to differences among regions in their capacity to 
provide earned income opportunities to their inhabitants. Regional development 
policies seek to reduce such disparities, essentially by seeking to promote increased 
development in lagging region (Polèse 1999). Regional development from a holistic 
perspective is concerned simply and principally with getting poorer regions to 
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converge with richer ones in terms of wealth and presumably quality of life. Regions, 
in this sense, may be within a country or they may lie across countries, and 
comparisons can be made among "developed" or "developing" regions, or between 
both of these types. Regional development presents itself in different forms and with 
different characteristics in different countries. The rate of economic growth and the 
development of regional economic disparity (or convergence) show different levels of 
performance among both “developed” and “developing” countries. 
It is important to study how persistent disparities in aggregate growth rates 
across nations, regions, or groups of people have led to differences in welfare and 
“happiness” (quality of life). Does a more equal distribution of income and wealth 
encourage national economic growth1? Will income disparity among individuals or 
regions be reduced as an economy expands? Will globalization and technological 
progress enlarge or reduce inequalities among nations, regions, or individuals? What 
is the difference in terms of regional disparities between developed and developing 
countries? What forces have contributed to the changing patterns of regional 
development? …. 
One of the universal characteristics of macroeconomic growth is the unequal 
participation and the unequal incidence of the benefits and the costs of production 
between regions and territories at all geographic scales of analysis. National economic 
growth has often been accompanied by intensified polarization among regions and an 
increase in the disparities between them. Only in a few countries has national 
economic growth been accompanied by a narrowing of regional disparities (Lipshitz 
1995). 
Regional income disparities have attracted a great deal of attention in the 
post-Second World War period in most countries as a popular subject for debate, 
research and public action. Since the early 1960s, regional development studies have 
assumed considerable importance in economic and geographic research in most 
countries. Many studies have been devoted to this topic with an increasing degree of 
                                                              
1 Economic Growth - A positive change in the level of production of goods and services by a country 
over a certain period of time. 
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analytical sophistication. 
These studies have variously focused on regional disparity, cross-country 
comparisons, and convergence and divergence including Canada and China. For 
example, Coulombe (1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2007) has undertaken much research on  
economic growth and regional disparities in Canada and the Northern United States 
and convergence within Canada;  Akbari (1996) focuses on provincial income 
disparities in Canada; Sakamoto (2006) on regional disparities in Indonesia; Ioannides 
and Petrakos (2000) on regional disparities in Greece; Barro (1991) on economic 
growth in a variety of countries; and Chechi and Peragine (2005) on regional 
disparities and inequality of opportunity in Italy. 
The degree to which incomes have converged across countries over time has been 
the subject of extensive research. Initial studies tended to be descriptive - highlighting 
the key trends in inequality over time (Abramovitz 1986; Baumol 1986). However, in 
recent years this work has become more closely connected with research on economic 
growth theory. Two theories have come to dominate the literature on economic growth. 
The traditional Solow growth model (Solow 1956) predicts that countries that are 
furthest away from their steady states will grow more quickly than countries closer to 
their steady state2. For countries with the same steady state, this implies that incomes 
will converge along the transition path. In contrast, endogenous growth models 
(Romer 1986) can generate patterns of growth that do not exhibit any tendency 
towards convergence.
 
Initially, it was suggested that the presence of convergence 
could form the basis of a test of the neo-classical growth model against the more 
recent endogenous growth models. As a result, several papers were written examining 
the nature of the convergence process (e.g. Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1992; Mankiw et 
al. 1992). As a consequence of this work, however, there has been much controversy, 
debate and confusion regarding how to measure and interpret income convergence. 
The dominant approach in the early literature is characterized by the work of 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). This involved regressing income growth rates on 
                                                              
2 A steady-state is defined as the situation where all variables grow at constant rates (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin 1995: 19). 
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initial income to test whether poor countries grow faster than rich countries.
 
However, 
several authors (e.g. Friedman 1992; Quah 1993) have argued that these regressions 
detect mobility within a distribution but tell us little about whether income dispersion 
across countries has fallen: it is possible to observe poor countries growing faster than 
rich countries and yet for incomes still to diverge. For this to happen, the initially 
poorer countries must overtake or leapfrog the richer countries, so that the rankings of 
countries change.
 
To distinguish between these different forms of convergence 
Sala-i-Martin (1996a) coined the term β-convergence to capture situations where 
“poor economies tend to grow faster than rich ones.” The term σ-convergence is 
defined as follows: “a group of economies are converging, in the sense of σ, if the 
dispersion of their real per capita GDP levels tends to decrease over time” 
(Sala-i-Martin 1996: 383). While Friedman (1992) has argued that the real test of 
convergence should focus on the consistent diminution of variance among countries 
(σ-convergence), Sala-i-Martin (1996a, b) argues that both concepts of convergence 
are interesting and should be analyzed empirically (O’Neill
 
and Van Kerm 2004). 
A considerable literature also exists focusing on regional inequality in China. For 
instance, Fan (1995) focussed on state policy and uneven regional development in 
post-Mao China; Tsui (1991) on regional inequality in China from 1952 to 1985; Lin 
and Chen (2004) on China's widening economic disparities and its ‘Go West 
Program’; Pedroni et al. (2005) on regional income divergence in China; Duo Qin et 
al. (2006) on income disparity in relation to economic growth; and Lakshmanan and 
Chang-i Hua (1987) on regional disparities in China. 
Public concern for regional economic development disparity in China has been 
increasing rapidly since the 1990s with the appearance of growing economic 
differences between the Western, Central and East Coastal Regions (see, for instance, 
Tsui, 1993; Thomas 1998; Tian 1999; Wangshaoguang and Anguanghu 1999; Wei 
yehua 2000; Sylvie 2001; Carsten 2000; Guang 2004; Xuhua 2004; and Xiaopei 
2004).  The question of regional inequality in China has been extensively studied in 
recent years both from a microeconomic (individual or household inequality) and a 
macroeconomic perspective (GDP per capita or consumption level differences 
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between provinces). The most commonly highlighted feature in the studies on 
regional disparity in the post-1978 period is the growing gap in both income levels 
and income growth rates between the coastland provinces and the interior provinces 
of China.  
There is also a wealth of studies that have focused on urban and rural 
development and urban-rural disparities in both countries (see Chapter 1). 
Canadian scholars have mostly concentrated on micro studies and micro-level 
determinants such as worker participation rates, capital productivity by sectors which 
reflects the technology and capital intensity by sector and industrial structure in order 
to analyze regional disparity. Migration and immigration are major factors underlying 
or associated with transformations of the Canadian economy. Compared to other 
countries, Canada receives a large number of immigrants (about 250,000 each year) in 
proportion to its population. This is the complete opposite of China. There are also 
quite a few studies of Canada’s immigrant population, their direction of destination, 
internal migration patterns and processes between Canadian provinces and major 
metropolitan regions (Simmons, 1980; Vanderkamp and Grant 1988; Field 1988; 
Termote 1988; Prescott and Wilton 2002). Some scholars put a special emphasis on 
smaller units of analysis (larger cities, smaller towns, rural areas) to help further our 
understanding of regional economies (Chalifoux et al. 2004). These factors can be 
appropriately analyzed with standard statistical techniques if comparable data over 
time and regions are available (Dholkia 2005). 
In recent years, many studies have been devoted to cross-country studies, with an 
increasing degree of analytical sophistication. However, these studies are mostly 
focused on comparisons between developed countries, or between developing and 
undeveloped countries. For instance, Valletta (2005) discusses the ins and outs of 
poverty in advanced economies (Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and the United 
States); Venables (2003) analyses spatial disparities in developing countries; 
Heidenreich (2003), the regional inequalities in the enlarged Europe; Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1999), patterns of convergence across States and regions; Togo (2001), 
patterns of regional convergence in East Asian economies; and Gajwani et al. (2006), 
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the patterns of spatial convergence and divergence in India and China. 
Several researchers have focussed on large countries. Milanovic (2004), for 
instance, attempted to compare regional inequality in five large countries - China, 
India, the United States of America, Indonesia and Brazil in the period 1980-2000. 
However, there has also been some resurgence of interest in small countries and their 
economic performance (Alesina and Spolaore 2003; Armstrong and Read 1995, 2002; 
Bertram 2004; Easterly and Kraay 2000; Poot 2004; Felsenstein and Portnov 2005). 
Portnov (2005) in a very interesting study compared regional inequalities in 22 small 
countries (small in terms of size of territory) in Europe (Table 1), and rejected the 
hypothesis that small territorial countries have smaller interregional disparities3. The 
world economy had experienced more or less a steady boom since 1980. The current 
world-wide economic recession raises the question of how this will affect regional 
disparities both in developed and developing countries. Most countries have been 
affected by the economic recession since 2008. China avoided this recession 
successfully with a 9% real GDP growth rate in 2009. In contrast, in Canada labour 
productivity fell, and unemployment rose, real GDP growth rate declined from 2.5% 
in 2007 to 0.4% in 2008. The RBC Economics news report indicated that although the 
Canadian economy contracted by 2.5% in 2009, it is estimated to grow in 2010 with 
real GDP rising by 2.6% and that it will continue to expand in 2011, at 3.9%4. 
Measurement of regional economies in large territories is a complicated and 
delicate matter. Because it is difficult to choose “the best” index of regional disparity, 
the measure employed must reflect the purpose of the analysis.  
There is considerable debate over which technique is the most suitable to 
measure regional disparities. The main problem in this debate is that the term 
disparity is a multifaceted concept encompassing dimensions such as convergence, 
inequality and polarization (Villaverde and Maza 2009). 
When drawing up their overall judgments on progress or expressing their 
                                                              
3 Note: See more about regional disparity in small countries in “Regional Disparities in Small 
Countries” by Portnov and Felsenstein. Springer (2005). 
4 http://banknerd.ca/category/news/  RBC Economics: Canada on the Path for Recovery in 2010. 
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concerns about the future, many observers in developed societies still rely heavily – 
perhaps even more than they used to – on the main indicators of economic growth, 
which measures variations in GDP or its variants and remains the cornerstone of 
national accounting.  
Of course in the arena of public debate and in the media, and different academic 
fields, other major indicators regularly attract attention, particularly unemployment 
rates, inflation rates, and more recently, the main stock exchange indices. However, 
the level of GDP and growth are still treated as the main symbols of success. Since the 
1970s, however, the dominance of this criterion has attracted criticism. However, 
these criticisms have had little impact until now, at least as far as the 
institutionalization of alternative indicators are concerned (Gadrey 2006: 1).   
Regional differences in economic performance are usually judged on the basis of 
per capita income, but income can be viewed in several ways. Indicators, both 
quantitative and qualitative, are obvious tools to employ to assess economic 
development (Cole 1981). While economic indicators such as GDP are useful, 
development is generally considered to be a much broader concept and must involve 
more than a focus on economic growth (Carlucci and Pisani 1995). There have been 
numerous calls for broadening the concept of development, going back certainly as 
far as the 1950s; inevitably, this has resulted in demands for a more diverse set of 
indicators.  
Throughout the history of development, the concept of development has changed 
from time to time. Observers suggest it should include all the components expected to 
lead to a better and satisfactory life worldwide. Prefixes have been added to the term 
to reflect paradigm shifts so that, for instance, development became ‘human’, 
‘participatory’ and ‘sustainable’ (Germond-Duret 2009). In the literature reviewed 
thus far, development has a range of different meanings but it is generally regarded as 
a desirable goal. Another consensus which emerges from the discussion thus far is that 
development is closely related to the broader definition of modernization, as a process 
of economic and social change (Schech and Haggis 2000). A desire to promote a 
broader vision of human development understandably helped to spawn the need for an 
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alternative index to the GDP and its family of economic indicators for gauging 
progress in human development (Gadrey et al., 2006). 
Alongside these calls for a broader perspective and associated matching 
indicators, there have also been moves to aggregate them into a single index of 
development, thereby keeping intact the power of a single number as exemplified, for 
example, by the GDP indicator (Bayless and Bayless 1982). There are many examples 
of composite development indices (synthetic indicators), and in each case the 
selection of indicators is used by the authors concerned (e.g. Morse 2004). Some 
examples are: the Human development Index (HDI) and its variants such as the 
Gender Related Development Index (GDI), the Gender Improvement Measure (GEM), 
and the Human Poverty Index (HPI), various Indicators of Sustainable Development, 
the Index of Social Health, the Personal Security Index (PSI) and the Genuine 
Progress Indicator (GPI) (Morse 2004). To some extent, in this thesis, a multivariate, 
multilevel approach will be used to analyze regional development data.  
 In this thesis, based on statistical data from Canada and China, the regional 
economic development trajectory of both countries since 1980 will be compared, in 
an attempt to examine systematically regional disparities and their changing patterns 
and rates of change. Comparing regional development performance between Canada 
and China poses a challenge because of differences in governmental systems and data 
collection processes. So, statistical indicators which capture both spatial and temporal 
dimensions are analyzed in this thesis at three scales – national (cross-country), 
provincial, urban (and to a lesser extent the rural peripheries) and for four dimensions 
(Natural, Economic, Social, Environment) with respect to the different 
socio-economic indicators available. 
    Based on an analysis of regional development policies and statistical analyses of 
convergence and regional disparities, the research objectives of this thesis are to 
attempt to provide an explanation of the different processes and patterns of regional 
economic development in large territories (countries) using Canada and China as 
examples, to undertake an analysis of the different factors and driving forces 
underlying regional development in both countries, and to explore both the apparent 
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successes and failures in regional development policy through comparing and 
contrasting the regional development experiences and models of these two countries.  
The research uses a multiscalar approach and integrative multivariate measurement 
methods, in the course of investigating regional disparities across both country’s 
macro regions, provinces and selected city regions. This approach is intended to show 
the complex mosaic of regional development in both countries.  
 
I.2 Regional Scope and Time Period for the Study 
 
The study is based upon selecting two countries for general comparative analysis, 
including provinces (as well as a metropolitan region within each province) for more 
detailed analysis, focusing on the role of different actors in shaping those processes 
and patterns, in order to identify existing problems in terms of regional development 
and to propose solutions. In this study, Canada is selected as a developed country and 
China is chosen as a developing country for this international comparative analysis; 
the provinces of Quebec in Canada and Xinjiang in China are selected as the 
provincial case studies; Montreal in Quebec and Urumqi in Xinjiang are also selected 
as the metropolitan cases for comparison, representing the ‘core’ regions of their 
respective provinces. Necessarily, some comments are made in relation to rural and 
resource peripheries in these two provinces. 
One difficulty is that of securing adequate and reliable statistical data from 1949 
to 1978 from China’s statistical data sources. The other difficulty is the comparability 
of indicators between the two countries. Most of the statistics for China during the 
Great Cultural Revolution (as well as, particularly, those for the late 50s and early 60s) 
must be read with great care and caution. Statistical data are publicly available since 
1980 in China. Furthermore, the question arises concerning the conformity of these 
statistical indicators with Canada’s statistical indicators. Because of this, the analysis 
of the statistical data is mainly focused on the time period between 1980 and 2008. In 
this study, to explore income convergence between 1960 and 2007, the latest 
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(published in 2009) version of the Penn-World Tables5  is used.
 
The Penn World 
Tables provide price adjusted income measures for 168 countries for the years 
1950-2007 and have been used extensively in previous studies of convergence. For 
the other comparative analyses, statistical data for the 1980-2008 time period are 
selected. Statistics quoted or used for this study are taken directly from the official 
Chinese Statistical Yearbook and the Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook or related 
statistical sources. Statistics for Canada quoted or used for this study are taken 
directly from Statistics Canada, the Gouvernement du Québec 
(http://www.stat.gouv.qc.ca/), or related statistical sources such as World Bank Penn 
(Data http://web.worldbank.org/) and Databank of Official Statistics on Québec 
(http://www.bdso.gouv.qc.ca/). 
 Statistical data analysis software SPSS 16.0 for Windows, StatsDirect and GIS 
tools such as Arcgis 9.0 and Mapinfo8.2 are used for data processing and mapping to 
develop databases, perform statistical spatial analysis and produce maps.   
 
I.3 Research Questions 
 
1. Is it true that large territorial countries have larger interregional disparities? 
What is the result of comparisons between developed and developing 
countries? 
2. What are the most influential indicators (in a statistical sense) in the economic 
development of large territories in developed and developing countries? 
3. What are the mechanisms of convergence and divergence in large territories 
developed and developing countries respectively? 
 
Much of the literature on regional inequality implicitly assumes that small and 
large territorial units should be treated uniformly. For example, the intense 
preoccupation with measuring national or regional convergence using Barro-type 
                                                              
5 http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php 
 11
growth models does not make any distinction between large and small countries or 
regions (Barro and Salai-x-Martin 1991; Salai-x-Martin 1996; Armstrong 1995; 
Cuadraro-Roura et al. 1999; Tsionas 2002; Hofer and Worgotter 1997). This could 
just be due to a perception that small countries are simply scaled-down versions of 
large ones and therefore do not warrant special and separate treatment. It could stem 
thus from a view that regional or country size is something of a red herring in regional 
analysis (Beenstock 2005).  
It is argued that the size of the region or country should be taken into account 
as an important factor in regional analysis. It is argued that a geographically large 
territory has more difficulty compared to small ones in achieving more balanced 
patterns of economic and social development. Small countries can be regionally more 
homogenous while large countries can be regionally more heterogeneous. 
Regional disparity is certainly a phenomenon common to both developed and 
developing countries (Tables I.1 and I.2). Being large and diverse countries, Canada 
and China will always face the challenges of balanced regional development and 
national economic integration. In China, for instance, it will likely take a significant 
length of time before the less developed regions converge with the advanced and fast 
growing coastal region, if they ever will. 
 Substantial disparity in regional income is a reality in every geographically 
large area, the causes of which are numerous and complex. To start with, 
geographically vast countries such as Canada and China invariably face the problem 
of regional disparity because natural endowments and climate and physical conditions 
differ significantly across their regions. The regional problems are manifested through 
several symptoms such as significant differences among regions in levels of per capita 
incomes, levels of unemployment rates, physical quality of life, human development 
indices and so on. The regional problem has led people from relatively economically 
weak regions to migrate out to better off regions since there are likely to be few or no 
barriers to movement of people within a given country. 
International migration has been a major factor during many periods of Canadian 
development. In 2006, international migration accounted for two-thirds of Canadian 
 12
population growth. More than 225,000 immigrants have been admitted to Canada 
each year, on average, since the early 1990s6.  
Internally, migration tends to occur from poorer provinces to richer ones in both 
countries. For instance, Quebec lost almost 300,000 people to other provinces in the 
last 20 years. Younger migrants (under the age of 30) tend to go disproportionately to 
Alberta and British Columbia. As a result, interprovincial migration is making Alberta 
younger. The opposite is true for the Atlantic Provinces (Prescott and Wilton 2002).  
 
Table I.1 Per Capita Average Income Difference of Some Territorially 
Small-sized Countries 
Country Year Max/Min (Times) CV7 
Austria 2000 2.18 0.58 
Belgium 2000 3.26 0.47 
Bulgaria 2000 1.66 0.48 
Czech 2000 2.80 0.15 
Denmark 2000 1.40 0.26 
Finland 2000 1.73 0.92 
Greece 2000 1.63 1.20 
Hungary 2000 2.37 0.49 
Ireland 2000 1.66 0.80 
Israel 2000 2.08 0.25 
Italy 2000 2.21 0.86 
Netherlands 2000 1.77 0.92 
Norway 2000 2.10 0.76 
Poland 2000 2.21 0.51 
Portugal 2000 1.75 0.95 
Romania 2000 3.00 0.22 
Slovakia 2000 3.28 0.40 
Spain 2000 2.16 0.99 
Sweden 2000 1.61 0.50 
Switzerland 2000 1.67 0.39 
UK 2000 3.73 0.50 
Source: Felsenttein and Portnov (2005) 
The analysis of Fan (2005) shows that in China the relationship between 
migration and regional development has become stronger over time, with migration 
                                                              
6 Statistic Canada, Catalogue no. 91-003-XIE, 2008. 
7 CV-Coefficient of  Variation 
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flows from the central and western regions to the eastern region increasing 
dramatically from the beginning of new reform era. Cai Fang et al. (2009) analyzed 
migration and labour mobility of China since 1980 and found that the total number of 
migrants has kept growing and reached 136 million, migrant workers accounted for 
46.5% of total urban employment, and concluded that migrant workers have had a 
substantial role in the urban labour market.  
Regional economic development is a long-standing issue of public policy in 
Canada. Despite the attention it has received, however, and despite major government 
programs and expenditures aimed at stimulating regional development, the problem of 
regional disparities has not been significantly reduced (Coffey and Polèse 1987; 
Polèse 2010)   
Table I.2 Per Capita Average Income Difference of Some Countries 
Country Year Max/Min (times) CV 
China1 1978 14.27 0.73 
China2 1978 3.87 0.34 
China1 1994 18.34 0.87 
China2 1994 5.34 0.39 
Greece 1988 1.69 0.10 
Spain 1988 2.23 0.17 
Germany 1988 1.93 0.13 
France 1988 2.15 0.26 
Canada 1988 2.30 0.28 
Japan 1988 1.47 0.12 
Italy 1988 2.34 0.26 
Portugal 1988 1.66 0.23 
Belgium 1988 1.61 0.15 
England 1988 1.63 0.15 
Holland 1988 2.69 0.19 
America 1983 1.43 0.11 
Australia 1978 1.13 0.05 
Korea 1985 1.53 0.15 
India 1980 3.26 0.36 
Source: Dengxiang (2002). In the table, China1 indicates the three cities of Shanghai, Beijing and 
Tianjin are excluded in the calculation. China2 shows all regions are included in the calculation. 
In Canada, regional development, including in recent decades attempts to reduce 
regional disparities, has been a top priority objective of both federal and provincial 
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governments, no matter what political party has been in power. Equity in Canada has 
been thought of much more in terms of regions and provinces (Higgins and Savoie 
1994). Provincial disparities in per capita gross domestic product (GDP), per capita 
income, and productivity have lessened since World War II in Canada, but they are 
still substantially larger than those among US states. The persistence of regional 
disparity in Canada is the result of the country’s diversity and its particular model of 
fiscal federalism (Coulumbe 1999). 
China, also a large country, has severe regional disparities between the eastern 
coastal regions which are highly prosperous, urban and growth-oriented while the 
western hinterland of China is poor, rural and underdeveloped. Yet migration within 
China from west to east is not fully allowed due to the household registration (Hukou) 
system (which still has some restriction in relation to basic social benefits such as 
education and health care, as well as jobs,). The case of Canada is very different in 
this regard. Population in Canada is more mobile both within and outside the country. 
 
Table I.3 HDI Trend of Canada and China 
Country 
HDI 
rank 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Average Growth 
Rate 1980-2006 
Canada 3rd 0.892 0.915 0.935 0.941 0.95 0.956 0.963 0.965 0.967 0.075 
China 94th 0.529 0.552 0.607 0.655 0.718 0.738 0.744 0.754 0.762 0.233 
Source: Human Development Report Various Annual Issues (1980-2007) 
 
There are few studies on the comparisons between Canada and China due to the 
difficulty of comparisons such as differences in income level and status, population 
size, statistic system, government system and its composition and public policy. They 
do share the characteristic of similar territory size, however. Canada is among the 
least densely populated and one of the world’s wealthiest nations, with a high per 
capita income, while China is the most populous country in the world but with a per 
capita income classified as low by world standards, at about $3259 (Nominal, 104th of 
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178 countries/economies), and $5970 (PPP, 97nd of 179 countries/economies) in 2008, 
even though it accounts for 11.35% of world total GDP based on 
purchasing-power-parity (PPP) in 2008, according to the IMF8. There are therefore 
sharp contrasts that exist between these two countries. Canada is the less populated 
but a high ranked country in economic development and HDI (Human Development 
Index) while China is fast developing and the most populated country in the world 
with a medium ranked HDI (Tables I.2 and I.3). Despite these great contrasts, both 
countries share the same basic problem of regional disparity. 
 Canada and China also present some parallels and contrasts in terms of the 
implementation of regional economic development policy. Both economies are 
characterized by “unidirectional” growth, Canada towards the south while China’s 
development has been towards the coast. In the late 1960s, Canada began to 
implement a development policy based on growth pole ‘theory’ and later, more of a 
decentralization policy to address the problem of regional disparity, while China 
pursued a high growth rate, and only later on implemented policies to try to reduce 
regional disparity, notably through its Western Development Policy. Though there 
have been some successes over the years, more often regional development policies 
have not reduced disparities in either country. The ratio of the lowest to the highest 
provincial per capita incomes in China is 4.77 in 2008 if the three cities of Shanghai, 
Beijing and Tianjin are excluded (if these three cities are included in the calculation, 
the ratio of the lowest to the highest provincial per capita incomes reaches 8.25), 
while Canada has a ratio of 1.76 between the lowest to the highest provincial per 
capita incomes in 2008 if northwest territory is excluded (when the Northwest 
territory is included the disparity ratio reaches 3.04). As another example, we can note 
that the ratio of per capita income of the richest region over the poorest region was 2.2 
in the US (1990)9, 2.02 in the US (2000), 5.59 in Brazil (2000), 4.81 in India (2000) 
and 9.07 in China (2000) 10. 
                                                              
8 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/weoselgr.aspx 
9 The data is taken from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).    
10 The data is taken from Mario Polèse (2010), The Wealth and Poverty of Regions: 5. 
 16
In the context of a strong demand for direct government intervention to reduce 
regional disparities in various spheres because of the substantial lagging regions in a 
large nation, it is important to identify those factors and determinants of regional 
disparity that can be directly influenced by government policies. 
This study aims to evaluate regional economic development in the broad 
context of public policy in both countries and to determine whether there has been 
progress in narrowing regional disparities by using long term statistical analysis of 
economic indicators. This involves developing an appropriate methodology and 
measures or indicators to monitor achievements in reducing regional disparities (to 
identify divergence or convergence or persistence). Then, the thesis attempts to assess 
whether government policies have succeeded in inducing regional convergence or 
have further widened regional disparities, thus necessarily involving an evaluation of 
the sustainability of regional development. 
 
I.4 Organization of this Research 
 
The thesis is divided into six inter-related chapters and as follows: 
In the Introduction, the general framework of the study, including its objectives, 
questions, regional scope and organization have been presented. 
In Chapter 1, the major theoretical literature that is relevant to the study is 
reviewed. An overview of the major theoretical schools which either explicitly or 
indirectly contribute to the explanation of the phenomenon of regional growth 
differences, and hence regional income differences, are provided. This is followed by 
Chapter 2 in which the research methodology is presented. 
Chapter 3 contains an overall perspective of the regional economic development 
policies and programmes of Canada and China in different periods at different scales. 
In Chapter 4, the data analysis of cross-country convergence between Canada 
and China at the national scale and within country provincial convergence for each 
country is presented using different measuring techniques such as traditional methods, 
beta convergence and sigma convergence. In order to overcome the heterogeneity bias 
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associated with the traditional convergence analysis, spatial analysis is taken into 
consideration in the beta convergence analysis in this Chapter. 
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, comparative analyses are presented using statistical 
data, moving from analyses of the two countries to analyses of the regional, provincial 
cases retained in Chapter 5 and then to the selected urban regions and more peripheral 
regions in Chapter 6. 
Finally, the research findings are summarised and the conclusions of the research 
are presented. 
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review 
 
1.1 Development Theories and Concepts: An Overview 
 
The dominant paradigm for dealing with the issue of regional disparities has changed 
considerably in recent years. Analysis of development, underdevelopment, and lagged 
development between countries and between regions of the same country is today 
approached via growth models, whereas in the 1970s it was based more on the 
neoclassical general equilibrium model, international trade theory, the hypothesis of 
constant returns to scale and the theory of comparative advantage (Coulombe 1999). 
The resurgence of economic growth analysis in the late 1980s stemmed from the 
development of endogenous growth models. The key feature of these models is that 
accumulation of physical and human capital, ideas and knowledge is the ultimate 
source of long-run growth in per capita economic indicators. In the neoclassical 
growth model — the benchmark model since the 1950s — long-run growth was 
thought to rely on exogenous technical progress since the accumulation of the stock of 
variable productive factors was considered to face decreasing returns (since some 
factors, such as land, are fixed). The conflicting predictions of the two alternative 
theoretical frameworks have given rise to an explosion of empirical studies since 2000. 
At the core of the research agenda has been the notion of convergence across national 
and regional economies.  
The emergence of a regional development policy in Canada, the US, France, Italy 
and other countries since the Second World War heralded a major advance in national 
government strategies for development by recognizing that a country’s economy has a 
spatial dimension. However, although it is necessary to develop (ideally at least) a 
comprehensive regional development policy for all regions within a country (or 
province, which can also be seen as a ‘central state’), the objectives of regional policy 
for each region should be different, because the characteristics and problems of the 
regions are different. An overall national regional policy objective designed to reduce 
interregional economic and social imbalance necessarily involves different objectives 
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and strategies for each region. 
“… It should be admitted that no such thing (regional development theory) exists. 
So far, economists, geographers, physical planners and sociologists have recognized 
the specific character of regional development as well as the need to explain the 
phenomenon, but neither (sic) of these scientists has been successful in presenting a 
doctrine. Nevertheless, the necessity for such a doctrine is being experienced by more 
and more now that many governments in the developed and underdeveloped parts of 
the world have decided to embark upon or to continue with regional planning efforts.” 
(Hilhorst 1969: 21) 
Because of the comparative neglect of the subject – unlike some other branches of 
economics – the factors which govern the spatial dispersion of economic activity, and 
the causes of regional growth and decline, are still not clearly understood, although 
some important conceptual frameworks have been developed. If the dimensions of 
regional socio-economic development problems and their interrelationships were 
clearly distinguishable and quantifiable, and if a generally accepted “theory of 
regional development” was available, then the task of designing a comprehensive 
development strategy would be, presumably, a relatively easy one. This, however, is 
not the case (Francis et al. 1974: 16). 
What are some of the major theoretical tools now available and what has been 
their contribution toward resolving the practical problems of policy-making in 
regional development? 
Industrial location theory is the oldest and one of the more important elements in 
the conceptual tool-kit. The main concern of much of the theoretical work in this area 
has been with the factors affecting the firm’s location. Work of this nature tended to 
assume a predefined spatial distribution of economic activity and ignored both the 
factors which determine how economic activity comes to spread over space, as well as 
those which account for regional growth and decline overtime. 
Before focussing on the industrial sector, it is worth making some brief comments 
on the location framework for agricultural activity. Although the theoretical 
framework for this has gone through major modifications and refinements since its 
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first formulation by Von Thunen (Von Thunen 1826), its main focus is still largely on 
micro-economic considerations (so therefore also at the individual firm or farm level). 
Von Thunen, for example, assumed the sites of towns as given, and postulated that the 
choice of agricultural activity location would depend on the cost of transporting the 
product to the market (the sites of towns). This theory has been helpful in explaining 
the phenomenon of economic rent and, by the nature of its assumptions it may also 
have applications in analyzing the effect of new urban development on the 
surrounding agricultural area. However, it is weak in that it is not concerned with the 
broader questions of spatial dispersion of economic activity, or with the dynamics of 
economic growth and change. 
Alfred Weber’s Theory (Weber 1909) was about industrial location. But the 
emphasis on the firm’s locational choice based on the lowest combination of 
production and transportation costs, the assumption of proportionality of 
transportations costs to distance, and the neglect of the role of market demand in 
industrial location decisions, makes Weber’s theory also quite inadequate in 
explaining the factors that influence the overall spatial pattern of economic activity. 
This weakness of the theory remains even after Losch’s modification of it (Losch 
1954) that focussed on ‘profit maximization’ as the key objective in locational choice 
and his recognition of the importance of agglomeration economies. 
Other refinements of industrial location theory by Hoover (1948), Isard (1956), 
and others, suggest that the extent to which a firm can benefit from external 
economies in a particular location might be a more important consideration than 
transportation costs in locational choice. However, even after account is taken of all 
the relevant external economies and diseconomies, the emphasis in the theory is 
primarily on the location of the firm, and it does not provide an adequate explanation 
of such phenomena as the changing patterns of spatial distribution of economic 
activity and the differences in the economic structure and performance of regions. 
Central place theory was developed to deal with a larger spatial scale, and 
attempts to tackle the question of the distribution of an activity in geographic space (a 
specific type of activity, namely the service sectors). In Christaller’s (1933) 
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pioneering work, the concern was with the tertiary sector of the economy; he 
postulated that central places (i.e. towns and villages providing services to a 
surrounding area) which provide an equivalent range of goods and services will be 
located equidistant from each other since this assures that the population will be 
served with a minimum of transportation costs. Since different goods and services 
have different market thresholds, the relative importance of the centres will vary; 
however, they will be located in such a way that the total central place system will 
take the form of a hierarchy of centres nesting within a system of hexagonal market 
areas. This is the framework based on the marketing principle (Christaller also 
developed frameworks based on a transportation principle and on an administrative 
principle). While this framework is useful for looking at service activities, it does not 
hold for centres with a concentration of manufacturing activity since, in such cases, 
centres of the same size could have vastly different economic structures and market 
areas.  
Losch’s developments in relation to manufacturing activity location are also 
restrictive since he assumed an even spatial distribution of agricultural population and 
natural resources. Furthermore, although the theory suggests that the growth of a 
central place will be sustained by its hinterland (Richardson 1978), it is not concerned 
with the dynamics of regional growth and change. 
There have also been efforts to apply the theory of international trade to explain 
interregional economic dependence and change. Here again, a complete answer to the 
question has been elusive. In contrast with the conditions which make international 
trade profitable for participating nations, the regions of a country have neither the 
advantage of factor immobility (which enables nations to trade on the basis of 
comparative advantage) nor of complete factor mobility (which would tend to make 
persistent unemployment impossible). This seems to question the validity of the 
principle of comparative advantage as the sole basis for interregional trade. 
Furthermore, if the prevailing costs and prices in the regions do not reflect real 
differences in productivity, the prospects of interregional balance of payments 
equilibrium are even more remote. Under such conditions, a region which is less 
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efficient than others in all sectors of economic activity, due either to inferior resources 
or to an inability to realize economies of scale, or both, will be at a general 
disadvantage, and this process could result in the cumulative decline of the region 
(McCrone 1969). The final outcome of this process depends on the relative strength of 
what Myrdal calls the “spread effects” arising either out of deliberate public action to 
stimulate regional economic activity or from the pressure on resources in the 
prosperous region (Myrdal 1954). 
Over the period of the 1950s through to the 1980s, three exogenous development 
theories or set of concepts gained prominence. They are growth pole theory, 
cumulative causation theory and the core-periphery model (Hansen 1981). 
Growth centre strategies received their original impetus from an article on 
polarized development by Perroux (1955), where he coined the term ‘growth pole’. 
The growth pole was identified as a ‘point’ in the economy, but not a geographic point. 
As a growth pole (sector) experienced growth it would pull along other sectors and 
sub-sectors in the economy and with it, regions because of the positive interactions 
between the growth pole and these other sectors and sub-sectors. This notion was 
eventually transformed into a growth centre theory (see below), in which it was 
argued that because of limited resources, especially in peripheral rural regions, 
development efforts and resources should be concentrated in a few well-situated 
places, the development of which would then spill over into surrounding regions and 
possibly other regions.  
  Perroux argued that analyses of economic development should concentrate on 
the process by which various economic activities appear, grow in importance and in 
some cases, decline or disappear. Similar to Schumpeter (1934), Perroux maintained 
that entrepreneurial innovation is primarily responsible for the development process 
which involves a succession of dynamic sectors, or poles, over time. Although 
Perroux’s article did discuss the advantages to be obtained from the geographic 
clustering of economic activity, he was mainly concerned with relations among 
industrial branches. The spatial aspects of polarized development were elaborated for 
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France primarily by Boudeville (1972) and, more generally, by Hirschman (1958). 
Hirschman uses the term polarization to refer to the negative impact of a growth pole 
on surrounding regions. ‘Trickling down’ is the term he uses for the positive impact 
of a growth centre on adjacent regions. Myrdal (1957), a Swedish economist, uses the 
terms backwash and spread effects for the same concepts as Hirschman's polarization 
and trickling down concepts respectively, and also uses the powerful concepts of 
cumulative processes of change (growth and decline) as well as the reinforcing effects 
of the spatial flows of capital, labour and goods. The American economist, Friedmann 
(1956), developed a concept that is related but distinct from the ideas of growth poles 
and growth centres, and involves two key concepts, the centre (core) versus the 
periphery of an economic region. Friedmann builds a broad theoretical framework, 
composed chiefly of four factors: population migration, flow of capital investment, 
spatial diffusion of technological innovation and spatial organization of political 
power. Their simultaneous influences cause instability in the spatial system that 
increases the inequality between the core and the periphery. The cumulative causation 
theory was constructed to explain regional development processes and to explain 
regional differences. Both Mydral (1957) and Hirshman (1958) argued that 
development efforts should not be widely spread but should instead be concentrated in 
a relatively few selected areas. Mydral’s (1957) cumulative causation theory 
suggested that the gap between core and periphery depends on the relative rates of 
backwash and spread effects. If backwash effects dominate there is an increasing gap; 
if spread effects dominate, there is a decreasing gap. Friedman’s core-periphery model 
was built on the basis of an understanding of the historical processes of spatial 
development. His growth model argued that the spatial change of regional 
development processes (core-versus periphery) moved through four different stages, 
i.e. the preindustrial economy, the transitional economy, the industrial economy and 
the post-industrial economy.  
   Writers like Perroux, Myrdal, Hirschman, Rostow and many other advocates of 
the exogenous development approach have argued that growth does not take place 
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evenly, but rather occurs in a few growth points that usually prosper at the expense of 
the rest of the country. They also add that market forces, if left alone, tend to reinforce 
the concentration of development in the growth centres by attracting capital and 
labour from the backward regions in a search for high returns on investment, 
employment opportunities, better living standards and public services. These writers 
have convincingly argued that government intervention, through a process of regional 
development, is not only predictable but also necessary in order to facilitate the spread 
and trickling down of growth from core regions to the hinterland. Such theories and 
concepts influenced many governments in their development policies and programs 
for rural regions during the 1950s and especially the 1960s (Alhowaish 2006) 
There have also been disputes over the nature of the policies that might be required 
to break a country out of a low-level development trap. For instance, 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) argued for planned large-scale investment programs in the 
industrialization of countries with a large surplus workforce in agriculture, in order to 
take advantage of network effects, i,e. economies of scale and scope in order to escape 
the low level equilibrium "trap".  He argued that balanced growth appeared to imply 
that a coordinated, broadly based investment program, or the “Big Push Model”1 
would be required. Hirschman (1958) disagreed, arguing that a policy of promoting a 
few key sectors with strong linkages, then moving on to other sectors to correct the 
disequilibrium generated by these investments, and so on, was actually the more 
appropriate approach (Krugman 1994). 
Richardson (1973), like Friedmann, attributed great importance to spatial 
distribution in the creation of technological innovation and in the absorption of such 
innovations in order to explain the increase in interregional inequality. Richardson 
                                                              
1 The major contributions of the concept of the Big Push were made by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan in 
1943 and later on by Murphy et al. in 1989. In addition, the works of Matsuyama (1992), Krugman 
(1991) and Romer (1986) proved to be seminal for the later literature on the Big Push. The Big Push 
Model is a concept in development economics or welfare economics that emphasizes the fact that a 
firm's decision whether to modernize or not depends on the expectation of what other firms will do. It 
assumes economies of scale and an oligopolistic market structure 
(http://www.viswiki.com/en/Big_Push_Model). 
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maintains that a wise spatial policy undertaken by government or its authorities may 
influence the rate at which inequality is reduced (Lipshitz 1995). 
Growth poles (à la Perroux as noted above) refers to a ‘point’ in the economy, 
not necessarily a geographic point, characterized by a leading sector which influences 
a whole set of other interrelated sectors. The growth centre is a specifically 
geographical concept. It is true that in some of the literature the distinction was not 
made clearly and the two terms have been sometimes used interchangeably.  
The problem has been compounded by the use of other terms: growth point,  
growth area, development pole, development centre … Certain authors, notably 
Darwent (1969) and Higgins (1971), suggested particular conventions by which these 
terms might be distinguished. Unfortunately, their suggestions appear to have gained 
little general acceptance. Preston (1987) explained the logical relationship between 
the central place theories and growth centres and concluded that the role of 
development poles – primary growth centres – and of secondary growth centres 
should be integrated into the system context of the central place hierarchy and 
exploited in that context in regional development theories and programs.  
Overall, the concept of growth poles has been of only marginal importance in 
analyzing regional economic problems. Nevertheless the idea of growth poles and 
more specifically its geographic cousin the development centre has had a major role 
in formulating regional policy (Darwent 1969). During the 1960s and 1970s, the 
growth centre concept experienced a cycle of boom and slump (Richardson 1978; Parr 
1979). Initially, growth centres were considered to offer a solution for numerous 
regional development problems in advanced and developing countries alike, and 
policies involving channeling economic growth into specific locations were either 
advocated or practiced in a number of nations (Kuklinski 1972; Moseley 1974; 
Higgins 1978). Subsequently, however, resistance to development strategies 
employing growth centres intensified, especially in developing countries (Richardson 
1978; Higgins 1978; Friedman and Weaver 1979). Not only is the concept no longer 
regarded as a panacea for understanding the regional development process in both 
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developing (Corraggio 1981) and developed (Hansen 1981) countries, it has also been 
questioned on both theoretical and ideological grounds.  However, Richardson (1978) 
and Parr (1979) rejected the popular critical view and made a more nuanced argument. 
They concluded that growth centres do not offer a universal remedy for regional 
problems, but that growth centres can still be a valuable component of national 
economic development programs and they are particularly well suited for use in rural 
development schemes (Preston 1984). 
      Growth centre strategies were eventually adopted, at least nominally, in a host of 
newly developing countries such as China (after 1990) as well as in such industrial 
nations as France, Canada and the US early on, where two major regional development 
programs both specified that relevant investments should be concentrated in places 
with significant growth potential. It was held that beneficial “spread effects” from the 
growth centres would eventually induce development in remaining peripheral areas, 
and that growth centres would have a significant relay function in the process of 
innovation diffusion through the urban hierarchy. However, during the 1970s, growth 
centre strategies came to be almost universally regarded as failures. It should be 
acknowledged that the concepts of positive spread effects to areas surrounding growth 
centres and of hierarchical innovation diffusion were both rather naïve given the more 
complex spatial interdependencies that characterize actual economic activity. However, 
with hindsight it is clear that growth centre strategies were rarely if ever implemented 
in accordance with their theoretical rationale, and some never actually got beyond the 
planning stage. The principal difficulty was that implementation would necessarily 
leave out more places and people than would be included, which meant that majority 
political support could not be obtained. Although interest in the growth centre strategy 
faltered because of these difficulties, its central insight concerning agglomeration 
economies and increasing returns was independently rediscovered with much 
enthusiasm in the 1990s (Hansen 1996). 
Regional policies also lost favour in the 1970s because of widespread economic 
and demographic revival – unrelated to the regional policies of many North American 
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and European non-metropolitan areas. Widespread decline in regional disparities 
during the 1970s, usually a continuation of longer term trends, suggested to some 
observers that market forces would reduce interregional per capita income differences 
without the need to resort to regional policies. However, developments during the 
1980s, when governments tended to have a relatively favourable view of market 
resource allocation, indicated that reduction in regional disparities was not necessarily 
an automatic phenomenon. For example, regional disparities increased in the United 
States (Amos 1989) and Australia (Maxwell and Hite 1992), and they stabilized 
within the EC, with a slight increase between 1983 and 1987 (Suarez-Villa and 
Cuadrado Roura 1993; Hansen 1996). Thus, there was been increased interest in the 
role that regional policies might have in addressing regional disparity issues; however, 
if they are to be effective, regional policies must take account of the forces that 
impinge on the economic destinies of the regions concerned. Neoclassical economic 
theory suggests that increasing economic integration would tackle interregional 
income differences through the relatively free movements of labour and capital.  
Polèse (1999) argued that the term "growth pole" has fallen into disuse. For 
instance, in Canada, the Department of Regional Economic Expansion was closed 
down in the mid-1980s. In many other Western states, notably the U.K., central 
government departments devoted to regional development have either been entirely 
abolished or, at best, greatly reduced in importance. Polèse (2010) argued that 
regional development is in general no longer seen as a burning national policy issue 
for some countries, even though it is still a major issue in many European countries 
and the EU in particular, and also in China.  
On the other hand, the recent economics literature on endogenous growth theory 
indicates that growth tends to be more rapid in countries and regions that have a 
relatively large stock of capital, a highly educated population and an economic 
environment favourable to the accumulation of knowledge (Romer 1986; Gould and 
Ruffin 1993).  
The endogenous growth literature has also recently rediscovered this cumulative 
process, though there are differences in emphasis on whether regional specialization 
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(Krugman 1991) or knowledge spillovers among industries (Glaeser et al. 1992) are 
the main sources of growth. If there are elements of truth in both the neoclassical 
theory and in the increasing returns argument, then one would expect that economic 
geography at a large scale would be characterized by a complex mosaic of patterns 
and processes that cannot be sufficiently explained by any single model. Evidence 
from Europe and the US suggests that this is the case (Hansen 1996).   
     The endogenous development approach is, theoretically, the direct opposite of the 
exogenous development approach. It contends that development planning, policies and 
decisions should be taken and implemented at the grassroots level by local people 
affected directly by the development decisions rather than at the central or national 
level (Friedman 1978; Stohr 1985). The notion of endogenous development was 
conceived (in the research filed) in the 1980s as academics and practitioners began to 
question the effectiveness of exogenous economic development models and to identify 
serious short-comings with the existing approach.  In fact, since the early 1980s, there 
have been a number of major revisions in development theories and concepts leading to 
a new perspective on development that favours a more area-based or endogenenous-led 
development (Coffey and Polèse 1984; Bryant and Preston 1987; Stolar 1990; Putnam 
1993; Douglas 1997; Morgan 1997; Ray 1999; Annis 2002; and Shucksmith 2004).   
In countries at an early stage of economic development, where the economic 
structure is quite simple, where primary activities such as agriculture or resource 
industries dominate hinterlands and where modern activities are few and concentrated 
in a limited number of metropolitan areas the region-centred perspective appears to be 
reasonable. The notion of distinctive, weakly linked regions is descriptively accurate 
and is analytically useful in helping to explain the problems such as spatial dualism 
that Hisrchman and Myrdal demonstrated. 
   As economic development advances, this region-centred model becomes 
increasingly tenuous. This is because the structural changes inherent in economic 
growth in reality have more complex spatial impacts. Development historically 
features the increasing dominance of industrial and tertiary activities over primary 
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activities. These activities involve much greater differentiation and interdependence 
than primary activities. The spatial patterning of structural changes entails the 
nodalization of activity, and greater interdependence between the nodes, or urban 
centres. This patterning is attributable to the dominance of locational factors such as 
market size, scale economies, externalities in production and consumption, and 
declining relative costs of transportation (recent increases in energy costs may well 
require this statement to be revised!). The dominant activities within a given region 
will tend to be those that are functionally linked to activities in other regions – a 
spatial extension of increasing specialization and exchange. And as regional 
interdependencies intensify, the internal structure of regions becomes increasingly 
heterogeneous. These sorts of development patterns are clearly in strong contrast to 
the rather neat and simple assumptions of the region-centred or core-periphery model. 
The results of a long period of poor economic performances are similar 
everywhere. It is the identification of their real causes and effective remedies which 
presents one of the greatest challenges to modern society. There are indeed ‘more 
questions than answers’ in the regional development domain once we start exploring 
the real causes and appropriate remedies.  
Regional policy, which constitutes the economic policy line of regional economics, 
pursues a different focus than regional growth theory. Scholars in regional policy 
have a desire to propose policy strategies which should lead to regional development, 
e.g. the export-led growth strategy or the endogenous development policy. Regional 
development policy strategies partly borrow from economic theories of other fields, 
such as growth theories and theories of economic development. However, regional 
policies embody also additional micro-economic and spatial aspects which are 
original to the regional economics discipline. Reflecting the common 
macro-economic views, regional economics has in principle offered two competing 
paradigms to explain regional inequalities, a neo-classical approach, which stresses 
the supply side, and other approaches which emphasize demand factors (Tondle 
2000). 
Regional policies in less-developed regions have typically provided infrastructure 
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investments, grants, loans, and other subsidies to support and encourage private 
business initiatives. Although basic education is usually a more local (e.g. provincial 
in the case of Canada) responsibility, national standards for educational attainment, 
when they exist, can also indirectly promote the human capital base that is essential 
for sustained development. Such polices in effect attempt to provide a (more) level 
playing field on which local, regional and provincial authorities and leaders can 
further develop an innovative milieu.  
 Regional policy may also be considered in more of a development context. 
National governments have typically addressed national competitiveness issues in 
sectoral terms, yet it has become increasingly apparent that the conditions that 
underlie national competitiveness are often localized. This means that if one wants to 
understand differences in national growth rates, one should also start by examining 
differences in regional growth (Porter 1990; Krugman 1991; Hansen 1996). The sum 
of the parts is greater than the whole! 
The objectives of regional policies have varied. But generally, they have been 
oriented to such equity considerations as reducing unemployment, increasing incomes, 
promoting structural adjustments, and/or realizing development potential. 
Neoclassical economists have tended to view such efforts as distortions of efficient 
resource allocation from a national perspective because resources are shifted from 
more ‘efficient’ places to ‘less efficient’ places, but this really depends upon the 
perspective one adopts. They have also typically argued that labour migration from 
lagging regions and capital flows to such areas will eventually reduce regional 
disparities (Hansen 1996).  
Tondle (2000) summarized major theories which were proposed in regional 
economics and that have followed closely the current paradigm of general economic 
theory (Figure 1.1) and explained that the phenomenon of regional income 
inequalities, synonymous with differences in regional growth performance and 
regional development gaps, constitutes the core interest of regional economics. Thus, 
the neo-classical approach, and in particular the neo-classical model of growth, had a 
strong influence on regional growth theory. This led to the neo-classical model of 
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regional growth in the 1960s and 1970s, proposed by Borts and Stein (1964), Siebert 
(1970) and Richardson (1973). Very much in contrast to this school of thought are 
demand-oriented models of regional growth, e.g. the model of cumulative causation 
proposed first by Myrdal in 1957 and then by Kaldor in 1970.  Since then, however, 
regional economics has participated less in the formulation of theories of regional 
growth and has shifted its own focus more towards regional development policies. 
Nevertheless, regional policy often used the input of general growth theory as a 
starting point. Similarly the new economic geography approach, which attempts to 
explain regional growth differences, was initiated in general economics and not within 
the regional economics discipline — although reviving old models from regional 
economics. 
 
Figure 1.1 Major Theories in the Explanation of Regional Growth (Tondl 2000) 
 
 
 
The new economic geography approach, which emerged in the early 1990s, has 
gained much attraction for its arguments on centralizing and decentralizing forces in 
geographic economic space, which could lead to convergence or divergence of 
regional incomes. A key issue in economic development is whether economies which 
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start out behind tend to grow faster in per capita terms and thereby converge toward 
those that began ahead (Barro 1994). 
Beyond the traditional paradigms of regional growth, regional economics did not 
further engage in theoretical questions of regional growth. Instead, regional 
economics shifted its focus to regional policy issues in the 1980s, with a stronger 
focus on policy measures and an emphasis on the micro-economic level. Regional 
policy has employed new general economic models, which were suggested by new 
growth theory, and later by the new economic geography, merely as the theoretical 
explanation of regional growth differences and as a justification for policy 
intervention. 
The neo-classical paradigm rests on the neo-classical theory of growth and 
allocation mechanisms as suggested in international trade theory. In a period when the 
belief in a neo-classical world led to the neo-classical model of growth on the 
macro-economic level by Solow and Swan in 1956, Cass (1965) and Koopmans 
(1965), regional economists followed these ideas to formulate a neo-classical model 
of regional growth with very much the same spirit. For example, Borts and Stein 
(1964), Siebert (1970) and Richardson (1973) established the neo-classical model of 
regional growth to explain regional income differences (McCombie 1988; Amstrong 
and Taylor 1985). 
In short, faced with imperfect concepts and theories on the one hand and the 
reality of the problems of regional disparity and the need for a more cohesive national 
economy on the other hand, regional policy-making in modern industrialized societies 
has almost taken on an experimental character! The approach to the problem of 
regional development in advanced societies thus generally reflects a blend of the 
practical capability of the analytical tools and the institutional constraints within 
which developmental action has to be designed, i.e. a very pragmatic approach. 
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1.2 Convergence Studies: A Literature Review 
 
Whether poor economies tend to converge towards rich ones or else to diverge over 
time is an issue that has attracted the attention of policy-makers and academics alike 
for some decades. Economic convergence or divergence is a topic of considerable 
interest and debate, not only for validating or otherwise the two leading and 
competing growth models (the neoclassical and the endogenous growth approaches) 
but also for its policy-oriented implications. Generally speaking, the presence of 
convergence is considered as a valid test in favour of the neoclassical growth model 
as opposed to the endogenous models that predict divergence in most cases. 
  The convergence issue has been revived in the past two decades thanks to the 
seminal works of authors such as Abramovitz (1986), Baumol (1986) and Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992). Convergence analysis has even gained momentum by the 
development of endogenous growth models that allow a major role for economic 
policy. Unfortunately, the available empirical evidence does not provide unambiguous 
support for either of the two aforementioned growth frameworks, although it does 
point to the existence of conditional convergence. 
 At the regional level, the issue of economic convergence is also much debated. A 
look at the growth performances of member countries of integration schemes in 
Europe, Asia and Latin America over a relatively long period of time does not show 
unambiguous empirical support for the convergence hypothesis either (De Lombaerde 
2002). This is in sharp contrast with the fact that, as for the EU, for the majority of 
commentators, economists and politicians economic convergence is an expected (if 
not necessary) outcome of regional economic integration processes (Meeusen and 
Villaverde 2002b). The empirical assessments of the effects of the elimination of 
barriers to flows of goods, services and production factors on growth (and its spatial 
distribution) and the debate on cohesion policies in the EU have considerably 
contributed to the development of the conceptual framework and the methodological 
toolbox for studying economic convergence (Villaverde Castro, 2004). 
Since the early 1990s, in the suite of cross-country convergence analyses, many 
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researchers have investigated the question of income convergence across and within 
countries. There is an argument about the existence of convergence among countries 
or between regions within a country over time that has been ongoing since Solow 
(1956) and Swan (1956) developed the neoclassical growth model. One of the 
important findings of the neoclassical growth model is its prediction of convergence 
— poor nations or regions tend to grow faster than rich ones in terms of the level of 
per capita product or income.  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin who analyzed the data of US states since 1880, the 
prefectures of Japan since 1930, and the regions of eight European countries since 
1950 found that absolute beta-convergence is the norm for these regional economies, 
i.e. poor regions of those countries tend to grow faster on a per capita basis than rich 
ones. The authors found the similarity of β-convergence rate which exhibit at a rate of 
close to 2-3% a year. However, they found that regional income convergence is 
weaker in Europe than in the US. The authors also analyzed another 122 countries 
from 1965 to 1985, dividing these countries between fast growers and low growers on 
the basis of real per capita GDP, and they found that the average gap between these 
two groups declined during this period2. Sala-i-Martin (2006) estimated the world 
distribution of income by integrating individual income distributions for 138 countries 
between 1970 and 2000 and found that all of them show reductions in global 
inequality during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Many researchers have examined the existence of β-convergence for a variety of 
regions from the macro level to the single country level, from cross-country analysis 
to single country analysis. The existence of a convergence process can therefore 
reveal the real chances of reaching the aim of better cohesion among different 
territories and regions; this is the main reason why the measures of economic 
convergence are so popular in regional studies, particularly in the field of European 
Regional studies (Neven and Gouyette 1994; Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996; 
Fingleton et al. 1996; Tondi 1997a; Button and Pentecost 1994, 1999;  Leonardi 
                                                              
2 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995: 413-415. 
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1995; Marques and Soukiazis 1998; Nachtigal and Votavova 2002;  Veiga 2004; 
López-Bazo et al. 2004; Rodriguez–Pose and Fratesi 2004; Ertur et al. 2006; Busetti 
et al. 2006; Paas and Schlitte 2007; Dall’Erba and Le Gallo 2007; Piras and Arbia 
2007; Krüger 2007; Ramajo et al. 2008; Albu 2008; Karras 2008; Brasili et al. 2008; 
Becker and Hall 2009).  
Mathur (2005) measured the speed of absolute and conditional convergence for 
selected European countries – the EU16, South Asian countries (5) and some East 
Asian (8) countries – from 1961 to 2001. Some researchers have assessed the 
convergence rates of countries in North America (Coulombe (1999) for Canada-USA; 
Gerber (2003) for USA-Mexico); Latin America (Wiggins and Pfitzner 2005), and 
Asia (Togo 2001; Ghosh 2007) by using different data sources in relation to various 
periods in time. 
While empirical findings from cross-country studies remain controversial, there is 
ample evidence for convergence across regions within countries. Different regions 
have been studied by different researchers : Keller (1994) for Austria and Germany; 
Cashin (1995) for Australia;  Coulombe and Lee (1993) for regions in Canada; Kim 
(1998), Jhonson, (2003) and Young et al. (2007) for US states; Kangasharju (1999) 
for Finland; Solanko (2003) for Russian regions; Carlos et al. (2000) for Brazilian 
states; Duncan et al. for Chili (2006); Adabar (2004) for Indian states; and Young 
(2005) for China. 
Coulombe and his co-authors have similarly demonstrated in a variety of 
publications that convergence has taken place in Canada, with poorer regions growing 
more rapidly than richer regions (Coulombe and Lee 1995; Coulombe and Day 1999; 
Coulombe 1999, 2000; Coulombe and Tremblay 2001). Not all studies provide such a 
striking confirmation of convergence theory however. Hofer and Wörgötter find only 
weak confirmation of convergence theory in the Austrian context (1997). Moreover, 
Chatterji and Dewhurst (1996) and Siriopoulos and Asteriou (1998) have rejected the 
convergence hypothesis in Great Britain and Greece, respectively. In short, the 
convergence hypothesis is a central component of mainstream neoclassical growth 
theory. Moreover, it has been verified to a varying extent in most countries. 
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The evidence seems to be unequivocal: different regions in different countries are 
converging. However, the same cannot be said about the whole world. Furthermore, 
Boldrin and Canova (2001) using a similar methodology severely criticized previous 
results. Using a different data set, which includes 185 EU regions during the period 
1980 - 1986, they concluded that the results are mixed and not supportive of 
convergence of regional per capita income. Both Delong (1988) and Barro (1991) 
used world-wide country data to test the convergence hypothesis which resulted in 
rejecting the null hypothesis due to the differences of economic structures among 
countries that are too large to converge to a long run equilibrium. Canova and Marcet 
(1995) also, basing their analysis on per capita incomes for 144 EU regions, found 
only limited signals of convergence during the period 1980 - 1982.  
Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro and Sala -I-Martin (1992) suggested that when 
using advanced economies such as OECD countries, states in the US, or regions in 
Western Europe, it is easy to attain a convergent equilibrium because their economic 
structures are similar. But while using data from both developed and developing 
economies simultaneously, it is not possible to find the same result because their 
economic structures are different. Galor (1996) and Quah (1996) proposed the club 
convergence hypothesis and suggested hypothesis testing frameworks indicating that 
an initial capital abundant rich country will accumulate more capital, while the initial 
capital poor country may even de-accumulate the capital. Consequently, the rich are 
getting richer and the poor are getting poorer (Durlauf and Johnson 1995; Quah 1996). 
Canova (2004), searching for clubs using per capita income from European regions 
and OECD countries, found that there are heterogeneities of per capita income and a 
tendency for the steady-state distribution to cluster around four poles of attractions. In 
both cases, a rich–poor, north–south dimension in the clubs emerge. Hansen (2000) 
applies the threshold model which allows the individual observations to be classified 
into different classes based on the value of an observed threshold variable. He finds 
that there are threshold effects in the initial per capita GDP as well as the literacy rate. 
Funke and Niebuhr (2005) tested for the existence and the significance of thresholds 
and multiple equilibriums across Western Germany. They found that the 71 West 
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German regions cluster towards three distinctive income clubs. The above 
convergence models have used a set of explanatory variables such as the initial 
income per capita, the investment rate, the initial secondary-school enrollment rate 
and the average annual rate of population growth to examine their impact on income 
growth. Chou (1997) followed this line and examined the exogeneity of the 
determinants of per capita growth, and built a simultaneous equation system to find 
the mechanism by which trade activities affect economic growth (Chou 2007). 
The standard beta–convergence concept and test have also been more profoundly 
criticized by Friedman (1992) and Quah (1993b). Moreover, Quah (1993a, 1996a, 
1996b, 1997) argued that convergence should be studied by taking into account the 
shape of the entire distribution of per capita GDP and its intra-distribution dynamics 
overtime and not by estimating the cross section correlation between growth rates and 
per capita GDP levels or by computing first or higher moments. Using an alternative 
empirical methodology based on Markov chains and probability transition matrices, 
Quah (1993a, 1996a, 1996b, 1997) found evidence on the formation of convergence 
clubs, the international income distribution polarizing into “twin-peaks” of rich and 
poor. Quite surprisingly, Quah (1996c) does not find evidence supporting 
“twinpeakedness” in the European regional income distribution for a sample of 82 
regions (excluding southern poor Portuguese and Greek regions) over the 1980-1989 
periods. Quah (1996c) raises another criticism concerning the neglected spatial 
dimension of the convergence process: countries or regions are actually treated as 
“isolated islands” in standard approaches while spatial interactions due to 
geographical spillovers should be taken into account. Arbia et al. (2005) described the 
law of motion of cross-sectional distributions of per-capita income and its 
components in Europe. These results are also in line with the most recent literature 
available on the distribution dynamic approach to regional convergence (Pittau and 
Zelli 2006).  
An important part of the empirical literature uses a cross-section notion of 
convergence in order to verify the existence of a negative relationship between initial 
per capita income and its growth rate. However, if economies show multiple long run 
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equilibria, cross-sectional tests tend to spuriously reject the null hypothesis of no 
convergence (Bernard and Durlauf 1996). Tests of the Convergence Hypothesis or the 
tendency for per capita income levels to narrow over time have generally utilized 
cross-sectional data and have usually found conflicting evidence.  
Hall et al. (1997) consider possible definitions of convergence for time series. 
Thus, in these cases, a different notion of convergence might be used, such as 
applying a time series approach. Kosfeld and Lauridsen (2004) introduced a dynamic 
spatial modeling approach which is suitable for tracing regional adjustment processes 
in space instead of time and measured conditional income and productivity 
convergence across labour market regions in unified Germany. Wan and Zhou (2005), 
Li (2003), discusses Chinese regional economic inequality among 30 provinces. Lall 
and Yilmaz (2000) show that the speed of convergence is influenced by region 
specific characteristics and the availability of trained labour in neighboring regions. 
Islam (1995) raises alternative techniques like panel data to measure convergence. 
After that, Antunes and Soukiazis (2006) apply a panel data approach to test the 
convergence in per capita income among regions in Portugal. Llussá (2007) reviews 
the econometric methodology on panel data estimation and testing as applied to the 
study of convergence in empirical growth analyses and discusses and compares the 
different econometric methodologies used in cross-section and panel data studies of 
conditional convergence. Amplatz (2003) critically examines theories and empirical 
studies for three types of convergence, namely beta, sigma and club convergence from 
1996 to 2000, uses population-weighted and non-weighted data. 
Most studies do confirm some convergence in incomes across regions within a 
country. Even when the results are not statistically significant, there is almost always 
some tendency towards convergence. Sala-I-Martin, for instance, does not explicitly 
test convergence theory in each country, but he emphasizes that across all prominent 
Western European countries – Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Spain – regional 
divergences in income have consistently narrowed across the decades from 1950 to 
2000. There are clearly countries which registered a high rate of regional convergence, 
such as the Britain and Spain with 2% and more (Sala-i-Martin 1996; de la Fuente 
39 
 
1996), and countries with low to medium rates of regional convergence with only 1% 
rates, such as Germany and France (Sala-i-Martin 1996) and Italy and Austria 
(Fabiani and Pellegrini 1997; Hofer and Wörgötter 1997). 
In contrast to those cross-section analyses, the panel data analyses of Canova and 
Marcet (1995) and Tondl (1997b) come to the conclusion that European regions are 
converging at an average rate of about 2% to their own steady state incomes, which 
are much different. Both studies derive their results from annual growth rates rather 
than from growth averaged over a period as in the cross-section analysis. Gaulier et al. 
(1999) presents new empirical tests of the convergence hypothesis based on panel 
data by testing three samples (Europe, OECD and World). Some authors have 
addressed the issue of convergence with a distinctly different econometric 
methodology, applying Markov chain analysis to study intra-distribution dynamics of 
income and its long-term distribution. Quah (1996a), Fingleton (1997, 1999) and 
Magrini (1999) applied this concept to investigate convergence of European regions. 
Gallo (2004) studied space-time analysis of GDP disparities among European regions 
by applying the Markov chain approach. Quah (1996a) who investigated regional 
income distribution dynamics of NUTS II3 level regions in the 1980s shows that in 
contrast to the first half of the 1980s the income distribution became more 
concentrated around the mean income in the second half. In addition, a peak in the 
upper income classes, which had existed in the first half of the 1980s, disappeared 
afterwards. In that period, the spread of cross-sectional income declined as well. The 
standard deviation of income fell from 0.27 in 1980 to 0.25 in 1989. 
Some recent research in this area has tried to reconcile these findings with 
sensible theoretical models by exploring the role of alternative convergence 
                                                              
3 NUTS: The database is based on the Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units: a coherent 
system created to provide a geographical subdivision of the EU’s territory. The NUTS system is a 
hierarchical classification. Each Member State of the EU is divided into a number of regions at the 
NTJTS- 1 level. Each of these is further divided into sub-regions at the NUTS-2 level and these, in 
turn, into smaller areas at the NUTS-3 level (Eurostat 2002). There are 78 European Union regions at 
the NUTS-1 level, 211 basic administrative units at the NUTS-2 level, and 1093 subdivisions of basic 
administrative units at the finer NUTS-3 level of spatial disaggregation (Arbia 2006). 
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mechanisms and the possible shortcomings of panel data techniques for convergence 
analysis. 
In a standard convergence analysis, the existence of both beta-convergence (which 
refers to the narrowing of income disparities) and σ-convergence (which tells whether 
poor economies are growing faster than rich ones) has been studied. If conditioning 
variables are used, it can be determined whether the poor economies are approaching 
their own steady states at a faster rate than the rich economies are approaching theirs 
(Sari Pekkala 1999). 
Despite the recent criticism directed at neoclassical growth theory and 
cross-section regressions, it can be argued that they provide at least a good starting 
point for the analysis of regional disparities, as they are straightforward to use and 
continue to be commonly employed in empirical studies of convergence. 
Until a few years ago, spatial statistics was a topic outside the range of interest of 
applied economists. In recent years, however, there has been a flourishing of eco-
nomic studies that, by developing theoretical models that involve relationships 
between variables observed across countries or regions have greatly stimulated 
interest in the measurement and statistical modeling of spatial variables. Most of these 
models are linked to the developments in the so-called new economic geography 
(Krugman 1991; Fujita et al. 1999; Krugman and Venables 1995; Ottaviano and Puga 
1998; Puga and Venables 1997, 1999; Durlauf and Quah 1999) and to economists’ 
renewed interest in problems related to economic growth and the conditions under 
which the per-capita income levels of various regions tend to converge over time 
(Arbia 2005). 
The importance of taking spatial effects into account was reviewed extensively 
by Anselin (1988) and since then, a growing literature attests to the importance of the 
problem of errors and misspecifications that can occur if spatial issues are ignored in 
cross-sectional data analyses involving geographic units. Among such economic 
problems is the question of per-capita income convergence; the current methodology 
would suggest that the econometric analysis of regional convergence should consider 
the possibility of spatial dependency among the regions (Magalhaes et al. 2005). 
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In recent years, the regional per-capita income convergence studies have been 
integrated with spatial econometrics in many regional convergence studies. Paas et al. 
(2007) deal with the development of disparities in regional per capita GDP and 
convergence processes in the enlarged EU from the regional spatial dependence 
perspective. Brasili et al. (2008) assessed European Union Cohesion Policy by 
estimating a conditional β-convergence model for a sample of 196 EU regions over 
the period 1980-2006, using a spatial econometric perspective and a distance-based 
weight matrix; Kamarianakis and Gallo (2004) compared regional productivity of 
European Union from 1975 to 2000 by applying Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis 
and a Spatial Econometric Model;  Magalhaes and Hewings (2005) introduced some 
spatial econometric techniques to the convergence issues among Brazilian states. 
There are also some studies for single countries. For example: Rey and Montouri 
(1998) reconsidered the question of US regional economic income convergence from 
a spatial econometric perspective; Henley (2005) measured regional growth 
convergence in Great Britain; and Buccellato (2007) tested convergence across 
Russian regions using spatial econometrics approaches. 
The analysis of convergence has so far been mainly focused on studies of regional 
or personal income distribution. However, there have been few studies that develop 
linkages between other related fields and the broader literature on economic 
convergence. Starting with studies by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991, 1992, 1995) and 
Mankiw et al. (1992), the question of convergence - that is, the catching up of poor 
economies with rich economies, whether at the regional or international level - has 
received considerable attention from researchers. Significant progress has been made 
in dynamic modeling under the neoclassical model and endogenous growth models. 
Recent analyses stress features such as the dynamics of the adjustment of physical and 
human capital, migration, economic and political integration, the stability and 
effectiveness of public institutions, economic policy and the spread of technology. 
Recently, some other researchers have extended the framework to other related fields 
such as market force, productivity, labour, spatial problems, education and 
information. 
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1.3 Studies on Regional Disparity and Convergence in Canada and China 
 
The study of regional income convergence is gaining even more attention as scholars 
explore the impacts of globalization on income disparity among countries. The issue 
has been stressed within countries because of accumulating evidence which suggests 
that increased economic growth has generated increasing regional income inequalities, 
especially in many developing economies (Mossi et al. 2003; Aroca et al. 2006).  
The recent literature on territorial disparities has been dominated by an 
econometric approach aimed at testing the convergence hypothesis. This approach is 
elegant and concise, but at the same time it provides a narrow understanding of 
territorial structures and processes of regional change (Quah 1996b, 1993; Rey and 
Montouri 1999; Lopez-Bazo et al. 1999). 
In the case of Canada, there exists an abundant literature on regional disparity, on 
provincial disparities and convergence. Only some of them are listed on Table 1.1.  
  
Table 1.1 Summary of the Related Literature on Regional Disparity and 
Provincial Disparities and Convergence 
 
Topic Author 
Convergence 
Coulombe and Day (1997, 1998); Coulombe and Lee (1993, 1995, 1998); Helliwell 
and Chung (1991); Helliwell (1994); Lee and Coulombe (1995); Lee (1997); and 
Lefebvre (1994), Day (2006), Akbari (1996); James and Krieckhaus (2008),  
Afxentiou and Serletis (1998); Ralhan and Dayanandan (2005). 
Provincial 
Disparity 
Regional Disparity - Coulombe (1997, 1999, 2004); Provincial Standards of Living 
- Coulombe and Jean-François (2006); GDP per Capita, Measures of Territorial 
Disparity - Alasia (2002);  Taxes, Transfers and Regional dDisparities - Alter and 
Greenberg (1990). Income Earning Differences- Shearmur, Polèce (2005) 
Micro analysis 
Labour Productivity and Work Intensity – Baldwin et al. (2001, 2004, 2005); 
Provincial Earnings - Sharan (2000); Trade, Equalization and Regional Disparities - 
Hobson, Paul A.R and Donald J. Savoie (1992, 2002); Federal Income Tax Cuts - 
Fougère and Ruggeri (2001). 
Urban-rural 
Income 
Disparity 
Rural Income Disparities – Singh (2002); Urban-Rural - Beckstead and Brown 
(2005); Wages and Labour Productivity- Campbell (2002); Rural / Urban Divide- 
Alasia and Rothwell (2003). 
Canada-USA 
Comparison 
Standard of Living - Létourneau and Lajoie (2000); Ndayisenga and  Downs 
(2005); Coulombe and Day (1999)  
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Regional disparities in per capita incomes have long been a feature of the 
Canadian economy. One of the first to quantify this fact was McInnis (1968), who 
used historical data on nominal personal income per capita for the Canadian regions 
to examine the evolution of relative regional disparities from 1926 to 1962. He 
concluded that “the trend of regional income differentials in Canada appears to have 
been roughly a constant; there has been neither convergence nor divergence” 
(McInnis 1968: 441). The findings of the research conducted to date show that, at the 
provincial level, the dispersion indices of various income and output measures record 
a substantial convergence among Canadian provinces from the 1950s to the 
mid-1980s. Since the mid-1980s, the catch-up convergence process appears to have 
come to an end. The dispersion indices converge slowly suggesting that the system is 
approaching a steady state (Coulombe 1999). 
Gunderson (1996) discussed the factors that foster regional convergence such as 
migration, spatial convergence, inter-jurisdictional competition for jobs and 
investment and equalization in the context of a theoretical framework, while other 
researchers have tried to estimate this from the empirical analysis of convergence.  
Lefebvre (1994) examined whether the hypothesis of economic convergence 
holds for Canadian provinces by using data on real gross domestic product per capita 
and on factor productivity from 1966 to 1992. His results support the findings of other 
authors who have studied convergence among Canadian provinces. Afxentiou and 
Serletis (1998) in their study used data extracted from Statistics Canada, Provincial 
Accounts publications for the period 1966 to 1991 and from publications of the 
Conference Board of Canada for 1961 to 1965; they found some results that conflicted 
with the work of Coulombe and Lee (1995), who had found that different per capita 
concepts converge at different speeds toward the national average. They also concluded 
that the various regional developmental policies and transfers introduced after 1960 had 
neither sped up nor slowed down the overall convergence process. Ralhan and 
Dayanandan (2005) measured unconditional and conditional income convergence 
among provinces in Canada during the period 1981-2001 by applying the 
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first-differenced GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimation technique to the 
dynamic Solow growth model and compared the results with the other panel data 
approaches such as fixed and random effects. They found higher convergence rate of 
around 6% to 6.5% p.a. whereas the previous studies using OLS and other techniques 
reported a convergence rate of around 1.05% for per capita GDP and 2.89% for 
personal disposable income among Canadian provinces.  
According to Coulombe (1999), the level of regional (i.e. provincial) disparities 
in Canada is close to a condition of disparity equilibrium, which reflects the industrial 
structure, and the institutional and political context. On the other hand, Sheamur and 
Polése (2001) observe a steady process of concentration of economic activities 
between 1971 and 1996. Keddie and Joseph (1991), Joseph and Keddie (1988) and 
Coffey and Polése (1988), after assessing population and employment trends, suggest 
that most of the alleged process of decentralization supposed to have occurred over 
the 1970s and the 1980s is in fact decongestion, due to urban spillovers into adjacent 
rural areas.  
However, the large majority of empirical work concerned with regional disparities 
in Canada has used provincial level data (see Coulombe (1999) and references therein; 
Afxentiou and Apostolos 1998; Moazzami 1997; Lefebvre 1994; Maxwell 1994).  A 
limited number of studies have used small geographic area data such as Census 
Division data, mainly from the Census of Population (Sheamur and Polése 2001; 
Keddie and Joseph 1991; Joseph and Keddie 1988). Alasia (2002) has assessed 
territorial income disparity trends in Canada using annual time series data for small 
geographic units and with a national coverage. James and Krieckhaus (2008) 
emphasized the importance of initial income in explaining growth variation across 
individual units and they found that Canadian provinces do show convergence over 
time in terms of overall economic performance. They suggested that national 
economic performance and convergence effects largely determine growth in the 
provinces and concluded that from an economic policy perspective it is important to 
recognize that provincial inequality is largely a self-correcting problem.  
In the case of China, the widening regional disparities and income convergence 
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have generated a great deal of attention both within and beyond China, because it 
would appear that regional income disparities have increased at the same time as the 
country has been growing rapidly after the period of economic reform. Several 
hypotheses have been proposed to explain the widening disparities. Yingqi Wei (2003) 
and Wei et al. (2008) emphasized the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on 
regional disparities. Other studies (Wang and O'Brien 2003; Wan, Guanghua and 
Zhou 2004; Fleisher et al. 2008; Kanbur et al. 2001; Ajit et al. 2003; Démurger et al. 
2001,2002) have attributed the widening of regional disparities to the biased regional 
policy of the central government or to location factors. These studies argue that the 
central government’s investment priority favouring the eastern region was the root 
cause for the lagging behind of the central and western regions and, at the same time, 
the unfavourable geographic conditions limited the development the central and 
western regions. Tsui also found that physical capital is the dominant factor that 
affected the interprovincial differences.  Also, articles indicate “club convergence” 
exists in China (Shen and Ma 2002), which means it is of great importance to 
decrease the disparity among the three regions in China.  Wei (2000) points out the 
asymmetric distribution of fixed-capital investment among regions and industry is one 
of the reasons of inequality in China’s development. Cai et al. (2001) studied the 
effect of labour and Hu and Xiong (2000) studied the role of knowledge for disparity 
among regions. Wei et al (2001) investigated the international trade can reduce the 
disparity between urban and rural regions; Wei (2000) and An (2007) also found the 
distribution of FDI can result in disparity. There is also a considerable literature about 
the effect of regional development policies (e.g. Yang 2002; Raiser and Martin 1998; 
Ma and Yu 2003). Local factors include the natural, historical and infrastructure 
condition (Yao and Zhang 2001b; Demurger et al. 2002; Demurger (2001) and 
Demurger et al. (2002) showed geographical location, transportation and 
communication facilities can explain a certain degree of inter-provincial disparity in 
China. Furthermore, some scholars have provided explanations based on other factors. 
Lin (2002, 2003) believed the strategy of “heavy industries must develop in advance” 
is the main reason for disparity, because it breached the regional relative advantage, 
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while Cai (2002) et al. believed the distortion of the labour market was an important 
factor. 
Recently, a great deal of research has been undertaken to measure regional 
income convergence and income inequality from different factors. Wan et al. (2008) 
tackled the inequality-growth relationship, Wang (2008) discussed the influencing 
factors of income inequality, Zhang et al. (2006) introduced the impacts of growth and 
inequality on rural poverty, Lin and Liu (2008) focused on China’s development 
strategies on regional inequality, Tsui (2007) proposed forces shaping China’s 
Interprovincial Inequality, Liang (2006) analysed the impact of financial development 
of regional inequality and Aroca et al. (2008) using the non-parametric methods of 
kernel density function and Marcov chain analysis analyzed regional convergence 
from spatial interactions. Fan and Wan (2008) and Lee (2008) analyzed regional 
inequality from the perspectives of innovation capability and education opportunity 
respectively. While previous literature recognizes the importance of space and 
geography in China’s growth process, Aroca et al. (2008) used techniques which have 
been tailored specifically to take spatial effects into account. 
For example, based on the Solow growth model, Weeks and Yao (2003) find 
conditional convergence in both the pre-reform (1953-1978) and reform (1978-97) 
periods with the convergence speed in the reform era being much faster than during 
the pre-reform time. Applying two methods for detecting convergence (sigma 
convergence and beta convergence), Jian et al. (1996), on the other hand, found that 
China’s real income convergence developed strongly since 1978 reform, a period 
strongly associated with the adoption of market economy and openness to external 
trade. However, they noted a divergence in regional income between the coastal and 
non-coastal regions since 1990. 
Using an augmented Solow growth model, Chen and Fleisher (1996) measured 
regional inequality and projected that overall regional inequality in the near term is 
likely to decline modestly but the coast/non-coast income difference is likely to 
increase somewhat. Fujita and Hu (2001) analyzed the problem by relating it to the 
processes of globalization and economic agglomeration in China. They argued that 
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income disparity between the coastal area and the interior is increasing, while there 
was a trend towards convergence within the coastal area. Zhang et al. (2001) and 
Wang and Ge (2004) suggested that China’s regions, especially the eastern and 
western regions, have converged to their own specific steady states over the past 40 
years, while the differences between the east and west regions have widened.  
Yao and Zhang (2001) proposed a production model to explain regional 
divergence based on the hypothesis that in developing countries where the technology 
and capital are scare, initial economic growth depends on the economic spillover from 
growth centres. Furthermore, they provide alternative tests to demonstrate that 
regional divergence can be associated with studies of different geo-economic clubs. In 
contrast to some previous studies, they found that regions in China did not converge 
in the reform period. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
Over the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, exogenous development theories or 
concepts gained prominence in explaining regional development. The conflicting 
predictions of the two alternative theoretical frameworks (endogenous versus 
exogenous development approaches) have given rise to an explosion of empirical 
studies especially since 2000. Significant progress has been made in dynamic 
modeling under the neoclassical model and endogenous growth models. The new 
economic geography approach, which emerged in the early 1990s, has gained much 
attraction for its arguments on centralizing and decentralizing forces in geographic 
economic space, which could lead to convergence or divergence of regional incomes.  
There are many empirical and theoretical studies on Canadian and China’s 
regional disparities and regional convergence mainly based on the single indicator of 
GDP as well as some other indicators. While the previous literature recognizes the 
importance of measuring regional disparity in Canada and China independently, none 
has used multiple indicators in convergence analysis which has been tailored 
specifically to take some additional indicators and other related spatial effects into 
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account. This would constitute a significant advance in the cross-country analysis of 
two countries with different income levels and status. In this study, we expect to fill 
this gap and to report new information derived from the application of new methods 
in the analysis of regional income disparities between Canada and China. 
In Chapter 2 that follows, the methodology of the analysis used in this thesis is 
presented and discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
Methodological Framework 
 
This chapter outlines the methodological framework for the cross-country analysis of 
Canada and China. First, the traditional methods of measuring regional economies are 
briefly introduced. Then, economic convergence in the new classical models is 
explained in greater detail theoretically and methodically to construct a  
methodology to accomplish the objectives of this study. This includes the types of 
convergence, approaches and methodologies for measuring convergence and spatial 
analyses (within each country). Finally, the econometric methods applied in this study 
are presented.     
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Regional disparities continue to be a major concern of regional policy and regional 
development throughout the world. A prominent theme in the recent macroeconomic 
has been that economic convergence. 
Whether poor economies tend to converge towards rich ones or else diverge 
over time is an issue that has attracted the attention of policy-makers and academics 
alike for some decades. Economic convergence or divergence is a topic of con-
siderable interest and debate, not only for validating or otherwise the two leading and 
competing growth models (the neoclassical and the endogenous growth approaches) 
but also for its policy-oriented implications. Generally speaking, the presence of 
convergence is considered as a valid indicator that supports the neoclassical growth 
model as opposed to the endogenous models that predict divergence in most cases 
(Castro 2004). 
In recent years, the issue of regional economic convergence has increasingly 
drawn the interest of economists to the empirical analysis of regional and spatial data. 
Regional disparities exist in both developing countries and developed countries. 
Hence, regional policy makers are interested in whether to expect convergence or 
divergence of regional incomes and what are the major determinants of regional 
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growth. The neo-classical convergence hypothesis has given rise to a considerable 
amount of empirical research since the early 1990s. Meanwhile quite different 
methodological approaches for convergence analyses have been suggested. 
Until a few years ago, spatial statistical analysis1 was a topic outside the range 
of interest of applied economists. In recent years, however, there has been a 
burgeoning of economic studies that, by developing theoretical models that involve 
relationships between variables observed across countries or regions have greatly 
stimulated interest in the measurement and statistical modeling of spatial variables. 
Most of these models are linked to developments in the so-called new economic geog-
raphy (Krugman 1991; Fujita et al. 1999; Krugman and Venables 1995; Ottaviano and 
Puga 1998; Puga and Venables 1997, 1999; Durlauf and Quah 1999) and to 
economists’ renewed interest in problems related to economic growth and the 
conditions under which per capita income levels of various regions tend to converge 
over time. One important aspect of such a goal concerns reduction of disparities 
between growth rates of per capita income levels, based on the assumption that this 
would, in the long run, lead to a reduction in welfare disparities. The analysis of the 
dispersion of regional incomes is often considered as a proxy for the inequality in 
personal incomes distribution and is used as an indicator in economic policy debates. 
As a consequence, substantial empirical research efforts have been devoted to this 
topic by researchers. 
Part of the contrasting results that are often encountered in comparing empirical 
studies, however, can be explained by the variety of research methods, technical 
definitions and caveats applied by different studies. In particular, three questions must 
be kept in mind when comparing research results. First, what type of disparity exactly 
is being measured? This implies a clear definition of the income concept used. 
                                                              
1 Complex issues arise in spatial analysis, many of which are neither clearly defined nor 
completely resolved, but form the basis for current research generally. The most fundamental of these 
issues is related to the problem of defining and selecting the spatial entities being studied. In this study, 
however, spatial statistical analysis is associated with the national case (provinces in a given country) 
only. 
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Second, disparity between whom? This refers in particular to the level of geographic 
aggregation. Third, disparity over what time horizon? The time frame may 
considerably alter the outcomes of any assessment (Alasia 2002). A fourth question 
arises in that some temporal patterns of convergence may be related to particular 
patterns of periodic or cyclical commodity price fluctuations. 
 
2.2. Measuring the Regional Economy 
 
Measurement of regional economies in large territories is a complicated and delicate 
matter. As it is difficult to choose “the best” index of regional disparity, the measure 
employed must reflect the purpose of the analysis. There are many difficulties in 
trying to compare the regional economic development performance between Canada 
and China. One is developed and less populous; the other is developing at a high 
speed and has a huge population. One of the difficulties is the absence of a broadly 
acceptable measure of economic convergence. Though individual studies of regional 
disparity may deal with separate development measures – such as population growth, 
wages, welfare and regional productivity - the use of multiple indicators appears 
essential, particularly if a comparative (cross-country) analysis is required. In order to 
measure the extent of disparities, various indices of inequality are commonly used. 
 
2.2.1 Classical Methods 
 
There are many approaches that have been used over a long period of time in studies 
of regional income inequality. 
The computational problems associated with multi-group comparison of income 
inequality were noticed relatively early on by the American economist Max Lorenz. 
In 1905, Lorenz highlighted several drawbacks associated with the comparison of 
wealth concentration between fixed groups of individuals. In particular, he found that 
while an increase in the percentage of the middle class is supposed to show the 
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diffusion of wealth, a simple comparison of percentage shares of persons in each 
income group may often lead to the opposite conclusion. His suggestion was to 
represent the actual inter-group income distribution as a line, plotting “along one axis 
cumulated percents of the population from poorest to richest, and along the other the 
percent of the total wealth held by these percents of the populations” (ibid.: 217; see 
also Portnov (2005)). 
The Italian statistician Corrado Gini moved Lorenz’s ideas a step further in 1912, 
suggesting a simple and easily comprehensible measure of inequality known as the 
Gini coefficient. This coefficient is calculated as the arithmetic average of the 
absolute value of differences between all pairs of incomes, divided by the average 
income. Subsequently, Dalton (1920) carried out the first systematic attempt to 
compare the performance of different inequality measures and found that the standard 
deviation is sensitive to transfers among the rich, while the standard deviation of 
logarithms is less sensitive to transfers among the rich than to transfers among the 
poor but still changes when a transfer among the rich takes place. Dalton’s 
calculations showed that the ‘simplest’ measures, such as absolute mean deviation, 
absolute standard deviations and absolute mean difference, fail to indicate any change, 
when proportional additions to the numbers of persons in individual income groups 
are applied (ibid.: 355-357; see also Champernowne and Cowell (1998: 87-112)).  
Kuznets (1955) introduced the famous ‘inverted-U’ shape relationship between 
inequality and income which states that the distribution of income first becomes more 
unequal as income increases before inequality decreases with income increases. This 
relationship received much attention in the development debate in the 1970s and was 
adopted by the World Bank in order to predict trends in inequality (Cappelen 2006). 
Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) noted another deficiency inherent to most inequality 
measures, i.e. their insensitivity to the position which a specific population subgroup 
occupies within an overall distribution. Their Gini decomposition technique takes 
group-specific positions into account. In particular, they suggested weighting 
subgroups by the average rank of their members in the distribution. This is in contrast 
to the weighting system used more conventionally in which between-group inequality 
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is weighted by the rank of the average (Pyatt 1976; Silber 1989).  
It is common to use a variety of statistics for the measurement of regional 
disparities. By far the most frequently employed summary statistics for measuring 
dispersion are the variance and the standard deviation. However, these two indicators 
are unsatisfactory descriptive measures of dispersion in that their value is related to 
the units of measurement. In contrast, the coefficient of variation is independent of the 
units of measurement; this is why it is used here as an indicator of σ-convergence. 
The simplest concept of economic convergence refers to the reduction of per capita 
income inequality across a sample of economies (countries, regions, states, 
provinces …). In order to measure it, a whole array of inequality indicators has been 
proposed, the three most popular being some summary measure of dispersion, such as 
the CV, the Gini index and the Theil index. In this study, descriptive analysis, the 
coefficient of variation (CV), the weighted coefficient of variation (WCV), the Gini 
coefficient (Gini) and Theil’s inequality statistic (Theil) are used. The main classical 
methods for looking at regional inequality indicators can thus be summarized three 
types such as descriptive analysis, absolute difference indices and relative difference 
indexes as follows: 
A. Descriptive Analysis - A fundamental and basic distinction can be drawn using 
regional descriptive analysis. 
B. Absolute Difference Indices - The common measures of central tendency of a 
distribution are Arithemetic Mean and Standard Deviation. The mean (arithmetic 
mean) is the average (sum of observations / number of observations) in a distribution, 
sample or population.  The standard deviation of the mean (SD) is the most 
commonly used measure of the spread of values in a distribution. SD is calculated as 
the square root of the variance (the average squared deviation from the mean).  
n
x −
=
2
2 )( μσ  (2.1) 
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[x is a value from the population, μ  is the mean of all x, n is the number of x in the 
population, ∑ is the summation] 
C. Relative Difference Index 
1. Variance of logarithms, weighted (VLW) and unweighted (VL) 
The Calculation Formula for the calculation of weighted (VLW) and unweighted (VL) 
Variance of logarithms is given as:  
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Note: For the above equation y the average per capita income, Y indicates the aggregate income, 
Pop is the population, i is the subscript for the ith territorial unit, and the superscript ‘*’ indicates 
national values. 
2. Coefficient of Variation (comparing the variability of two data sets) (CV) 
(adjusted or unadjusted)  
A frequently used indicator for the convergence measurement is the variation 
coefficient of the GDP per capita denoted by σ and calculated as follows: 
( ) ( ) xxxn i −= 2.1σ   (2.4) 
where xi, is the value of the variable of interest for the ith region, there are n regions, 
and x is the sample mean for x. This indicator is also known as σ- convergence, first 
used by Sala-i-Martin, along with β-convergence (Iancu 2007). 
Williamson (1965) introduced CV weighted by the proportion of population, 
known as wσ . If the population factor is taken into consideration, then σ can be 
transformed into a new weighted one, wσ  by simply employing a population 
weighted variance *Pop
Popi   given by the expression below: 
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where xi, is the value of the variable of interest for the ith region, there are n regions, 
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x is the sample mean for x , pi is population of the ith region, and pop* is the national 
population. 
3. Gini Coefficient (an aggregate numerical indicator of inequality ranging from 0 
(absolute equality) to 1 (absolute inequality).  
A very popular inequality indicator is the Gini coefficient. This is derived from 
the Lorenz curve (see Appendix A2 and A3), a cumulative frequency curve which 
plots the cumulative share of population of the economies in the sample on the X-axis 
and the cumulative share of total income of these same economies on the Y-axis. In 
both cases, the economies are ranked according to their per capita income from 
bottom to top. The Gini index (G) corresponds to twice the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the 45° line. 
  The classical definition of G appears in the notation of the theory of relative 
mean difference: 
    (2.6) 
where x is an observed value, n is the number of values observed and x  is the 
mean value. 
  If the x values are first placed in ascending order, such that each x has rank i, 
some of the comparisons above can be avoided and computation is quicker: 
   (2.7) 
   (2.8) 
where x is an observed value, n is the number of values observed and i is the rank of 
values in ascending order2. 
 
 
                                                              
2 http://www.statsdirect.com. 
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4. Theil Index (used to measure in group, or intra group inequality) 
 
There are three types of Theil index of inequality – Theil, Theil1 and Theil0.The Theil 
indexes of inequality are calculated as below: 
 = xnxxxTheil ii log   (2.9) 

=


 


=
n
i
ii
x
x
x
x
N
Theil
1
ln.11   (2.10) 

=



=
n
i
i
x
x
N
Theil
1
ln10         (2.11) 
 
Note: where xi, is the value of the variable of interest for the ith region, if there are 
n regions, x is the sample mean for x 
=
=
N
i
ixN
x
1
1  
2.2.2 Convergence Approaches  
 
2.2.2.1. The Neo-Classical Model of Growth and Convergence 
 
The convergence postulate of this growth model has been extensively tested in 
empirical growth studies. The automatic reduction of income disparities, in other 
words the convergence of regional incomes, is postulated by the neo-classical model 
of growth. The idea of a transitional growth path to a steady state income, on which 
growth rates decline, is the fundamental theoretical ingredient of convergence 
analyses.  
The concept of convergence has its roots in the neo-classical model of growth. 
The original model, generally referred to as the Solow model of growth, rests on the 
work of Robert Solow (1956) and Trevor Swan (1956).  
The neo-classical model of growth postulates that an economy starting from a 
low level of capital and low per capita income, accumulates capital and runs through a 
growth process, where growth rates are initially high, then decrease, and finally 
approach zero when the steady state per capita income position is reached. The 
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transition growth path of the single economy can be transposed to the situation of a 
set of economies, which start from different income levels. If economies have the 
same steady state, the same transition dynamics will apply for the whole cross-section. 
Therefore, the dynamics of the neo-classical growth model are the key to the 
convergence hypothesis. 
In conclusion, we can state the fundamental prediction which is made by the 
Solow growth model: The growth rate of per capita income declines when the 
economy moves from a low per capita income level, with a low capital stock per 
person, to a higher income and a higher capital stock, to reach its steady state income. 
 
2.2.2.2 The Definition of Convergence 
 
The neo-classical model of growth postulates the convergence of regional incomes. 
Given the dynamics of this model of growth discussed in the previous chapter for the 
single economy, one may expect that in a set of economies, which have the same 
steady state per capita income, and which differ only in their initial capital 
endowment per person and per capita income, initially poor economies will grow 
faster than rich economies to converge finally on the same per capita income. In the 
literature, the phenomenon that poor economies grow faster than richer ones is known 
as β-convergence. β-convergence is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for 
the decline in income disparities or σ-convergence, as the latter is called. 
This basic kind of convergence to a common income level is referred to as 
absolute convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991, 1995; Sala-i-Martin 1996; de la 
Fuente 1995; Galor 1996). The assumption of a unique steady state will only be 
satisfied if all economies have the same fundamental parameters with respect to the 
saving rate s, population growth n, capital depreciation σ and above all the same level 
of technology A, i.e. if they all have the same production function. The only 
difference is in the endowment of capital. Only a homogenous group of economies 
with similar technological level and similar institutional environment, such as for 
example the OECD countries or the federal states of the US, fulfils the condition of 
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similar fundamentals to assure a convergence mechanism towards the same steady 
state income, i.e. absolute convergence (Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1 Dynamics in the Neo-classical Model3 
   
 
 Source: Barro and  Sa1a-i-Martin (1995: 23)  
Otherwise, if economies differ in their fundamentals, one will find in a set of 
economies several subgroups which differ in their steady state income. The group will 
show multiple steady states. If one regards a large set of non homogenous economies, 
e.g. a world-wide sample of economies including both industrialized and developing 
countries, it is obvious that their fundamentals are not the same. Differences in a 
variety of factors, e.g. in the technology level, in the level of education and in 
government policies, imply that economies, or groups of economies have different 
steady states. For example, those countries with a high level of education in the labour 
force will have a higher steady state income than those with a low educational level. 
Similarly, countries with a higher saving ratio have a higher steady state than those 
with a low one. Also, in the case of different steady states, one may find the dynamics 
of the neoclassical growth model, so that economies grow faster the further they are 
away from their steady state position. However, they will not reach the same steady 
state position and it may happen that a rich economy shows a higher growth rate than 
a poor one, because it is further away from its particular steady state. With different 
                                                              
3 Note: In this figure, K indicates capital and growth rate indicates per capita income growth rate. This 
figure shows the fundamental prediction which is made by the Solow growth model: the growth rate of 
per capita income declines when the economy moves from a low per capita income level, with a low 
capital stock per person (poor economy), to a higher income and a higher capital stock (rich economy) 
to reach its steady state income. The vertical distance between the curve and the line equals the growth 
rate of capital per person and the crossing point corresponds to the steady state. 
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steady states, the neo-classical growth model invokes the concept of conditional 
convergence rather than absolute convergence. 
 
Figure 2.2 Conditional Convergence4 
  
 
Source: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995: 29). 
 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995: 29) state that if a rich economy has a higher saving 
rate than a poor economy, then the rich economy may be proportionately further from 
its steady state position. In this case, the rich economy would be predicted to grow 
faster per capita than the poor economy: that is, absolute Beta convergence would not 
hold. The neoclassical model does predict that each economy converges to its own 
steady state and that the speed of convergence relates inversely to the distance from 
the steady state (Figure 2.2).   
The concept of conditional convergence, which encompasses the existence of 
multiple steady states, can also explain the phenomenon of club convergence (Galor 
1996). This refers to the situation where richer economies converge towards a high 
level of income, whereas poor economies converge towards a lower income level 
(Ben-David 1994). If the difference in steady state of the two is caused, e.g. by 
different endowments of human capital, poorer economies will remain inside the 
low-income club unless a substantial rise in their human capital leads to a rise in their 
                                                              
4 Note: In this figure, k(0)poor and k(0)rich  indicate the different initial stocks of capital per person of 
poor and rich economies, spoor and srich indicate the different saving rates of poor and rich economies. 
The steady state values are determined by the intersection of si.f(k)/k curves with the common line of 
n+ δ parameters. 
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steady state income (Figure 2.3). 
The major focus of recent work on the empirical analysis of economic growth 
has been the issue of convergence. Empirical studies on the convergence hypothesis 
have mushroomed since the mid-1980s. The concept of convergence in its most 
general form refers to equalizing or at least decreasing disparities and originated from 
the discussion that was centred on whether a steady state existed in economic 
dynamics. However, far from narrowing, the gap between the incomes of rich and 
poor countries has grown markedly and is likely to widen further (Chett 1996).  
 
Figure 2.3 Club Convergence5 
 
Source: Durlauf and Quah 1998; Tondle 2002: 43. 
 
In practice, what people are interested in is the question of whether income 
disparities across economies decline over time. 
The dispersion of income over time is referred to as σ-convergence. This concept 
was often used in the earlier empirical growth literature (Easterlin 1960; Streissler 
1979; Dowrick and Nguyen 1989). It typically is measured by a measure of dispersion 
such as the standard deviation of income, the coefficient of variation, or the Gini 
coefficient. 
β-convergence is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for 
σ-convergence. Only if poor economies grow faster than richer ones will a reduction 
of income disparities take place. However, as Chatterji (1992) pointed out, a negative 
                                                              
5 Note: y*1 and y*2 indicate the steady state per capita income of two different economies. 
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value of β does not guarantee that the dispersion of incomes is smaller at the end of a 
period than at the beginning, nor does it guarantee that regions converge to a common 
steady state. He showed that for both to happen a value of —2 <β< 0 is required. 
A similar important argument against the conclusion of a tightening income 
distribution from conditional β-convergence was raised by Quah (1993a) when he 
pointed to the analogy to Galton’s fallacy: The general observation in a population 
that the heights of the single family’s members tend to converge toward their mean 
does not mean that the dispersion of heights across the total population will have 
diminished. Similarly, conditional convergence would not necessarily indicate a 
reduced dispersion of incomes. 
Convergence and divergence processes have been widely discussed over the last 
several years. Convergence refers to the process by which relatively poorer regions or 
countries grow faster than their rich counterparts. If in a region poorer economies are 
growing faster than richer ones, regional income inequality will decrease over time. In 
this situation, the region’s economies are said to be converging toward one another. 
Conversely, if the poorer economies are growing more slowly than the richer ones, 
then income inequality will become increasingly exacerbated over time and such 
economies are said to be diverging from one another.  
Empirical analysis on the existence of convergence is the debating point of 
conventional and endogenous growth theories. Conventional growth models imply 
that there should be a convergence of growth rates as wealthier and more capital 
intensive economies should grow more slowly, and poorer less capital intensive 
economies should grow more rapidly. However, the more recent endogenous growth 
literature emphasizes that the very process of growth may generate externalities or 
positive spillover effects that generate further growth (Gunderson 1996).  
Since the rather informal contribution of Baumol (1986), and the more formal 
contributions of Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991, 1992, 1995) and Mankiw et al. (1992) 
among others, the controversial convergence issue has been extensively debated in the 
macroeconomic growth and regional science literature and heavily criticized on both 
theoretical and methodological grounds. Alternative concepts such as club 
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convergence (Durlauf and Johnson 1995; Quah 1993a, 1993b, 1996a, 1996b) or 
stochastic convergence (Bernard and Durlauf 1995, 1996; Evans and Karras 1996) 
have also been developed (Ertur et al, 2006). 
The hypothesis of convergence of GDP per capita among countries or regions has 
been intensively tested in recent years. The most popular approaches for the 
quantitative measurement of convergence are those based on the concepts of σ- and 
beta-convergence (Durlauf and Quah 1999). Recent empirical studies have proposed 
and used a variety of additional measures for inter-group inequality. Quah discusses 
alternative methods, namely the intra-distribution dynamics approach (Quah 1997; 
Rey 2001). In relation to the convergence concepts used, econometric problems, such 
as heterogeneity, omitted variables, model uncertainty, outliers, endogeneity and 
measurement errors, are often raised and alternative techniques like panel data (Islam 
1995; Caselli et al. 1996), time series (Bernard and Durlauf 1995, 1996; Carlino and 
Mills 1993, 1996a, 1996b; Evans and Karras 1996) and probability transition matrices 
(Quah 1993a, 1996a, 1996b) have been proposed (Beaumont et al. 2002). 
  Empirical convergence studies have attracted much attention as a research area 
since the seminal study of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), “Convergence across states 
and regions”. Convergence studies can be placed in three broad categories: 
cross-section studies for absolute or conditional convergence, panel data analyses, and 
time-series approach. According to the convergence methodology used, three types of 
approaches to convergence can be identified: 
1. The Barro regression approach 
Sigma convergence: variability of per capita income, as measured by the coefficient 
of variation, reduces over time.  
Beta convergence: this can be absolute or conditional convergence. Baumol 
(1986) rejected absolute beta convergence using a set of world countries, but Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1992) accepted conditional beta convergence on a set of world 
countries. 
The interest in regional convergence has been growing substantially in the last 
decade or so. The most widely-accepted method of testing the convergence hypothesis 
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is the regression approach developed by Barro and Sala–I-Martin (1995), known as 
the β-convergence approach. This method has been discussed from different points of 
view (see Durlauf and Quah (1999) for a review of the literature on economic 
convergence; and Magrini (2004) for a survey focusing on regional convergence 
studies). One of the critical points is that this approach tends to concentrate on the 
behaviour of the representative economy. In particular, it sheds light on the transition 
of this economy towards its own steady state, but provides no insight on the dynamics 
of the whole cross-sectional distribution of regional per capita incomes. Generally 
speaking, in fact a negative association between the growth rates and the initial 
conditions can be associated with a rising, declining and stationary cross-section 
income dispersion. Quah criticized that a method that cannot differentiate between 
convergence, divergence and stationarity (steady state behaviour) is of limited or no 
use).  
To overcome this problem, the combination of the β-convergence approach with 
the analysis of the evolution of the un-weighted cross-sectional standard deviation of 
the logarithm of per capita income has been proposed. A reduction over time of this 
measure of dispersion is referred to as σ-convergence. However, concentrating on the 
concept of σ-convergence does not represent an effective solution: analyzing the 
change of cross-sectional dispersion in per-capita income levels does not provide any 
information on the intra-distribution dynamics. Moreover, a constant standard 
deviation is consistent with very different dynamics ranging from criss-crossing and 
leap-fogging to persistent inequality. Distinguishing between these dynamics is, 
however, of essential importance.  
Quah criticised this approach saying that parametric tests generally refer to the 
behaviour of a representative unit, and they are then unsuitable to catch the more real 
situations of polarization and club convergence. Sigma and beta convergence 
approaches are shown to be uninformative about convergence in some cases, and the 
beta convergence approach does not properly consider the dynamics of change over 
time. 
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2. Panel data approach  
More recently, new testing procedures for the convergence hypothesis using panel 
data have been developed. These procedures bring together cross-sectional and time 
series analysis. Panel data estimates of the neoclassical model, which accommodated 
level effects for individual countries through heterogeneous intercepts, deal with some 
of the econometric difficulties arising in some of the earlier cross-sectional studies. 
Islam (1995) presented panel estimates of the neo-classical model which provide 
fixed effects for individual countries through heterogeneous intercepts (i.e. the ‘fixed 
effects’). Islam (1995) found that each steady state is better proxied by employing a 
fixed effects panel estimator, otherwise the convergence effect would be 
underestimated; he found evidence to support the convergence hypothesis for a set of 
world countries. Ismail (2008) tested for growth and convergence in Asean countries 
using a dynamic panel data approach.   
There are several advantages of using panel data over time series and cross 
section data. These include: (1) panel data usually provide a large number of 
observations, which increases degrees of freedom, reduces uncertainty among 
explanatory variables, and increases the probability of producing more reliable 
parameter estimates; (2) it is possible to specify and test sophisticated models that 
incorporate less restrictive behavioural assumptions. As there are large differences in 
the growth performance of states, which are due to regional factors such as 
differences in institutions, leadership and technological adoption, the use of panel data 
provides methods to examine the heterogeneity across statistical units; and (3) these 
data sets enable the identification and measurement of effects that are not observable 
in pure cross-section or time series analysis. For example, it has been argued that 
cross-sectional data reflect long run behaviour and time series data show short run 
effects, and so the combination of these two in a panel data set enable the formulation 
of a comprehensive dynamic structure (Hsiao 1986; Balestra 1996). 
3. Time series approach  
Bernard and Durlauf (1995) test the presence of common long-run trends between per 
capita GDP series. Hobjin and Franses (2000) propose an algorithm to detect clubs of 
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converging countries and rejected the convergence hypothesis, while Evans and 
Karras (1996) performed a unit root test on panel data and confirmed the convergence 
hypothesis. 
Mikael (2000) suggested a non-parametric time series testing to analyze the 
convergence of international output per capita gaps. Non-parametric tests are based on 
signs and ranks of time series properties of output differences. The methods are 
applied to logs of USA per capita income differences for 16 OECD countries from 
1900-1997. Oxley and Greasley (1995) utilized time-series data on Australia, UK and 
USA for the period 1870-1992, and time-series tests, to consider both catching-up, 
and long-run convergence. Wolff et al (2001) tried to use Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) methods to assess convergence using a time series and dynamic systems 
approach. 
Francisco (2003) used time series analysis to study how the gap between a number 
of countries and the USA evolves through time, and found that time series analysis 
provides a better insight into the concept of convergence than the cross-sectional one. 
In general, he found European countries catching up, convergence for East and South 
Asian countries, and neither for Latin American countries.  
 
2.2.2.3 Alternative Approaches  
 
Recently, some authors have developed alternative methods to the standard 
convergence analysis.  These are based on a Markov chain approach, and in 
particular on empirical transition probability matrices. Examples of this approach are 
the studies by Quah (1993, 1996a), Lopez-Bazo et al. (1999) and Rey (2001). These 
methods provide a set of measures and indicators that can describe the persistence or 
change in disparity conditions. A transition probability matrix is an analytical tool in a 
matrix format; each cell of the matrix shows the probabilities of a region making the 
transition from income category i to income category j over a certain period of time. 
When the income class boundaries that define the matrix are kept fixed, the analysis 
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also provides insights into the evolution of the distribution of territorial units across 
income class boundaries over time. Territorial income convergence would be 
reflected by the distribution concentrating in the middle income classes, while the 
opposite would indicate territorial divergence. Furthermore, a number of indices that 
summarize the mobility in the distribution can be calculated from the transition 
matrix. Mobility indices, and extension of them that include measures of mixing as 
defined in the previous section, are presented by Rey (2001).  Also, Lopez-Bazo et 
al. (1999) present a measure of ranking changes. These indices are referred to here for 
completeness of the review. Their application is not fully developed in the empirical 
part of the analysis, and further consideration should be given to these indicators in 
future research (Alasia 2002). 
More recently, a new approach to the analysis of convergence has been suggested 
in order to overcome such problems. This method, known as the intra-distribution 
dynamics approach (Quah 1996), examines directly how the whole income 
distribution changes over time and thus appears to be more informative than the 
convergence empirical analysis developed within the regression paradigm. 
The intra-distribution dynamics has been generally analyzed through the 
application of Markov chain methodologies (Quah 1996; López-Bazo et al. 1999; 
Fingleton 1997, 1999) or, more recently, through the estimation of conditional 
densities using stochastic kernel estimators (Quah 1997; Magrini 2004; Cheshire and 
Magrini 2005). All of the studies that make use of non-parametric stochastic kernel 
estimators6 provide contour plots of the conditional density to describe the law of 
motion of cross-sectional distributions7. In this way, they treat the conditional density 
                                                              
6 Definition of Kernel Estimation: Kernel estimation means the estimation of a regression 
function or probability density function. Such estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal if as 
the number of observations n goes to infinity, the bandwidth (window width) h goes to zero, and the 
product nh goes to infinity. http://economics.about.com/library/glossary/bldef-kernel-estimation.htm 
7 Cross-sectional distribution means a scientific method for the analysis of data distribution 
gathered from two or more samples at one point in time. Cross-sectional data or cross section (of a 
study population) in statistics and econometrics is a type of one-dimensional data set. Cross-sectional 
data refers to data collected by observing many subjects (such as individuals, firms or 
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function as a bivariate density function. However, it is important to note that the 
conditional density function is a “sequence of univariate functions” (Hyndman et al. 
1996).  
The above Barro regressions and the Markov transition matrix approach to the 
convergence hypothesis are relatively new. The Barro regression has the advantage of 
differentiating the effects of government policies and those of market mechanisms. By 
introducing explanatory variables such as the amount of public investments and 
dummies for regional policies into the right-hand side of the Barro regression, it is 
possible to distinguish the effect of market mechanisms from superficial phenomenon. 
However, the Markov transition matrix and classical indexes can provide basic 
information about regional income inequality, but they cannot differentiate between 
the effects of market mechanisms and those of policies.  
 
2.3  On the Methodologies of Measuring Convergence 
 
In the early 1990s, Barro and Sala-i-Martin initiated the branch of convergence 
research by proposing what has now become the classical theoretical concept of 
convergence analysis in two prominent papers: “Convergence across states and 
regions” (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991) and “Convergence” (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1992). In the following, the major points of this concept are introduced based on the 
convergence theories of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Romer (1996) and Durlauf 
and Quah (1998). 
 
2.3.1 The Central Model for Convergence Studies 
 
Given the convergence hypothesis of neo-classical growth theory, one requires a 
specification for its empirical testing. The question is whether the economy reveals 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
countries/regions) at the same point of time, or without regard to differences in time. Analysis of 
cross-sectional data usually consists of comparing the differences among the subjects.  
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β-convergence, i.e. whether growth rates are negatively related to the income gap, and 
how fast the economy converges to its steady state. This answer is given by the rate of 
convergence β. Equation (2.12)8 implies that the average growth rate of per capita 
output y over a period of time of length T is given by: 
(1/T).log[yT /y0]= x +(1- e-βt)/T·Log[y*/y0] (2.12) 
(remember that x is the growth rate of technology and the steady state growth rate of 
output p.c.). Let x be constant, then Eq. (2.12) models the dynamics in the Solow 
model and states that in a given interval T and for a specific rate of convergence β, the 
average growth rate of income depends negatively on the ratio of y0 to y*. Hence, the 
equation shows that the average growth rate must be higher the further away the 
economy is from the steady state.  
Note that for a given β, the coefficient (1- e-βt) /T establishing the relationship 
declines with the length of the time period. Its construction has the effect that for a 
longer time interval more of future lower growth rates are combined with present 
higher growth rates. In contrast, if one considers a fixed time interval T, then the 
coefficient becomes larger for higher β (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995: 81). 
 
2.3.2 Convergence Time 
 
To derive the corresponding convergence time for a given convergence rate one has to 
consider that Eq. (2. 13) is a differential equation in log[y(t)] with the solution: 
 log[y(t)] = (1 - e-βt) .log(y*) + e-βt log[y(0)] (2.13) 
where y(0) denotes per capita output at the beginning of a time period, y* is the 
steady state income and y(t) is an observation in between at time (t). 
The time t where y(t) is halfway between y(0) and y* satisfies the condition: 
   e-βt =1/2 . (2.14) 
Taking logs and solving with respect to t, the half-life H is: 
                                                              
8 Note: For the derivation of 2.13 see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995: 53). 
 
 69
  H = log (2)/β = 0.69/β.  (2.15) 
For example, if β is 0.02, the half life is 35 years (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995: 37; 
Romer 1996: 23). 
 
2.3.3 Estimating Absolute Convergence 
 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin consider a cross section of economies i in period T with two 
observations of per capita output Yi0 and yiT. The steady state income per capita of an 
economy is yi*, and xi* is the steady state growth rate of output, corresponding to the 
labour augmenting technological progress. 
The starting point is the convergence model of Eq. (2.16): 
(1/T).log[yiT / yi0]= x +(1- e-βt)/T·log[yi*/yi0]+ui0,T (2.16) 
In practice, estimation is effected with a reduced form (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995: 
387): 
(1/T).log[yiT / yi0]= α-[(1- e-βt)/T]·log[yi0]+ui0,T  (2.17a) 
In this specification, one does not find the steady state y* or the steady state growth 
rate x. Both are contained in the intercept a: 
 a = x + [(1 —e-βt)/T] [log(yi*)] . (2.17b) 
It is convenient to work with this reduced form as in practice neither the steady state 
of an economy nor its steady state growth rate are known. 
This specification states absolute convergence as it considers a common intercept 
a for the set of economies that represents the steady state according to Eq. (2.17b). 
We consider the case in which all economies converge to the same steady state 
income position. 
An empirical test for absolute convergence is provided by the growth process of 
US states. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) investigate income convergence 
among 48 US States for the period 1980-1988. The most striking result from their 
study is that the authors find an absolute convergence process in all sub-periods, 
except for the Great Depression period and the 1980s. However, the speed of 
convergence changes somewhat. It reaches 2% in the beginning of the century, 1% 
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between 1930 and 1940, soars to 4% in the post-war time, and stays at 2% during the 
3 decades after 1950 (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991: 118). Consequently the 
dispersion of personal income across US States dropped from 0.55 in 1880 to 0.15 in 
1980. 
 
2.3.4 Estimating Conditional Convergence 
 
If we consider a large group of countries from around the world, then we should not 
expect that they have a common steady state income. 
The Solow model shows that differences in the savings ratio and in technology A 
affect the steady state income position — besides differences in population growth n 
and capital depreciation σ.  
One can consider that the level of technology represents a number of persistent, 
positive or negative factors which determine the level of the output curve and steady 
state values of k* and y*,  for example good or bad government policies, 
institutional efficiency and educational level. Such differences in fundamental factors 
would lead to steady state differences. Such differences can be captured by various 
variables contained in the vector X, which can proxy for the steady state: 
(1/T).log[yiT / yi0]= α-[(1- e-βt)/T]·log[yi0] + Xi +ui0,T. (2.18) 
 It is important to note that conditional convergence analysis tests for convergence 
to different steady states and not to a common one. Any estimation for convergence, 
which includes other variables, even if they are only dummy variables for each 
economy, investigates convergence to different steady state incomes. 
Conditional convergence has a less clear effect on the development of the 
dispersion of incomes. Only if steady state differences show a small deviation can one 
expect a decline of income disparities from convergence. On the other hand, if steady 
state differences are large, σ-convergence may not happen. 
There is widespread empirical evidence now for conditional convergence. 
However, absolute convergence was the most interesting finding of the original 
convergence studies. Employing the concept of conditional convergence, Barro (1991) 
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initiated research in the field of global income convergence. As mentioned before, one 
cannot assume the appropriateness of the absolute convergence hypothesis in the case 
of a large set of heterogeneous countries, which will have quite important steady state 
differences. Therefore, the investigation should rather be for conditional convergence. 
Barro (1991) introduced the methodology to include structural variables, variables on 
human capital and socio-political features to approximate for differences in steady 
state income. He showed that the convergence hypothesis in the sense of conditional 
convergence can be verified also for a worldwide group of 98 countries. The 
convergence coefficient is slightly smaller and reaches 1.8% for the large set of 
countries in the period from 1960-1985. Growth rates and hence the catching-up of 
poor regions are positively determined by the availability of human capital, and 
negatively by political instability. On the other hand, if steady state differences are not 
accounted for one cannot find convergence in the large country set (β is negative in 
that case, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992: 242). The inclusion of proxy variables for 
steady state differences also raises the convergence rate of the OECD countries to the 
benchmark value of 2 % (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992: 242). 
 
2.4 Spatial Analysis  
 
In recent years the so-called new economic geography and the issue of regional 
economic convergence have increasingly drawn the interest of economists to the 
empirical analysis of regional and spatial data. In all the aforementioned notions of 
convergence, the spatial dimension of the data under consideration is completely 
neglected. Because these spatial effects are largely ignored, problems of model 
mis-specification in the previous convergence analysis may arise; in particular, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates ignoring spatial effects — as in the standard 
β-convergence approach — will be inefficient and/or biased (Anselin 1988). 
  Spatial effects refer to spatial dependence (autocorrelation) and/or spatial hetero-
geneity - it is not an easy task to differentiate between them practically. Spatial 
autocorrelation implies that the observations (economies) in cross-sectional data are 
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not independent. Following Anselin (1988: 11), it means “the existence of a 
functional relationship between what happens at one point in space and what happens 
elsewhere”. Spatial dependence can originate either as a result of a true spatial 
interaction among the economies (substantive spatial dependence) or as a 
measurement error problem (nuisance spatial dependence). 
  Spatial heterogeneity comes from the lack of homogeneity of the economies 
under consideration. From the perspective of regional economics, regional 
convergence studies should consider the possibility of spatial dependencies and the 
distance to consumer markets as an influential factor for the income development of a 
region. 
 In relation to the first point, since regions are small and highly open economic 
systems, it is fairly self-evident that their income development would be highly linked 
to those of their neighbouring regions. The dependence on other regions’ income 
decreases with distance. A regression of regional income, that neglects the distance 
factor, may have spatially auto-correlated residuals. Hence regional income y, is 
modeled in a spatially auto-correlated errors model (see Fingleton 1995: 7-9; Anselin 
1988): 
log(yt+1,i) = b0 + b1 log(yi,t) + ei,  (2.19) 
ei= p∑jWijej+ ui,, ui=N(0,σ2), (2.20) 
where Wij is a matrix which considers the auto-correlation between a region i and all 
other regions j as a function of the distance dij between them. It is defined as: 
Wij*=1/dij2, e.g. if dij<250km, i,j=1,….n 
Wij*=0        if dij>250km  
Wij= Wij*/∑j Wij*.                    (2.21) 
Another simple ‘way of taking spatial dependence into account is to normalize a 
region’s income on the average of all surrounding regions’ income, as performed by’ 
Quah (1996). 
 In relation to the second important spatial factor determining regional income, 
the closeness to large consumer markets — as emphasized, for example, in 
demand-oriented models of regional growth (Kaldor 1970) and the agglomeration 
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effect of the new economic geography models — can be captured by a term that is 
familiar in gravity models: 
  MPi = ∑j Yjf(dij).  (2.22) 
The potential consumer market of a region i, MPi, is given by the income of 
other regions’ Yj, ,j=1,……….N, weighted by the distance dij between both regions. 
Regional income then can be written: 
 logyi,t+1 = b0 + b1 log(yi,t) + MPi + ui  (2.23) 
While spatial dependency was found to be an important explanatory for regional 
income (e.g. Fingleton 1995), the closeness to important consumer markets has lost its 
significance in determining a region’s income over the 1980s (Maurseth 1999: 39). 
Thus, dynamic income regions have also emerged in the periphery, and need not 
necessarily be close to rich regions. 
 The statistical device usually employed to test for the presence of spatial 
dependence (spatial correlation) is the Global Moran’s I statistic. The spatial 
dependence measure for each period t is provided by a global statistic such as 
Moran’s I statistic, which can be represented by equation 2.24. 
 (2.24) 
where iy  is the variable under consideration in spatial unit i in year t; y  is the 
average of the variable over all regions in year t; n is the number of spatial units (in 
this case the number of provinces in country); wij is an element on the ith row and jth 
column of the matrix of n×n weights. wij is a non-stochastic square matrix of which 
the elements represent the intensity of the interdependence between each pair of 
economies; in the simplest case wij=1 if the economies i and j are neighbors and 0 
otherwise. Global Moran’s I statistic provides only a limited set of spatial association 
measurements. So in order to get a better result of spatial dependency, it is necessary 
to carry out Local Moran’s Ii Statistic. Local Moran’s I is a local spatial 
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autocorrelation statistic based on the Moran’s I statistic.  According to Anselin 
(1995), a local Moran statistic for a point i is defined as 
 (2.25) 
where 
  (2.26) 
Another dimension of the convergence analysis is that regional economic growth 
may follow a spatial pattern. Spatial dependence can be handled in beta convergence 
in alternative ways: The first approach, through the spatial error model, assumes that 
the spatial dependence operates through the error process, where any random shock 
follows a spatial pattern, so that shocks are correlated across adjacent regional 
economies, such that the error term in equation (2.28) may reveal a significant degree 
of spatial covariance, which can be represented as follows: 
( ) iiiit uyyy ++= 00 loglog δα  (2.27) 
iii Wuu ερ +=               (2.28) 
So substituting (2.28) into model (2.27) results in a spatial error regression given by 
(2.29) as below: 
( ) ερδα +++= iiiit Wuyyy 00 loglog  (2.29) 
where ρ is the spatial error coefficient, εi is a white noise error component and W is a 
spatial weighting matrix. W may be constructed using information on physical 
distance between pair wise combinations of economies in the sample or may be 
defined such that element wij = 1 if i and j are physically adjacent and 0 otherwise. 
Here, the latter approach is preferred.  
Alternatively, the spatial lag model examines the extent to which regional growth 
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rates depend on the growth rates of adjacent regions, conditioning on the level of 
initial income:  
( ) ( ) iiitiiit uyyWyyy +++= 000 logloglog ρδα  (2.30) 
where ρ denotes the spatial autoregressive parameter.  
Moreover, the spatial cross-regressive model allows any spatial spillovers to be 
reflected in the initial levels of income as follows: 
( ) iiiiit uyWyyy +++= 000 logloglog τδα  (2.31) 
where τ represents the spatial spillovers. 
Despite the convincing argument of spatial dependency in regional convergence 
analysis, there does not seem to be a way to combine it with panel data estimation 
techniques. Therefore one has to choose whether to consider spatial dependency more 
important or region-specific steady state effects as more important. 
 
 
2.5 The Econometric Methods Applied in this Study  
 
There are different concepts of convergence and each one requires its own type of 
measurement technique. However, the concepts of σ-convergence and β-convergence 
continue to be the most popular methods of measurement. The former method 
evaluates convergence through the time evolution of a summary measure of 
dispersion and the latter method through the estimate of cross-section regression. 
As has been shown, there are other ways to evaluate the convergence processes 
that are also revealing. Among these are the Gini and Theil inequality measures. 
These indices permit the disaggregation of the convergence process (or divergence~ 
into different components. 
This study employs the following econometric methods with cross-national 
convergence estimation and provincial convergence estimation for each country, 
according to the comparability and availability of statistical data and indicators.  
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2.5.1 Integrative Approaches 
 
It can be seen from the above experimental studies, critiques and methods that all 
debates centred on convergence or divergence have focussed on the measurement of 
the trend in income inequality and economic growth in regional development. These 
convergence concepts and tests have been substantially criticized in the recent 
literature both on theoretical and methodological grounds and several econometric 
problems are often raised (such as being unrealistic in empirical cases (Arbia 2005). 
Still, some researchers have argued for convergence while some others disagree. In 
relation to the convergence concepts used, econometric problems, such as 
heterogeneity, omitted variables, model uncertainty, outliers9, endogeneity10 and 
measurement errors, are often raised and alternative techniques like panel data, time 
series and probability transition matrices proposed. Divergence and convergence will 
remain a ‘hot’ topic not only in regional economic and econometric science, but also 
in social and political science. Looking for evidence of income convergence among 
the world’s nations has become a fashionable pursuit. The tendency for poorer 
countries to grow faster than richer ones and, hence, for their levels of income to 
converge — has recently again received a great deal of attention in the economics 
literature. Through the convergence comparisons of Canada and China, we will 
explore in this thesis the possibility of existing convergence or divergence using the 
Barro regression methods in different time series. 
 One notable limitation of the research described earlier in this chapter is that 
there has been a general tendency to focus on a single economic variable while 
ignoring other relevant ones. Economic performance by itself is an insufficient 
indicator for understanding regional development. One can argue that the analysis has 
to include the whole range of dimensions (from physical to social and political 
                                                              
9 In statistics, an outlier is an observation that is numerically distant from the rest of the data.  
10 In econometrics the problem of endogeneity occurs when the independent variable is correlated with 
the error term in a regression model. This implies that the regression coefficient in an OLS regression 
is biased. 
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conditions) that determine a region’s sustainable development potential.  
 The notion of territorial disparity has a complex connotation even when 
attention is focused on one indicator only, such as per capita income. It has been 
acknowledged that, in order to generate a better understanding of territorial trends, it 
is necessary to rely on a comprehensive set of indicators that capture the multiplicity 
and complexity of the underling spatial processes (Alasia, 2003). 
 Regional development is a dynamic process. Convergence (or divergence) is not 
static. All the factors related to the regional manifestation of the economy are in the 
process of changing temporally and spatially. Neither the steady-state equilibrium nor 
the speed of convergence is unique and constant across countries and time. So the 
econometric analysis of convergence (or divergence) processes across countries or 
regions which analyzes trends in convergence (or divergence) should be capable of 
showing the characteristics of these dynamic processes.  
This research attempts to answer the question of whether the convergence would 
be better described as dynamic or as static. It will have different results when it is 
applied to countries of a different state (developed or developing), and a lengthy 
period of time (with sub-periods) is required to combine theoretical development with 
empirical research methods. But it should be clear that convergence methods should 
be adapted to the specific conditions prevailing in Canada and China in the different 
time periods. For Canada and China given that they are large and diverse countries, 
integrative approaches will be used to compare cross-national and national analysis. 
One interesting line of research that is proposed is to extend the analysis to include 
convergence not only in economic indicators, but also in social, and environmental 
indicators including policy factors.  
Initially, convergence studies started by using a single variable, GDP. Many 
researchers dealt with regional GDP per capita to measure convergence (e.g. Easterlin 
1958; Mera 1975; Colen 1978; Richardson 1978; Fields and Schultz 1980; Israeli and 
Lin 1984; Fisch 1984). However, convergence does not involve only GDP per capita, 
and other researchers have used a number of variables such as education, migration, 
employment, public services and consumption (e.g. Andrews 1974; Schneider 1975; 
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Kuz 1978; Smith 1979; Wasserman and Chua 1980; Lipshits 1993).  
Theoretically, it is relatively straightforward to compare personal income among 
individuals, but it is more difficult to measure disparities in, for example, per capita 
income between Canada and China. To deal with this, there are at least three possible 
measures of territorial disparity. The first considers the differences in GDP per capita 
among regions, i.e., each region (national or provincial scale) is considered as an 
“individual”. This implies giving the same importance to all regions. In practice, 
however, policy makers may be more concerned by low GDP per capita in a region 
with a greater population than in a region with few inhabitants.  
 The second possibility is, therefore, to weight regions by population. This 
method, however, does not take into account the “geography” of regions. In particular, 
since rural areas are less populated than urban areas, an index weighted by population 
would systematically underrate disparities between rural and urban regions.  
 A third option is, therefore, to weight regions by their area (ideally, only 
inhabitable area, i.e., excluding for example, deserts and glaciers, but this information 
is not available for all regions). 
 Based on the data of a weighted coefficient by territorial size and population, this 
study uses some other alternative variables for measuring income disparity including 
both economic and social indicators. Using only one variable cannot explain the total 
picture of convergence. For example, Canada which has a very high GDP per capita 
has had a lower level of productivity than several developing countries in some 
industrial sectors. China has a very high growth rate but lower GDP per capita.  
 Thus, in this research an integrated overall convergence method is applied to 
obtain a clearer picture of convergence of the two countries, and the two provinces. 
The general methodology proposed is now presented. 
  Based on Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s classic model which involves analyses using 
each variable separately, the approach combines univariate analysis of each variable 
as well as multivariate statistical analysis. For purposes of presentation, the following 
discussion focuses on the use of GDP per capita for the two countries. 
 Absolute β convergence analyses use each variable separately. The simplest 
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version of the classic model obtains a single β coefficient for the single time period 
under consideration. 
  For example, Barro and Sala-I-Martin (Sala-I-Martin 1996a) examined the 
growth and dispersion of personal income in several regions and countries by 
conducting regressions using the following equation: 
ln(yi0+T/yio)/T=α0+α1ln(yio)+εi   (2.32) 
where  
yi0 – initial GDP per capita in region i 
T – number of years in observation period 
α0,α1 – parameters to be estimated 
εi- normally and independently distributed error term. 
and where ln (yi,t) is the natural logarithm of economy i’s real GDP per capita at time 
t, T is a positive interval of time and ln(yi0+T/yio)/T is economy i’s log annualized 
growth rate of real GDP between t-T and t. Here a negative value of β implies 
convergence, whereas a positive β implies divergence. 
 We consider multiple sub-periods within the overall time period, and estimate a 
first-stage β coefficient for each one of the t sub-periods for each variable which was 
used in this study. The β coefficient is weighted by territorial size and population of 
each country. This convergence methodological approach follows two different 
dimensions, i.e. cross-country analysis and cross-region analysis in Canada and China 
separately at the national scale. 
For the estimation results of β-convergence at the national level the following 
model is used. Based on Model 1, the provincial beta convergence of each country 
can be calculated:  
by regressing the average growth rate of per capita GDP between time t
beg 
= 1981 
and time t
end 
= 2007 on initial income at time t
beg 
= 1981 where:  
(lnY
it(end) 
– lnY
it(beg) 
)/ T = α + βlnY
it(beg) 
+ μ
i 
(2.33)  
Here, i is the index for each region where i = 1 to 10 in Canada while i = 1 to 31 in 
China. Time is indexed by t where t(beg) = 1981 and t(end) = 2007. The sample 
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period is indexed by T where T = 27 years for the whole period.  
lnY = natural log of real per capital income.  
α = constant term and μ
i 
= random error term. 
A statistically significant and negative β suggests absolute income convergence. 
Absolute convergence hypothesis is not supported by any empirical proof, though, 
particularly when studying the economies of different States or regional economies of 
different States. Conditional convergence, in turn, occurs when the relation between 
the growth rate of per capita output and its initial level is negative once we have 
controlled for factors that condition the steady state. In other words, the economies 
converge only when we take into account the factors that are specific to the steady 
state toward which they are moving. To test for conditional β-convergence, we extend 
equation 2.35 below by using a set of dummy variables to control for country-specific 
effects that differ between individual countries and affect the growth of per capita 
growth rate. By accounting for these unobserved differences of both countries, it can 
be determined whether or not country-specific effects influence the test of 
convergence:  
(1/T).log[yiT / yi0]= α-[(1- e-βt)/T]·log[yi0] + Xi +ui0,T. (2.34) 
Then, this traditional regression model can be changed into the following form: 
( lny
it(end) 
– lny
it(beg) 
)/ T = β0 + β1lnyit(beg) + β2X1 + β3X2 + β4X3 +βnXn+ μit     (2.35)  
where yi0 – initial GDP per capita in region i,  
T – number of years in observation period, 
β0, β1... βn - parameters to be estimated,  
εi– normally and independently distributed error term. 
When the estimated coefficient β1 is negative, poor economies tend to grow faster 
than rich ones. The annual rate of convergence β1 can be obtained from the equation 
β=−ln(1−β1)/T, where T denotes the number of years between the initial and the final 
year of observation.
 
    In addition, the spatial analysis method is also taken into consideration in 
convergence analysis. Since this was already stated in section 2.4, it is not repeated 
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here. 
  Relative Difference Indexes (WCV, Gini or Theil according to data availability), 
convergence analysis and spatial analysis are used to compare the province of Quebec 
with the province of Xinjiang at the regional scale, by focusing on the metropolitan 
areas of Montreal and Urumqi using sectoral analysis to identify the key factors in the 
regional economies of those regions. 
 For the provinces of Quebec and Xinjiang, a similar analysis of the evolution of 
regional disparities is undertaken at the level of the major urban regions and 
metropolitan regions (statistical reporting units) and the remainder of the two 
provinces using the most similar statistical units for which comparable data are 
available (Regional Administrative units in Quebec from the ISQ, and similar units 
from the Statistical Bureau of Xinjiang). 
At both scales of analysis (country, province and infra-provincial), additional 
variables are incorporated as the study progresses (including additional economic 
variables as well as social and environmental variables such as the Human 
Development Index) and/or alternative measurements into the model for a potentially 
more comprehensive assessment of the convergence picture. An integrated approach 
in which multiple key economic variables are simultaneously considered can be 
expected to yield an enhanced understanding of convergence. 
The final component in the research methodology deals with the search for 
different explanations of the results of convergence-divergence at the different scales. 
At the level of the two countries and their provinces, this will involve confronting the 
results from this research with those of other researchers, identifying the different 
policies and regional development programs such as centralization and 
decentralization including growth pole oriented policy over the study period and the 
principal ministerial and other governmental actors involved. The analysis in this 
thesis on this subject here centres on an analysis of policy documents, including 
evaluations undertaken by the respective governments. At the level of the two 
provinces and their intra-provincial convergence-divergence patterns, a similar 
analysis is undertaken, taking into account of course that federal and central state 
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programs are also operative in each province. This thesis presents an original analysis 
of the patterns of regional convergence-divergence at two different scales of analysis, 
and confronts the patterns observed and the researcher’s explanations with the 
perspectives of key players and knowledgeable resource people (e.g. other researchers 
such as Mario Polèse, Richard Shearmur and Serge Coulombe). 
The final stage of this research involves synthesizing all of the results and 
constructing a number of scenarios based on postulates regarding the efficacy of 
public intervention, on-going regional development processes, and selecting the most 
reasonable scenarios upon which to base proposals.  
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Chapter 3 
Regional Policy, Disparity and Convergence 
 
This chapter lays out the national contexts for the thesis research. The primary 
intention is to present their regional policies, analyze regional disparity in each 
country initially, and then measure the regional convergence process between Canada 
and China over the past five decades, to provide a critical analysis of the way in 
which national policy makers have dealt with regional issues.  
Although the focus of this chapter is the analysis of cross-country disparities 
between Canada and China, three preliminary matters are identified which need to be 
addressed before presenting the empirical results. In the first few sections of this 
chapter, an overview of regional growth and regional development policies of both 
countries and their economic place in the world by growth level and rate of change 
are provided from 1950 to the present. Then, an attempt is made to answer the 
question whether China has succeeded in achieving convergence with Canada in 
relation to GDP per capita as well as in relation to other indicators. The main purpose 
of presenting this material is to provide a background for the interpretation of the 
empirical convergence analysis presented in the following chapter which focuses on 
the more recent periods.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Since China’s economic reform in 1978, China has witnessed rapid economic 
transformation and growth with an average annual GDP growth rate of 10%. This has 
subsequently triggered a boom in comparative studies of different countries with 
China. Since World War II, Canada has enjoyed solid economic growth except for a 
few slowdowns in its economy (Figure 3.2). The impressive growth of the 
manufacturing, mining, and service sectors has transformed Canada from a largely 
rural economy into one that is primarily industrial and urban.  
Since it is a territorially large and fast developing country, China has faced 
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pronounced problems of regional disparities across its provinces and at the 
intra-provincial scale. Not only is China a vast country with the largest population in 
the world, but it is hard to imagine a country more regionally diverse than China. 
Canada is a territorially large, developed country, and since its early days has been a 
collection of diverse provinces in terms of economy, natural resources wealth, 
population size and culture. Canada is a Federal country; Federal-provincial relations 
reflect the complex and multifaceted networks of influence which have developed 
between Canada's federal and provincial governments. These relationships have 
become a central element of Canadian government and policymaking, and a 
fundamental characteristic of Canadian federalism. This fact is perhaps more 
important than physiographic and other differences (Simeon 1985). It should not 
therefore come as a surprise that regional considerations have always been a core 
ingredient of national economic policy in both countries. For much of the last 50 
years, Canada has been viewed as having one of the highest standards of living in the 
world due in large part to the high incomes generated by her economy, its resource 
base and its relationships with the US.  
Before analyzing for the convergence of regional incomes, it is appropriate to 
recall the pattern of economic growth, the behaviour of regional development policy 
and the evolution of income disparities at the national scale for each country. 
 
3.2 Economic Growth 
 
In 2008, Global output rose by 3.8%, down from the 5.2% rate of 2007. Among major 
economies, growth was led by China (9.8%), Russia (7.4%) and India (7.3%). 
Worldwide, nations varied widely in their growth results, with Macau (15%), 
Azerbaijan (13.2%) and Angola (11.6%) registering the highest rates of growth 
(WDR 2008; Figure 3.1). 
     Growth rates slowed in all the major industrial countries (Canada 0.5%) and 
most developing countries, because of uncertainties in financial markets and a drop in 
consumer confidence. The world economy was beginning to show signs of recovery 
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by mid-2009. Canada's GDP grew 2.5% in 2007 and edged up 0.5%in 2008. Although 
the IMF in July 2009 predicted the 2009 GDP would contract 2.3%, this was still the 
best anticipated performance of any G8 nation. The forecast was for 1.6% growth in 
2010, double that of the US and better than any other G8 country except Japan.1 
 
Figure 3.1 Economic Growth of the World 
 
Source: WDR (2008) 
  
It is estimated that China’s economy will recover quickly and return to its ‘normal’ 
annual speed of 8%. It is expected that the Canadian economy will recover slowly 
while the real GDP will fall by 2.9% in 2009 according to the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s Country Forecast (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009). 
 
Figure 3.2 Annual Average Growth Rate of GDP per Capita: Comparison 
between Canada and China (%), 1961 – 2008 
 
Source: Based on the data of the World Bank Group, 2008 
                                                              
1 http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/canada/ 
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3.2.1 Canada’s Place in the World by Growth Level  
 
From the per capita GDP growth rate in Figure 3.2, it can be seen that the Canadian 
economy appeared to be more steady compared to the fluctuating Chinese economy 
between 1961 and 2008. Even so, there have been several highs and lows in Canada’s 
economic history. As an affluent, high-tech (relatively speaking) industrial country, 
Canada resembles the US in its market-oriented economic system, pattern of 
production and affluent living standards. Canada occupies a major northern portion of 
North America, sharing land borders with the contiguous US to the south and with the 
US state of Alaska to the northwest, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the east to 
the Pacific Ocean in the west; to the north lies the Arctic Ocean. In terms of total area 
(including its waters), Canada is the second largest country in the world after Russia 
and the largest on the continent. By total GDP (PPP- Purchasing Power Parity) it 
ranks 13th in the world, and by per capita GDP (PPP) and by HDI, it ranked 14th and 
4th respectively in 2007. By land area it ranks fourth, after Russia, China and the 
United States.  
    The Canadian economy is the eighth largest in the world according to the IMF. 
The Canadian economy is diversified and highly developed. The foundation of the 
Canadian economy is foreign trade and the US is by far the nation's largest trade 
partner. Foreign trade is responsible for about 45% of the nation's gross domestic 
product (GDP). Canada is one of the few developed nations that is a net exporter of 
energy2. As of 2007, its nominal GDP was $1.274 trillion, with a growth of 2.7%. It is 
part of the G8 and other 'rich clubs' such as the OECD. Since World War II, the 
impressive growth of the manufacturing, mining and service sectors has transformed 
the nation from a largely rural economy into one that is primarily industrial and urban. 
The service sector which now accounts for nearly 67.9% of GDP is very diverse and 
includes the retail sector, financial services, real estate, education, health, high-tech 
(IT or information technology), entertainment and tourism. All these sectors are 
developing at a rapid rate with retail and health leading growth. The service industry 
                                                              
2 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/GDP-Growth.aspx?Symbol=CAD#ixzz0iO0IhsAY 
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employs 75% of the 17.9 million working Canadians. Although manufacturing has 
never been a dominant sector of the economy, it has been  important  and produces 
for instance a significant number of cars and light aircraft,  mainly in central 
Canada3. 
    Natural resources contribute significantly to Canada’s total wealth. Fuelled by 
rising resource prices, Canada’s natural resource wealth grew, on average, 10% per 
year during the last decade. This growth rate would have been higher if extraction 
costs had not risen significantly during this period. In 2006, natural resource wealth - 
the dollar value of selected natural resource reserves - stood above $1 trillion or more 
than $30,000 per capita. In 2006, energy resources accounted for 57% of total 
resource wealth, followed by timber (24%) and mineral resources (19%). For much of 
the decade, natural resource wealth increased rapidly, with resource prices playing a 
substantial role in the expansion of this wealth4. Oil and lumber - including pulp and 
paper - are two major industries and exports. According to the U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS)5, Canada has the second-largest oil reserves in the world, with its large oil 
and gas reserves in Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan and the Athabasca 
Tar Sands. Canadian mines are leading producers of nickel, gold, diamonds, uranium 
and lead. Canada is also one of the largest exporters of soft commodities including 
grains and wheat in particular.  
The Canadian economy has enjoyed substantial development and GDP has not 
stopped increasing since the Second World War except for a few periods of recession 
and economic stagnation (Figure 3.2). The period from the end of the war in 1945 to 
the early 1970s ranks as one of the most prosperous in Canada’s economic history. 
The standard of living, as measured by real per capita income, more than doubled in a 
single generation. The liberalization of trade opened markets for Canadian goods and 
services and provided lower-cost imports. The economy in the first decade of the 21st 
century is larger, richer and much transformed compared to that of 1945. In 2002 
                                                              
3 http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/canada/ 
4 http://www.statcan.ca. EnviroStats, Winter 2007, Vol. 1, no.3, Catalogue no. 16-002-X 
5 http://www.usgs.gov/ 
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constant prices, GDP increased from $257 billion in 1961 to $1279 billion in 2009, a 
factor of nearly 5 times (Figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.3 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Increase of Canada  
(in 2002 constant prices, $ Million) 
  
Source: Statistics Canada. Table 380-0017 . Gross domestic product (GDP), expenditure-based, annual. 
Prices=2002 constant prices. 
 
Norrie et al. (2002) provide a detailed discussion of the economic development 
history and regional development policy of Canada for the period from 1945 until 
2000 in their book “A History of the Canadian Economy”. In it, they argued that the 
constancy in the relative position of the Canadian economy in the postwar period is 
surprising, given the type and magnitude of economic change that has taken place. 
The resource boom of the early 1950s, the stubborn recession that followed toward 
the end of 1956 and the boom of the 1960s altered the trend lines only slightly, and 
then only temporarily. Aggregate growth rates did, however, differ markedly among 
provinces. But interregional trade and capital and labour flows were sufficient to 
offset these differences in economic opportunity. Ontario, Alberta and British 
Colombia grew faster in these years, but they did not noticeably become much richer 
relatively speaking. Atlantic Canada grew more slowly, but managed to retain its 
relative living standards. 
Wallace (2002) also offers a detailed account of the evolution of Canadian 
economy and economic forces after the Second World War in his book “A Geography 
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of Canadian Economy”. Wallace (2002: 5) stated that Canada’s rapid economic 
development growth in the 1950s and 1960s rested on large firms of leading 
industries that contributed to the well-being of the wider society through a taxation 
system that provided the basis for expanded government investment in public health, 
education and other benefits (such as pensions) of the welfare state, with the added 
contribution of steady immigration from Europe and the growing demand of US 
industries for Canadian natural resources. 
The Canadian economy experienced an extended boom for the period 1962 to 
1973. Several factors such as the spread of prosperity of European countries to 
Canada, sustained development of the US, and natural resources development and 
export to the US, contributed to the strength and duration of this economic expansion. 
The most notable development in the manufacturing sector in this period undoubtedly 
was the Autopact6. The agreement brought about duty-free trade in the auto industry 
between Canada and the US, and boosted the Canadian auto-industry. 
Norrie et al. (2002) also  pointed out that foreign capital entered Canada to 
take advantage of the earnings opportunities available and that entry was facilitated by 
a relatively liberal policy. The great surge in investment came in the 1950s; by 1960, 
the basic patterns were set with 80% of the capital being held by Americans and 60% 
of Canadian manufacturing being foreign controlled, including 75% of oil and gas 
activity and 60% of mining. Investment continued after 1960, but it was more or less 
in line with the growth of the economy. Canada was growing rapidly during these 
years, creating both high and rising wages and employment opportunities, and was 
thus an attractive destination. Its political stability and generally high quality of life 
merely added to its attractivity. The supply of labour to the economy grew over time 
in separate ways - in domestic population, in immigration and increases in 
participation rates. The decade after 1970 was one of the most challenging in 
Canada’s political and economic history. Many of Canada’s difficulties during this 
period stemmed from the international economy being affected by the oil crisis of 
                                                              
6 See more about Canada-US Automotive Products Agreement at 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0001245 
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1973. Macroeconomic performance deteriorated markedly and in ways that seemed to 
contradict current theory about the operation of a modern industrial economy. Growth 
slowed, leading some to look beyond cyclical factors to fundamental weaknesses in 
the economy. Policies once sought to promote growth or equity started to be seen as 
doing just the opposite. The federal-provincial consensus which had seemed (to some 
observers at least) to facilitate innovative policy formation, disintegrated into regional 
strife. 
Norrie’s et al. (2002: 415) analyzed these changes and showed that as a trading 
nation, Canada could not avoid dealing with the growth slowdown and stagflation that 
were gripping the industrial world during the 1970s. The macroeconomic record 
during this period illustrates the extent of the difficulties. GDP growth fell to 4.4% in 
1974, from 7.7% a year earlier, and to 2.6% in 1975. It rose to 6.2% in 1976. After the 
economic disaster year of 1981, GDP grew at quite respectable rates for the next six 
years. By mid 1989, the Canadian dollar appreciated due to the tight monetary policy 
of Canada related to a resurgence in inflation. As a result, real GDP rose by only 2.9% 
in 1989 compared with 5% in 1988, then declined in both 1990 and 1991 for only the 
third and fourth time in the postwar period, and rose by less than 1% in 1992. The 
Canadian economy entered into its second recession in a decade, this one the worst at 
the time since the great depression. Economic growth strengthened after 1993. Real 
rates of growth have averaged nearly 3.0% since 1993 until quite recently.  
International and inter-provincial trade affects the regional incomes of a 
geographically large country due to the different trade links and volume of trade 
emanating from each region. It is one of the major factors contributing to regional 
disparity. Canada has long enjoyed strong economic ties with the US. The 1989 
US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and 1994 North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) (which included Mexico) touched off a dramatic increase in 
trade and economic integration with the US.  
The rise of the US as Canada's chief trading partner and source of foreign 
investment since WWII has benefited some regions more than others. Southern 
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Ontario has benefitted not only from its access to the Great Lakes but also because of 
its proximity to the major industrial zones of the American Midwest. The integration 
of Canada into the North American economy has contributed to the isolation of 
Atlantic Canada, whose economy traditionally had strong links with the UK. In more 
recent years, the growth of the PACIFIC RIM economies (Japan, China, California) 
has benefited BC and, to some extent, Alberta (Polèse 1987). 
Canada enjoys a substantial trade surplus with the US, which absorbs nearly 80% 
of Canadian exports each year. Canada is the US's largest foreign supplier of energy, 
including oil, gas, uranium and electric power. Given its great natural resources, 
skilled labour force, and modern capital plant, Canada has enjoyed solid economic 
growth, and prudent fiscal management produced consecutive balanced budgets from 
1997 to 20077. Real GDP grew at an annual average rate of 3.7% between 1994 and 
2000, compared to 2.7% between 1983 and 1993. Much of this growth was the result 
of an extraordinary economic expansion in the US after 1995. The US economy 
slowed appreciably in the winter of 2001 and, predictably, the Canadian economy 
followed suit (Wallace 2002).  
Figure 3.4 Real GDP per Capita from 1991-2007 
 
Source: Canadian Economic Observer, Statistics Canada – Catalogue no. 11-210-X : 105 (2008). 
The slow growth in real GDP per capita in the 1990-1997 period reflects the 
sharp recession of the early 1990s. In the early 1990s, the effects of the recession 
were compounded by restructuring associated with the implementation of the 
Canada-US Free Trade Agreements. The 1997-2003 period was characterized by a 
                                                              
7 Https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ca.html 
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major turnaround in almost all key indicators of economic activity: unemployment 
fell, inflation remained in check and there was a surge in economic growth (Figure 
3.3). 
From 1991 to 2006, Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP), which reflects the 
total value of all goods and services produced by a nation, experienced continuous 
growth (Figure 3.4). The services sector dominates the economy—it accounted for 
more than two-thirds of GDP in 2006. Services have also been the driving force of 
Canada’s economic growth, expanding nearly 17% over the last five years—or almost 
twice as fast as the goods-producing sector, which grew just over 9%. The continuing 
resources boom has shifted economic growth from east to west. Since 2003, Alberta 
and British Columbia have outpaced the nation. Ontario and Quebec, the traditional 
manufacturing centres, have fallen short of the national average from 2003 to 20068 
(Economic Accounts, 2007). 
Figure 3.5 Real Gross Domestic Product Growth, 2008 
 
Source: Statistic Canada. Provincial and Territorial Economic Accounts Review Catalogue no. 
13-016-XIE, Vol. 5, no. 1, 2009.. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/13-016-x/13-016-x2009001-eng.htm 
 
In 2008, economic growth slowed sharply as a result of the global economic 
downturn, the US housing slump, plunging auto sector demand and a drop in world 
commodity prices. Public finances, too, deteriorated for the first time in a decade. 
Based on the statistics report of Provincial and Territorial Economic Accounts 
Review, 2009, Statistic Canada, output in most goods producing industries was down 
in 2008 with manufacturing and forestry strongly affected. Growth in services 
                                                              
8 Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11-402-XIE. 
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industries generally slowed. GDP growth in five provinces and two territories 
surpassed that of the national economy. These regions tended to have strong growth in 
their construction industry or enough personal or government expenditures to 
overcome a general weakness in the export market. Provincial real GDP has also been 
affected by the economic slowdown. Ontario, British Colombia, Alberta and 
Newfoundland experienced hardships and their economic growth declined. The 
Northwest Territories showed the worst slump of 6.5% in its real GDP growth 
compared to 2007 (Figure 3.5). Real gross domestic product (GDP) increased 0.5% 
nationally in 2008, a deceleration in growth from the 2.7% gain in 2007. The year 
2008 was marked by a downturn in exports, the first decline since 2003. Trade in 
manufactured goods, particularly related to forestry and automotive products, was 
hard hit. Domestic demand grew at a slower pace than 2007, as growth of personal 
spending decelerated and housing construction declined. Since 2003, the 
services-producing sector which accounts for over two-thirds of Canada’s GDP had 
been particularly strong. Services grew 14% from 2003 to 2007, driven mainly by 
wholesale trade, with 23% GDP growth, retail trade, 20%, and finance, insurance and 
real estate, 16%. 
    Canada’s economy shrunk for the sixth consecutive (quarterly decline) time in 
January 2009 according to Canada Economic Statistics reports. It has been further 
confirmed by Canada Economic Statistics that manufacturing has decreased at a rate 
of 3.1% with a marked decline in automobile production. Construction in Canada has 
decreased at a rate of 3% as well. Production in construction industry has been falling. 
However, Canada’s economy stood up to the mild economic crisis in 2009 and it is 
now set for a nationwide recovery in 2010 according to a new report in the RBC 
Economics Report9. The new report indicated that although the Canadian economy 
contracted 2.5% in 2009, we will be seeing a return to positive growth in 2010. 
According to the report, the Canadian economy is set to grow in 2010 with real GDP 
rising by 2.6% and it will continue to expand in 2011, at 3.9%. 
                                                              
9 http://banknerd.ca/category/news/ 
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    As Canada's population has grown and its economy has expanded, and as the 
goods-producing sector has increased its efficiency and productivity, there has been a 
steady growth in the share of the working population employed in the service sector. 
But while the resource industries still account for a significant share of overall 
economic activity, two-thirds was from the service industries, especially community, 
business and personal services (which include much of the "para-public" sector, 
education and health care, mainly), and public administration and defence10. 
     Canada has been one of the most resilient and steady economies amongst the 
developed nations despite several slumps since World War II. Furthermore, a number 
of economic problems have emerged with significant geographic implications over 
the years, e.g. the collapse of the cod fishery in the 1960s, the economic slowdown 
with the oil crisis in 1973, the economic recession in 1981-82 (GDP in Canada fell 
4.9% and employment by 5%) and the 1991-92 economic slump (causing a 3.4% fall 
in GDP and a 3.2% decline in employment) and the mild economic recession in 
2008-2009. 
Canada's services sector is an economic strength of the country. However, having 
a larger service sector (the very sizable nature of the “non-market” goods and service 
component, e.g., hospitals, schools, public administration, clinics, social welfare 
services, community colleges and universities) and a smaller manufacturing sector is 
unusual for an advanced economy. Harmonizing Federal-provincial relationships and 
reducing the persistence of provincial disparities have been a major concern of 
Canada’s regional economy. Canada and the US are currently the world's largest 
trading partners. Access to US markets, investment and technology have benefited 
Canadians, but it has also created a high level of dependency on and vulnerability in 
relation to the US economy and its policies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
10 http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com 
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3.2.2 China’s Place in the World by Growth Level  
 
The People's Republic of China, or China, is the largest country in East Asia and the 
third largest country in the world. Beijing, a major world city, is the capital. With a 
population of over 1.3 billion, China is the most populous country in the world. It also 
has the second largest economy in the world after the US with a GDP of nearly $7 
trillion (2007) when measured on the purchasing power parity (PPP) basis. In 
November 2007, it became the third largest in the world after the US and Japan on the 
basis of a nominal GDP of US$3.42 trillion (2007) when measured in exchange-rate 
terms. China has been the fastest-growing major nation for the past quarter of a 
century with an average annual GDP growth rate above 10%. Nonetheless, the 
country's per capita income is still classified as low by world standards, at about 
$2,000 (nominal, 107th out of 179 countries/economies), and $7,800 (PPP, 82nd out 
of 179 countries/economies) in 2006, according to the IMF (International Money 
Fund). China is the world's fastest growing major economy and it is predicted that it 
could become the world’s largest economy by 2025 if it can sustain the high growth 
rate (IMF 2008) (see Table 3.1). 
During the last three decades, China's economy has changed from a centrally 
planned system that was largely closed to international trade to a more 
market-oriented economy that has a rapidly growing private sector. It has also become 
a major player in the global economy (Table 3.1). Reforms started in the late 1970s 
with the abolition of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual 
liberalization of prices, fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state 
enterprises, the foundation of a diversified banking system, the development of stock 
markets, the rapid growth of the non-state sector, and opening up to foreign trade and 
investment. Annual inflows of foreign direct investment rose to nearly $84 billion in 
2007. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis which is adjusted for price 
differences, China in 2008 stood as the second-largest economy in the world after the 
US, although in per capita terms the country is still a ‘lower middle-income’ country. 
In late 2008, the global economic downturn began to slow foreign demand for 
 
 
96
Chinese exports for the first time in many years. From Table 3.1 it can be observed 
that China has a high ranking position for major indicators in the world. However, if 
population size is taken into account, while the country is fast developing, it is still a 
lower middle-income country on the world scene. 
 
Table 3.1 The Changing Ranked Position of China for Major Indicators in the 
World 
 
Indicator 1978 1980 1990 2000 2004 2005 2006
 Area  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 Population 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Life Expectancy①
11 
75(169) 77(173) 83(186) 88(190) 87(213) 86(216)  
 GDP (USD) 10 11 11 6 6 4 4 
 GNI per capita① 175(188) 177(188) 178(200) 141(207) 132(208) 128(208) 129(209) 
 Foreign Trade  27 25 16 8 3 3 3 
Exports 28 28 14 7 3 3 3 
Imports 27 22 17 9 3 3 3 
 FDI  60 12 9 2 3 5 
 Foreign 
Exchange 
Reserves(USD) 
40 37 7 2 2 2 1 
 HDI①   79(160) 96(173) 81(177) 81(177)  
Data sources: FAO Database; UNSD Database; World Bank Database; IMF Database;UNDP Human 
Development Report 200712. Note: The data indicates ranks. The number in the parentheses indicates the 
number of countries or territories the order based on. 
 
China has experienced a sharp increase in GDP since the economic reforms in 
the late 1970s. The share of primary industry in its GDP decreased from 28% in 1978, 
at the beginning of the reform period, to 15% in 2004. This drop occurred because 
agricultural output grew more slowly than output of other economic sectors. At the 
same time, the share of tertiary industry grew from 24% to 32% as the various service 
sectors proliferated and expanded. Manufacturing grew slightly faster than GDP over 
                                                              
11 http://www.indexmundi.com/china/life_expectancy_at_birth.html 
12 Website: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/qtsj/gjsj/2008/t20090608_402563712.htm 
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the period as a whole - though in recent years it has tended to grow more rapidly. The 
construction sub-sector of China only accounted for 5.7% in 2008, an increase from 
3.8% of GDP in 1978. 
    It can be seen from Figure 3.1 that China’s economy has experienced substantial 
changes during the past few decades, which includes a steady growth in the First FYP 
(1953-1957), a short leap (GDP up 15.6% in real terms) forward followed by a sudden 
economic disaster between 1958 and 1962, a rapid growth period (1963-1965), a 
chaotic period stemming from the Cultural Revolution movement (1966-1976) which 
undermined the economy (GDP actually fell during this decade), and then a fast 
growth and recovery period (1977-1989) during the post-reform era with a few 
exceptions (notably 1981 and 1989-1990). From 1983-1985, double-digit real GDP 
growth accompanied the first wave of foreign investment into China, and non-state 
enterprises started to develop. From 1989 to 1991, growth slowed after the 
government put the brakes on an overheating economy following an aborted effort at 
wholesale price reform in 1988. Growth rates subsided gradually in subsequent years. 
During the 1990s and 2000s, living standards and GDP continued to rise first in the 
coastal provinces and then subsequently in the central and western provinces.  
Particularly noteworthy is that economic growth in China has been sustained at an 
average rate of about 10% annually since 1978, placing it among the highest of the 
dynamic nations during the same period. Furthermore, according to the World Bank 
standard, China has just moved from a ‘least developed economy’ status to a 
‘lower-middle-income economy’ status based on per capita GNP.  It should be noted, 
however, that if calculated using the PPP rates, China’s economic size would be much 
larger than when measured by the current exchange rate. Because of its vast 
population, rapidly growing economy, and large research and development 
investments, China has been called an ‘emerging superpower’, with one of the 
world’s largest economies, measured by any indicator. China is also a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation. Since 1978, China’s market-based economic reforms have brought its 
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poverty rate down (from 53% in 1981 to 8% by 2001). In 2008, the global economic 
crisis began to reduce China's growth rate. The government decided to pump Rmb 4 
trillion into the economy in the form of an economic stimulus package consisting 
largely of investment in fixed infrastructure and human capital. The government 
vowed to continue reforming the economy and emphasized the need to increase 
domestic consumption in order to make China less dependent on foreign exports for 
GDP growth in the future.  
 
3.3 Regional Policy and Disparity 
 
The importance governments attach to regional policy has varied considerably over 
time between countries. Some have argued that, comparing one country to another, 
regional policy is likely to be more important in countries which are large and 
regionally diverse than in countries which are small and relatively homogeneous 
regionally (Groenewold et al. 2008). 
Geographically vast countries invariably face the problem of regional disparity 
because natural endowments, climate and physical conditions can be expected to 
differ significantly across their regions; as a result, economic opportunities based on 
such factors are not uniformly available to the population residing in different regions. 
Regional policies are often assessed against their effects on regional disparities. 
Policy makers in country after country have regularly expressed concern about the 
growing disparities between rich and poor regions and about the adverse affects of 
regional disparities for national integration. Moreover, regional disparities have long 
been recognized and have always been at the forefront of macroeconomic policy of 
both Canada and China since Second World War. There are great differences between 
Canada and China in income levels, economic development status and government 
administration systems; and these differences are bound to result in differences in the 
content and institutional expression of regional policy. 
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3.3.1 The Case of China 
 
China’s economic growth has averaged about 8% per annum over the past 50 years, a 
truly remarkable performance and one without precedent in modern economic history. 
This has led to a substantial reduction in poverty, but this rapid growth has also been 
accompanied by rising regional and intra-regional disparities.  
China’s vast territorial size and wide diversity of physical environments and 
natural resource endowments have inevitably resulted in great differences between 
Chinese regions. China has a population of more than 1.3 billion, with different ethnic 
groups. China has three kinds of provincial-level units in its territorial-administrative 
hierarchy: provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the 
central government. In short, the Chinese economy is one of the most complicated 
and most highly differentiated spatial systems that can be found in the world. With the 
rapid development of China after the implementation of the open-door policy and the 
growth centre strategy after the mid-1980s, clear economic disparities appeared not 
only between the Western, Central and Eastern Coastal provinces but also within 
provinces. While the facts of China’s regional disparities are reasonably well known, 
the uneven geographic distribution of output and output growth has been the subject 
of much policy deliberation in China although concerns and proposed solutions have 
varied considerably over this period.  
Natural resources (such as land, climate, biology, water, minerals, energy, and so 
on) represent the basic component among the factors that influence social and 
economic activities, especially for less-developed economies lacking capital and 
technology. Until recently, the natural resource-based sectors still played the most 
important role in the less-developed areas of China. As a geographically diverse 
country, China exhibits vast differences among regions in terms of natural 
endowments. Undisputedly, the coastal area (the eastern part of the country) enjoys 
the advantage of climate and geographical accessibility compared to inland regions. In 
addition, the coastal area was able to capture significant advantages when the country 
started to implement a more liberal trade policy. Putting this into the core-periphery 
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framework, the coastal region can be regarded as the core area while the inland area 
can be considered as the periphery area. 
 
Figure 3.6 Regional Per Capita GDP Change of China, 1953-2007 
 
 
Sources: The population data used to compute per capita GDP come from: 1953 to 2005: Comprehensive Statistical Data and 
Materials on 55 Years of New China (State Statistical Bureau, 2005) and for 2005 from China Statistical Abstract 2006 (State 
Statistical Bureau, 2006). GDP data come from Wu (2004) and China Statistical Yearbook (State Statistical Bureau, various 
issues). The “Coastal 8” excludes the three city-provinces of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai from the coastal region; 2007 data 
come from my own calculation. 
  The economy of China was weak, modern industry limited, foreign dominated and 
geographically concentrated in 1949. At that time, industry was in its early stages, 
with the estimated per capita gross national product and per capita GDP not exceeding 
$250 per capita a year according to different data sources (Vladislav Leonidovich 
2002).  
There were large inter-provincial income disparities in 1952. The enormous 
disparities were to have an important influence on regional policy under Mao for the 
next two decades. In 1980, the per capita GDP of Shanghai, the richest region in 
China, was 11.6 times that of Guizhou, one of the poorest regions in the western part 
of the country, while in 1952 the difference was 7.5 times. However, by 1999, the 
difference had again increased to a factor of 12.5, although by 2007 the difference had 
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declined to a factor of 9.6 times; nonetheless, these are large disparities by any 
standard. High income was generally associated with industrialization and was 
concentrated in the coastal cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin and in the 
north-eastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning (Figure3.6). 
In China, inequality has thus followed a U-shaped pattern, with inequality falling 
until the mid-1980s and rising since. Regional disparities have become a dominant 
issue of great concern for Chinese government policy makers since the 1990s, 
because it is increasingly viewed as the most disturbing factor affecting contemporary 
China in relation to social stability (Zhao and Tong 2000). There are two main 
streams of studies that have dealt with regional disparities in China. The first one has 
mainly focused on the measurement of regional disparities and convergence analyses 
(Zhang et al. 2001; Fujita and Hu 2001; Sun 2000; Dèmurger 2000). Despite the 
different observation periods used by these researchers, all of these studies confirm 
the presence of increasing disparities since the adoption of economic reform and the 
open door policy. Nevertheless, as Fujita and Hu (2001) argue, these studies have not 
sufficiently explored the reasons behind the increasing disparities. The second stream 
of research has focused on explanation of the increasing regional disparities in China 
(Yao et al. 1998, 2001; Jean et al. 1996; Tian 1999; Dèmurger 2002). Most of these 
studies have found that export and foreign direct investment (FDI) have a positive 
impact on the growth of the coastal regions, but not on the inland regions (Fu 2004). 
These studies assume the presence of regional disparities and focus on FDI and export 
performance in relation to regional disparities (Chen et al. 2004). 
China adopted a growth centre strategy after the implementation of market 
oriented reforms and open door policies. Almost two decades into the implementation 
of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Get Rich First’ policy and ‘Coastal Development Strategy’, 
income inequality and an imbalance in regional development have emerged as two of 
the most disturbing factors affecting contemporary China, and have stimulated both 
national and global concern. 
During the central planning period (1949-1978), China implemented the two 
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key sets of guiding principles behind the Soviet development strategy: (1) the Marxist 
principles of common ownership with the state as trustee and of generalized 
egalitarianism; and (2) the Stalinist practices of central planning for resource 
allocation, suppression of light industries and services in favour of heavy industries, 
and minimization of trade and financial linkages with capitalist economies. Mao 
added a third guiding principle to China’s economic policy-making, the principle of 
regional economic self-sufficiency. This third principle unquestionably had the 
greatest impact on regional economic outcomes. The self-reliance principle had 
several virtues. The first was that it overlapped with the egalitarian principle because 
it reduced provincial inequality, which Mao had identified as one of the key social 
contradictions to be eliminated in the new China. The second virtue was that the 
biggest beneficiaries of the self-reliance principle were the poorest provinces (because 
they were overwhelmingly agricultural). The pouring of investment funds into the 
interior provinces was a clear violation of the comparative advantage principle. Not 
only did the growth of the interior provinces occur at the expense of the coastal 
provinces, it also lowered the overall growth rate of the economy. The discrimination 
against the coastal region was so severe that although Shanghai provided more than 
40% of the state’s revenue during the Cultural Revolution period, it was not even 
allowed to retain enough funds to cover the depreciation of its capital stock 
(Dèmurger 2002). From 1972 to 1978, China reduced its discrimination against 
investments in the coastal provinces and increased its economic interaction with 
capitalist economies. This policy shift occurred because the government realized that 
China’s economy and technological capacity was falling further behind the rest of the 
world (Table 3.2). 
Mao’s long-implemented redistributive and egalitarian policy, compounded 
with a series of political movements, such as the Cultural Revolution, had resulted in 
pushing the whole national economy towards the edge of total collapse (Zhao 1996). 
In particular, the extreme inefficiency and failure of Mao’s enduring ‘Third Front’ 
development in China’s interior provinces, which exhausted about two thirds of 
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China’s investment but produced little output in real terms for the period 1963-1975, 
made Deng Xiaoping and the new generation of Chinese leaders eager to look for a 
new policy dimension that could revitalize the national economy and make its 
‘equally poor’ people rich (Zhao 1996; Fan 1997). 
 
 Table 3.2 Investment, GDP and Per Capita GDP by Region of China 
 
Period Investment 
(% of Total) 
GDP 
(% of Total) 
GDP Growth 
(%) 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth (%) 
Mao’s Interior Costal Interior Costal Interior Costal Interior Costal 
1953-57 55.92 44.08 48.30 51.70 9.08 8.72 6.33 5.95 
1958-62 59.36 40.64 46.10 53.90 -1.74 0.07 -2.46 -1.31 
1963-65 62.51 37.49 46.91 53.09 13.74 14.03 10.70 11.39 
1966-70 70.60 29.40 45.42 54.58 7.93 7.93 2.85 5.56 
1971-75 60.54 39.46 43.40 56.60 5.20 6.81 2.61 5.01 
Post-Mao Coast Centre West Coast Centre West Coast Centre West Coast Centre West 
1976-80 45.8 32.7 21.6 57.8 27.8 14.4 8.2 7.1 9.8 6.8 5.6 8.4 
1981-85 50.7 31.1 18.3 57.7 27.9 14.4 11.1 10.9 10.4 9.6 9.5 9.3 
1986-90 56.2 26.5 17.2 58.9 26.6 14.5 8.2 6.8 8.0 6.4 5.1 6.2 
1991-95 58.7 25.4 15.9 62.1 24.4 13.5 15.3 11.5 10.2 14.2 10.3 9.0 
1996-00 56.5 25.3 18.3 64.2 23.8 12.1 10.6 9.9 8.8 9.6 9.2 7.8 
2001-05 52.8 26.9 20.3 65.6 23.0 11.4 12.1 11.2 10.5 11.3 11.3 10.5 
Sources: Groenewold et al. Linkages between China’s Regions –Measurement and Policy 
Notes: Investment data come from China’s Fixed Investment Directory 2000 (State Stataistical Bureau, 
2000). GDP data are derived from Wu (2004) and the China Statistical Yerabooks (State Stataistical 
Bureau, various issues) 
Since economic reforms were introduced in the late 1970s, China’s national 
development priority switched from the inland to the eastern coastal regions. Most 
Chinese policy makers, along with Deng Xiaoping, have been strongly influenced by 
two western schools of regional development theory, namely Williamson’s (1965) 
inverted-U hypothesis and the centre-down paradigm (Fan 1997). Deng’s open-door 
policy introduced both western development theory and experience to Chinese policy 
makers and academics. Deng and other Chinese policy makers strongly believed 
Williamson’s theory that inequality is a matter of development – ‘increasing regional 
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inequality is generated during the early development stages, while matured growth 
produces regional convergence or a reduction in differentials’ (Williamson 1965), 
which echoes Friedman’s core-periphery model (Friedmann 1966). 
Deng and other Chinese policy makers also thought that China should centralize 
all scarce and limited resources and develop only one sector and/or area first, 
assuming that the spill-over effects would follow a pattern of hierarchical diffusion 
and eventually extend to all other sectors/areas - the basis of the centre-down 
paradigm (Fan 1997). During the market-oriented reforms period (1978-1998), China 
started opening its doors to the outside world partially at the beginning, and 
implemented effective development strategies such as the decentralization of 
agricultural production, the decentralization of the fiscal system and the deregulation 
of prices; the strategy on the international front was the Open Door Policy. The 
practice of each provincial government’s covering more of its expenditure from local 
revenue necessarily meant reduced development expenditure in the poorest provinces, 
which had been receiving fiscal subsidies from the central government. The Open 
Door Policy consisted of attracting foreign direct investment and promoting foreign 
trade in targeted areas. From this moment on, China started to adopt the economic 
growth pole strategy, afterwards reformulated into strategies based on economic 
growth centres, open special economic zones and the more node-axle model and 
implemented regional preferential policies. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, as a vast developing country where technology and 
capital were scarce, China did not appear to have much choice and its initial economic 
growth had to depend on the development of some growth centres. By design, the 
Chinese government adopted a trickle-down growth strategy to develop a few 
regional centres, beginning with those that possessed initial advantages such as 
location, infrastructure, human and natural resources. According to this plan, disparity 
of growth would inevitably occur initially. The government under Deng hoped that by 
supporting the growth centres in the eastern regions first, these centres would 
ultimately lead the rest of the economy to expand. However, the spillover effect from 
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growth centres in the coastal provinces to inland areas has not happened as expected.  
In the early 1980s, Deng’s ‘special economic zone’ policy became extremely 
effective by adopting the node–axle theory. According to this theory, the rapidly 
expanding economy would quickly lead to the reduction of regional disparities. The 
strategy specifically used the West Hai-lan New Railway Line, the Yangtze River 
upper stream and Nanning Guiyang Kunming as the connecting lines. Clearly, this 
strategy was an application of the node–axle model. This theory is closely related to 
the life-cycle theory of industrial production developed by Vernon (Zhao and Tong 
2000). Since the 1980s, the Special Economic Zones in the eastern Chinese coastal 
area have played a leading role in attracting foreign investment, and in stimulating 
trade. These zones are examples that support leading theories of economic 
development: Rostow’s ‘leading sector’, Lewis’s ‘satellite city’, Hirschman’s ‘linkage 
effect’ and Perroux’s ‘development poles’. The relevant common feature of these 
theories is that when resources are scarce, the priority development of a pilot sector or 
area would eventually lead to the overall development of the country. It would 
thereby quickly achieve the objectives of improving productivity and people’s living 
standards. The coastal areas were thus rapidly modernized, thus creating a haven for 
development.  
The open economic zones provided investors with various preferential tax 
treatments and exemptions on duties and from labour regulations. 
In summary, the implementation of regional preferential policies went through 
the following three broad stages:  
1. Early 1980s: opening to a limited extent, in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, with 
the establishment of special economic zones in 1979-1980.  
2. Middle to end of the 1980s: coastal preference strategy enforcement, with the 
designation of Coastal Open Cities, which were entitled to set up their own Economic 
and Technological Development Zones, in 1984; this was followed by the 
establishment of Coastal Open Economic Zones in 1985, an Open Coastal Belt in 
1988 and the Shanghai Pudong New Area in 1990. 
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3. Early 1990s: further extension of the Open Door Policy to all of China, after Deng 
Xiaoping’s southern inspection trip in 1992. During that year, new open economic 
zones were officially started in major cities along the Yangtze River, Border 
Economic Cooperation Zones, Capital Cities of inland provinces and autonomous 
regions. The acceleration in the opening-up process in 1992 led to a boom for a large 
number of so-called open economic zones, set up by local officials without proper 
authorization. Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan were to prove an important gate for 
trade and foreign investment flows to China in the succeeding period. Besides the 
official policy launched by the State Council, all the provinces, as well as hundreds of 
counties and townships, started to formulate their own preferential policies for foreign 
investment in specific ‘development zones’. As a consequence of this ‘zone fever’ (i.e. 
a ‘growth centre fever’), there were around 2,000 open economic zones of various 
kinds at and above the county level by 1993 (and probably even more below the 
county level), offering tax exemptions and reductions of all sorts in order to attract 
investment. Following the implementation of the austerity program in 1993, most of 
these unapproved zones were closed, and regional policies have tended to equalize 
over time (at least up to 2000). 
In addition, the central government invested large amounts in infrastructure 
development to facilitate the expected growth in industrial production and exports. As 
a result, the national real GDP growth for the 1953-1976 period was 5.4% at an 
average annual rate of 9.5% for 1976-1990. The corresponding per capita growth was 
3.2% and 7.9% respectively. Deng Xiaoping’s policy had played a significant role in 
relation to the development of the market economy and promoting a greater openness 
to the outside world appeared to be a policy whose time had come. 
The leading role of this selective open-door policy in regional growth has been 
emphasized by a large number of studies (e.g., Lee 1994; Mody and Wang 1997; 
Berthélemy and Démurger 2000; Chen and Feng 2000; and Démurger 2000). Most of 
them have found that an economic dualism has emerged which often manifests itself 
in spatial terms as a core-periphery contrast. However, various negative consequences 
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of liberalization also appeared, such as more regional inequality, income disparity, a 
backward social welfare system and unemployment. The severity of these problems 
had not been anticipated by government. 
 
Map 3.1 Provincial Foreign Direct Investment, China 2005 
      
 
Data source: Calculated based on the 2005 China Yearly Statistical Book 
 
China’s early reforms were focused mainly on the development of the coastal 
areas, with the aim of attracting investments from abroad. Until 2000, according to the 
Chinese Statistical Yearbooks, 86% of FDI was invested in the coastal regions, and 
only 10% in central China and 4% in the western regions causing more unequal 
development among regions (Map 3.1). China’s current regional inequalities are to a 
great extent due to the growth centre policies of the government. In order to control 
rising regional inequality, the central government decided to make some substantial 
efforts to control regional disparities. 
Fan (1997) shows that there was widespread criticism of the regional 
development theory underlying the uneven development policy and a vigorous 
discussion of a range of alternative theories (once it was recognized that the 
authorities would countenance criticism of the policy).  
To counter this potentially destabilizing problem, the government initiated the 
China Western Development strategy (called by some the Coordinated Development 
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Program) that was put into practice in 1998, the Revitalize Northeast China initiative 
(2003), and the Rise of Central China policy (2004), all of which are aimed at helping 
the interior of China catch up and decrease the huge provincial disparities.  
 
Figure 3.7 China Per Capita GDP Change 1953-2007 (at current prices: Yuan) 
 
Source: Calculated based on the 50 years of Chinese Statistical Yearbook in 2004 and Chinese 
Statistical Yearbook2008. 
During the 9th five year plan (1991-95), disparities in growth rates narrowed 
considerably from five years earlier; the growth rates of real GDP for the currency of 
the ninth FYP were 10.6% (coast), 9.9% (centre) and 8.8% (west), compared to 
15.3%, 11.5% and 10.2% respectively for five years earlier.  
Despite all these measures to spread the benefits of China’s rapid expansion all 
around the country, there was still a strong concentration in the coastal region. 
Growth during the period of the tenth FYP (1996-2000) was 12.1% for the coast, 
11.2% for the central provinces and 10.5% for the west. As a result, by 2005 the 
coastal region had achieved a record share of 65.6% of national real GDP, compared 
to shares of 23.0% for the central region and 11.2% for the west. 
National real GDP growth for the period 1990-2005 ran at an annual average of 
11.8%, with the coast region growing at an annual average of 12.7%, the central area 
at 10.9%, and the west at 9.9%. These regional differences are larger than those for 
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the preceding period (1978-1990). While the difference in growth rates of one to two 
percentage points is modest perhaps, they are nevertheless important when they 
accumulate over a 15 period. Thus, the 2.2 percentage-point difference between the 
coast and interior meant that the coast’s share of real GDP increased from 60.1% in 
1991 to 65.9% in 2005. 
During the eleventh FYP (2006-2010), continued concern was expressed about 
the level of regional disparities. According to some commentators (Li and He 2006), 
there was a fear at the national level that dissatisfaction with uneven development had 
reached a stage of potential national crisis with the disillusionment being expressed by 
leaders in the poorer regions and amongst ethnic minorities (who had often become 
marginalized during the economic development process) to such an extent that the 
cohesion of China was being threatened. Li and He (2006: 20) suggested in relation to 
the eleventh FYP that “the gap between different regions and between income groups 
will be further enlarged” and that much of the population will benefit only minimally 
from economic growth (Figure 3.7). Thus, for example, in a recent conference 
presentation, Li Shantong expressed the view that growing disparities during the 
period of the eleventh FYP “will not only reduce the consumption inclination of the 
Chinese as a whole but also aggravate social conflicts and jeopardize the stability in 
domestic economy and social environment” (Li and He 2006: 20) (Nicolaas et alé 
2008). What makes things worse is that there are also huge existing intra-provincial 
and urban-rural disparities in China (see Chapters 4 and 5 for further development of 
this theme). 
  Furthermore, since the reform, income disparities between urban and rural China 
have experienced different patterns. In the early period of the economic reform which 
was concentrated on the agricultural sector, rural income increased very rapidly and 
the gap between rural and urban areas narrowed until 1985. Since then, the 
rural-urban gap began to increase again as a result of the diminishing marginal returns 
of the agricultural sector on the one hand and of urban-industrial reform on the other 
hand. The ratio of urban to rural per capita income fell from 2.36 in 1978 to 1.70 in 
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1983, but it then increased to reach 3.0 in 2007. 
 It is not surprising, therefore, that there was a continuing emphasis placed on the 
reduction of regional disparities and a commitment to bring prosperity to the whole 
country. Through all these government sponsored development programs, a huge 
amount of central state funds has been invested in infrastructure, energy, environment 
and resources projects in those areas. These development policies promoted rapid and 
continual growth in the coastal areas, but had little impact on the inland provinces. 
The gap between the coastal and interior areas continued to widen, which also brought 
many economic, social and political repercussions (Figures 3.5 and 3.6).  
Changes in fiscal policy and economic reform over time are affecting the 
dynamics of the relationships between China’s central government and the provinces. 
However, in spite of this great endeavour (changes in fiscal policy and economic 
reform), it is becoming increasingly difficult for the government to control and direct 
the economy, as market economy mechanisms now appear to have a far greater 
influence than the government. Some of the relatively prosperous provinces are able 
to manifest greater independence from Beijing than in the past, making it difficult for 
the central government to ensure that its policy objectives are put into action. The 
conventional regard is that the economic reforms have considerably weakened control 
by the central government over economic activities in the localities. Su et al. (2000) 
argued that those provinces that enjoyed greater representation on the central 
committee stood to benefit more from the allocation of state sector investment. Huang 
(1999) disputed the contention that economic decentralization has been accompanied 
by a strengthening of China's unitary political system. This has direct bearings on 
local economic conduct. Because of the political and institutional constraints, local 
officials surrender tax revenues to the central government and curb their inflationary 
investment demand. Wedeman (1999) noted that even though fiscal reforms may have 
given provincial governments independent sources of income, they remain dependent 
upon the centre for budgetary subsidies and that without central subsidies provincial 
governments would face serious budgetary shortfalls.  
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Not surprisingly, compared with Deng’s opening up policies, the later 
development policies are becoming less and less effective in terms of their 
implementation. It could even be concluded that there is something unchangeable 
about regional disparities in China during the last six decades! Average growth rates 
and their dispersion seem more often than not follow in directions opposite to those 
intended by policy (Tables 3.5 and 3.6 below). It can be concluded that public policy 
in China has had little effect on convergence since 1980. 
 
3.3.2 The Case of Canada 
 
The discussion of Canada’s place in the world by growth level and pace in section 
3.2.1 highlights the major development in the performance of the Canadian economy 
since 1960. However, all the provinces and regions of the country did not benefit 
equally from these developments and regional disparities have been a significant issue 
to be tackled. The presence of economic disparities in Canada is well documented and 
is a widely discussed subject. Polèse (1984) argues that Canadian economic policy 
has been influenced by regional considerations. Since Confederation, national policies 
have important repercussions at the regional level, intentional and unintentional, often 
creating tensions between the provinces and the federal government and among 
provinces. 
Canada has implemented development policies based on growth pole (and 
growth centre) theory and decentralization policy during different time periods to 
address the problem of regional disparity. Though there have been some successes 
over the years, more often than not, regional development policies have not reduced 
disparities in Canada.  
By the late 1950s, with the persistence of regional economic inequalities, the 
federal government was prompted to inaugurate a system of “equalization payments” 
program. After the Second World War, a “system of fiscal equalization” program was 
adopted to equalize provincial public services through augmenting the revenues of 
low income provinces with equalization payments. This step marked the first 
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important phase of federal regional policy in Canada and played an essential role in 
preventing provincial gaps from widening (Francis et al. 1973)13.  
In the late 1950s, Canada then began to focus attention on persistent regional 
disparities. Specific federal regional development programs (RDPs) targeted at 
low-income regions have existed since the 1960s, initially aimed at depressed rural 
regions but have been broadened since. 
A major change in federal-provincial fiscal arrangements came into place in 1962, 
when tax-sharing was replaced by tax-collection agreements, instituting the system 
still in place today. The most visible elements of regional policy in the 1960s and 
1970s sought to assist poorer areas to achieve higher rates of economic growth. 
 
Map 3.2: DREE Designated Regions and Special Areas, 1973 
 
Source: Department of Regional Economic Expansion, 1972. 
Federal efforts to formulate development policies and to implement programs 
aimed at reducing regional disparities led to the creation of the Department of 
Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) in 1969. DREE accepted Francois Perroux’s 
theory of growth poles (i.e. the geographic extension of the growth pole theory). Two 
programs were set up: a ‘Special Area’ program and a ‘Regional Industrial Incentives’ 
program. The ‘Special Area’ program sponsored and funded such projects as 
highways, water systems, industrial parks, sewer systems and schools in defined areas. 
                                                              
13 The Canadian Equalization Program is embedded in the Constitution of 1982 (Milne 1994). 
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The Regional Industrial Incentives program provided grants to companies on the basis 
of the new jobs created in designated regions (Beaumier 1998). 
In particular, DREE targeted overall the Atlantic Provinces and eastern Quebec. 
DREE was to focus its efforts on 23 areas of the country (growth ‘centres’) from 
which further development would spin off into the regions (see Map 3.2). At these 
growth ‘centres’, DREE offered assistance for improving infrastructure, for 
implementing social adjustment measures, and for helping private investment in a 
designated area. 
Figure 3.8 shows GDP per capita by province relative to the Canadian average. 
From 1961 to 1981, two observations are obvious. First, there is a considerable 
difference between the average income of the richest province and that of poorest. 
Second, these disparities have not changed much from what they were in 1929 or, for 
that matter, 1870 (Norie et al. 2002). For instance, personal income per capita in 
Newfoundland in 1961 was 50% of the national average, while in Ontario it was 
120%%, more than twice as great. Personal income per capita in Newfoundland in 
1973 was 52% of the national average, while in Ontario it was 116% , more than 
twice as great. The disparity between provinces has converged since the late 1970s. 
Personal income per capita in Newfoundland in 1981 was 59% of the national average, 
while in Ontario it was 103%, more than 1.7 times as great. 
Figure 3.8 Canada Provincial Per Capita GDP (at 1986 income base) 
 
Source: Provincial Economic Accounts: Historical issues 1961-1986, Catalogue: 13-213S 
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The efforts of the new department would be focused on eastern Canada, with 
as much as 80% of DREE’s expenditure being spent east of Trois-Rivières. Even 
these expenditures were to be concentrated into selected growth poles (centres) in the 
belief that this would create new opportunities for economic growth in Eastern 
Canada's urban centres. While the establishment of DREE addressed the need for a 
coordinated and rationalized federal effort, it did not deal adequately with the 
problems of regional disparity. DREE was also criticized for discriminating in favour 
of certain communities and against others. After four years there was no convincing 
evidence that it had accomplished anything in terms of reducing regional disparities. 
The centralized system established under DREE was subsequently discarded in favour 
of one that placed more emphasis on provincial government participation. In 1972, the 
so-called ‘growth pole’ approach was abandoned in favour of a more flexible 
multi-dimensional approach involving increased cooperation between the federal and 
provincial governments as well as among federal departments. 
Beginning in 1974, each province signed a General Development Agreement 
(GDA) with the federal government to establish the goals of regional development in 
each jurisdiction and broad guidelines as to how the programs were to be 
implemented. Predictably, GDAs soon became criticised and they were abandoned in 
1982. Later the GDAs were replaced by Economic and Regional Development 
Agreements (ERDAs). ERDAs provide greater visibility to the federal government 
than GDA for its regional development spending. 
In 1982-1983, DREE was amalgamated with the Department of Industry, Trade 
and Commerce to create the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE). 
Economic and Regional Development Agreements were signed with each province, 
and the federal role in planning and administration was made more explicit. The cycle 
of regional development polices in those years was complete. In fifteen years, a 
highly centralized system (DREE) had given way to the highly decentralized one 
(GDAs), which had, in turn, been abandoned for something in between (Norrie et al 
2002). DRIE was dismantled in 1988 and replaced by 4 regionally based agencies: 
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Western Economic Diversification Canada (WEDC); Atlantic Canada Opportunities 
Agency (ACOA); the Federal Office of Regional Development for Quebec (FORD-Q); 
and the Northern Ontario Program (FEDNOR). The agencies are active in promoting 
industry via varying financial support measures for local firms and entrepreneurs, as 
well as inheriting many of the programs of the old federal departments (Polèse 1999).  
During the 1980s, steps were taken to facilitate a deeper integration of the 
Canadian and American economies. While this move, culminating in the signing of 
the FTA in 1988, had parallels in the other parts of the world, it marked a significant 
departure from the century-old Canadian policies of economic nationalism (Wallace 
2002). 
For over two decades the most important objective of regional development 
policy in Canada had been the reduction of regional disparities, with “regions” 
defined as provinces, or occasionally as groups of provinces; or more rarely, smaller 
regions in one province. Resource frontier development has played some role, but not 
a very important one. By and large, Canadians have been content to leave 
development of the north, or other resource frontiers if they are proven to exist, 
mainly to private enterprise or the “market” (Higgins and Savoie 1994). 
Since the expansion of FTA to NAFTA in 1993, the Canadian economy has 
become more broadly integrated into the North American economy. By the early 
1980s, however, the federal government had clearly become dissatisfied with the 
political and economic impacts of its regional policies. DREE was disbanded and 
residual regional commitments were integrated into the sectoral mandates of the 
Department of Industry. 
There are still large differences between the different regions of Canada in 
terms of per capita production. The persistence of such large regional disparities has 
created major problems for the management of economic policy. To reduce these 
disparities and enable comparable service delivery nationwide, for a long time the 
federal government pools and transfers moneys through equalization payments from 
the ‘have’ provinces (those with above average economies) — namely Ontario (at 
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least until the current year, 2009) and Alberta — to ‘have-not’ ones (those having 
below average economies). Equalization payments are made by the federal 
government to ensure that reasonably uniform standards of services and taxation are 
kept between the richer and poorer provinces (Milne 1994). In absolute terms, Quebec 
is a major long-standing beneficiary of equalization as are the Atlantic Provinces. In 
the last decade, British Columbia and Saskatchewan had both subsidized and received 
equalization. Newfoundland had become a ‘have’ province because of successful 
development of the oil industry. Courchene (1978, 1994) has argued that federal 
transfers may lessen the need for lagging regions to make necessary adjustments 
through wages and factor mobility to improve their economic future. It has also 
argued that these transfer payments inhibit the adjustment process, create dependence 
and thereby widen disparities (Milne 1994). 
Canada has set up a vast structure for inter-regional redistribution; the 
principal feature of the new policy was a decentralization of administrative and policy 
functions away from Ottawa and towards the regions. In 1987, Ottawa established 
agencies to plan and promote regional economic development in the Atlantic 
provinces (Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency), Northern Ontario (FedNor) and 
the Western provinces (Western Economic Diversification), and it did the same for 
Quebec (Federal Office of Regional Development-Québec) in 1991 (Colombo 1997). 
The ability to support these programs and policies is directly linked to the persistence 
of regional economic disparities. While Canada’s ten provinces and three territories 
exhibit high GDPs, there was wide variation among them still in 2007 (Figure 3.8). 
Though there have been marginal successes over the years, more often Canada's 
regional development programs have not reduced disparities. Regional disparities in 
per capita incomes have long been a feature of the Canadian economy. While studies 
in the early 1990s of relative per capita incomes in Canada, such as Swan and Sera 
(1991) and Maxwell (1994), noted a narrowing of disparities since the 1970s, regional 
per capita income disparities are far from completely eliminated, despite decades of 
economic growth and an active regional development policy instituted by the federal 
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government. The disparities have been maintained at similar levels; from a positive 
respective, at least greater divergence has been avoided.     
 
Figure 3.9 Canada Provincial GDP Per Capita, 1981-2007 (in 2002 dollars) 
 
 
Sources: Calculated based on the data tables of Statistics Canada, Provincial and Territorial 
Economic Accounts: Data tables, catalogue number 13-018-X  
 
In 2007, in per capita GDP by 2002 dollars P.E.I was 74.6% of the national 
average, while Alberta was at 136% of the national average, more than 1.8 times as 
great. In 1981, the per capita GDP in 2002 dollars for P.E.I was 65% of the national 
average while for Alberta it was 137% of the national average in 1981, more than 2 
times as great. From this it can be concluded that provincial disparity of Canada 
converged but only weakly since 1980 (Figure 3.9). 
 
Figure 3.10 Equalization as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Special Report- Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, Industry Canada , 2004 
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A recent study conducted by the IMF (International Monetary Fund 2008) further 
concluded that equalization may have reduced provincial income disparities in 
Canada (Figure 3.10). Equalization payments reduce fiscal disparities. Paid by the 
federal government, it has probably allowed poorer provinces to finance better 
education and narrow their human capital gap over time (Chalifoux et al. 2004). 
All Canadian provinces benefited from the strong economic boom of the late 
1990s. But Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, the most often used indicator 
of standard of living, remains uneven across the country. Other measures, such as 
personal income and earned income are also uneven reflecting different industrial 
structures between provinces. 
Canadian provinces also had slightly different GDP growth rates during this 
period from 1961 to 2007. Over the 1981-2008 period, Yukon, Ontario, Alberta and 
Newfoundland posted the best performance in terms of GDP growth at around 3%, 
while Nunavut was the only province with an average GDP growth below 1.5% for 
the short period 1999-2008. In terms of per capita annual growth rates, Newfoundland 
and Yukon had the highest annual growth rates of 3.23% and 2.53% respectively 
while British Colombia had the lowest annual growth rates of 1.06% for this period. 
In 2002, Newfoundland and Labrador’s GDP surged by 15.4% due to crude oil 
production. This boosted its average annual GDP growth rate to 4.1% over the 
1995-2002 period. But the GDP growth rate in Newfoundland and Labrador has 
fluctuated substantially during this period. It is clear that the eastern provinces have 
higher compound annual growth rates (CAGR) during this period (Figure 3.11).  
Over a period of almost 5 decades, the relative GDP per capita of all the 
provinces has converged towards the national average except that Alberta has 
maintained the highest rate, Quebec has kept the same rate and Ontario and British 
Colombia have seen their rates decreasing. The other provinces have been  
increasing their relative per capita rate towards the national average. Although the 
difference in growth rates between periods and provinces may appear small, minor 
differences in growth rates can lead to very large differences in the level of real GDP per 
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capita in the long run. 
 
Figure 3.11 Provincial GDP: Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) and Per 
Capita GDP, 1981-2008 
 
Sources: Calculated based on the data tables of Statistics Canada, Provincial and Territorial Economic 
Accounts: Data tables, catalogue number 13-018-X. Notes: Gross Domestic Product (2002). 
Note: The Statistic Data of Nunavut is calculate based on the period 1999-2008. 
 
Substantial changes in the relative position of provinces with regards to GDP per 
capita have occurred since 1990. Alberta started the 1990s above the national average 
current dollar GDP per capita and moved up over time to increase the gap between itself 
and the rest of Canada. Saskatchewan started behind the national average, but moved 
upward over time.  
 
Figure 3.12 Relative per Capita GDP, 1961-2007 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data tables of Statistics Canada, Provincial and Territorial 
Economic Accounts: Data tables, catalogue number 13-018-X, Provincial Economic Accounts:  
 Historical issues 1961-1986, Catalogue: 13-213S 
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Newfoundland and Labrador started well behind the national average and moved up 
to substantially close the gap between itself and the national average. The other Atlantic 
Provinces also tended to increase their relative position, but by smaller amounts. Ontario 
and British Columbia saw their relative position deteriorate over the same period. Ontario 
was still above the national average by the end of the period, but British Columbia moved 
further below it (Figure 3.12). 
Apart from the weak inter-provincial disparity in Canada, there is also strong 
intra-provincial disparity in Canada. For example, in Québec, Montreal had the 
highest per capita GDP of $36,800 in 1998 and $49,595 in 2005 while Lanaudière had 
the lowest per capita GDP of $14,715 in 1998 and $19,926 in 2005 among Quebec’s 
Administrative Regions (Figure 3.13). More analyses of regional and provincial case 
will be given in the following chapters. 
 
Figure 3.13 Per Capita GDP of Quebec’s Administrative Regions, 1998-2005 
 
Sources: Calculated Based on data from Web Site, 
http://www.stat.gouv.qc.ca/publications/regions/flash_pibr.htm 
 
3.4 Cross Country Analysis 
 
Regional development, as noted earlier, is concerned with getting poorer regions to 
catch up to richer ones. As noted earlier, regions, in this sense, may be within a 
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country or across countries, and comparisons can be made among "developed" or 
"developing" regions, or between both of these types. 
For a number of reasons, analysts who study the evolution of the “catching up” 
countries pay special attention to China. First of all, the history of that country, its size 
and its share of the world’s population all make the sweeping economic and social 
transformations in the PRC a phenomenon having an immediate effect on the world 
economic situation and the world balance of political forces. The successes achieved 
by the Chinese economy over the past three decades are indisputable. The gross 
national product growth rate has averaged over 10% a year, with most of the 
fast-growing exports going to the post-industrial nations; and the country is 
successfully becoming an integrated part of the world information economy. China is 
turning into a mighty regional superpower rapidly superseding Japan as the leader of 
the Asia-Pacific Region.  
According to the World Development Report of 2009, all regions have made 
progress in human development in the past 30 years, but advancing at very different 
paces and achieving very different levels. Differences among regions and countries 
are particularly marked in economic growth. Per capita income in China grew at an 
impressive 8% a year, and in India at an average rate of 3.2%. OECD countries had an 
average growth of 2% a year. Although there are reasonable data within countries on 
inequality for different points in time, the data are not based on uniform surveys 
across countries and so comparisons must be treated with care. Has the situation been 
improving or deteriorating? The answer is not clear. 
Income levels across countries have been both diverging and converging, with 
some regions closing the income gap and others drifting away. Despite a reduction in 
the relative differences between many countries, absolute gaps in per capita income 
have increased. Even for East Asia and the Pacific, the fastest growing region, the 
absolute difference in income with high-income developed countries and income 
growth has varied considerably among countries in recent decades, more so than 
trends in many human development indicators. 
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When inequality decreases over time in the income level of countries or 
regions, it is known as a convergence process. Convergence analysis has become 
particularly relevant over the last few years with new tools contrasting the 
convergence process, such as absolute or conditioned β-convergence, being added to 
the older measurement tools, such as the study of income dispersion (σ-convergence). 
Results of the above mentioned analyses usually depend on the group of territories 
studied (see more on this in Chapter 2). When countries or regions of similar ranking 
or with similar institutions are examined, the results usually show clear convergence 
processes, where the territories which were poorer at the beginning of the period are 
those which grow more, decreasing the initial inequality. By contrast, when countries 
or regions with different conditions and institutions are compared, the results are not 
so conclusive: convergence is less obvious and at times, there is divergence.       
Some of the economic disparities among nations can be better explained when rich 
and poor countries or societies are contrasted. The evolution of the income gap 
between poor and rich countries is related to convergence. Convergence can be 
defined as "the tendency for poorer countries to grow faster than richer ones and, 
hence, for their levels of income to converge" (Sala-i-Martin 1995: 26). Convergence 
is a matter of current research and debate, but most studies have shown a lack of 
evidence for absolute convergence based on comparisons among countries (Cole and 
Newmayer 2003). 
The great difference between Canada and China is the status of their economies 
and their population size. The difference in terms of real GDP per capita between 
Canada and China has widened since 1965 (Figure 3.14). China’s population since the 
Second World War has always been equal to 40 times Canada’s population. 
According to World Bank Data in 2007, the per capita GDP of China at current 
US$ was $92 in 1960 and reached $2,432 in 2007, while per capita GDP of Canada 
increased from $2,294US in 1960 to $43,280US in 2007. 
Based on the IMF, WB and CIA14, the per capita GDP (PPP) of China was 
                                                              
14 see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita 
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$6546 (IMF,2009), 5962$ (World Bank, 2008), $6500 (CIA, 2009) respectively, 
giving it a ranking of 97, 89 and 101 respectively in the world while the per capita 
GDP (PPP) of Canada was $38,290 (IMF,2009), $36,444 (World Bank, 2008) and 
$38,400 (IMF, 2009), giving it a ranking of 12, 12 and 19 respectively in the world. 
Based on the Penn Data Table (PWT6.315), the economic openness of China has 
grown quickly and converged with Canada to an extent since 1980 as a result of its 
opening policy and enrolment in the WTO (see Figure 3.15). 
 
Figure 3.14 Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita for China and Canada 
CGDP16 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data of PWT6.3. Note: For China1 and China 2, see note12.  
 
From the regional policy and disparity analyses of Canada and China above, it 
can be seen that both countries have similar interprovincial and intra provincial 
disparities and even somewhat similar regional policies. But the degree of disparity in 
China is always higher than that of Canada. The other discernible characteristic is that 
the national and provincial regional growth rates of economic indicators in China are 
faster than in Canada since 1980. Is there any convergence between China and 
                                                              
15 http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php 
16 Note: Due to data differences between official data and the modifications of some researchers, in 
PWT6.3, users are offered a choice of 2 Chinas in PWT6.3: ‘China Version 1’ uses the official growth 
rates for the whole period as in PWT 6.2; in ‘China Version 2’, PWT 6.3 uses the recent modifications 
of official Chinese growth rates contained in Maddison and Wu (2007 in the Papers section of the PWT 
site) for the period before 1990, and apply the modification of the official rate from 1995-2000 to the 
official rate after 2000.   
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Canada in terms of per capita gross domestic product (GDP)? Are the standards of 
living of China catching up with those of Canada?  
 
Figure 3.15 Comparison of Openness17 between China and Canada 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data Penn Data Table PWT6.3 
 
3.4.1 Evaluation of the Opportunity of Achieving a Real Convergence of China 
with Canada  
 
The successes achieved by the Chinese economy over the past five decades are 
indisputable. China’s economic growth has averaged about 8% per annum over the 
past 50 years, a truly remarkable performance. The result has been a vast 
improvement in living standards, with per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) 
expanding about 21-fold over the 1953 to 2007 period. The gross national product 
growth rate has averaged over 10% a year, with most of the fast-growing exports 
going to post-industrial nations. 
The degree to which incomes have converged across countries, over time, has been 
the subject of extensive research. So we raise the question of whether there has been 
                                                              
17 Note: Openness: OPENC- Exports plus Imports divided by GDP is the total trade as a percentage of 
GDP. The export and import figures are in national currencies from the World Bank and United 
Nations data archives. Note that when the export and import figures and GDP are expressed in real 
values, the value of OPENC will be the same because the price level (conversion factor) for DA and 
exports and imports is the same. 
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convergence or divergence between Canada and China in economic development? 
According to the Human Development Report Office for 2008, the HDI for China is 
0.762, which gives the country a rank of 94th out of 179 countries, while the HDI for 
Canada is 0.967, giving it a rank of 3rd out of 179 countries. The HDI provides a 
composite measure of three dimensions of human development: living a long and 
healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated (measured by adult literacy 
and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary level) and having a decent 
standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity, PPP, income). To compare 
economic statistics across countries, the data must first be converted into a common 
currency. Unlike conventional exchange rates, PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) rates of 
exchange allow this conversion to take account of price differences between countries. 
GDP per capita (PPP US$) accounts for price differences between countries and 
therefore better reflects people's living standards. In theory, at the PPP rate, 1 PPP 
dollar has the same purchasing power in the domestic economy of a country as 1 US 
dollar has in the US economy. If we compare long-term HDI progress from 1975 to 
2007, China had a 0.772% annual average growth rate for the HDI while Canada had 
a 0.275% average annual HDI growth rate (Figures 3.16 and 3.17).  
 
Figure 3.16 HDI Trends of Canada and China, 1975-2007 
 
 
Source: Based on the World HDI annual reports 1975 to 2007. 
 
What it does provide is a broadened perspective for viewing human progress and 
the complex relationship between income and well-being (HDI Report 2008). Since 
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1980, Canada has achieved a steady HDI with an average long-term (1980-2006) HDI 
rate of 0.075, while China saw its HDI increase rapidly until 2000, then slowing 
gradually with an average long-term (1980-2006) HDI rate of 0.233. This can also be 
explained by the fact that, when HDI reaches a certain level, it is very difficult to 
increase the value of this index significantly. 
 
Figure 3.17 Gross National Income of per Capita (PPP) of Canada and 
China 1980-2007 
 
Source: World Bank Data 2008 
 
In order to answer the question in this section, i.e. an evaluation of the opportunity 
of achieving a real convergence of China with Canada, the convergence is measured 
by applying one of the economic convergence applications introduced by Iancu 
(2007). Iancu carried out a study to predict the opportunity of achieving a real 
convergence of Romania and the EU using the single indicator of GDP per capita. 
But a single indicator GDP cannot fully explain real regional economic 
development. So some additional indicators such as GDP growth rate, openness, Per 
Capita Real GDP, HDI, and the Gini Index can be used to better explain the 
“catch-up” process of a fast increasing poor economy to a steady developed economy. 
For such an evaluation, it is necessary to point out China’s place in the world on 
the basis of GDP per capita. Second, we should define and evaluate China’s 
advancing speed towards convergence with the developed country Canada, also 
taking into account the advancing speed of the developed countries or groups of 
countries (see Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5).  
The economies of Canada and the China are significantly different because of the 
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differences in industrial structure and their contribution to GDP. In Canada, 
agriculture only accounted for 2.1% of GDP and 2% of employment while it 
accounted for 10.6% of GDP and 43% of employment in China in 2008. The service 
sector accounted for 40.2% of GDP and 32% of employment in China while the 
corresponding figures for Canada were 69.1% of GDP and 76% of employment in 
2008. In Canada’s GDP composition, agriculture accounted for 2.1%, industry 28.8% 
and services about 69.1% of total GDP in 2007 (Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 Some Comparisons between Canada and China with the World 
 
 GDP – composition 
by sector (2008 est.) 
Labour Force - by 
occupation 
Urban Population/ 
Urbanization Rate 
World 
agriculture: 4%  
industry: 32%  
services: 64%  
agriculture: 40% 
industry: 20.6% 
services: 39.4% 
(2007) 
50% (2008) 
urbanization 
rate :1.98% (05-10 
est.) 
Canada 
agriculture: 2.1%  
industry: 28.8%  
services: 69.1%  
agriculture 2%, 
manufacturing 13%, 
construction 6%, 
services 76%, other 
3% (2006) 
80%  
urbanization rate: 1% 
China 
agriculture: 10.6%  
industry: 49.2% 
services: 40.2%  
agriculture: 43% 
industry: 25% 
services: 32%  
(2006 est.) 
44.94%,  
urbanization rate: 
2.7% 
Source: Based on the https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
     
When household incomes increase, consumption patterns change. Simply, the 
share of household (or individual) income spent on food will decline as income grows. 
The result of this change in consumption patterns is a steady decline in the share of 
expenditures on food (Polèse 2010). Engel’s Coefficient in Canada is below 10 %, if 
it is calculated by the share of food spending in annual household total spending for 
major categories such as personal taxes, shelter (house), transportation, food and 
clothing. Foot (2009) noted that despite successive recessions, Canadians’ standard of 
living has risen steadily for decades (Figure 3.18) and stated that food was the 
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costliest household expense in 1969, accounting for 19% of total household spending. 
By 2007, the share of food spending had decreased to 10%.  
Figure 3.18 Average Annual Household Spending for Major Categories of 
Canada, 1968-2008 (in constant 2004$) 
 
Source：Richard Foot (2009), For A nation in Crisis, We Live Well, Canwest News Service, The 
Gazette, montrealgazette.com, Wednesday, April8, 2009, A12. 
 
Engel's Coefficient in China has diminished quickly from 62.6% in 1978 to 
40.8% in 2008. Chinese urban and rural residents have witnessed a huge change in 
food consumption structure since 1980. The result of Engel's Coefficient statistics 
showed a decrease of 19.6% in Engel’s Coefficient for urban residents, from 57.5% in 
1978 to 37.9% in 2008, and a decrease of 24% in Engel’s Coefficient for rural 
residents from 67.7% in 1978 to 43.7% in 2008 (Figure 3.19).  
The status and level of economic development of both countries can clearly be 
seen based on the comparable indicators such as HDI, GDP, GDP (PPP) per capita, 
Life expectancy Index, GDP Index, GDP composition by sectors, labour force by 
occupation, urbanization and urban population from Tables 3.3 and 3.4 and Engel's 
Coefficient in Figure 3.18 and 3.19. China is a fast developing country with a high 
growth rate while Canada has maintained the steady status of a high developed 
economy with a low growth rate. Service and agriculture sectors in both countries are 
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very different in composition by sector and by labour force in relation to GDP. 
Figure 3.19 Engel's Coefficient of Urban and Rural Households of China, 1978-2008 
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook-2008, http://www.sei.gov.cn/hgjj/yearbook/2008/indexeh.htm 
 
Table 3.4 General Comparison between Canada and China 
 
Country China  Canada 
Capital Beijing Ottawa 
Largest city Shanghai Toronto 
Official Languages Chinese English & French 
Government Republic Federation 
Establishment October 1, 1949 July 1, 1867 
Total Area 9,640,821 km² (3rd) 9,984,670 km² (2nd) 
Population – 2007 1,321,851,888 (1st) 33,261,000(36th) 
Population  Density 140/km² (53rd) 3.6/km²  
GDP (PPP) 2007 $7.043 trillion (2nd) $1.274 trillion (13th) 
Per capita GDP(PPP) $5,300 (105th)  $38,200 (21st)  
GDP (nominal Total) 2007 $3.42 trillion (4th) $1.432 trillion (9th) 
Per capita GDP (nominal) $2,800 (101st) $42,738 (14th) 
Gini(2007) 46.9 (UN) 32.6 ((UN))  
HDI (2007) 0.777 (medium) (81st) 0.961 (high) (4th) 
Source: World Bank Database; IMF Database; UN Database; FAO Database; UNCTAD World 
Investment Report 2007; UNDP Human Development Report 2007. 
 
In Canada agriculture only accounts for 2.1% of GDP and 2% of employment 
while it took up 10.6% of GDP and 43% of employment in China in 2008. Service 
sector accounts for 40.2% of GDP and 32% of employment in China while it 
accounted for 69.1% GDP and 76% of employment in Canada in 2008. Canada had a 
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high urban population of 80% while China had an urban population of only 44.94% in 
2008. 
 
Table 3.5 Some Comparisons between Canada and China 
 
Indicators Period Canada China 
Population, urban 
(% of total population) 
1975 75.6 17.4 
2005 80.1 40.4 
2015 81.4 49.2 
Public expenditure on education (% of 
GDP) 
1991 6.5 2.2 
2002-2005 5.2 1.9 
Researchers in R&D (per million people) 1990-2005 3,597 708 
Public expenditure on health (% of GDP) 2004 6.8 1.8 
Source: World Bank Report (2007) 
 
In terms of some other indicators, Canada had a higher HDI index of 0.961 
(ranked 4th in the world) and lower Gini index of 32.6 while China had a high Gini 
index of 46.9 and low HDI index of 0.777 (ranked 81st in the world) in 2007. Public 
expenditure on education and health are higher in Canada (12.5%, 2000-2007) than in 
China (around 4%18). In addition, the number of researchers in R&D per million 
people was 3597 in Canada while it was only 708 in China based on the statistics of 
World Bank Report during the 1990-2005 period (Table 3.5). According to the World 
Development Indicators database, 2009, Net migration in China was -1,339,000 in 
2000 and increased to -1,900,000 in 2005. In contrast, Canada receives a large 
number of immigrants and the average net migration of Canada has been over 
225,000 since 1990 compared to its small population. 
In terms of the indicators of communication, China had 365.4 million telephone 
(main line) users (coverage of total pop 27.65%) and 547.286 million telephones - 
mobile cellular users (coverage of total population of 41.42%) in 2007. In 2008, there 
were 253 million internet users (coverage of total pop 19.14%), 14.306 million 
internet hosts19 (coverage of total population of 1.08%). These indicators were higher 
                                                              
18http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/observer/2010-02/506897.html 
19 An Internet host is a computer connected directly to the Internet; normally an Internet Service 
Provider's (ISP) computer is a host. Internet users may use either a hard-wired terminal, at an 
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in Canada than that of China if compared to its coverage to its population. Canada had 
21 million telephone (main line) users (coverage of total population of 64.46%) and 
18.749 million telephones - mobile cellular users (coverage of total population 
57.55%) in 2006. There were 28 million internet users (coverage of total population 
of 85%) in 2007, 5.1196 million internet hosts (coverage of total pop 15.36%) in 
200820. 
China, the new superpower, is rapidly growing its consumption of the world’s 
natural resources. Chinese energy consumption rose by 8.4% continued to account for 
the majority of global energy consumption growth. The Chinese oil consumption 
growth of 6.7% was close to the 10 year average. 
The differences in energy production and consumption structure are closely 
related to the different resource availabilities in each country as well as their respective 
patterns of changing social and economic development. If the two countries are 
compared by energy production and consumption share of the world, the energy 
demand of China has grown – especially oil, coal consumption since 1996 – while 
Canadian energy consumption has almost remained at the same level (BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy, June 200721).  
China is the biggest coal producer and consumer in the world. It accounted for 
39.36% of world coal production and 38.55% of world coal consumption of world in 
2006. In China, coal accounted for 57.8% of Total Energy Consumption, while oil, gas 
and Water, Wind and Electricity only accounted for 23.9%, 14.1% and 4.2% 
respectively in 2007. For many years the US was the world’s leading polluter, but in 
2008 China took on the unenviable crown of being the biggest polluter in the world. 
So, air pollution (greenhouse gases, sulfur dioxide particulates) from its reliance on 
coal and the concomitant production of acid rain is the biggest environmental problem 
in China, although others may be just as important (e.g. soil erosion and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
institution with a mainframe computer connected directly to the Internet, or may connect remotely by 
way of a modem via telephone line, cable, or satellite to the Internet Service Provider's host computer. 
The number of hosts is one indicator of the extent of Internet connectivity.  
20 https://www.cia.gov/ 
21 www.bp.com/statisticalreview.  
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desertification). According to the World Watch Institute, China is home to 16 of the 
world’s most polluted cities. Pollution is also draining China’s economic reserves, 
costing $200 billion annually. According to 2008 HDI report, China took up 10.6% 
share of CO2 emission of the world while Canada only had a 1.8% share in 1990. 
However, in 2004, China shared 17.3% of world CO2 emission compared to Canada’s 
modest 2% (Table 3.6). China’s CO2 emissions share of the world from the 
consumption and flaring of fossil fuels has increased continuously while it has 
diminished slightly in Canada since 1980 (Figure 3.20). 
A detailed input-output analysis in China tracked the distribution of fuels, raw 
materials, and intermediate goods to and from industries throughout the economy. 
Taking carbon intensities and trade data into account, it estimated the energy-related 
carbon dioxide emissions embedded in domestic production for export at 34% of its 
2004 emissions (IEA 2007). 
 
Figure3.20: Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption and Flaring of 
Fossil Fuels, 1980-2006 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data of Energy Information Administration, International Energy 
Annual 2006, 2008. www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/eia   
 
With China’s production facilities expanding rapidly, the figures for later years 
could be higher. Annual greenhouse gas emissions are projected to grow from 44 
gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2005 to 60 gigatons in 2030, a 35% increase. 
Of the 23 gigatons of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in the International 
Energy Agency sample, one-third was embedded in production for export. China 
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alone accounted for 2.3 gigatons (31%) of this, and Europe and the Russian 
Federation combined for another 1.7 gigatons (23%). Africa and Latin America each 
accounted for just 2% of embedded emissions (IEA 2008a)22. If both countries are 
compared on the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI)23 score which consists of 
5 components, 21 indicators and 76 variables published in 2005 by the Yale Center 
for Environmental Law and Policy (2005), Canada ranked 6th with a score of 64.4 
while China ranked 104th with a score of 38.6 in the world in 2005. It can be seen 
from these data that environmental problems have been aggravated in China with its 
fast development and its pollution share in the world has increased substantially. 
 
Table 3.6 Some Comparisons by Energy Production and Consumption Share of 
the World (Unit: Million Tonnes Oil Equivalent) 
Indicator 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
(Ca)Oil Prod. 3.42 3.47 3.53 3.47 3.51 3.50 3.77 3.85 3.82 3.72 3.87 
(Ch)Oil Prod. 4.69 4.60 4.51 4.60 4.49 4.57 4.67 4.58 4.51 4.64 4.69 
(Ca)Oil Cons. 2.45 2.48 2.51 2.48 2.48 2.53 2.56 2.61 2.64 2.60 2.54 
(Ch)Oil Cons. 5.19 5.71 5.71 5.96 6.29 6.38 6.86 7.39 8.36 8.49 8.99 
(Ca)Coal Prod. 1.81 1.85 1.81 1.74 1.63 1.58 1.46 1.26 1.25 1.17 1.05 
(Ch)Coal Prod. 30.63 29.75 27.94 28.72 28.90 29.39 30.73 34.11 36.59 38.39 39.36 
(Ca)Coal Cons. 1.09 1.15 1.23 1.22 1.24 1.34 1.27 1.16 1.09 1.10 1.13 
(Ch)Coal Cons. 30.96 29.92 28.52 28.82 28.23 28.57 29.29 32.40 34.87 37.06 38.55 
(Ca)Gas Prod. 7.32 7.40 7.48 7.54 7.53 7.50 7.41 6.96 6.77 6.67 6.51 
(Ch)Gas Prod. 0.90 1.01 1.02 1.07 1.12 1.22 1.29 1.33 1.51 1.79 2.04 
(Ca)Gas  Cons. 3.79 3.74 3.73 3.57 3.42 3.38 3.38 3.56 3.43 3.29 3.39 
(Ch)Gas  Cons. 0.80 0.85 0.87 0.90 0.98 1.09 1.13 1.28 1.44 1.64 1.95 
(Ca)Nuclear Energy Cons. 3.85 3.45 2.94 2.91 2.82 0.29 2.80 2.82 3.28 3.32 3.51 
(Ch)Nuclear Energy Cons. 0.59 0.61 0.58 0.60 0.65 0.07 0.93 1.64 1.82 1.91 1.94 
Note: Ca-Canada, Ch-China, Prod-Production, Cons-Consumption. Source: Http:\\www.bp.com 
 
   The openness of the Canadian economy to international trade has been a major 
factor of Canadian economic growth. But there are great differences in international 
trade direction, structure and partners between the two economies. Trade accounts for 
roughly a third of GDP of Canada. Canada has signed two agreements with the US – 
                                                              
22 2009 World Development Indicators, Environment :pp.131 
23 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index- The ESI score is the equally weighted average of these 21 
indicators. 2005 Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy 
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the 1989 US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the 1994 North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (which includes Mexico), which has brought a trade 
boom for Canada. The relationship which Canada enjoys with US is thus another 
major defining factor for Canada's dramatic increase in trade. The US and Canada 
have the world's largest trading relationship and US absorbs more than 85% of 
Canadian exports24. In terms of international trade, high technology exports (% of 
manufactured exports) of Canada increased 13.7% in 1990 to 14.4% in 2005 while it 
augmented in China from 6.1% in 1990 to 30.6% in 2005. Canada merchandise export 
trade value increased $1.78 billion in 1977 to $46.3 billion in 2007 and merchandise 
import trade value increased to $41.5 billion in 2007 from 1.53 billion $ in 1977.  
International export-import trade structure of Canada are composed of agriculture 
and fishing (7.65%-6.35%), energy (20.4%-9.1%), forestry (6.51%-0.74%), industrial 
goods (23.25%-21.2%), machinery and equipment (20.8%-29%), auto 
(17.2%-19.92%)  and consumer goods (4.17%-13.6%) in 2007. The main export 
commodities of Canada are motor vehicles and parts, industrial machinery, aircraft, 
telecommunications equipment; chemicals, plastics, fertilizers; wood pulp, timber, 
crude petroleum, natural gas, electricity, aluminum while imports – commodities are 
concentrated on machinery and equipment, motor vehicles and parts, crude oil, 
chemicals, electricity, durable consumer goods.  
The main export partners of Canada are the US (76.9%), the UK (3.5%), other 
European countries (5.22%), Japan (2.1% ), China( 2.1%) while the main import 
partners are the US (64.99%), the UK (2,1%), other European countries (7.8%),  Japan 
(2.8%), China (9.4%) and Mexico (4.2%) in 2007.  It can be seen clearly that the US 
has always been the main international trade partner of Canada. In China, foreign trade 
is the main booster of Chinese fast economic development in recent decades. After the 
entrance to WTO, China has augmented its export based foreign trade amount at a 
high speed. Total value of exports and imports increased from 206.4×108 US$ in 1978 
                                                              
24 http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/canada/export-import.html 
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(exports 47.2%, imports 52.8%) to 25632.6 ×108 US$ (exports 55.8%, imports 44.2%) 
in 2008. Its average annual growth rate was 17.4% (exports 18.1%, imports 16.7%) 
from 1979 to 2008. Foreign direct investments has increased from 34.0 ×108 US$ in 
1990 to 924 ×108 US$ in 2008 with an average annual growth rate of 20%. The main 
export commodities of China are electrical and other machinery, including data 
processing equipment, apparel, textiles, iron and steel, optical and medical equipment 
while the major import commodities are electrical and other machinery, oil and mineral 
fuels, optical and medical equipment, metal ores, plastics, organic chemicals. The 
major export partners of China were the US (19.1%), Hong Kong (15.1%), Japan 
(8.4%), South Korea (4.6%), Germany (4%)  and is main imports partners were Japan 
(14%), South Korea (10.9%), Taiwan (10.5%), the US (7.3%) and Germany (4.7%) in 
2007. 
From the above-mentioned figures, it can be seen clearly that the Chinese share in 
Canadian international trade has also increased in recent years even though there has 
been some frictions in the relationship. China is Canada's second largest trading 
partner, second only to the United States, with bilateral trade reaching $36.6 billion in 
merchandise in 2005, an increase of 19.1%. In 2005, Canadian exports to China grew 
by 6.7%, reaching $7.1 billion, while imports from China reached $29.5 billion, an 
increase of 22.5% compared to 2004. Canada's direct investment in China increased 
from $6 million in 1990 to $1 billion in 2005. Likewise, Chinese direct investment in 
Canada increased from $54 million in 1991 to $1.4 billion in 2005. 
According to the World Human Development Report (2008), Canada ranked 4th 
(HDI 0.961), while China ranked 81th (HDI 0.777) out of 179 countries in 2008. For 
example, if compared to the world average of 2007, China’s GDP per capita 
calculated by the purchasing power parity index (PPP) was 7.2 times lower than 
Canada’s. In 2008, China ranked 2nd (after the USA) based on total GDP calculated 
by PPP in $, while Canada ranked 14th in the world by the International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank, CIA. If calculated on a per capita basis, China ranked in a worse 
position with a ranking of 105 based on GDP per capita PPP ($6,546 in 2009), while 
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Canada ranked in 12th position ($38,290) in GDP per capita (PPP)25. Still, according 
to the index of Inequality measures in the Human Development Report 2007 Data, the 
ratio of the richest 10% to the poorest 10% of Canada and China are 9.4 and 21.6 
respectively, while the ratio of the richest 20% to the poorest 20% are 5.5 and 12.2 
respectively. The gap between the extreme cases seems to be more dramatic than on 
the world level. China is listed far from the high level countries on the rank, but above 
the average world level if calculated by the GDP index, per capita GDP, HDI, Life 
Expectancy Index and Education Index, among the 208 countries and independent 
territories in the world (Table 3.6). 
 
Table 3.7 Canada and China: Relationships to Development Indicators in the 
World in 2005 
 
Indicators (HDI) value 
2005 
GDP per capita 
(PPP US$)2005 
Life expectancy 
index 
Education 
index 
GDP 
index 
Canada 0.961 33,375 0.921 0.991 0.97 
China 0.777 6,757 0.792 0.837 0.703 
Developing countries 0.691 5,282 0.685 0.725 0.662 
Least developed countries 0.488 1,499 0.492 0.519 0.452 
OECD 0.916 29,197 0.888 0.912 0.947 
High-income OECD 0.947 33,831 0.906 0.961 0.972 
High human development 0.897 23,986 0.854 0.922 0.915 
Medium human development 0.698 4,876 0.709 0.738 0.649 
Low human development 0.436 1,112 0.391 0.515 0.402 
High income 0.936 33,082 0.903 0.937 0.968 
Middle income 0.776 7,416 0.764 0.843 0.719 
Low income 0.57 2,531 0.583 0.589 0.539 
World 0.743 9.543 0.718 0.75 0.761 
Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2007. 
 To explain whether China has succeeded in achieving convergence with Canada 
in relation to GDP per capita as well as the other indicators, we have to compare 
China’s and Canada’s progress in a comprehensive way using integrated indicators to 
provide a more robust explanation. If we define the progress by the annual average 
                                                              
25 http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm 
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growth rate of the GDP per capita and analyze China’s rate in relation to Canada 
(Table 3.7) over as long a period of time as possible, we conclude that, in fact, 
China’s convergence is a mere hypothesis. Not only it is impossible to be achieved, 
but the gaps become broader, even though (see table 3.1) China’s annual average rate 
was much faster between 1960 and 2007 and even into the double digits in some 
sub-periods during the period 1980-2007. 
  If we compare a recent trend, China achieved an 11.94% and Canada a 4.39% 
GDP (PPP) annual growth per capita in the period 1981-200926. If we analyze a long 
series of data for GDP per capita, the annual growth rate (%) of China was 8% during 
the period while for Canada it was a 3.6% annual growth rate respectively during 
1961-2008 (Figure 3.1). 
Although the analysis and forecast calculations require a long series of data, 
we consider it is unreasonable to use the 1949-1978 data for China, since these three 
decades are non-typical as regards economic continuity and stability. The changes 
began to produce good results from 1980 since the onset of economic reform, when 
the stability and functioning of the economy were achieved on the basis of the new 
principles. Therefore, it is advisable to support the idea that for the convergence 
scenarios and calculations one should consider, in the case of China, the growth rates 
from 1980 onwards, as they are significant and credible for the future evolution of 
China’s economy, when it entered into a more ‘normal’ phase of development. 
 
3.4.2. The Assessment of the Time Required for Convergence 
 
The most frequent question concerning economic growth convergence refers to the 
length of the process. Specifically, when we analyze the convergence of the real 
economies of China and of Canada, the first thing to be clarified is the length of the 
period necessary to achieve the future balance between China’s annual average 
income per capita (Ycn) and Canada’s one (Yca). The initial level of GDP per capita 
(expressed by the PPP in US$) of the two entities (YCN and YCA) is characterized by a 
                                                              
26 http://www.indexmundi.com/ 
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significant difference. The ratio of YCA to YCN was 1: 26.4 in 1961, and 1: 15.7 in 2007. 
The balance may occur in a reasonable period of time, only if China is able to achieve 
annual average growth rates per capita (rCN ) much higher than those achieved by 
Canada (rCA ), CA(řCA), that is řCN> řCA. 
To assess the convergence period we start with the simple relationships 
concerning the GDP per capita growth of the two entities with different initial levels 
and annual average growth rates: 
YtCN= YCN (1+ řCN)t  (3.1) 
YtCA= YCA (1+ řCA)t  (3.2) 
 
Convergence is achieved when the values of the two relations become equal 
according to the relation (3.3): 
YCN (1+ řCN)t= YCA (1+ řCA)t  (3.3) 
 
And the curves YtCN and YtCA meet in the balance point t* (steady state see Figure 
3.21), according to Figure 3.21. 
 
 
Figure 3.21 The Convergence of the Economic Growth Curves of Developed and 
Less Developed Countries 
 
Source: Modified from Dynamics in the neo-classical model (Barro and Sa1a-i-Martin, 1995) 
 
By logging and rearranging the terms, one may assess the period of time (t) when 
the convergence (balance) of the GDP per capita of the two entities is achieved: 
T=log YCA- log YCN/ log(1+ řCN)- log(1+ řCA)   (3.4) 
Using this formula, we may calculate the period of time (in years) when China 
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can catch up (in terms of the GDP per capita calculated by the PPP in US$) with 
Canada. Catching up with the developed countries is achieved through higher growth 
rates in the period 1980-2008, namely when the restructuring effects occurred and the 
system began to function on the basis of the new principles and in the new external 
context. Table 3.8 includes the data used in the calculation formula (initial GDP per 
capita and the annual average growth rates) and the results representing the number of 
years required to achieve convergence with Canada, in relation to China’s annual 
growth rates, considered as alternatives ( rCN1=4%, rCN2=5%, rCN3=6%, rCN4=7%, 
rCN5=8%, rCN6=9%) in relation to Canada’s annual growth rates considered as 
alternatives rCA1=1%, rCA2=2%, rCA1=3%, rCA1=4%).  
 
Table 3.8 Forecasting the Time to Achieve Convergence between China and 
Canada 
Indicators 
Canada 
YCA 
China 
YCH 
Annual 
average 
growth rate 
of Canada 
The time to achieve the convergence of alternative annual growth rates 
of China (rCN1,.......................................... rCN6) 
rCN1=4% 
rCN2=5
% 
rCN3=6% rCN4=7% 
rCN5=8
% 
rCN6=9
% 
GDP(PPP)/2008 
40900$ 6100$ řCA =3.5% 395 132 80 57 45 37 
40900$ 6100$ řCA =2.5% 131 79 57 44 36 31 
40900$ 6100$ řCA =1.5% 78 56 44 36 31 27 
HDI/2008 0.961 0.777 řCA =0.275 řCN =0.772 43     
Urban Pop 2008 80.1% 44.9% řCA =0.143 řCN =0.89 78 
Gini index 32.6 46.9 řCA =0.16 řCN =0.66 73 
LEI 2006 0.924 0.795 řCA =0.21 řCN =0.006 151 
GDP I2008 0.986 0.642 řCA =0.0045 řCN =0.009 96 
OPENC2004 73.4 54.38 řCA =0.5 řCN=1.5 30 
Note: The Annual average growth rate of indicators ř are calculated based on the data of 
GDP(1961-2008), HDI (1975-2008), UrbanPop, Gini index (1998-2008), Life expectancy 
index(LEI)(1995-2006), GDPI-GDP Index (2000-2008), OPENC-Openness(1950-2004), Engel 
Coefficient (Canada 1968-2008) China 1978-2008) from difference sources such as PWT6.2 Database, 
World Bank Database; IMF Database; UN Database; FAO Database; UNCTAD World Investment 
Report 2007; UNDP Human Development Reports of different years. Average urbanization rate is 
calculated based on 1980-2008 data of both countries. 
 
If China maintains a high growth rate as shown in the Table 3.6 data, the 
convergence time can theoretically be estimated. At an annual average growth rate of 
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6%, China would need 80 years to reach Canada’s level. At a growth rate of 7%, the 
number of years to achieve convergence with Canada would diminish to less than half, 
i.e., 45 years, and at a rate of 9%, convergence with Canada requires 37 years. The 
dynamics of the GDP per capita points of convergence of China and Canada in 
relation to China’s average growth rates compared to Canada’s rate is shown in 
Figure 3.4, where the abscissa contains the time (number of years) necessary to 
achieve the convergence, and the ordinate indicates the evolution of the GDP per 
capita in China, as given by the 9% annual average rate of China and the 3.5% annual 
average rate of Canada (see Table 3.8). 
 
Figure 3.22 The Dynamics of Convergence Between China and Canada, in 
Relation to GDP per Capita by Size of Annual Average Growth Rate in China  
 
Source: Calculated based on World Bank Data. 
 
At a 9% growth rate for China’s economy and one of 3.5% for Canada, the 
convergence point (curve intersection) of the two entities will be achieved at a GDP 
per capita of about 147000 $, that is 37 years, while with a rate of 9% for China and 
1.5% for Canada, the convergence of the two entities will be achieved at a GDP per 
capita of about 62000 $, that is 27 years (Figure 3.22). These figures seem impossible 
and unbelievable to achieve. But fast economic growth even during the recent world 
economic recession became a distinguishing feature of the Chinese “economic 
miracle.” It is precisely by extrapolating the current trends into the future that many 
experiments have conjured up a picture of that formerly backward country as 
becoming an economic superpower that could catch up with the industrialized 
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countries. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, a brief description of regional growth, policy and disparity starting 
from 1950s until the present time has been provided, mainly in a descriptive vein. 
Clearly, much has happened in both countries during this time and to provide a 
thorough description even of something as narrow as regional development 
background would require far more than a single chapter. However, the intention has 
been primarily to provide background material against which to interpret the more 
detailed empirical results presented in Chapter 4 and which are the main focus of this 
study. In fact, economic development is a very complicated process affected by many 
factors and is always changing and fluctuating. If the other indicators are considered, 
such as the Human Development Index (HDI), Urban Population growth rate, Gini 
Index, Life expectancy Index (LEI), GDP Index, OPENC Index, it will take China 43, 
78, 73, 151, 96, 30 years respectively to catch up with Canada under the different 
combinations of annual GDP growth rate scenarios. It is difficult to use the HDI to 
monitor changes in human development in the short-term because two of its 
components, namely life expectancy and adult literacy change slowly (HDIreport, 
2008). Natural Disaster, World economic recession, war, and many other social 
economic and environmental problems also affect the stability and growth of regional 
economies. 
In summary, it must be admitted that China has achieved impressive successes 
in a catching up effort on a range of total economic indicators on the world stage. But 
it will still remain a very poor country by international standards. However, China is 
now faced with a number of other economic and social problems, including 
pronounced regional disparity, an aging population, an increasing rural-urban income 
gap, and rapid environmental degradation. Today, just under 15.9% of the Chinese 
population is below the income poverty line of 1US$ a day, and there is still 36.3% 
population of China below the income poverty line of 2$ a day (HDI 2008). 
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According to the World Development Indicators database of April 2009: the 
inequality measure of the ratio of the richest 10% to the poorest 10% is 9.4 in Canada 
but in China it is very high at 21.6; another inequality measure, the ratio of the richest 
20% to the poorest 20%, is at 5.5 in Canada, but in China it is at 12.2. Furthermore, in 
2009, 90.9% of the population of China is relatively literate, compared to 20% in 
1950. All Canadian regions had a much higher GDP per capita than all regions in 
China in 2007 (Figure 3.23).  
 
Figure 3.23 Provincial per Capita GDP of Canada and China, 2007 (C$)27 
 
Notes: Chinese Provincial GDP calculated based on Bank of Canada 2007 the average exchange rate of 
Canadian dollars to Chinese RMB. 1C$=7.096RMB in 2007. 
 
From an economic point of view, China is still in a marginal position when 
compared with Canada. In 1950, GNP per capita was $1,349 in Canada while in 
China it was about $300. If we compare the two countries by using per capita GNI 
(Atlas method) from the World Bank data, it was $2,340 in 1962 for Canada, 
increasing to $39,650$ in 2007, while China had a per capita GNI of $70 in 1962, 
increasing to $2,370 in 2007. It would appear that China caught up with the 1960s’ 
economic level of Canada after 5 decades of development. But significant gaps also 
                                                              
27 This figure is given in this way to show clearly the pronounced cross-national and national per 
capita GDP disparities. 
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remain in terms of standard of living between China and Canada, with regional 
standards of living being much higher in Canada than China. Though the growth in 
gaps between the regions in each country or between both countries may be improved, 
the gaps are not likely to be eliminated in the near future. Hence, there is a recognition 
of the need to address regional disparities but little by way of policy specificity, which 
suggests that the long-standing problem is unlikely to be reversed in the near future. 
 
In Chapter 4 that follows, more detailed econometric methodologies and 
measurement methods are presented and discussed for investigating differences 
between Canada and China at the national scale as well as within country provincial 
convergence in each country. 
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 Chapter 4  
 
Empirical Analysis 
 
The focus of this chapter is the analysis of cross-country convergence between 
Canada and China at the national scale and of within country provincial convergence 
in each country using different measurement methods such as the traditional methods, 
beta convergence and sigma convergence (see Chapter 2). In order to overcome the 
heterogeneity bias associated with traditional convergence analysis, the spatial 
dimension is taken into consideration in the beta convergence analysis presented in 
this Chapter. The main purpose of presenting such material is to provide the tools for 
the interpretation of the empirical convergence analysis that is presented in the 
following chapters.  
 
4.1 Traditional Methods 
 
In order to measure the economy, a whole array of inequality indicators have been 
proposed, the most popular being some summary measure of dispersion, such as 
using Descriptive Statistics: Variance of logarithms, CV, the Gini index and the 
Theil index. Some of these are non-weighted measures of inequality as they do not 
incorporate the population size of each economy. Because of the huge difference in 
population between Canada and China, the population size of each economy should 
be taken into consideration.  
 
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
A fundamental and basic distinction can be drawn from the descriptive statistics of 
both countries. Here, only the Cross Country Comparison with Multi-Indicators are 
shown in Figure 4.1. The other provincial numerical measures for describing data are 
given in the Appendix of this thesis (Appendix A, Table 1 and Table 2).  
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Figure 4.1 Cross Country Comparison with Multi-Indicators, 1960-2007 
(Unit: %)  
 
 
 
Note: In Figure 4.1, A is Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), B is Exports of goods and services 
(% of GDP), C is Gross capital formation (% of GDP), D is High-technology exports (% of 
manufactured exports), E is Imports of goods and services (% of GDP), F is Industry, value added (% 
of GDP), G is Inflation, GDP deflator (annual%), H is Merchandise trade (% of GDP), N is 
Services, …., value added (% of GDP); ca is Canada, ch is China. Source: World Bank Data 2007. 
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From Figure 4.1, it can be seen very clearly that Ac (Agriculture, value added 
(% of GDP)) has decreased faster in China than for Canada, but in China it exhibits 
greater variability as opposed to Canada where it experienced a steady decrease. B 
(Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)) has increased gradually in Canada since 
1960, while for China it started from 2.61% in 1970 and reached 41.87% in 2007. C 
(Gross capital formation) has increased gradually and steadily in both countries but 
in China it picked up faster than for Canada. D (High-technology exports) has 
remained fairly steady for Canada while in China it increased continuously and 
reached 29.69% in 2007. E (Imports of goods and services) has increased steadily in 
Canada since 1960, while it started off slowly 2.7% in China in 1970, but reached 
the same level as Canada in 2006. In terms of F (Industry, value added (% of GDP)), 
both countries exhibit the same growth during this period. There was a considerable 
difference in terms of G (Inflation). Initially, the inflation rate was very unstable in 
both countries; since 1984, Canada has experienced a low inflation rate while China 
has experienced a much higher rate of inflation. There has been a significant gap in 
N (Services, …, value added (% of GDP)) in both countries. This indicator has 
played a very important role in the Canadian economy and has increased gradually, 
while it has increased only very slowly in China since 1960.  
From the comparison of these indicators, the conclusion can be drawn that 
most of the indicators for China have increased faster than for Canada over the 
whole period under study. The rate of increase of these indicators was also higher in 
China that for Canada. Furthermore, there were large differences between the 
percentage (%) of GDP for the indicators of agriculture, industry and services. Both 
countries are very different in economic status and structure. This will be 
demonstrated even more forcefully with other statistical methods in the following 
sections. 
 
4.1.2 Coefficient Variation  
 
From the population weighted Coefficient Variation (CV) result (Figure 4.2), it can 
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be seen that provincial disparity in Canada has decreased steadily since 1981, while 
in China it diminished during the period 1981 to 1990, then increased until 2003, and 
finally decreased again. If both countries are compared, there is divergence of the CV, 
showing the economies of the two countries are diverging from one another. This has 
been obvious since 1990. 
Figure 4.2 Population Weighted CV for Canada and China 
 
 
Note: In the calculation for Canada, GDP and Population data for three territories are excluded 
because of lack of data.  
 
4.1.3 Variance of logarithms, weighted (VLW) and unweighted (VL) 
 
There are different variants of GDP for both countries because of different 
calculation methods. Here, per Capita GDP, per capita GNI and per Capita PPP (GNI) 
are used in the calculation of the weighted (VLW) and unweighted (VL) Variance of 
logarithms and the log of these indicators to obtain a better comparative result for the 
two countries. 
The Calculation Formulae for the weighted (VLW) and unweighted (VL) 
Variance of logarithms measures are respectively (4.1) and (4.2):  
2
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Note: For the above equation, y is the average per capita income, Y indicates the aggregate 
income, Pop is the population, i is the subscript for the ith territorial unit and the superscript ‘*’ 
indicates national values. 
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Figure 4.3 Weighted (VLW) and Unweighted (VL) of Canada and China 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Log of Per Capita GDP 
 
 
Note: Log of Per Capita GDP of Both Countries from 1960 to 2007 
 
Figure 4.5 Log of GNI Per Capita    Figure 4.6 GDP per Capita (PPP) 
 
         
 
If the log of per capita GDP (Figure 4.4), per capita GNI (Figure 4.5) are 
considered, there is divergence between the two countries. But when per Capita 
GDP (PPP) is considered, there has been a slight convergence between the two 
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countries since 2006 (Figure 4.6). The result is the same as the result obtained 
regardless of whether weighted (VLW) and unweighted (VL) values are considered 
for comparison (Figure 4.3); in Canada, provincial disparity has gradually 
decreased since 1960, while in China provincial disparity decreased during the 
period 1981 to 1990, then increased until 2003, and finally decreased again. For the 
whole period, there was divergence between both economies. From the 
above-mentioned figures, it can be seen very clearly that the provincial per capita 
GDP inequality for China converged from 1981 to 1990, then diverged until 2003, 
then again began to converge. The case for Canada is slightly different.  The 
provincial per capita inequality GDP generally converged gradually except for a 
few small periods of divergence from 1983 to 1985 and 1987 to 1988. It maintained 
almost the same level from 1991 to 1996, and from 2002 to 2007. From the 
comparation of following Lorenz plots in 1981 and 2007 in Section 4.1.4, Canada 
exhibits continued small change, but there was not much change in China. If we 
compare both countries, the distribution of provincial inequality converged from 
1981 to 1990, and diverged since 1991.  
 
4.1.4 Gini Index 
 
A very popular inequality indicator is the Gini coefficient. This is derived from the 
Lorenz curve (see Appendix A2), a cumulative frequency curve which plots the 
cumulative share of population of the economies in the sample on the X-axis and the 
cumulative share of total income of these same economies on the Y-axis. In both 
cases, the economies are ranked according to their per capita income from bottom to 
top. The Gini index (G) corresponds to twice the area between the Lorenz curve and 
the 45° line. The Calculation Methods for the Gini coefficient of inequality are given 
in the appropriate section of Appendix A3.  
 From the Gini coefficient of inequality index on Figure 4.7, it can be concluded 
that provincial disparity in China is greater that in Canada. Provincial inequality 
decreased between 1981 and 1990 in both countries, but since then it increased in 
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China until 2004 followed by a decrease, while it decreased gradually in Canada 
during this whole period. For the whole period, there was divergence of the Gini 
coefficient of inequality index between both economies. 
Figure 4.7 Gini Coefficient of Inequality for Canada and China 
 
Note: Calculated with StatsDirect Software. 
If we compare the Lorenz curves of 1961, 1981 and 2007 for the two countries 
on the graphs below, the change and difference can be very clearly seen. The Lorenz 
curve line (blue) between the line of perfect equality (red) and the line of perfect 
inequality approaches the line of perfect equality significantly in Canada, while it 
has not changed much during the period 1961 to 2007 for China (see data for the 
Lorenz Curves for both countries in 1961 and 2007, Figure 4.8). 
 
Figure 4.8a Gini Coefficient of Inequality for Canada, 1961,1981 and 2007 
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Figure 4.8b Gini Coefficient of Inequality of China, 1961, 1981 and 2007 
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4.1.5 Theil Index 
 
The Theil index, derived by econometrician Henri Theil, is a statistic used to measure 
economic inequality. The Theil index ranges from 0 to infinity and the higher the 
value of Theil, the higher the inequality. If every region has the same mean income, 
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then the index is 0. There are three types of Theil index of inequality identified as 
Theil, Theil1 and Theil0. The Theil indices of inequality are calculated as follows: 
 
 = xnxxxTheil ii log   (4.3) 
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From the three types of Theil indices (Figure 4.9), it can be concluded that the 
results are the same as with the other indicators. China has a greater provincial 
disparity than that of Canada. It can be seen from this graph that from 1981 to 1990, 
both countries experienced provincial inequality but that the indices for both 
countries converged; then they experienced a divergence of provincial inequality 
from 1991 to 2003, followed by convergence again from 2004 onwards. In China, 
provincial inequality changed more significantly than that of Canada from 1981 to 
2007. If we compare the cross-country analysis, the distance of the curved Theil 
index lines between both countries seems not to have changed significantly, almost 
keeping the same distance during the whole period. 
 
Figure 4.9 Theil, Theil0 and Theil1 Indices for China and Canada 
 
Note: xi is the value of the variable of interest for the ith region; if there are n regions, x is the 
sample mean for x, or 
=
=
N
i
ixN
x
1
1
. 
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4.2 Convergence  
 
Two concepts of convergence appear in discussions of per capita income convergence 
across countries and across regions (see Chapter 2). In this section per-capita GDP 
data are used to estimate σ-convergence and β-convergence. Cross-sectional data are 
constructed for the 31 provinces of China, and for the 10 provinces of Canada from 
1981 to 2007. Regression analysis is then undertaken for different time periods: (i) the 
whole period 1961-2007; (ii) the first sub period 1961-1980; and (iii) the second 
sub-period 1981-2007; and (iv) for shorter periods such as 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 
1981-1990, 1991-2000 and 2001-2007. First, a simple descriptive per capita GDP is 
analyzed to see if there are signs of convergence. 
Table 4.1 Simple Test of Convergence 
 
Year Canada China Disparity 
1960 GDP (Current US$) 2200 92 2108 
1980 GDP (Current US$)/ (PPP) per capita GDP 10987/11109 313/251 10674/10858 
2008 GDP (Current US$)/ (PPP) per capita GDP 45085//39098 3259/5970 41826/33128 
Total GDP Growth Rate from 1960 to 2008 20. 49  35.4  18.29  
Data source: Calculated based on the GDP (Current US$) and population data report of World Bank 
2009. 
 
Figure 4.10 Standard Deviation of Per Capita GDP between Canada and China 
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Figure 4.11 Standard Deviation of Per Capita PPP (GNI) between Canada and 
China, 1980-2007 
 
 
From Table 4.1 and Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 it can be concluded that both 
economies increased gradually while the disparity of per capita GDP between both 
countries has become greater: 
• The rate of growth of China is faster than Canada. It is not possible for the 
income gap between Canada and China to narrow if the initially ‘poor’, in this 
case China, does not grow faster than the initially ‘rich’, or Canada. From the 
table it can be seen that there is Absolute Beta-convergence between the two 
countries. 
Figure 4.12 Per Capita GDP of Canada and China 1960-2007  
(Current $US) 
 
Note: Per Capita GDP ($US), World Bank Group Data 
 
• The disparity in Per Capita GDP increases from $2108 in 1960 to $41826 in 
2008 (and the standard deviation of Per Capita GDP increases from $1490.5 to 
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$29575 between 1960 and 2008). So there is a lack of Sigma convergence in 
this case (Figures 4.9 and 4.10).  In other words, China growing faster than 
Canada is not enough to guarantee a fall in the standard deviation of GDP per 
capita in the cross-sectional analysis. If we consider the standard deviation and 
disparity per Capita PPP of both countries from 1981 to 2007 (Figure 4.9), the 
per capita PPP of both countries increased since 1981, and then decreased 
from 2007. But the disparity had diverged since 1981 gradually. In order to 
test the results of these descriptive statistics, the empirical convergence 
analyses are performed in the following sections. 
 
4.2.1 Sigma Convergence  
 
The concept of σ-convergence can be defined as when “a group of economies are 
converging in the sense of σ if the dispersion of their real per capita GDP levels 
tends to decrease over time” (Sala-i-Martin 1995: 323). 
A frequently used indicator for the convergence measurement is the variation 
coefficient of the GDP per capita denoted by σ and calculated as follows: 
( ) ( ) xxxn i −= 2.1σ   (4.6) 
where xi is the value of the variable of interest for the ith region, there are n regions, 
and x  is the sample mean for x. This indicator is also known as σ- convergence, 
first used by Sala-i-Martin, along with β-convergence (Iancu 2007). This type of 
convergence may be presented in terms of the standard deviation or coefficient of 
variation of per capita income across economies. It is widely used in the growth 
literature and displays a decrease over time in the dispersion of real per-capita 
income across a group of economies (see more on this in Chapter 2). A higher value 
of σ- convergence indicates a more serious income disparity, and vice versa. The σ- 
convergence not only quantifies the income inequality problem but also measures the 
development of an income gap between different economies. 
To compare Canada and China, the population factor should also be taken into 
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consideration. So σ can be transformed into a new weighted one, wσ , by simply 
employing a population weighted variance *Pop
Popi   given by the expression below: 
( )
x
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−
=
1
2
*    
σ      (4.7)                  
where xi, is the value of the variable of interest for the ith region, there are n regions, 
x  is the sample mean for x , pi is population of the ith region, and pop* is the national 
population. 
 
Figure 4.13 The σ-Convergence (the Variation Coefficient) of Canada and 
China 1981-2007 Calculated by GDP per Capita 
 
Notes: China includes 31 provinces and cities. Canada includes 10 provinces; the 3 
territories are excluded in the calculation because of data availability problems.  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995: 383) pointed out that the dispersion can be measured 
by calculating the standard deviation of the per-capita logarithm for each year. The 
following formula will be used to estimate the standard deviation for each year: 
( ) ( )
=
−=
n
t
ittt xxn
1
2lnln.1σ  (4.8) 
where σt stands for standard deviation at period t, xln and itxln represent the logarithm 
of the average per capita GDP of regions at period t and the logarithm of per capita 
GDP in region i at period t respectively; n is the number of regions. By computing the 
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dispersion of provincial per-capita GDP of Canadian and Chinese regions, we can 
examine the provincial σ convergence rate of both countries’ regional income 
disparity. If σt -1 is less than σt, then σ-convergence exists. However, if σt -1 is more 
than σt, then σ convergence does not exist. 
    Finally, to investigate whether the regional distribution of income tended 
toward being divergent during the period of high national economic growth or 
during the period of crisis, we can plot the σ convergence for each period. The 
growth rate across regions will be convergent if the period of the crisis, which is 
represented by the lower of the aggregate GDP growth values, exhibits decline in the 
value of σ convergence, and vice versa (Figures 4.13 and 4.14). 
 
Figure 4.14 The σ- Convergence (the Variation Coefficient) for Canada and 
China 
 
 
It can be seen from Figures 4.13 and 4.14 that from 1981 to 2007, Canada 
experienced a significant provincial σ convergence for the whole period while China 
experienced provincial σ convergence from 1981 to 1990 and σ divergence from 1991 
to 2003, with convergence starting again from 2004. If we compare the cross-country 
analysis, the distance of the curved σ convergence lines between both countries seems 
to have converged slightly for the period 1981-1990, and then diverged gradually. If 
we compare the weighted σ convergence that takes into account the population factor, 
there is significant divergence between both countries. 
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4.2.2 Beta Convergence 
 
To test if an initially lower income country has a higher rate of income growth, 
researchers often use two types of equation to estimate β convergence: absolute 
convergence and conditional convergence. First, absolute convergence is considered.  
   Beta convergence is defined as a negative relationship between initial income 
levels and subsequent growth rates. In order to test for regional Beta convergence, 
the common non-linear version of the basic growth regression approach with per 
capita income growth as the dependent variable and the initial income level as the 
explanatory variable are used to calculate Beta convergence. Beta convergence 
analysis has generally been employed in order to investigate convergence across 
economies or regions using cross-sectional data, and involves implementing the 
following model: 
 
ln(yi0+T/yio)/T=α0+α1ln(yio)+εi   (4.9) 
where  
yi0 – initial GDP per capita in region i 
T – number of years in observation period 
α0,α1 – parameters to be estimated 
εi- normally and independently distributed error term. 
 
In particular, if we consider estimations based on equation (4.9) these are 
referred to as absolute Beta convergence. The annual rate of convergence can be 
obtained from the equation β =-ln (1-α1)/T, where T denotes the number of years 
between initial and the final year of observation (see Chapter 2). If β<0 and is 
statistically significant, it is inferred that there is β-convergence, i.e. the lower the 
initial level of income, the higher the growth rate, or, in other words, when poor 
regions grow faster than rich ones, as a consequence incomes inevitably converge. If, 
on the contrary, β >0, then it is said there is β-divergence. A significant negative 
estimate can be interpreted as evidence of absolute convergence. The convergence 
rate measures how fast economies converge towards the steady state. The half-life Г= 
ln (2)/ β is defined as the time which is necessary for half of the initial income 
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inequalities to vanish. 
Model (4.9) is estimated by a non-linear version of the basic growth regression, 
for different periods: (i) the whole period 1961-2007, (ii) the first sub period 
1961-1980, and (iii) the second sub-period 1981-2007(iv) short periods such as 
1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2007. The estimated results are 
presented below in Table 4.2 with a summary of the most important statistics. 
Table 4.2 Cross Country Absolute Beta Convergence 
 
Year Country ln(y0+t/y0) lny0 Estimation Equation Annual Rate 
61-07 
Canada 2.894349886 7.709756864 
ln(y0+t/y0) = -0.169453 lny0 + 4.200791 -0.00326 
China 3.467219724 4.329055273 
81-07 
Canada 1.203146018 9.400960732 
ln(y0+t/y0) = -0.319544 lny0 + 4.207165 -0.01027 
China 2.521710491 5.274564506 
61-80 
Canada 1.586761204 7.709756864 
ln(y0+t/y0) = 0.210089 lny0 -0.03297 0.011792 
China 0.876514501 4.329055273 
61-70 
Canada 0.596715296 7.709756864 
ln(y0+t/y0) = 0.061779 lny0 + 0.120416 0.006377 
China 0.387859528 4.329055273 
71-80 
Canada 0.884685392 8.411832676 
ln(y0+t/y0) = 0.121389 lny0 -0.136419 0.012941 
China 0.441844969 4.763724805 
81-90 
Canada 0.551316985 9.400960732 
ln(y0+t/y0) = 0.018204 lny0 + 0.380179 0.001837 
China 0.476198901 5.274564506 
91-00 
Canada 0.107245529 9.961756461 
ln(y0+t/y0) = -0.228183 lny0 + 2.380351 -0.02055 
China 1.057268887 5.798331997 
01-07 
Canada 0.56085726 10.04324949 
ln(y0+t/y0) = -0.092697 lny0 + 1.491837 -0.01266 
China 0.847727074 6.948547923 
 
The regression results do not confirm the convergence hypothesis in all cases 
with the “beta” coefficient being negative. For the whole period, countries converge at 
a speed of 0.32% per year, but it is not very significant. In the first sub period 61-80, 
the rate of divergence is 1.17% per year while in the second sub-period 81-07 the 
convergence rate is 1.02%. Generally, the estimation results are not satisfactory and 
no serial correlation has been found in all cases. For the short periods 61-70, 71-80 
and 81-90, there was divergence at different rates 0.63%, 1.29% and 0.18% 
respectively, but during the other short periods both countries converge at a rate of 2% 
in the period of 1991-2000 while they converge at the rate of 1.26% in the period 
2000-2007. Finally, the results are partially consistent with the “sigma” convergence 
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analysis where we found a fall in the dispersion of per capita income in the last 
sub-period 2001-2007 and divergence in the period 1981-1990. However, the “beta” 
divergence for the whole period is not consistent with the “sigma” convergence 
indicating that the rate of “beta” convergence was not sufficient to ensure a close 
approximation in the absolute levels of per capita income (“sigma” convergence).  
The Absolute Beta Convergence approach assumes that all regions or economies 
under consideration have the same steady-state income path. But this is a highly 
restrictive assumption and may induce a significant heterogeneity bias in estimates of 
the convergence coefficient between different countries with different steady status.  
In this case, the cross-country absolute convergence of Canada and China does 
not fully support the absolute convergence hypothesis. Furthermore, the absolute 
convergence hypothesis is not supported by any empirical proof though, particularly 
when studying the economies of different states or regional economies of different 
states. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) themselves admit the need to take some other 
factors – called conditioning variables – into account, as they prevent the convergence 
to a unique steady-state taking place (Brasili 2005 ). 
 
4.2.3 Estimation Results of β-Convergence at National Level 
 
Based on Model 4.10, the provincial beta convergence of each country can be 
calculated as follows:  
- by regressing the average growth rate of per Capita GDP between time t
beg 
= 
1981 and time t
end 
= 2007 on initial income at time t
beg 
= 1981 where:  
(lnYit
(end) 
– lnY
it(beg) 
)/ T = α + βlnY
it(beg) 
+ μ
i 
(4.10)  
Here, i is the index for each region where i = 1 to 10 in Canada while i = 1 to 31in 
China. Time is indexed by t where t(beg) = 1981 and t(end) = 2007. The sample 
period is indexed by T where T = 27 years for the whole period.  
lnY = natural log of real per capital income.  
α = constant term and μ
i 
= random error term. 
161 
 
Model (4.10) is estimated by a non-linear version of the basic growth regression, for 
different periods: (i) the whole period 1981-2007, (ii) the first sub period 1981-1990, 
and (iii) the second sub-period 1991-2000, and (iv) the short period 2001-2007. 
 
Table 4.3 National Beta Convergence for Each Country 
 
Country Year B R (5% significance) 
Canada 
(10 
regions) 
1981-2007 -0.442724 (r) = -.719245 (r² = .517313) 65.24% 
1981-1990 -0.201322 (r) = -.883984 (r² = .781428) 95.05% 
1991-2000 -0.076575 (r) = -.28943 (r² = .08377) 11.81% 
2001-2007 -0.144079 (r) = -.372104 (r² = .138462) 17.28% 
China 
1981-2007 -0.160544 (r) = -.28066 (r² = .07877) 32.49% 
1981-1990 -0.171818 (r) = -.52254 (r² = .273048) 85.71% 
1991-2000 0.154364 (r) = .43113 (r² = .185873) 67.31% 
2001-2007 -0.116753 (r) = -.44046 (r² = .194005) 69.45% 
 
From Table 4.3, it can be clearly seen that the beta coefficient is negative 
(β<0), and is significant in Canada during the whole period and the sub-period 
1981-1990. It shows there is strong convergence during the 1981-1990 period, and 
convergence during the whole period while there is weak convergence during the 
1991-2000 and 2001-2007 periods.  
Table 4.4 Absolute Beta Convergence, Canada 
Canada Year B R (5% significance) 
13 region 
1981-2007 -0.131897 (r) = -0.218094 (r² = 0.047565) 10.15% 
1981-1990 -0.127565 (r) = -0.419275 (r² = 0.175792) 28.25 
1991-2000 -0.093729 (r) = -0.466586 (r² = 0.217703) 34.71 
2001-2007 0.101807 (r) = 0.326526 (r² = 0.106619) 18.15 
 
Most of the previous analytic studies excluded the three territories of Canada due 
to their sparse population within a large territory. There is a slight difference in the 
results of the Beta coefficient if these three territories of Canada are included in the 
absolute beta convergence calculation (Table 4.4). The results are also not very 
significant. For the whole period 1981-2007 and sub period 1981-1990, there are 
signs of convergence with smaller beta coefficients of -0.131897 and 0.127565 
respectively than the previous ten region beta coefficients of -0.442724 and 
-0.201322 respectively (Table 4.3).  The results are similar for the sub-period 
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1991-2000, but the result for the last sub period 2001-2007 is totally the opposite. 
In the case of China, per capita provincial income converged for the whole 
period from 1981 to 2007, but it is not very significant. For the sub-periods there is 
convergence during the period 1981-1990, then divergence during 1991-2000, and 
convergence again during 2001-2007, and all of these results are very significant. 
The result can be interpreted as reflecting very closely the regional development 
policy of China during these periods. The results are consistent with the “sigma” 
convergence of China where we found a divergence of per capita income dispersion 
during the first sub period (1981-1990) and a fall in the dispersion of per capita 
income in the whole period 1981-2007 for China. In the case of Canada, there is 
convergence for the whole period (1981-2007) and this is consistent with the sigma 
convergence of this country. However, the “beta” divergence for the last short period 
is not consistent with the “sigma” convergence indicating that the rate of “beta” 
convergence was not sufficient to ensure a close approximation in the absolute levels 
of per capita income (“sigma” convergence) during the last period. 
 
4.2.4 Conditional Beta Convergence 
 
Conditional convergence implies that a country or a region is converging towards its 
own steady state while absolute convergence implies that all countries or regions are 
converging to a common steady state. To test for conditional β-convergence, 
equation 4.11 is extended below by using a set of dummy variables to control for 
country-specific effects that differ between individual countries and affect the 
change in the per capita growth rate. These country-specific effects could include 
(but are not limited to) differences in industrial structure (agriculture, industry, 
service sectors proportion of GDP), Labour Force, High-technology exports (% of 
manufactured exports), Imports of goods and services (% of GDP), Foreign direct 
investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$), Exports of goods and services (% of 
GDP), Gross capital formation (% of GDP), and population in both countries. By 
accounting for these unobserved differences for both countries, it can be determined 
whether or not country-specific effects influence the test of convergence.  
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1/T log(Yit/Yi0) = α – 1/T(1-e-BT) logYi0 + λXit + uit    (4.11) 
This traditional regression model can be changed into the following form: 
( lnY
it(end) 
– lnY
it(beg) 
)/ T = β0 + β1lnYit(beg) + β2X1 + β3X2 + β4X3 +βnXn+ μit   (4.12)  
where yi0 – initial GDP per capita in region i,  
T – number of years in observation period, 
β0, β1... βn - parameters to be estimated,  
εi– normally and independently distributed error term. 
When the estimated coefficient β1 is negative, poor economies tend to grow 
faster than rich ones. The annual rate of convergence β1 can be obtained from the 
equation β=−ln(1−β1)/T, where T denotes the number of years between the initial and 
the final year of observation.  
Table 4.5 Conditional Beta Convergence 
 
Year Country Ln(y0+t/y0) lny0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 Beta 
61-07 Canada 0.06 7.71 21.22 23.75 22.67 22.90 23.23 17.02 β1  -0.001045 
  China 0.07 4.33 23.34 23.64 20.93 23.13 22.23 20.70 βw  -0.002033 
81-07 Canada 0.04 9.40 23.26 25.92 25.12 25.04 25.68 17.03 β1 -0.005139 
  China 0.09 5.27 24.85 24.48 23.92 25.33 24.51 20.72 βw -0.008701 
61-80 Canada 0.08 7.71 21.39 23.92 22.84 23.07 23.40 17.06 β1 0.005429 
  China 0.05 4.33 23.29 23.59 20.88 23.09 22.19 20.76 βw  0.004342 
61-70 Canada 0.06 7.71 21.60 24.13 23.05 23.28 23.61 17.08 β1  0.002233 
  China 0.04 4.33 23.55 23.85 21.14 23.34 22.44 20.79 βw 0.003478 
71-80 Canada 0.09 8.41 22.18 24.92 23.76 23.81 24.27 16.89 β1 0.003586 
  China 0.05 4.76 24.25 23.88 21.72 24.09 22.31 20.55 βw  0.005374 
81-90 Canada 0.06 9.40 23.88 26.54 25.73 25.65 26.30 17.13 β1 0.000895 
  China 0.05 5.27 25.42 25.05 24.49 25.94 25.08 20.72 βw  0.001195 
91-00 Canada 0.01 9.96 23.52 26.73 25.74 25.44 26.25 17.15 β1 -0.0109 
  China 0.11 5.80 25.26 25.57 25.09 25.64 25.63 20.86 βw  -0.017639 
01-07 Canada 0.08 10.04 25.89 26.88 26.46 25.64 26.91 17.25 β1 -0.00527 
  China 0.12 6.95 25.97 27.01 26.43 26.90 26.96 20.96 βw -0.011165 
Note: β1 is the estimated coefficient, βw the estimated coefficient of regression weighted by the 
population factor X6. X1 is Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), x2 is Services, etc., value added (% 
of GDP), x3 is Exports of goods and services (% of GDP), x4 is Gross capital formation (% of GDP), 
x5 is Merchandise trade (% of GDP), and X6 is population.  
 
Model (4.12) is estimated by a multiple (general) linear version of the 
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generalized growth regression, for different periods: (i) the whole period 1961-2007, 
(ii) the first sub period 1961-1980, and (iii) the second sub-period 1981-2007, and for 
(iv) short periods such as 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2007. 
The estimated results are presented in Table 4.5 which contains a summary of the 
most important statistics. The regression results do not confirm the convergence 
hypothesis in all cases with “beta” coefficient being negative. For the whole period, 
the countries converge at a speed of 0.1045% per year, and 0.2033% per year by 
population weighted regression; the results are not very significant. In the first sub 
period 61-80, the rate of divergence is 0.5429% per year while in the second 
sub-period 1981 - 2007 the convergence is 0.5139%. Generally, the estimation results 
are not satisfactory (little significance) and no serial correlation was found in any of 
the cases. For the short periods 61-70, 71-80, 81-90, there was slower than absolute 
beta divergence at different rates (0.2233%, 0.3586%, 0.0895% respectively), but 
during the other short periods both countries converge at a higher speed - 1.09% rate 
in the period 91-00 while they converge at the rate of 1.11% in the period 00-07. If the 
population weighted conditional Beta Convergence results are compared, there are 
higher speeds of convergence during the periods 61-07 (0.2033%), 81-07 ( 0.8701%), 
91-00 (1.7%), 01-07 ( 1.11%) while there is a lower speed of divergence during the 
period 61-80 (0.4342%). The difference of weighted and unweighted regression 
during the other periods is very slight. Finally, the results are partially consistent with 
“sigma” convergence where we found a decrease in the dispersion of per capita 
income in the last sub-period 2001-2007 and divergence in the period 1981-1990. 
However, the conditional “beta” divergence for the whole period is not consistent 
with “sigma” convergence while it is consistent with absolute beta convergence 
indicating that the rate of conditional “beta” convergence was not sufficient to ensure 
a close approximation in the conditional levels of the per capita income “beta” 
convergence between two countries. 
 
4.3 Spatial Data analysis 
 
Another dimension of the convergence analysis is that regional economic growth may 
165 
 
follow a particular spatial pattern. It is important to investigate the spatial patterns that 
may indicate the spillover effects among regions. 
Convergence patterns can be expected to differ between Canada and China, 
because of the large territorial size of both countries and the unequal distribution of 
population and economic centres. Therefore, separate spatial models for both 
countries are estimated individually. Spatial dependence can be handled in beta 
convergence in alternative ways. 
 
4.3.1 Spatial Dependence 
 
The statistical device usually employed to test for the presence of spatial dependence 
(spatial correlation) is the Global Moran’s I statistic. The spatial dependence measure 
for each period t is provided by a global statistic such as Moran’s I statistic, which can 
be represented by equation 4.13. 
 (4.13) 
where is iy  is the variable under consideration in spatial unit i in year t; y  is the 
average of the variable over all regions in year t; n is the number of spatial units (in 
this case the number of provinces in a country); wij is an element on the ith row and 
jth column of the matrix of n×n weights; wij is a non-stochastic square matrix the 
elements of which represent the intensity of the interdependence between each pair 
of economies; in the simplest case wij=1 if the economies i and j are neighbors and 0 
otherwise. 
It is interpreted much like a correlation coefficient. Values near +1 indicate a 
strong spatial pattern (high values tend to be located near one another); values near -1 
indicate a strong negative spatial autocorrelation; high values tend to be located near 
low values (spatial patterns with negative autocorrelation are either extremely rare or 
nonexistent!); and finally values near 0 indicate an absence of spatial pattern.  
The results in Figure 4.15 show that there has been a stronger tendency for 
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spatial dependence among the regions in Canada than that of in China since 1997. In 
Figure 4.15 Moran’s I shows that there is a very gradual increase in spatial interaction 
among the Chinese regions, but the speed (of increase) is very slow. This pattern 
becomes stronger in the last decade; since 1991 it is statistically significant and it has 
been rapidly growing since 1981, which is coincident with the beginning of the new 
regional development policy. Interestingly, the measure of spatial autocorrelation also 
tends to co-move with the measure of income dispersion. But it is interesting to 
observe that provincial spatial correlation has increased in Canada since 1981. In 
particular, the spatial dependence tends to reach its minimum values in 1981, followed 
by slow long term increases from 1984 to 2001; then there is a slight decrease until 
2006 and then an increase in 2007, coinciding with the period some have previously 
identified with a long term regional income convergence (Colombo 1996; 
Sala-i-Martin 1996b; Shiller 2009). It revealed no evidence of departure from 
normality; this is partly consistent with convergence trends. In the case of China, 
spatial correlation coefficients have increased gradually since 1981 (leveling off from 
1995 onward), which is consistent with beta convergence during the whole period.  
Global Moran’s I statistic provides only a limited set of spatial association 
measurements. The Moran’s I statistic provides a visual impression of the overall 
stability of the global pattern of dependence, as well as the ability to identify local 
regimes of spatial dependence that may depart from the overall pattern. So in order 
to obtain a better insight of spatial dependency, it is necessary to carry out an 
analysis using Local Moran’s Ii Statistics.  Local Moran’s I is a local spatial 
autocorrelation statistic based on the Moran’s I statistic. It was developed by Anselin 
(1995) as a local indicator of spatial association or LISA statistic. It is used to 
evaluate whether clustering occurs around particular points or may be used to detect 
clusters. The local Moran for state i takes the following form. 
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Figure 4.15 Dynamic Change of Moran’s I for Regional GDP per Capita of 
Canada and China 
 
Note : The three territories of Canada are included. 
 According to Anselin (1995), a local Moran statistic for a point i is defined as 
 (4.14) 
where 
   (4.15) 
In this analysis, Local Moran’s I is used to look for spatial association around 
each individual location. 
Figure 4.16 Local Moran’s I Statistics for Canada 
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In terms of the spatial autocorrelation of Canada with provinces as the spatial 
units (Figure 4.16), the Local Moran’s I analysis can be used to confirm that there is 
positive spatial autocorrelation in this area. Quebec has high values for Local 
Moran’s I, but it is not very significant.  It can be concluded from this analysis 
using Local Moran’s I that there is not a clustering tendency with most provinces 
having zero proximity on Local Moran’s I in Canada (Map 4.1).  
 
Map 4.1 Map of Local Moran’s I Statistics 2007, Canada 
 
 
In the case of China and using the province as the spatial unit to analyze spatial 
autocorrelation (Figure 4.17), the Local Moran’s I analysis confirms that there is 
more positive spatial autocorrelation in China. There is a clustering trend in China’s 
provincial level development. 
However, the Global Moran’s I cannot indicate on which side the clustering 
trend takes place: high values cluster or low values cluster? The three economic 
centres of China, Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin, have the high values of Local 
Moran’s I since 1981 and are statistically very significant. It can be concluded from 
this analysis using Local Moran’s I (Map 4.2) that there is a high clustering tendency 
for Beijing, Tianjin, and the provinces around Shanghai. Shanxi province (the dark 
blue curve) has the unsteady Local Moran’s I due to its fluctuating per capita rank 
during the period.   
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Figure 4.17 Local Moran’s I Statistics for China 
 
 
Map 4.2 Map of Local Moran’s I Statistics 2007, China 
 
 
  
Guizhou, Yunnan and Tibet, three provinces in southwest China, also 
contributed relatively highly to the Moran index in 2007, meaning that the poorest 
provinces tend to form a ‘poor’ cluster; but their Local Moran’s I value has 
decreased with the economic increase of other economic centres.  
In contrast to the weighted and unweighted σ Convergence series and Local 
Moran’s I (Figure 4.18), it can be seen that there is convergence, if the Local Moran’s 
I increases. This provides support for positive spatial dependency. This is important 
since it implies that any convergence models that ignore such spatial dependency 
would be incorrectly specified.    
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Figure 4.18 σ Convergence and Spatial Autocorrelation for China 
 
 
In brief, the number of regions and w (the scaling factor equal to the sum of all 
the elements of the wij matrix) are significantly different in each country. Canada has 
only 13 regions, and the wij matrix is very simple while China has 31 regions and its 
wij matrix is very complex. Most of the provinces border with 4 or 5 other provinces, 
with the maximum number of bordering provinces reaching 8 (e.g. Inner Mongolia) 
in China; in Canada, most of the provinces border with 1 or 2 other provinces, with 
the maximum number of bordering provinces reaching 5 (e.g. Northwest Territory). 
The sum of all the elements of the wij matrix is only 34 in Canada if three territories 
are included, but in China it is 136. The most important factor is that the average 
territorial size of provinces in Canada is much larger than that of China. Thus, if the 
smaller spatial units such as cities and counties are taken into consideration in 
Moran’s I statistics, the results are more more convincing. 
 
4.3.2 Spatial Analysis 
 
Another dimension of the convergence analysis is that regional economic growth may 
follow a spatial pattern. Spatial dependence can be handled in beta convergence in 
alternative ways.1 The first approach, the spatial error model, assumes that the spatial 
dependence operates through the error process, where any random shock follows a 
                                                              
1 For a detailed analysis of spatial econometric techniques and methods see Anselin (1988) and 
Henley (2003). 
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spatial pattern, so that shocks are correlated across adjacent regional economies, such 
that the error term in equation (4.16) may reveal a significant degree of spatial 
covariance, which can be represented as follows: 
( ) iiiit uyyy ++= 00 loglog δα  (4.16) 
iii Wuu ερ +=                (4.17) 
So substituting (4.17) into model (4.16) results in a spatial error regression given by 
(4.18) as below: 
( ) ερδα +++= iiiit Wuyyy 00 loglog  (4.18) 
where ρ is the spatial error coefficient, εi is a white noise error component and W is a 
spatial weighting matrix. W may be constructed using information on physical 
distance between pair wise combinations of economies in the sample or may be 
defined such that element wij = 1 if i and j are physically adjacent and 0 otherwise. 
Here, the latter approach is preferred.  
Alternatively, the spatial lag model examines the extent to which regional growth 
rates depend on the growth rates of adjacent regions, conditional on the level of initial 
income:  
( ) ( ) iiitiiit uyyWyyy +++= 000 logloglog ρδα  (4.19) 
where ρ denotes the spatial autoregressive parameter.  
Moreover, the spatial cross-regressive model allows any spatial spillovers to be 
reflected in the initial levels of income as follows: 
( ) iiiiit uyWyyy +++= 000 logloglog τδα  (4.20) 
where τ represents the spatial spillovers. 
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Table 4.6 Beta Coefficient of Spatial Dependency Models 
    Beta Coefficient Rate   
Country Period Absolute SEM SLM SCM Absolute SEM SLM SCM 
Canada 
81-07 -0.442724 -0.418118 -0.476003 -0.942018 0.0216554 0.0200551 0.023935901 0.105467506 
81-90 -0.201322 -0.094568 -0.146172 -0.092583 0.0224797 0.0099343 0.015802551 0.009715318 
91-00 -0.076575 -0.083692 -0.127604 -0.085734 0.0079666 0.0087403 0.013651183 0.008963372 
01-07 -0.144079 -0.316555 -0.071866 0.468023 0.0222253 0.0543727 0.010654166 -0.054845228 
China 
81-07 -0.160544 -0.050355 0.013448 -0.065913 0.0064815 0.0019136 -0.000494755 0.002525396 
81-90 -0.171818 -0.203154 -0.132257 -0.192486 0.0188522 0.0227094 0.014185969 0.021379489 
91-00 0.154364 0.144622 0.245982 0.20297 -0.014355 -0.013507 -0.021992397 -0.01847935 
01-07 -0.116753 -0.027899 -0.017103 -0.055646 0.0177358 0.0040422 0.002464421 0.008179169 
Notes: Detailed Tables of Calculation are given in Appendix A4. SEM, SLM, SCM indicate the 
spatial error model, the spatial lag model, and the spatial cross-regressive model respectively. 
 
4.3.3 Econometric Results of Spatial Models 
 
SEM, SLM and SCM Models (4.18, 4.19, 4.20) are estimated by a non-linear 
version of the basic growth regression, for different periods: (i) the whole period 
1981-2007, (ii) the first sub period 1981-1990, and (iii) the second sub-period 
1991-2000, and (iv) the short period 2001-2007. From Table 4.6, it can be clearly 
seen that the beta coefficient is negative (β<0) and is significant in Canada during 
the whole period and the sub-period 1981-1990. The results of convergence are 
mostly consistent with the results of other researchers. For example, Sala-i-Martin 
(1996b) measured absolute convergence for Canadian provinces for the period 
1960-1991 and found a Beta convergence of 0.024. Colombo (1996) who estimated 
per capita income of Canadian provinces over the period 1924-1994 period, found 
that there was no convergence prior to the entry of Newfoundland into 
Confederation in 1949; and also detected there was convergence of personal income 
at a rate of 0.0277 during the 1950-1977 period. Shiller (2009) found that Canadian 
provinces converge at an annual rate of between 2.15% and 2.37%. In this study, the 
difference is that all the 10 provincial and three territories of Canada are taken into 
consideration for the estimate of convergence. The Beta convergence rate of 
Canadian provinces is 0.022 during the period 1981-2007, 0.022 during the period 
1981-1990, and 0.022 during the period 2001-2007, but it is not very significant at 
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0.008 during the period 1991-2000. If spatial independence is considered, Beta 
convergence results are similar at about the 0.02 level found by the models SEM and 
SLM for the period 1981-2007; the SCM model had a high convergence coefficient 
of 0.11. This implies that the growth rate of an individual province is affected by the 
initial per capita income level of its neighbours. For the short sub-periods 1981-1990 
and 1991-2000, the beta coefficients SEM and SCM are not very significant, but the 
beta coefficients calculated by the SLM model are significant for the whole period 
and the sub-periods. This clearly indicates the growth rate of an individual province 
is affected by the growth rate of its neighbours. The beta coefficient 0.05 is the 
highest one found by SLM while the beta coefficient calculated by the SCM model 
is not consistent with the other models during the short sub period 2001-2008. 
In the case of China, there is a weak convergence of per capita provincial 
income during the whole period from 1981 to 2007, but it is not very significant 
even if it is consistent with the results of the SEM and SCM models. If provincial 
spatial dependency is considered, the provincial convergence rates of China are not 
very significant for the different periods with exception of the subperiod 1981-1990. 
All the estimates of Absolute Beta, SEM, SLM and SCM models strongly confirm 
that there is convergence for the period 1981-1990 at the different rates of 0.02, 
0.022, 0.0142, 0.021 respectively, and there is divergence for the sub-period 
1991-2000; there is a very weak convergence if spatial SEM, SLM and SCM Models 
are considered for the last sub-period. The SLM model does not support the 
convergence for the whole period while the other models confirm a weak but not 
significant convergence. This indicates that actual interaction of provinces is not 
very positive for the period. However, for the last sub-period 2001-2007, the result is 
better if spatial dependency is considered. The result suggests it is very closely 
related with the regional development policy of China during these periods.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to compare and measure cross-country convergence 
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between Canada and China at the national scale by using recently released long term 
data and to derive new evidence of convergence in each country using different 
measurement methods for the period 1961-2007. 
At first, both countries were compared usiing multi-indicators and traditional 
methods such as Descriptive Statistics, the Variance of logarithms, the CV, the Gini 
index and the Theil index. The empirical results as reported in the previous sections 
showed that there is significant gap in both countries in many indicators such as 
GDP, per capita GDP, and GDP composition by sectors and both countries are very 
different in economic status and structure.  
All the results of the analyses showed that in Canada provincial disparity has 
gradually decreased since 1960, while in China provincial disparity decreased during 
the period 1981 to 1990, then increased until 2003, after which it  decreased or 
remained at the same level. If both countries are compared, for the whole period there 
was divergence between both economies. It can be concluded that provincial disparity 
in China is greater than in Canada. The analysis indicated that most of the indicators 
for China have increased faster than for Canada over the whole period under study.  
Then, under this precondition of existence of absolute β-convergence, 
cross-country beta convergence (including conditional convergence) and 
σ-convergence were tested. The σ-convergence showed Canada experienced a 
significant provincial σ convergence for the whole period while China experienced 
provincial σ convergence from 1981 to 1990 and σ divergence from 1991 to 2003, 
with convergence starting again from 2004. If we compare the cross-country analysis, 
both countries seem to converge slightly, but not significantly. If we compare the 
weighted σ convergence that takes into account the population factor, there is 
significant divergence between both countries. The estimation results of 
β-convergence at the national level (in each country) showed that the beta coefficient 
is negative (β<0), and is significant in Canada during the whole period. There is a 
slight difference in the results of the Beta coefficient, if the three territories of Canada 
are included in the absolute beta convergence calculation. However, the territories 
cannot really be compared with the provinces, since their populations are so small. 
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However, this does not change the outcome of the analysis. 
Thirdly, Conditional β-convergence was tested using a set of dummy variables 
to control for country-specific effects in terms of agriculture, services, exports of 
goods and services, gross capital formation, merchandise trade and population 
factors. Lastly, the estimated coefficient of regression was weighted by the 
population factor. For the whole period, the results are not very significant. The 
results are partially consistent with “sigma” convergence where we found a decrease 
in the dispersion of per capita income in the last sub-period (2001-2007) and 
divergence in the period (1981-1990). However, the conditional “beta” divergence 
for the whole period is not consistent with “sigma” convergence while it is 
consistent with absolute beta convergence. 
Finally, the spatial analysis including Global Moran’s I, Local Moran’s I were 
calculated and the spatial error model (SEM), the spatial lag model (SLM), and the 
spatial cross-regressive models (SCM) were also taken into consideration in the beta 
convergence analysis of each country individually. Global Moran’s I statistic 
showed that there has been a stronger tendency for spatial dependence among the 
regions in Canada than for China since 1997 and that there is a gradual increase in 
spatial interaction among the Chinese regions, but the speed is very slow. The Local 
Moran’s I analysis confirms that there is more positive spatial autocorrelation in 
China. There is a clustering trend in China’s provincial level development while 
there is not a provincial clustering tendency of Local Moran’s I in Canada in 
regional per capita income. This spatial trend also indicates the larger provincial 
disparity in China and the smaller provincial disparity in Canada. The estimated 
results of spatial SEM, SLM and SCM are mostly consistent with the convergence 
results of other researchers (for example, Sala-i-Martin (1996b), Colombo (1996) 
and Shiller (2009)). The results of these spatial models supports the “sigma” 
convergence for China where we found a convergence of per capita income 
dispersion during the first sub period (1981-1990) and a fall in the dispersion of per 
capita income in the whole period 1981-2007. In the case of Canada, there is weak 
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convergence for the whole period (1981-2007) and this is consistent with sigma 
convergence for this country. 
 In Chapter 5 that follows, regional, provincial and urban case studies based on 
recently released updated long-term statistical data are presented in order to provide 
more detailed evidence and to explore structural differences between both 
economies. 
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 Chapter 5 
Regional and Provincial Case Studies 
 
 
The objective of this chapter is to present new evidence of regional and provincial 
patterns based on recently released updated long-term statistical data in both countries; 
further it provides an overview of regional economies with particular attention to 
structural differences between the two economies. An analysis of regional economic 
dynamics at a different scale is necessary in large countries to improve regional 
economic development policy. The focus of this chapter and the following Chapter 6 
is on multi-scalar comparative studies of regional, and provincial and urban cases of 
Canada and China. First, the regional economic data are compared at the regional 
scale for each country using regions as units of observation. In addition, the provinces 
of Quebec in Canada and Xinjiang in China are selected as the provincial case studies.  
 
5.1 Regional Case 
 
The regional economic development of a country with a large territory is more 
complicated and difficult to analyze. The main problem with economic analysis at the 
sub-national level in this situation is the choice of the unit of analysis. The word 
“region” can mean very different things both within and between countries. One 
feasible approach that can be applied is, therefore, to divide its vast land area into 
smaller geographical scales which can yield a better interpretation of the spatial 
mechanisms at work and the regional characteristics.  
 
5.1.1 Regional Division 
 
Canada is a federation composed of ten provinces and three territories. The ten 
provinces are Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland 
and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec and Saskatchewan, 
while the three territories are the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and the Yukon. The 
provinces and territories of Canada combine to make up the world's second largest 
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country in total area. Unlike the provinces, the territories of Canada have no inherent 
jurisdiction and only have those powers delegated to them by the federal government. 
In general, the 10 provinces and territories are geographically divided into 4 sub 
regions (Map 5.1), i.e. Atlantic Canada or Eastern Canada (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia ); Central Canada 
(Quebec and Ontario); Western Canada (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British 
Columbia); and Northern Canada (the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Yukon) for 
different research purposes. However, the three Northern Canada territories combined 
are the most sparsely populated region in Canada with about only 107,000 people 
spread across a huge area. They are often referred to as a single region, the North. The 
three territories generally exhibit higher GDP per capita values, especially the 
Northwest Territories and Nunavut, attributable to heightened federal transfers that 
accommodate the high costs of living in the rather difficult Arctic climate and relative 
isolation of Northern Canada.  
 
Map 5.1 The Major Regional Divisions of Canada 
 
 
   Politically, the North was long defined as comprising the Yukon and the 
Northwest Territories (NWT). Since 1999, that geography has evolved through the 
creation of Nunavut out of the eastern and central parts of the former NWT, leaving 
the western part with its original territorial name (Wallace 2002). Due to the sparse 
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population of the three Northern Canada territories and their higher GDP per capita 
values, they are often excluded in geographical and scientific studies.  
China is a republic or the People’s Republic of China; it is geographically 
divided into 31 provincial-level administrations. China has three kinds of 
provincial-level units in its territorial-administrative hierarchy: provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government. In the 
Chinese state administration, ‘autonomous’ refers to self-government by a large and 
single (but not necessarily majority) ethnic minority in a given unit within the 
territorial hierarchy. In addition to these 31 administrative units there are the two 
Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao. 
Autonomous regions are provincial-level units of state administration where the 
presence of an ethnic minority is officially recognized. It should be noted that, in 
China, the three kinds of provincial-level administrations have different functions 
compared to each other. For example, the leaders of some top municipalities (4) 
directly under the central government leadership have been appointed as members of 
the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC), 
while very few provinces and autonomous regions leaders have been so appointed. 
The autonomous regions are only established in areas where one ethnic minority 
accounts for the major portion of the population. As a result of the cultural differences 
between the non-Han ethnic minorities and the Han majority, the autonomous regions 
are, at least in form, the most politically and socially autonomous units among the 
three kinds of provinces. Furthermore, all provinces are independent of each other in 
terms of designing local fiscal, tax, and labour and trade policies (Rongxingguo 
2007). 
Due to the diversified natural and geographical environments and the 
heterogeneous social and cultural conditions in China, the Chinese economy was 
spatially divided into 31 provinces (including five autonomous regions and four 
city-provinces) in mainland China. Before the sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985), the 
Chinese central government grouped China’s provinces into two regions for policy 
purposes, the coastal and interior regions. In 1986, the definition of the regions was 
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changed with the interior region being further disaggregated into central and western 
regions, making for three regions: coastal, central and western (see, for example, Tsui, 
Kai-yuen (1993) Thomas (1998), Tian, xiaowen (1999), Wangshaoguang and 
Anguanghu (1999), Weiyehua Dennis (2000), Carsten (2000), Sylvie (2001), Guang 
(2004), Liuxuhua (2004) and Yan Xiaopei (2004)).  
This three-region division was used to implement the “ladder-step development 
strategy”, in which the three regions were seen as steps of a ladder and they were 
expected to develop sequentially starting with the coast. Since then, the three-region 
definition has been widely used in government policy documents as well as in the 
research literature (see, for example, Yao and Zhang (2001), Brun et al (2002), Liu 
and Wei (2003) and Wu (2004)). It should be noted that the government’s definition 
changed somewhat after 1999 when, for example, the south-eastern province of 
Guangxi, originally part of the coastal region, was re-allocated to the western region 
and Inner Mongolia, originally part of the central region, was reallocated to the 
western region. 
Map 5.2 Three Regions of China 
 
Note: The three regions are divided according to the Government’s new reallocation. Taiwan, 
Hongkong and Aomen are not included due to missing data and other reasons.  
 
The updated composition of the three regions is as follows (Map 5.2): 
•Coastal Region: this consists of three municipalities directly under the central 
government and 8 provinces: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Guangdong, Hainan, Shandong, 
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Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shanghai and Liaoning; 
•Central Region: this consists of 8 provinces: Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, 
Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan; 
•Western Region: this consists of five autonomous regions, 6 provinces and one 
municipality directly under the central government: Sichuan, Chongqing 
(Municipality), Inner Mongolia, Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. 
Often, the method of regionalization of the national economy may be different, 
depending upon the analytical purposes. In this study, the four regions of Canada and 
the updated new regional division version of three regions of China (so the result 
might be somewhat different from previous studies) are selected for the analysis at the 
regional scale. 
 
5.1.2 Regional Case of Canada 
 
A relatively small population (33.3 million in 2008) is distributed unevenly across 
Canada. There are substantial differences in territorial size and population distribution 
between Canadian regions (Table 5.1). In 2008, 7% of the population lived in Eastern 
Canada, 62.1% in Central Canada and 30.6% in Western Canada respectively. The 
highest population density is 9.13 inhabitants per km2 in Central Canada while the 
lowest value is 0.03 inhabitants per km2 for Northern Canada. Because of the harsh 
climate, only 0.32% of Canada’s population is found in Northern Canada which 
accounts for about 39.21% of the area of the country. If we compare the distribution 
of population change for the period 1950-2008 (Figure 5.1), Central Canada and 
Northern Canada have maintained almost the same percentage share, but the 
population of Western Canada has increased from 28.9% to 30. 6% while it has 
decreased in Eastern Canada from 9.01% to 7% for this period. This can be explained 
by the international and interprovincial immigration and natural increase of 
population. Based on the 2001-2006 data of Statistics Canada, there was a -1.5% and 
-1.1% decrease in population in Newfoundland and Labrador and Saskatchewan 
 182
respectively, while population increased by 10.6% in Alberta and 8.7% in Northern 
Canada.  
Table 5.1 Territorial Size and Population Distribution, Canada 2008 
Source: Calculated based on data from Statistics Canada.  
 
Figure 5.1 Regional Population Distribution of Canada 
 
Source: Calculated based on the population data of Statistics Canada 
The Canadian economy has undergone significant change since 1950. But in 
terms of population and economic activities, it differs greatly from region to region. 
Based on the regional GDP proportion and the population distribution, it can be seen 
from the data (Figures 5.1 and 5.2) that Central Canada has been the economic core of 
Canada, home to about 62% of its population and producing about 60% of its total 
GDP and containing much of its industry. But its regional GDP proportion has 
decreased gradually while Western Canada has gained both in terms of population and 
the regional GDP share since 1981, while the rapid growth in trade with Asia has 
enriched British Columbia and oil wealth has provided a major boost to Alberta and 
Saskatchewan. The regional per capita GDP of Western Canada has been higher that 
the other regions since 1973 except for the Northern Region. Eastern Canada has 
Region Area% % of GDP Pop% Pop Density/ Km2 Employment% Investment% 
Atlantic 5.42 5.75 7 4.66 6.5 5.2 
Central 26.17 60.42 62.1 9.13 61.93 36.9 
Western 29.2 33.29 30.6 3.76 31.56 57.4 
Northern 39.21 0.50 0.3 0.03 0.01 0.5 
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experienced a major decline both in terms of population and regional GDP share, and 
has traditionally been significantly poorer than the rest of Canada. However, 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s offshore oil industry has made significant 
contributions to its provincial economy in recent decades. The oil industry accounted 
for 35 % of the provincial GDP in 2007, up from 13 % in 1999 and 24.3 % in 2004. 
According to Statistics Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador experienced greater 
economic growth in 2007 than any other Canadian province, largely due to its oil and 
mining industries1. 
The persistence of regional disparity in Canada reflects the country’s diversity and 
its model of fiscal federalism. Interprovincial migration can potentially play an 
important role in the convergence of regional disparities. People tend to migrate from 
poor regions with high unemployment to rich regions with low unemployment. The 
decision to migrate or not is also tied to the costs of migration, to the political, 
institutional and cultural context, and to the geographic and climatic environment 
(Coloumbe 1999). 
Figure 5.2 Change in Regional GDP Share for Canada, 1961-2008 
 
Source: Calculated based on data of Statistics Canada. Source: Provincial Economic Accounts: 
Historical issues 1961-1986, Catalogue: 13-213S, Statistics Canada, Provincial and Territorial 
Economic Accounts: Data tables, catalogue number 13-018-X. 
                                                              
1 http://www.heritage.nf.ca/society/oil_economy.html 
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If the total number of interprovincial migrants (net-migration (persons)) from 
1962-2007 is compared, the total number is -273,057 for the East region, -380,066 for 
the Central Region (Quebec -665,602 and Ontario +285,536) and for the Western 
Region (Alberta +516,361, B.C. +717,360, Manitoba -249,189 and Saskatchewan 
-312,908). The total regional GDP share and the population of the North have not 
changed much for the last six decades, but per capita GDP has increased sharply since 
1976, then leveling off above the other regions since 1998 due to federal transfer 
payments for equalization (Figures 5.3 and 5.4).  
 Figure 5.3 Regional Per Capita GDP for Canada, 1961-1981 
 
Source: Calculated based on data of Statistics Canada. Source: Provincial Economic Accounts: 
Historical issues 1961-1986, Catalogue: 13-213S  
 
Figure 5.4 Regional Per Capita GDP of Canada, 1981-2008 
 
Source: Calculated based on the statistical data of Statistics Canada, Provincial and Territorial 
Economic Accounts: Data tables, catalogue number 13-018-X. 
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Figure 5.5 Regional Labour Force Proportion for Canada, 1977-2007 
 
Source: Calculated based on the statistical data of Statistics Canada, Labour Force Information 
(Catalogue no. 71-001-XIE) 
 
Figure 5.6 Regional Final Domestic Demand for Canada, 1981-2007 
 
Source: Calculated based on the tables of Statistics Canada, Provincial and Territorial Economic 
Accounts: Data tables, catalogue number 13-018-X. 
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local, Canada Pension Plan and Quebec Pension Plan investment incomes. The 
regional share of Government investment income in the Central Region has decreased 
gradually from 54% in 1961 to 36.9% in 2006 while it has increased in the Western 
Region due to the rapid increase in Alberta’s provincial investment income with the 
boom of the oil industry since 1976 from 40.4% to 57.4% in 2006. In the Northern 
Territories and in the Eastern Atlantic Region, it has not changed much for the whole 
period.  
Figure 5.7 Regional Investment Income of Canada 
 
   Note: Source: Statistics Canada, Provincial and Territorial Economic Accounts: Data tables, 
catalogue number 13-018-X. Provincial Economic Accounts: Historical issues 1961-1986, 
Catalogue: 13-213S. 
Figure 5.8 Weighted and Unweighted σ Convergence of Regional Per Capita 
Personal Income and Disposable Income, 1961-2008 
 
Note: PI- Personal Income,  PDI-Personal Disposable Income. Author’s calculations from 
Statistics Canada data. 
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increase in regional GDP. Both indicators are significantly correlated with the total 
regional GDP (Figures 5.2, 5.5 and 5.6). The Central and Eastern regions have 
undergone a slight decrease in their share of all three indicators while the Western 
Region has experienced a gradual increase since 1991. 
 
Figure 5.9 Regional σ Convergence and Gini Coefficients of Canada, 1981-2008 
Source: Author’s calculations from Statistics Canada data. 
 
Figure 5.10 Cross Regional σ Convergence and Gini Coefficients for Canada, 
1961-2008 
Source: Author’s calculations from Statistics Canada.  
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Figure 5.11 Regional Gini Coefficients of Canada, 1981-2008 
 
 
If we compare cross-regional population the weighted and unweighted σ 
convergence of regional per capita personal income and disposable income for the 
period 1961-2008, they converge for the whole period, but there has been a significant 
divergence in 1981 due to the economic challenges faced by Canada and there has 
been a slight divergence in both indicators since 2000 (Figure 5.8). The changes in the 
cross-regional σ convergence and Gini coefficients (Figures 5.9 and 5.10) is 
consistent with the overall trend of the Canadian economy. During the whole period, 
the regional economies have maintained a steady trend. However, the figures 
highlight the three economic slowdowns in Canada which were associated with 
divergence at the beginning of the 1970s and again with the economic depressions in 
1981 and in 2007.  From the Gini coefficient of inequality index on Figures 5.9 and 
5.10, it can be concluded that regional disparity in Canada has not changed much 
since 1981.  
The provincial per capita GDP disparity in the northern region is significantly the 
largest in Canada ($91,270 for NW while it was $36,198 for Nunawut and $44,833 for 
Yukon in 2008); however, it does not affect the overall Canadian regional disparity 
results very much due to its small population. Newfoundland in eastern Canada has 
seen an increase in its per capita GDP since 2001, surpassing other provinces due to 
the development of mining and oil industry. The regional Gini coefficient in Figure 
5.11 shows that the provincial disparity in the Atlantic region and in the Northern 
Region have increased while the other major regions’ (Central Canada and Western 
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Canada) disparities between the provinces in each region have not changed much. 
Regional inequality decreased from 1981 until 1990, but since then it increased 
slightly until 2000 when it began to increase with more speed. If we compare the 
regional Lorenz curves of 1961, 1981 and 2007 (Figure 5.12), the differences can be 
very clearly seen. The curve point of the Lorenz curve line (green) between line of 
perfect equality (red) and the line of perfect inequality has approached the line of 
perfect equality slightly. This shows there is a weak convergence between Canadian 
regions for this period. 
 
Figure 5.12 Lorenz Plots of Gini Coefficients: Canada 
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mining industries. The Theil index indicates this trend more clearly than the Theil1 
index (Figure 5.13). This result is consistent with the results of the other above 
mentioned indicators such as the ơ and Gini coefficients.  
 
Figure 5.13 Regional Theil Index of Canada 
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Based on the absolute beta-convergence model 4.10 presented in Chapter 4, the 
regional beta convergence can be calculated as below:  
by regressing the average growth rate of per Capita GDP between time t
beg 
= 1981 and 
time t
end 
= 2008 on initial income at time t
beg 
= 1961 where:  
(lnY
it(end) 
– lnY
it(beg) 
) = α + βlnY
it(beg) 
+ μ
i 
(5.1)  
Here, i is the index for each region where i = 1 to 4 in Canada. Time is indexed by t 
where t(beg) = 1961 and t(end) = 2008. The sample period is indexed by T where T = 
48 years for the whole period.  
lnY = natural log of real per capital income.  
α = constant term and μ
i 
= a random error term. 
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Table 5.2 Regional Beta Convergence for Canada 
 
Country Year β R Annual rate 
Canada 
(4 region) 
1961-2007 -0.296722 (r) = -0.405265 (r² = 0.16424) -0.005413324 
1961-1980 0.243358 (r) = 0.436556 (r² = 0.190581) 0.013943 
1961-1970 -0.030376 (r) = -0.18467 (r² =0 .034103) -0.00299 
1970-1981 0.364271 (r) = 0.619869 (r² = 0.384237) 0.045298 
1981-2007 -1.265408 (r) = -0.806343 (r² =0 .650188) -0.029205531 
1981-1990 -0.425017 (r) = -0.861188 (r² = 0.741644) -0.035418374 
1991-2000 -0.512939 (r) = -0.409115 (r² =0 .167375) -0.041405412 
2001-2008 0.1055 (r) =0.413699 (r² = 0.171147) 0.013936297 
 
Model (5.1) is estimated by a non-linear version of the basic growth regression, 
for different periods: (i) the whole period 1961-2007, (ii) the first sub-period 
1961-1980, (iii) the second sub-period 1981-2007, and (iv) the short periods of 
1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000 and 2001-2007. From Table 5.2 it can 
be clearly seen that the beta coefficient β<0, and is not very significant in Canada 
during the whole period 1961-2007. It shows there is a weak convergence rate of 
0.005 for the whole period 1961-2007, and divergence during the first sub-period 
1961-1980 while there is convergence during the second sub-period 1981-2007. There 
were convergences indicated since 1980 for the sub-periods 1981-1990 and 
1991-2000, but there is strong divergence for the sub-short period 1971-1980 while 
there is a tendency of regional divergence since 2000.  
The issue of equity across regions is one of the most basic debates in Canadian 
regional development programs. Canada started the Canadian equalization program  
which transfers income form the ‘have’ provinces to ‘have-not’ provinces so that 
roughly similar standards of public services could be provided across provinces 
(Milne 1994). The per capita equalization payments has sharply increased to the 
northern regions since 1996, and shows there is an enlarged disparity between the 
Northern First Nation economies and the other regions. This has played a key role in 
reducing regional disparity to some degree and in avoiding further divergence.  
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Figure 5.14 Regional Per Capita Government Transfer Payments to Persons 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data Statistics Canada, Provincial and Territorial Economic Accounts: 
Data tables, catalogue number 13-018-X. 
However, the North only accounted for 0.58% of total transfer payments in 2006. 
It has however received the highest per Capita Government Transfer Payments to 
Persons since 1997 (Figure 5.14). The East Region has always had a high share of 
equalization payments (8.33% in 2006), while the Central Region and the Western 
Region accounted for 61.86% and 29.2% respectively in 2006. As a result, the 
equalization transfers might have actually helped encourage convergence. 
In order to better interpret regional differences, the industrial make-up of the four 
regions are compared by industrial share in GDP from 1984 to 2008 (Table 5.3). All 
the obvious changes occurred in the Centre and West regions. These regions together 
account for 93% of the industrial contribution to national GDP for the whole period. 
There is not much change in the East and North. The Centre has dominated the goods 
producing industries and service producing industries except for Mining, Quarrying 
and Oil Well industries for the whole period while the West has increased gradually. 
The industrial production of the West increased sharply from 26.53% to 34.12% while 
in the Centre’s share declined from 68.81% to 58.84%. Agricultural and Related 
Service industries, Mining, Quarrying and Oil Well industries, Manufacturing, and 
Construction industries have continuously increased their shares in the West, while 
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they decreased in the Centre. The difference is clear in the agricultural and mining 
industries2 . 
 
Table 5.3 Regional Comparison by Industry Share of GDP, 1984-2008 (%) 
Industry Year East Centre West North 
Goods producing industries 
1984 5.62 64.36 29.47 0.55 
2008 5.89 56.54 36.67 0.58 
Services producing industries 
1984 7.09 61.59 30.51 0.47 
2008 5.65 61.69 32.13 0.36 
Industrial production 
1984 4.55 68.81 26.53 0.49 
2008 5.76 58.84 34.12 0.56 
Agricultural & Related service industries 
1984 5.44 55.24 43.04 0.01 
2008 8.07 34.96 58.09 0.08 
Mining, quarrying & oil well industries 
1984 4.93 17.84 75.59 2.74 
2008 11.69 6.93 78.88 2.48 
Manufacturing industries 
1984 3.94 80.32 15.93 0.01 
2008 3.83 74.44 21.89 0.01 
Construction industries 
1984 7.38 54.86 36.39 1.04 
2008 5.51 54.27 38.98 0.90 
Transportation & storage ind. 
1984 7.49 52.73 39.52 0.77 
1999 6.47 50.30 42.60 0.62 
Communication industries 
1984 6.63 60.98 31.89 0.42 
1999 7.46 62.82 29.41 0.31 
Wholesale trade industries 
1984 5.17 63.20 31.61 0.15 
2008 4.23 62.94 32.79 0.19 
Retail trade industries 
1984 7.89 61.87 29.91 0.30 
2008 6.23 60.23 33.21 0.26 
Source: Calculated based on the data of Statistics Canada provincial economic accounts CANSIM 
tables: 380-0001, 380-0004, 380-0002 and 051-0005 and Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table (for fee) 
379-0027 and Catalogue no. 15-001-X. 
In summary, Central Canada dominates the national economy by almost any 
indicator and is regarded as the core region of the Canadian economy based on the 
Toronto and Montreal-based economic centres, while the other regions could be 
described described as peripheral regions, albeit with some important changes in the 
                                                              
2 Note: The regional industrial trends from 1984-2008 are omitted because of the very large amount of 
data that would have to be presented. 
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last several decades. The economy of Western Canada used to be dominated by 
renewable resource based industries (wheat, cattle, forest production). Since the early 
1970s, the oil and gas industry, overwhelmingly concentrated in Alberta, has become 
a vastly greater source of wealth, attracting population and supporting economic 
diversification in underlying the expansion of the economy of the western region. 
Moreover, BC has been the principal beneficiary of the expansion of Pacific Rim 
trade, and an influx of affluent immigrants contributes its economy. Farming and 
mining are the major sectors in Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The continuing resource 
boom has shifted economic growth from east to west. Since 2003, Alberta and British 
Colombia in the Western region have outpaced the nation. In fact, this has helped 
provincial and regional convergence in Canada. 
 
Figure 5.15 Distribution of Employed People, by Industry, by Region 2008 
(%) 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data of Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table (for fee) 282-0008 and 
Catalogue no 71F0004XCB. 
Table 5.4 Share of GDP and Employment by Sectors, 1966-2008 
Year 1966 1976 1986 1996 2008 
Indicators GDP EMP GDP EMP GDP EMP GDP EMP GDP EMP 
Goods  45.30 42.60 40.30 35.00 36.30 29.60 34.80 26.20 29.34 23.50 
Services 54.70 57.40 59.70 65.00 63.70 70.40 65.20 73.80 70.66 76.50 
Source: Statistics Canada (2000c: Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 and CANSIM, table (for fee) 282-0008 and 
Catalogue no 71F0004XCB. Last modified: 2009-01-08. EMP-employment. 
The sluggish economic performance that has characterized the Atlantic 
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Provinces for many decades reflects deep-seated problems both within the region and 
in it its relationship to the wider world. The regional economy remains heavily 
dependent on natural resources, in the form of fishing, forestry, agriculture and 
tourism (Wallace 2002) and now oil for Newfoundland. This region is far from the 
most dynamic regional markets of North America, the Pacific Rim and domestic 
economic centres. A low urbanization rate and slow growth below the national 
average are the main characteristics of Eastern Region’s recent economic 
performance.  
The northern economy is characterized by high costs and a narrowly based 
market economy. Long distances from manufacturing centres, a sparse population on 
a vast land area, limited transportation and climatic restriction severely limit its 
economic development. In recent years, high wage resource industries of diamond, 
gold and copper production surges in the North have improved the situation in the 
Northwest Territories. 
Employment in the service sector of the Canadian economy surpassed that in 
the goods producing sectors as long ago as the late 1950s (Wallace 2002). By 2008, 
76.5% of all jobs and 70.65% of national GDP were generated by service sector 
activity (Table 5.4). If the employment structure is compared by industry and by 
region, the East and Central regions have a higher proportion of employment in goods 
producing sectors than the West; forestry, fishing, mining, oil and gas employment is 
concentrated in the West and East regions while manufacturing is stronger in the 
Central region. In 2008, employment in the service producing sector was much 
stronger in the East and Central Regions than in the West (Figure 5.15).   
 
5.1.3 Regional Case of China 
 
Regional disparity has been an important concern in China, as it indicates the uneven 
development among regions and may threaten national harmony, unity and social 
stability. Thus, it has attracted attention by scholars and policy makers and reports on 
this topic have appeared continuously in the literature. It is true that with three 
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decades of reforms and subsequent economic growth, the Chinese economy has 
improved significantly since 1980. However, has the economic growth been equal 
across its regions? More importantly, has it led to a reduction in regional disparities? 
These issues have become the major focus of the recent convergence and divergence 
debate on regional disparities in China.  
The regional distribution of national GDP and per capita GDP is very different in 
China when compared to the distribution of population and territorial size. Its huge 
1.32 billion population is distributed unequally across its regions; 39.2% of the 
population lives in the eastern coastal region that only accounts for 13.8% of the 
country’s areal size. This same region produces 59.3% of the national GDP. 
Twenty-seven percent (27.5%) of the population lives in the western region with a 
territorial national share of 56.8% but only producing 17.3% of the national GDP.  
The coastal region is regarded as a core region of the Chinese economy with its 
favoured geographic location, abundant human capital resources, a great 
concentration of industry, and the advantages of international economic relationships 
in attracting FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). On the other hand, the west is 
considered a peripheral region with its disadvantages of a landlocked geographic 
location, the difficulties and costs of engaging in international economic activities 
even though some of its provinces border with other countries, poor natural conditions 
(generally mountainous) and lacking adequate water; it does however possess rich 
mineral and energy resources, and mostly consists of minority ethnic people. Between 
them, lies the central region which occupies 29.4% of the national area with a national 
population share of 31.7%, contributing 23.4% of national GDP (Table 5.5).   
Table 5.5 Area, Output, Population and Investment by the Three Regions of 
China, 2007 (% of total) 
Note: Hongkong and Macao are not included in the table  
Region Area GDP Population Non-agricultural 
Population  
Total investment in 
fixed assets  
Coastal 13.8 59.3 39.2 48.98 50.78 
Central 29.4 23.4 31.2 32.07 26.3 
Western 56.8 17.3 27.5 26.83 20.8 
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If we compare the distribution of population change for the period 1952-2007 
(Figure 5.16), the regional proportions of population has not changed much for the 
period; the Western region has almost kept the same percentage with slight change, 
but the population of Coastal region has increased from 36.9 % in 1989 to 39.2% in 
2007 while it has decreased in the Central region from 33.5% in 1990 to 31.77% in 
2007. This can be explained by interprovincial migration since the economic reform 
of China. With the economic boom of the Eastern coastal region after 1990, more and 
more people began to move into the Eastern coastal region. Fan (2005) undertook a 
statistical study of interprovincial migration patterns in China within and among 
regions; he concluded that the proportions of total flows were 56.95%, 26.15% and 
16,90% for the Eastern, Central and Western Regions respectively for the period 
1985-1990 while it increased 78.41%, 10.20% and 11.38% for the three regions 
respectively for the period 1995-2000. This trend has become very clear since 2003. 
 
Figure 5.16 Regional Population Distribution of China 
 
Note: Hongkong and Macao are not included in the table  
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Figure 5.17 Change in the Regional GDP Share for China, 1952-2008 
 
 
Note: Hongkong and Macao are not included in the table  
     Figure 5.17 compares the regional total GDP trend over the period 1952-2008; 
it shows that the Coastal Region has dominated in terms of its proportion of total GDP. 
It has increased gradually from 48.4% in 1952 to 59.3% in 2007, while the Central 
and Western Regions saw their total regional GDP share decrease from 30.7% and 
20.8% to 23.4% and 17.4% respectively. Particularly since the economic reform in 
1978, the Central Region has declined faster than the Western region, while the 
Coastal Region has diverged from the other two regions significantly (Figure 5.17). 
Figure 5.18 Regional per Capita GDP Trend of China 
 
Note: Hongkong and Macao are not included in the table.  
There were slight interregional income disparities in China in the 1950s due to 
the post-war recovery. The ratios of per capita GDP of the Coastal, Central and 
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Western Regions were only 1: 1.48: 1.7. This did not change much during Mao’s 
centralization and equalization policy period.  
Figure 5.19 Regional Weighted & Unweighted σ Convergence, Theil Index, Gini 
Coefficient of China 
 
However, substantial changes occurred after the opening and economic reform of 
China in the 1980s. This can be seen clearly from Figure 5.18 which shows that the 
Coastal Region has diverged significantly from the other two regions since 1980. The 
regional disparity ratios of the Coastal, Central and Western Regions on this indicator 
reached a significant level of 1: 2.03: 2.31 in 2008. 
If we compare regional population weighted and unweighted σ convergence of 
regional per capita GDP for the period 1952-2008 (Figure 5.19), the trend line of 
convergence indicates that they diverged for the whole period, but that there is a 
significant divergence in 1950s due to the post-war difficulties in China; this is 
followed by a short-lived convergence from 1960 to 1967, then again there is a 
divergence because of the cultural revolution from 1967 to 1977. With the period of 
new reform and opening up policy since 1978, the three regions converged for the 
period 1978-1990, but again diverged owing to the favoured development policy and 
the advantage of FDI of the Eastern coastal region until the beginning of the 2000s.  
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Figure 5.20 Per-Capita Annual Disposable Income of Urban &Rural 
Households of China, 1978-2007 
Note: R- indicates Rural, U-indicates Urban in the figure. Source: Author’s calculation based on the 
Chinese Statistical Yearbook data. 
All these government sponsored development programmes such as the ‘Western 
Development Strategy’ in 1998 and the ‘Northeast Revival Strategy’ that followed in 
2003 to reduce disparity have had little effect, and since 2003, the regions have begun 
to converge again (Figure 5.20). The trend lines of Regional Weighted & Unweighted 
σ Convergence, Theil Index, Gini Coefficient of China, have the same trajectory 
(curve line) in Figure 5.19, show the consistency of the divergence for the whole 
period with the whole economy. 
 
Figure 5.21 Regional per Capita Disposable Income of China, 1978-2007 
 
 
Because of the differences in the statistical systems of China and Canada, 
disposable income in China is often calculated by urban and rural disposable income. 
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The per Capita Annual Disposable Income of Urban and Rural Households in the 
Coastal Region has increased faster than the other regions while the West has been 
left behind since 1978 (Figure 5.21). In order to obtain per capita disposable income 
of China, the per Capita Annual Disposable Income of Urban and Rural Households 
for each region have been added together. This shows that the Eastern Coastal Region 
has always been above the national level while the others are not (Figure 5.21).   
Figure 5.22 Regional Registered Unemployment Rate in Urban Areas of China 
 
 
Note: Tibet is not included in the Western Region due to data shortage. 
In China, the registered unemployment is obtained for urban areas. For rural 
areas, there are no such data. It is certain that the unemployment levels shown are 
lower than the actual unemployment levels. There may be an unregistered 
unemployed population in both urban and rural areas in China. So these data in Figure 
5.22 cannot fully capture the unemployment rate in China. The unemployment rate 
has increased since 1990 in all regions. The unemployment rate in the Western 
Region has been above the national average for most of the period 1980-2008.  
China established its investment system in the early 1950s to take control over 
the economy and to promote the nation’s industrial and spatial development (Figure 
5.23). This investment system was highly centralized through centralized planning, 
centralized administration and state-controlled banks. The control of the state over 
investment has been declining during the reform period, and the influence of local 
factors and foreign direct investment in capital formation has risen (Yehua Dennis 
Wei 2000).  
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Figure 5.23 Regional Total Investment in Fixed Assets of China 
 
 
The Eastern Region was allocated a higher percentage of fixed investment for the 
first decade of new China, while the Central and Western Regions, especially the old 
industrial bases in northeast china, were also given more attention. Because of the 
“third front construction” to avoid any foreign attack, more investment was put into 
the interior provinces with the traditionally poor southwestern provinces of Yunnan, 
Guizhou including Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia during the period 1964-1971. In the 
early 1970s, China abandoned the Third Front program, and investment began to shift 
to eastern regions. The fixed investment has increased in the Eastern Coastal Region 
since the new economic reform in the 1980s, while the investment shares in the 
Central and Western Regions have declined. The Chinese Government has tried to 
control the investment rates since the end of 1990s in order to reduce regional 
disparities, but owing to the local investment and market forces’ induced foreign 
direct investment, regional disparities in terms of investment have become further 
enlarged (Figure 5.23).  
In 2007, the national average wage3 of staff and workers was 24,932 Yuan, 
while it was 29,660 Yuan, 20,536 Yuan and 24,294 Yuan for the East, Centre and 
                                                              
3 Average Wage  refers to the average wage in money terms per person during a certain period 
of time for staff and workers in enterprises, institutions, and government agencies, which reflects the 
general level of wage income during a certain period of time and is calculated as follows: 
 
Source http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm 
Time Referenceat  Workers
 and Staff ofNumber  Average
Time Referenceat  Workers
 and Staff of Bill  WageTotal
   WageAverage =
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West Regions respectively. If it is estimated in Canadian dollars by hours, with a 40 
hour week excluding 104 weekend days and 21 festival days, this yields $1.86C for 
the national average hourly wage of staff and workers, and $2.21C, $1.53C and 
$1.81C for the East, Centre and West Regions respectively. If the regional average 
wage of staff and workers are compared (Figure 5.24), it has increased in all regions 
since 2000. However, the speed of increase is faster in the Eastern Coastal Region 
than in the other regions. The salary level in the Western and Central Regions are 
below the national level, especially in the Central Region. This is one of the reasons 
underlying labour migration from the Central Region to the Eastern Region or even to 
the West in China. However, these data do not include the wage of rural farmers. 
Annual per-capita net income4 of rural households was $591.48 C (4140.36Yuan) in 
20075, If it is estimated in Canadian dollars by hours, it was only $0.31C.  
 
Figure 5.24 Average Annual Wage of Staff and Workers by Region of China, 
2000-2007 
 
Note: 7Yuan=1 C$ based on the 2002 price. Data source:  
Fan (2005) compared interprovincial migration of China between 1985-1990 and 
1995-2000. If the total number of interprovincial migrants (net-migration (persons)) 
from 1985-1990 and 1995-2000 is compared, the total number is 1,955,000 and 
17,138,000 during these two periods respectively for the East region, -876,000 and 
-12,344,000 for the Central Region and -1,078,000 and -4,794,000 respectively for the 
                                                              
4 Net Income- refers to the total income of rural households from all sources minus all corresponding 
expenses. The formula for calculation is as follows: Net income = total income - taxes and fees paid - 
household operation expenses - taxes and fees  depreciation of fixed assets for production - gifts to 
non-rural relatives. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm. 
5 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm 
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Western Region. It can be concluded that more population is flowing out from the 
Central and Western provinces to the Eastern Coastal provinces.    
The curve point of Lorenz curve line (green) between line of perfect equality 
(red) and the line of perfect inequality has deviated from the line of perfect equality 
gradually if we compare the Lorenz curves for 1952, 1980 and 2008 (Figure 5.25).  
This means there is a divergence among Chinese regions for this period.  
Figure 5.25 Lorenz Plot for 1952, 1980 and 2008: China 
 
 
     
 Based on the absolute beta-convergence model 4.10 presented in Chapter 4, the 
regional beta convergence can be calculated as below:  
by regressing the average growth rate of per Capita GDP between time t
beg 
= 1981 and 
time t
end 
= 2007 on initial income at time t
beg 
= 1981 where:  
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(lnY
it(end) 
– lnY
it(beg) 
) = α + βlnY
it(beg) 
+ μ
i 
(5.2)  
Here, i is the index for each region where i = 1 to 3 in China. Time is indexed by t 
where t(beg) = 1961 and t(end) = 2007. The whole sample period is indexed by T 
where T = 47 years for the whole period.  
lnY = natural log of real per capital income.  
α = constant term and μ
i 
= random error term. 
Table 5.6 Regional Beta Convergence of China 
Country Year β R Annual rate 
China 
(3 region) 
1961-2007 0.35205 (r) =0 .954599 (r² =0 .91126) 0.009233 
1961-1980 0.276148 (r) =0 .90019 (r² =0 .810341) 0.016158 
1961-1970 0.234144 (r) =0 .724284 (r² =0 .524587) 0.026676 
1970-1981 0.072008 (r) =0 .934794 (r² =0 .873839) 0.007473 
1981-2007 0.097886 (r) =0 .898377 (r² = 0.807081) 0.003815347 
1981-1990 -0.10232 (r) = -0.983259 (r² = 0.966798) -0.00974 
1991-2000 0.319451 (r) =0 .940534 (r² = 0.884604) 0.038486 
2001-2007 -0.141738 (r) = -0.947103 (r² =0 .897004) -0.01894 
Model (5.2) is estimated by a non-linear version of the basic growth regression,  
for different periods: (i) the whole period 1961-2007, (ii) the first sub-period 
1961-1980, (iii) the second sub-period 1981-2007, and (iv) the short sub-periods 
1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000 and 2001-2007. From Table 5.6, it can 
be clearly seen that the beta coefficient β>0, and significant in China during the whole 
period 1961-2007. It shows there is a weak divergence rate of 0.009 for the whole 
period 1961-2007, and strong divergence during the first sub-period 1961-1980 at a 
rate of 0.016 while there is weak divergence during the second sub-period 1981-2007 
at a rate of 0.0038. The result for the whole period is consistent with most other 
scholars’ conclusion that absolute β convergence did not exist in China for the whole 
period. There were convergences for the short sub-periods 1981-1990 and 2001-2007 
at different rates of 0.00974, and 0.01894, but there was a strong tendency of 
divergence for the short sub-period 1991-2000. This result is consistent with the 
results from most other studies that confirm these processes of divergence and 
convergence in China’s regional economy.  
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5.1.4 Summary of Regional Cases 
 
The empirical results showed that the regional economy of Canada has undergone 
significant change since 1950. But in terms of population and economic activities, 
there are important differences from region to region. The issue of equity across 
regions has been one of the most basic debates in Canadian regional development 
programs. The Canadian equalization program has played a key role in reducing 
regional disparity to some degree and has undoubtedly helped avoid greater 
divergence. Central Canada has been the economic core of Canada. Western Canada 
has gained both in terms of population and its regional share of GDP since 1981 with 
the rapid growth in trade with Asia which has enriched British Columbia and the oil 
wealth which has provided a major boost to Alberta and Saskatchewan. In Canada, 
almost 94.3% of government investment income has been centred in the Central and 
Western region since 1961 while it has increased in the Western region since 1980. 
The Centre and West regions contribute 93% of the industrial contribution to national 
GDP since 1960. The Centre has dominated the goods producing industries and 
service producing industries except for mining, quarrying and oil well industries for 
the whole period while the West has increased gradually.  
Central Canada dominates the national economy on the basis of almost any 
indicator and is regarded as the core region of the Canadian economy based on the 
Toronto and Montreal-based economic centres, while the other regions have been 
described as ‘peripheral’ regions (certainly a debatable category!). The economy of 
Western Canada used to be dominated by renewable resource-based industries (wheat, 
cattle and forest production). Mining and oil and gas extraction constitute the 
principal factors in recent years for the expansion of the economy of the West. 
Moreover, BC has been the principal beneficiary of the expansion of Pacific Rim 
trade and an influx of affluent immigrants has contributed to its economy. Farming 
and mining are the major sectors in Saskatchewan and Manitoba.  
A sluggish economic performance has characterized the Atlantic Provinces for 
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many decades. This region is far from the most dynamic regional markets of North 
America, the Pacific Rim and the main domestic economic centres. A low 
urbanization rate and slow growth below the national average are the main 
characteristics of the Eastern Region’s recent economic performance. The Northern 
economy has been characterized by high costs and a narrowly based market economy. 
Long distances from manufacturing centres, sparse population spread over a vast 
territory, and limited transportation and climatic restrictions severely limit its 
economic development. In recent years, diamond, gold and copper production surges 
have nonetheless improved the economy of the Northwest Territories. 
The regional economy has maintained a relatively steady trend in Canada since 
1980. Regional per capita personal income and disposable income converged for the 
period 1961-2008, but there was a significant divergence in 1981 due to the economic 
challenges of Canada and there has been a slight divergence in both indicators since 
2000. The change of cross-regional σ convergence and Gini coefficients is consistent 
with the trends in the Canadian economy. The Gini coefficient analysis and the Lorenz 
curves for 1961, 1981 and 2007 showed there is a weak convergence between 
Canadian regions for this period. The regional Theil index is consistent with the 
results of the other above mentioned indicators. The beta coefficient is β<0, and not 
very significant in Canada during the whole period 1961-2007. It shows there is a 
weak convergence rate of 0.005 for the whole period, and divergence during the first 
sub-period 1961-1980 while there is convergence during the second sub-period 
1981-2007. There were convergences for the sub-periods 1981-1990 and 1991-2000 
since 1980, but there is a strong divergence for the short sub-period 1971-1980 while 
there has been a tendency for regional divergence since 2000.  
In the case of China, the Eastern Coastal Region is regarded as a core region of 
the Chinese economy (39.2% of its population and 59.3% of national GDP on only 
13.8% of the national territory) with its advantages of a better geographic location, 
abundant human capital resources, concentrated industry and the advantages of 
international economic relations that have helped attract FDI. On the other hand, the 
Western region is considered as a peripheral region (27.5 % of the population, 
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producing only 17.3% of national GDP on 56.8% of the national territory) with the 
disadvantages of its landlocked geographic location, the difficulties and costs of 
engaging in international economic activities although some of its provinces border 
on other countries, and poor natural conditions which are generally mountainous and 
lacking in adequate water supplies, even though it has rich mineral and energy 
resources and mostly consists of minority ethnic peoples. Between these regions lies 
the Central region which occupies 29.4% of the national territorial area with a 
national population share of 31.7%, contributing 23.4% of national GDP. The Coastal 
region has diverged significantly with the other two regions since 1980. The trend 
lines of the Regional Weighted and Unweighted σ Convergence, the Theil Index and 
the Gini Coefficient of China share the same trajectory and show the consistency of 
the divergence for the whole period for the whole economy. Investment was highly 
centralized through centralized planning, centralized administration and 
state-controlled banks. The control of the state over investment has been declining 
during the reform period, and the influence of local factors and foreign direct 
investment in capital formation has risen. The Chinese Government has attempted to 
control the investment rates since the end of the 1990s to reduce regional disparities, 
but owing to local investment and market force-induced foreign direct investment, the 
regional disparity in terms of investment has been further enlarged. So China has 
quickly promoted the “Western Development” program and “Northeast Industry Base 
Strategy” program to reduce ever-increasing regional disparities. It seems these 
programs have played a role in reducing disparities to some degree, but the absolute 
disparity between regions is moving towards divergence. Per Capita Annual 
Disposable Income of Urban and Rural households shows that the Eastern Coastal 
region has always been above the national average in contrast to the other regions. 
The salary level in the Western and Central regions is below the national average, 
especially in the Central region. This is one of the main reasons causing labour 
migration from the Central region to the Eastern region or to the West in China. 
The Lorenz curve analysis showed that there was divergence among Chinese 
regions for this period. The beta coefficient is β>0, and significant in China during the 
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whole period 1961-2007. It shows there was a weak divergence rate of 0.009 for the 
whole period 1961-2007, and strong divergence during the first sub-period 1961-1980 
at the rate of 0.016 while there was weak divergence during the second sub-period 
1981-2007 at the rate of 0.0038. There were convergences for the sub-short periods 
1981-1990 and 2001-2007 at the different rates of 0.00974 and 0.01894 respectively, 
but there was a strong tendency for divergence for the sub-short period 1991-2000. 
This result is consistent with the results of most other studies that have confirmed 
these patterns of divergence and convergence in China’s regional economy. 
 
 
5.2 Provincial Case 
 
Because statistical data are collected at the provincial level in each country, it is often 
convenient to define individual provinces as regions. For the provincial case studies, 
all the provinces of both countries are selected. Some of the comparisons of per capita 
GDP in terms of convergence analysis have already been undertaken in Chapter 4. 
Therefore, they are not repeated here. Several indicators are used in this section to 
show provincial disparity. By looking at the evolution of each indicator’s distribution, 
it is possible to suggest the different factors that have contributed to increases or 
decreases in the variability of the per capita income distribution in each province. 
 
5.2.1 Provincial Case of Canada 
 
There have been many studies on per capita gross domestic product (GDP), per capita 
income, and labour productivity provincial disparities in Canada. In recent years, 
many studies have performed on different factors on growth convergence. Gunderson 
(1996) discusses the factors that foster regional convergence such as migration, spatial 
convergence, interjurisdictional competition for jobs and investment and equalization 
from a theoretical perspective, while other researchers have tried to estimate this from 
the empirical analysis of convergence as already noted in previous chapters. In the 
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first section of this Chapter, broad regional disparities and differences in Canada were 
analyzed using various statistical methods. In this section, updated long term 
statistical data are utilized to show further evidence of provincial disparity.  
In Canada, provincial disparities in per capita gross domestic product (GDP), per 
capita income and productivity have diminished since World War II (Chalifoux et al. 
2004). In 1999, Colombo (1999) stated that the current level of provincial disparities 
had reached a steady state in Canada. Based on the long term data, provincial 
disparities decreased significantly in terms of several indicators in Canada after 1960. 
But unevenness remains across the country.  
The contributions to the total GDP of the provinces are also uneven most of the 
time. Significant changes have occurred in Ontario, Quebec, Alberta and British 
Colombia. Ontario has almost kept the same 40% level of total national GDP with 
only a slight change for the whole period 1961-2008, while Alberta and British 
Colombia have increased their national GDP contribution from 7.94% and 9.95% in 
1961 to 14.4% and 12.48% in 2008 while Quebec has decreased its total GDP 
contribution from 26.13% to 20.37% in 2008. There is not much change in the total 
GDP percentage, except for a slight decrease, in Saskatchewan and Manitoba (Figure 
5.26).  
 
Figure 5.26 Provincial GDP as a Proportion of Canada’s GDP, 1961-2008 
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Figure 5.27 Provincial Population Distribution, Canada 
 
 
The distribution of population is very uneven among Canadian provinces (Figure 
5.27); 86% of the population concentrated in the four provinces of Ontario, Quebec 
Alberta and British Colombia, while the other provinces only account for 14% of the 
total population (Map 5.3, Figure 5.27). The share has increased in Ontario, Alberta 
and British Colombia gradually while it has decreased in Quebec faster than that of 
the other provinces. The 13 million Ontarians alone account for nearly 38.7% of 
Canadians. The Northern provinces account for only 0.3% of the total population. In 
Canada, the provincial distribution of population is consistent with a number of other 
indicators, including the provincial share of GDP, investment and income.   
Interregional trade and capital and labour flows were sufficiently responsive to 
offset provincial differences in economic opportunity. Ontario, Alberta, and British 
Colombia grew faster in these years, but they did not noticeably get relatively richer. 
The Atlantic Provinces grew more slowly, but managed to retain their relative living 
standards (Wallace 2002). 
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Map 5.3 Provincial Population Distribution 
 
Source : Statistique Canada, Division de la démographie, Section des estimations démographiques, 2009 
Per capita GDP, the most often used indicator of standard of living, remains 
uneven across country. Because of the different data sources with different prices, per 
capita GDP is shown here for two periods 1961-1980 and 1981-2008 (Figures 5.28 
and 5.29). The resource boom in the early 1950s, the stubborn recession that followed 
and the boom of the 1960s did not alter the per capita GDP trend line very much from 
1961-1970 among Canadian provinces.  
Figure 5.28 Provincial Per Capita GDP of Canada 1961-2008 
 
Source: Calculated based on Provincial Economic Accounts: Historical issues 1961-1986, Catalogue: 
13-213S. 
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In 1973, Canada experienced one of the most difficult times in its political and 
economic history due to the international economic growth slowdown. Small changes 
among provinces have occurred since 1974. Alberta has led the provinces in per 
capita GDP (Figure 5.28).  
   Figure 5.29 Provincial Per Capita GDP of Canada, 1981-2008 
 
 
Source:Calculated based on  Statcan cansim tables of provincial GDP account Table 3, Gross 
Domestic Product at 2002 Price. 
Alberta and Ontario have kept the level above the national average with Yukon 
since 1980, while the other provinces increased slowly. The Northwest Territory 
ranks first with a per capita GDP of $91,270 in 2008, Yukon, Alberta, Ontario, 
Saskatchewan are above the national level of per capita GDP while the other 
provinces are below the national level. For the periods, Alberta has demonstrated the 
best performance; the Northern territories have a higher per capita GDP due to 
equalization payments (Figure 5.29). Kaufman et al (2003) and Chalifoux (et al 2004) 
stated that equalization payments reduce fiscal and income disparities among 
provinces. 
It is also consistent with the patterns of provincial per capita Transfer Payments 
and Investment Income of Canada. In 2008, the Northern, Atlantic and Western 
provinces received higher per capita equalization payments above the national level of 
$4451: Yukon $9102 Nunavut $8468, Northwest Territory $6921, New Brunswick 
$5169, Newfounland $5773, PEI $5322, NS $4843, Manitoba $4885 and 
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Saskatchewan $4925. Alberta received the lowest per capita equalization payments of 
$4012 in 2008 (Figure 5.30). 
Figure 5.30 Provincial per Capita Transfer Payments for Canada, 1981-2006 
 
Source:Calculated based on Statistics Canada, Provincial and Territorial Economic Accounts: Data 
tables, catalogue number 13-018-X.  
 
Figure 5.31 Provincial Investment Income of Canada 
 
Data Source: Calculated based on Statistics Canada, Provincial and Territorial Economic Accounts: 
Data Tables, catalogue number 13-018-X. 
In terms of government investment income in Canada, the largest changes have 
occurred in the most populated provinces of Alberta, Ontario, Quebec and British 
Colombia since 1961. The investment amount has increased rapidly since 1974 in 
Alberta because of the sharp increase in provincial investment for the oil-gas industry, 
while there were decreases in other provinces until the beginning of the 1980s. Then, 
the trend towards decrease continued in the provinces of Alberta, Ontario and Quebec, 
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while it increased in British Colombia until the 2000s (Figure 5.31). There has been a 
rise and fall in investment income in these provinces since 2000. There were not 
many changes in the other provinces for the whole of this period. Various economic 
indicators – e.g. per capita income, earned income, personal income and personal 
disposable income – have grown faster in the poor provinces than in the rich ones 
since 1961 even though they have had high unemployment rates.  
If the total amount of Provincial Personal Income of Canada for the period 
1961-2008 is compared, it is consistent with the total amount of GDP income change 
and the data of provincial population distribution. Ontario (39.28%) and Québec 
(21.08%) account for 60% of the national total amount of personal income in Canada, 
while Alberta and British Colombia account for 13% and 14% respectively in 2008. 
The other provinces only account for 12.57% of the national total amount of personal 
income (Figure 5.32). 
 
Figure 5.32 Provincial Personal Income of Canada, 1961-2008 
 
Data Source: Calculated based on Statistics Canada, Provincial and Territorial Economic Accounts: 
Data Tables, catalogue number 13-018-X. 
 
In terms of per Capita Provincial Personal Income in Canada, per capita personal 
income has increased steadily in all provinces since 1981. The Northern provinces 
and Alberta and Ontario remained above national level, while the others have not. The 
Atlantic Provinces have the lowest personal income level almost throughout the 
whole period (Figure 5.33).  
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Figure 5.33 Provincial Per Capita Personal Income in Canada, 1981-2008 
 
Source: Calculated based on Statistics Canada, Provincial and Territorial Economic Accounts: Data 
Tables, catalogue number 13-018-X. 
 
Figure 5.34 Provincial Average Weekly Earnings of Canada, 1991-2007 
 
Source: Calculated based on CANSIM tables: 281-0024, 281-0027, 281-0039 and 382-0006. 
Ontario and Alberta have had the highest Provincial Average Weekly Earnings 
always above the national level since 1991, and Alberta surpassed Ontario in 2005 
and reached $835.52 in 2008. B.C has been below the national level but has kept close 
to it since 2000 while Quebec has diverged from the national level of Average Weekly 
Earnings since 1991.The other provinces are below the national level of $778.32. PEI 
has the lowest Average Weekly Earnings of $457.95 in 1991 and $628.9 in 2007 
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(Figure 5.34). 
Eighty-seven percent of personal disposable income of Canada comes from four 
provinces - Quebec 20.74%, Ontario 39.16%, Alberta 14% and British Colombia 
13.16% in 2008. Manitoba and Saskatchewan made up 4.77% and 3.7% of the total 
amount respectively in 1961. However, their proportion decreased to 3.347% and 
3.016% respectively in 2008. The provincial share of personal income has remained at 
the same level in Ontario since 1961, while it has increased in B.C. and Alta, and has 
declined in Quebec from 26.34% in 1961 to 20.75% in 2008. This is consistent with 
the trends in the shares of total GDP, personal income and population. The Atlantic 
Provinces account for 6.1% of the total amount of personal disposable income of 
Canada, while the Northern territories only accounts for 0.43% (Figure 5.35).  
 
Figure 5.35 Provincial Personal Disposable Income of Canada, 1961-2008 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data of Statistic Canada: Canadian Economic Observer Catalogue 
Number: 11-210-X. 
 
Since 1980, provincial per capita disposable income has increased steadily in 
Canada. The Northern territories and Alberta and Ontario were above the national 
average level during this period. The Northwest Territories has the highest level at 
$43,348 in 2008, with Yukon and Nunavut with $38,429 and $31,661 respectively 
while Alberta ranked third with $37,189. The reason for the Northern Territories 
having the higher personal disposable income is the increase of investment and 
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federal transfer payments mentioned earlier. Ontario has almost remained at the same 
level as national level while Quebec has dropped below the national level since 1985 
(Figure 5.36). 
 
Figure 5.36 Provincial Per Capita Personal Disposable Income of Canada, 
1981-2008 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data of Statistic Canada: Canadian Economic Observer Catalogue 
Number: 11-210-X 
Changes in GDP and personal income are closely related with provincial 
employment, unemployment rates, participation rates and provincial migration in 
Canada. It seems disparities in unemployment rates in 2007 have not diminished 
when compared with the level of 1971 (Figure 5.37). But there are several ups and 
downs and clear differences among provinces during the whole period from 1976 to 
2007 which follow the pattern of economic slowdowns at different times. 
 The unemployment rates increased in 1983-1984 and 1992-1994. But they 
decreased since 1995 until 2007, ending up with the same level as 1971. The Atlantic 
Provinces have higher unemployment rates – Newfoundland 13.6%, Prince-Edward 
Island 10.3%, Nova Scotia 8% and New Brunswick 7.5% while the western provinces 
have lower unemployment rates – Manitoba 4.4%, Alberta 3.5%, Saskatchewan 4.2% 
and British Colombia 4.2% in 2008. Ontario and Quebec had medium unemployment 
rates of 6.4% and 7.2%, higher than the national level of 6%. It is obvious that Alberta 
has had the lowest rates since 1997. 
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Figure 5.37 Provincial Unemployment Rates of Canada, 1976-2007 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data of Statistic Canada: Canadian Economic Observer Catalogue 
Number: 11-210-X. 
 
Figure 5.38 Provincial Labour Force Estimates, Participation Rates, 
1976-2007 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data of Statistic Canada: Canadian Economic Observer Catalogue 
Number: 11-210-X. 
 
The labour force in Canada is distributed very unevenly; 61.9% of Canada’s 
labour force is concentrated in Ontario and Quebec. If the percentage of Alberta and 
British Colombia are included, these four provinces account for 86.9% of the national 
labour force. The provincial share of the national labour force has increased in 
Ontario, Alberta and British Colombia from 38.38%, 8.7% and 10.88% in 1976 to 
39.1%, 11.62% and 13.44% respectively in 2008. However, it has declined in other 
provinces. The largest decline occurred in Quebec, from 26.1% in 1976 to 22.8% in 
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2007. Provincial labour force participation rates have increased gradually since 1976 
with some slight declines in some provinces between 1991 and 1997. Alberta has the 
highest labour force participation rate of 74.1%, while Newfoundland has the lowest 
labour force participation rate at 59.2% (Figure 5.38). 
Provincial industrial composition differs greatly in Canada. The most significant 
changes have occurred in the four most populated provinces. The changes in other 
provinces do not make any substantial difference to the national total GDP account 
(Figure 5.39); 64.36% of goods-producing industries and 56.54% of services 
producing industries were concentrated together in Ontario (Ontario: 41.91%, 38.72%) 
and Quebec (Quebec: 22.45%, 22.87%) in 1984. In 2008, their proportion changed to 
61.59% and 61.59% for goods-producing industries and services producing industries 
respectively. The greatest decreases occurred in goods-producing industries in Ontario 
and Quebec while the greatest increase appeared in Alberta. The goods-producing 
industries in Alberta rose to 19.51% in 2008 from 12.97% in 1984. British Colombia 
has kept the same level for the whole period. The services producing industries in 
Ontario, British Colombia and Alberta have increased gradually while it has 
decreased in Quebec. In terms of the provincial share of industrial production, this has 
decreased in Ontario from 45.89% in 1984 to 37.41% in 2008, while it has increased 
in Alberta from 12.97% in 1984 to 19.67% in 2008. Quebec and British Colombia 
have more or less kept similar levels for this period. Newfoundland has raised its 
industrial production from 1.17% in 1984 to 2.64% in 2008. Most provinces have 
reduced significantly the agricultural share of GDP for this period, although it 
increased in Alberta, British Colombia, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Novo Scotia 
and Newfoundland since 2000. Mining, quarrying and oil well industries are 
extremely strong in Alberta due to the boom of the oil industry and gas extraction. Its 
GDP share has increased from 53.94% in 1984 to 59.88 in 2008. It has also increased 
in Newfoundland rapidly from 2.01% in 1984 to 9.79% in 2008. British Colombia has 
kept the same level while it has diminished in Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan in recent decades.  
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Figure 5.39 Provincial Comparisons by Industry 
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Source: Calculated based on the Provincial and Territorial Economic Accounts Review, 2008 
Preliminary Estimates, Catalogue no. 13-016-X, Provincial Gross Domestic Product by Industry, 
1984-1999, Catalogue no. 15-203-XIB. 
Manufacturing industries have remained without change in Quebec (about 26%) 
while it has diminished in Ontario. These two provinces accounted for 80.3% of 
national manufacturing industries in 1984, but their combined share dropped to 74.4% 
in 2008. The reason is that Alberta increased its share sharply from 4.73% in 1984 to 
9.38% in 2008. Saskatchewan has also increased its share from 0.98% to 1.71% for 
this period. There is not much change in the other provinces. If we take the 
construction industries for example, the obvious increase has occurred in Alberta, 
where it has risen from 15.86% in 1984 to 20.21% in 2008. There are no major 
changes in the other provinces for this period although there were some slight ups and 
downs in provincial shares. The four provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Alberta and 
British Colombia have a strong showing in transportation and storage, 
communications, wholesale and retail trade industries for this period. The share of 
these four provinces in these four sectors changed from 81.96%, 84.21%, 85.71%, and 
84.21% in 1984 respectively to 83.17% in 1999, 84.75% in 1999, and to 88.68% and 
86.52% in 2008 respectively. From this statistical analysis, we can draw the 
conclusion that the four provinces contribute 93% of national GDP for the whole 
period. 
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Figure 5.40 Interprovincial Net Migration (Persons), 1962-2007 
 
Source: CANSIM tables: 51-0017, 276-0001, 276-0004, 276-0011, 276-0015, 276-0016, 278- 0007 
and 278-0009, Statistic Canada, Canadian Economic Observer 2007-2008 Catalogue Number: 
11-210-X 
In Canada, the increase of international immigrants and interprovincial migrants 
(Figure 5.40) has a high correlation with the increase in total GDP by province. Based 
on the data of Statistic Canada (Division de la démographie 2008), the majority of 
immigrants settled in Ontario. In 2006, more than four immigrants out of five (85%) 
choose to settle in Quebec, Ontario or British Columbia. Ontario alone received half 
of Canada’s newcomers in 2006, whereas the demographic weight of that province 
was less than 40%. 
Figure 5.41 Distribution of Employed People, by Sectors, by Province 1996 (%) 
 
Source: Based on the data of Wallace (2002), Statistics Canada, Cat. no. 93F002XDB96008 
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Over the last three decades, Ontario, Alberta and British Colombia have attracted 
more international and interprovincial migrants than Quebec and the other provinces. 
In terms of the long term data on interprovincial net migration, this has increased 24% 
in British Columbia, 17% in Alberta and 10% in Ontario while it has diminished 22% 
in Quebec, 10% in Saskatchewan, 8% in Manitoba and 5% in Newfoundland for the 
whole period 1962 -2007 (Figure 5.40). 
The provincial differences in the distribution of employed people by goods 
producing sectors and service producing sectors were not very significant in 1996 and 
2008 (Figures 5.41 and 5.42). Employment in the goods producing sectors has 
decreased a little in all provinces except Alberta. In 1996, 73.8% of those employed 
worked for service producing industries, producing 63.70% of Canada’s GDP. There 
was 76.52% of employment in goods producing industries while 23.48% employment 
in service producing industries in Canada in 2008. However, the distribution of 
employed people by industry obviously differs between provinces. Employment 
numbers in manufacturing was higher in Ontario and Quebec, while Saskatchewan, 
Prince Edward Island, Manitoba and Alberta had high employment numbers in 
agriculture and Alberta dominated mining employment in 1996.  
 
Figure 5.42 Distribution of Employed People, by Sectors, by Province 2008 (%)  
 
Source: Statistics Canada CANSIM, table (for fee) 282-0008 and Catalogue no 71F0004XCB. Last 
modified: 2009-01-08. 
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Figure 5.43 Distribution of Employed People, by Industry, by Province, 2008 (%) 
 
Source: Based on Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table (for fee) 282-0008 and Catalogue no 
71F0004XCB. 
The distribution of employed people, by industry, by province in 2008 (Figure 
5.43) reflects different economic industrial profiles between provinces. The 
proportion of agricultural employment is high in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Prince 
Edward Islands at 7.99%, 4.76% and 4.42% respectively, while it is about 1% to 2% 
in the other provinces. Forestry, fishing, mining, oil and gas employment numbers 
make up a higher proportion of employment in Alberta, Newfoundland and Prince 
Edward Island at 7.4%, 7.2%, and 4.13% respectively. The share of manufacturing 
employment is high in Quebec and Ontario while share of construction employment is 
high in Alberta and British Colombia. Employment in professional, scientific and 
technical services is highly concentrated in Ontario, Quebec and Alberta. There are 
not many differences in the other sectors.  
 
5.2.2 Provincial Case of China 
 
In section 5.1.3, regional disparities and differences of China were analyzed from a 
different point of view. In this section, updated long term provincial statistical data 
are used to reveal provincial disparities in China. In China, provincial disparity has 
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been a major focus of national regional development and policy. Provincial disparity 
in China is larger than regional disparity. National income and population are 
distributed unevenly between provinces. Economic growth differs greatly between 
provinces. The national average population density of China in 2008 was 138 
persons/km2. Most of the population in China is concentrated in the coastal and 
adjacent eastern provinces.  
    The four municipalities directly under central government, Shanghai (3029 
persons/km2), Beijing (1039 persons/km2), Tianjin (1010 persons/km2)Chongqing
（349 persons/km2) and Jiangsu (762 persons/km2), Shandong (610 persons/km2), 
Henan (570 persons/km2), Guangdong (538 persons/km2) and Zhejiang (505 
persons/km2) provinces have a high population density of over 500 persons/km2. The 
western provinces and ethnic autonomous regions, have lower population densities 
(Map 5.4) which are below national average while most of the provinces’ population 
densities are above 100 persons/km level (for example: Inner Mongolia (21 
persons/km2), Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (13 persons/km2), Tibet 
Autonomous Region (2.38 persons/km2) and Qinghai (7.69 persons/km2)).  
 
Map 5.4 Provincial Population Density of China, 2008. 
 
Source: Calculated based on the China Statistical Yearbook 2008 
There is not much change in the population distribution for the period 1949-2008 
except for some slight decreases which occurred mostly in some populated provinces 
if the provincial population is compared with the provincial population share in 
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national population (Figure 5.44). Henan, Shandong, Sichuan, Guangdong and 
Jiangsu have decreased their share, but still have a higher population proportion of 
7.1%, 7.09%, 6.12%, 7.18% and 5.78% respectively.  
In 2008, 53.8% of the GDP was produced by China’s eastern provinces. The 
highest contributors are Guangdong, Shandong and Jiangsu which had 10.9%, 9.49% 
and 9.26% respectively (Figure 5.45). Provincial disparity has clearly emerged since 
the 1980s as Guangdong, Shandong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces have developed 
faster than the others. Some provinces such as Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang and most 
of the western provinces could not retain their 1950s provincial levels due to regional 
development policy change and different favoured investment.  
In 1952, there were large interprovincial income disparities — the richest 
“city-province” (Shanghai) had a per capita income of more than 10 times that of the 
poorest one (Guizhou); even if the “city-provinces” are excluded, the richest province 
of Heilongjiang had a per capita income of almost 4 times that of Guizhou, a large 
disparity by any standards. High income was generally associated with 
industrialization and was concentrated in the coastal cities of Beijing, Shanghai and 
Tianjin and in the north-eastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, the 
former Manchuria (Rongxingguo 2007).  
 
Figure 5.44 Provincial Population Proportions in China 
 
 
In 2008, the ratio of interprovincial income disparities between the richest 
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province (Shanghai) and the poorest (Guizhou) had decreased by a factor of 7.04. But 
the absolute difference was 372 Yuan in 1952, while it increased to 53,088 Yuan in 
2008.  In terms of provincial per capita income, there has been no clear change in 
disparity between provinces from 1950 to 1980s. Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin 
dominated the per capita GDP for the period 1950-1980. Liaoning, Heilongjiang and 
Jiangsu provinces also had high per capita GDP for the same period. However, the 
sharp divergence has occurred since 1990 (Figure 5.46). 
Figure 5.45 Provincial GDP Change of China, 1952-2008 
 
 
Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin had high per capita GDP of 72,554Yuan, 
61,876Yuan, and 54,034Yuan respectively while Guizhou, Gansu, Qinghai and Tibet 
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have the lowest per capita GDP at 8,788Yuan, 12,547Yuan, 12,085Yuan and 
13,794Yuan respectively in 2008. Chongqing had only a per capita GDP of 17,952 
Yuan (Figure 5.46) . Living standards are actually improving in Central and Western 
China, but at a much slower rate than in the east as a result of large regional 
disparities. It is quite apparent that the rich get richer, and the poor get poorer in this 
case.  
Figure 5.46 Provincial Per Capita GDP Change of China, 1952-2008 
 Source: Calculated based on China Statistical Yearbooks 
The change in the provincial share of total GDP and per capita GDP change is 
highly correlated with the provincial total investment in fixed assets in China. As a 
result of provincial differences in the central government’s selective, coastal 
provinces-based investment policy, local conditions and the attractive power of FDI, 
investment disparity between provinces has been growing since the 1980s (Figure 
5.47). In the 1950s, the northeast provinces Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin except 
Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin, the so-called old-industrial base of China received 
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high levels of investment income. This is a major factor in their higher GDP value at 
that time. 
 
Figure 5.47 Provincial Total Investments in Fixed Assets in China, 1950-2007 
 
Source: Calculated based on China Statistical Yearbooks. Note: it is difficult to show clearly the 
changing trend of all the regions in one graph due to the long period 1950-2007and the large number of 
regions in China. The graph is nonetheless given simply to provide an overview of the patterns of 
change. 
In the 1960s, Sichuan province received high investment rate to strengthen its 
industrial base. However, the focus of investment then turned to the eastern coastal 
provinces since 1980. Meanwhile, the eastern coastal provinces have attracted more 
than 85% of FDI by because of their favorable opening policies, investment and cheap 
labor forces with so-called geographical advantages while the western provinces only 
received 1% of total FDI under unfavourable development policies since 1980. Even 
the control of the state over investment has been declining in the reform period, and 
the influence of local factors and FDI has risen, this has not been able to change the 
disparity in provincial investment levels. Guangdong, Shandong, Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang are the four provinces with the fastest investment growth in total fixed 
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investment although they have experienced some declining trend since 2004 while 
Qinghai, Ningxia and Tibet have always exhibited the lowest levels of investment. 
 
Figure 5.48 Provincial Annual per Capita Disposable Income in China, 
1982-2007 
 
Source: Calculated based on China Statistical Yearbooks. 
Provincial disposable income6 is calculated through the per capita urban and 
rural disposable income statistics of China (Figure 5.48). Provincial disposable 
income has increased in all provinces gradually since 1980 but at different speeds. 
The highest disparity in per capita disposable income proportion is 3.36 (between 
Shanghai and Qinghai) in 1980 while it is decreased to 2.74 (between Shanghai and 
Gansu) by 2007. Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang have diverged from other provinces 
more clearly while Guangdong, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong have deviated the 
other provinces slowly. Qinghai, Gansu, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Shaanxi have the lowest 
value of provincial disposable income.    
 
 
                                                              
6 Disposable Income of Urban Households- refers to the actual income at the disposal of members of 
the households which can be used for final consumption, other non-compulsory expenditure and 
savings. This equals to total income minus income tax, personal contribution to social security and 
subsidy for keeping diaries in being sample household. The following formula is used: 
Disposable income = total household income - income tax - personal contribution to social security - 
subsidy for keeping diaries for a sampled household. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm 
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Figure 5.49 Average Wage of Staff and Workers by Province, 2000-2007 
 
Source: Calculated based on China Statistical Yearbooks. 
 
The average wage of staff and workers by province is an important indicator with 
which to compare provincial per capita income because it is mostly controlled by the 
state. It can be seen from Figure 5.49 that the average wage of staff and workers has 
increased in all the provinces at a steady growth rate since 2000. Shanghai, Beijing, 
Tianjin, Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangsu exhibit the highest salaries while the 
central provinces have lower salaries and the western provinces the lowest. The ratio 
of the highest to the lowest salary is 2.54 between Shanghai and Hubei in 2008. 
Although Tibet has a high value for the average wage of staff salary, this is mainly 
due to government investment in this remote mountainous province and higher 
salaries of staff and workers of government in the energy production, transport, 
information, scientific and education fields. The data of Registered Unemployed 
Persons and Unemployment Rate of Tibet province are unavailable7. 
Based on the studies of Fan (2005), more and more population is flowing out from 
the central and western provinces to the eastern coastal provinces in the 1990s 
compared to the 1980s (Figure 5.50).  Sichuan, Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, Henan, 
Jiangxi and Guizhou have lost more of their labour force while Guangdong, Shanghai, 
Beijing and Fujian have received more and more from interprovincial migration. 
                                                              
7 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/indexeh.htm 
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Xinjiang is the only province that has received high positive interprovincial net 
migration among the western provinces for this period. 
 
Figure 5.50 Interprovincial Net Migration, 1985-2000 (Unit: 1000) 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data of Fan (2005).  
 
In China, provincial unemployment had decreased at the beginning of the 1980s, 
but increased since 1990 with the increase in the large amount of the urban labour 
force coming from rural areas. In the 1990s, Ningxia, Qinghai, Guizhou, Gansu and 
Guangxi had the highest unemployment rates in China. But the unemployment rates 
in the eastern coastal provinces has increased due to large number of interprovincial 
migrants since 2000 (Figure 5.51), except for Beijing and Guangdong.  
This unemployment rate refers to the registered unemployment rate8 in urban 
areas in China. It is most likely underestimated due to the large numbers in the rural 
labour force, substantial “hidden” unemployment in rural areas and the existence of 
unregistered employment. Global Finance (2009) estimated that unemployment in 
China is officially 4% in urban areas, but by including migrants it may be as high as 
                                                              
8 Registered Urban Unemployment Rate Registered unemployment rate in urban areas refers to 
the ratio of the number of the registered unemployed persons to the sum of the number of employed 
persons and the registered unemployed persons. The formula is as follows: 
Registered urban unemployment rate = number of registered urban unemployed persons/(number 
of urban employed persons + number of registered urban unemployed persons) ×100% 
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9%. There is thus reason to believe that there is substantial unemployment and 
underemployment in rural areas (2008 estimate). 
 
Figure 5.51 Provincial Unemployment Rate, 1980-2008  
 
Source: Calculated based on China Statistical Yearbooks. Note: The data provincial of provincial 
unemployment rate are so close in each province so it is difficult to show clearly the data of each 
province in this figure. But it is the overall pattern that emerges from this graph that is most interesting. 
 
  If the provincial labour force is taken into consideration, there is not much 
difference between provinces due to the huge provincial populations. It is clear from 
Figure 5.52 that the eastern coastal provinces have a higher labour (participation) 
force than that of central and western provinces. The poorest province has the lowest 
labour (participation) force rate of 64.5% while Beijing has the highest labour 
(participation) force rate of 80.12%. 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangdong are the provinces with the highest 
non-agricultural population in China. This is consistent with the provincial GDP, per 
capita income, investment and salary data. The eastern coastal provinces have the 
highest non-agricultural population while the western provinces have the lowest 
non-agricultural population and the highest agricultural population. Shanghai has the 
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highest non-agricultural population at 86.81% while Guizhou and Yunnan have the 
highest agricultural population of 83% (Figure 5.53). 
 
Figure 5.52 Provincial Labour Force Participation Rate of China, 2008 
 
 
Source: Calculated based on the population data of China Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
 
Figure 5.53 Provincial Agricultural, Non-Agricultural Population of China, 2008 
 
Source: Calculated based on China Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
 
Another important indicator used to measure personal income in an 
under-developed country is Engel's Coefficient9  which measures the change in 
consumption patterns. This coefficient can be calculated in China by means of Engel's 
Coefficient for rural households and Engel's Coefficient for urban households (Figure 
5.54-A, B). Engel's Coefficient for rural households and Engel's Coefficient for urban 
households have declined in all provinces since 1978 (Figure 5.54-A).  
                                                              
9 Engel’s Coefficient refers to the percentage of expenditure on food in the total consumption 
expenditure, using the following formula: Engel’s Coefficient = expenditure on food/Total 
Consumption expenditure×100%. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/indexeh.htm 
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Figure 5.54-A: Engel’s Coefficient for Urban Households, 1978-200410 
 
 
Figure 54-B Engel’s Coefficient for Rural Households, 1978-2004 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks 
The data in Figure 5.54-B indicate that the western provinces have the highest 
Engel’s Coefficient for rural households; in contrast, the eastern provinces Beijing, 
Shanghai and Zhejiang have the lowest Engel’s Coefficient for Rural households 
while the central provinces occupy a middle-of-the-road position.  
From the above data analysis, it can be concluded that the distribution of labour 
force, agricultural and non-agricultural population is highly consistent with provincial 
per capita income distribution. This is also closely related with industrial employment 
and provincial GDP by industry. In China, most employment is concentrated in 
                                                              
10 Note: This Figure 5.54 shows only the overall change (trend) of provincial Engel’s Coefficient for 
Urban and Rural Households. It is really quite difficult to show each province individually due to data 
similarities. 
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primary industry, mainly in agriculture. Employment in service sectors has increased 
since 1980. In 2008, 39.6% of employees worked in the primary industry while 27.2% 
and 33.2% of employment were engaged in secondary and tertiary industries 
respectively nationally. In China’s statistics, tertiary industries include all the service 
sectors. The employment by industry thus greatly differs by province (Figure 5.55). 
Beijing (72.5%), Shanghai (55.2%) and Tianjin (44%) ranked consecutively first, 
second and third in terms of the share of employment in the tertiary industry followed 
by Liaoning (41.2%). In the primary industry, all of the western provinces have the 
highest relative levels of employment such as Yunnan (62.6%), Tibet (55.7%), Gansu 
(52.9%), Xinjiang (51.6%) and Guangci (55.2%).  
 
Figure 5.55 Provincial Employment by Three Broad Sectors of Industry (%) 
(2008) 
 
Source: Calculated based on China Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
There is an obvious disparity in the importance of employment in secondary 
industry by province. Shanghai (39.3%), Tianjin (44%), Jiangsu (44.4%), Guangdong 
(33.4%), Zhejiang (46.5%) and Fujian (35.6%) in the eastern coastal provinces and 
Sichuan, Shanxi, Chongqing, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang in the western provinces 
have higher employment in secondary industry. 
The provincial GDP is decomposed into primary industry, secondary and 
tertiary industries in Chinese statistical data. Secondary industry consists of industry 
and construction while tertiary industry is further divided into transport, storage and 
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post, wholesale and retail trades, hotels and catering services, financial intermediaries, 
real estate and others (Figure 5.56). In China, the proportion of tertiary industry has 
increased while the proportion of primary industry has decreased. 
 
Figure 5.56 Provincial GDP by Industry 2008 (%) 
 
Note: All the industrial data indicate the percentage of total GDP by region. Source: Calculated based 
on China Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
 
The national average GDP share by industry is 11.3%, 48.6% and 40.1% for the 
three major industrial groups respectively in 2008. For secondary industry, industry 
accounts for 42.6% while construction accounts for 5.6% of national total GDP. In 
tertiary industries, transport, storage and post, wholesale and retail trades, hotels and 
catering services, financial intermediaries, real estate and others account for 5.81%, 
7.22%, 2.27%, 4.40%, 4.71% and 15.37% respectively. In terms of primary industry, 
Shanghai (0.8%), Beijing (1.1%) and Tianjin (1.9%) have the lowest value of GDP in 
this major sector, not surprisingly, while Hainan (30%), Sichuan (18.9%) and Hunan 
(18%) have the highest value of GDP in this major sector. Most of the provinces in 
the eastern coastal provinces have a value of GDP below 10%, while the western 
provinces have a value of GDP above 10% in the primary sector.  In terms of 
secondary industry, the share of these industries is high in almost all provinces except 
Beijing (25.7%), Tibet (29.2%) and Hainan (29.8%) which have the lowest value of 
GDP in this major sector. Tianjin (60.1%), Shanxi (61.5%) and Shaanxi (56.1%) have 
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the highest industry value of GDP. In construction, the western provinces have higher 
shares of GDP, for example, Tibet (21.74%) and Qinghai (9%). For the tertiary 
industry, Beijing (73.2%), Shanghai (53.7%) and Tibet (55.5%) have the highest 
values of GDP while Henan has the lowest value at 28% of total GDP. The reason for 
Tibet having a high value of GDP in tertiary industries is that agriculture and industry 
in Tibet are very weak due to natural conditions. It is totally the opposite of Beijing 
and Shanghai. The other provinces lie between the 30%-40% level in terms of tertiary 
industries. 
 
5.2.3 The Case of Quebec 
 
Quebec is the largest province in Canada with a territorial size of 1,667,441 km2. It is 
one of the key players in the Canadian economy. It is bordered to the west by the 
province of Ontario, James Bay and Hudson Bay, to the north by Hudson Strait and 
Ungava Bay, and to the east by the Gulf of Saint Lawrence and the provinces of 
Newfoundland and Labrador and New Brunswick. It is bordered on the south by the 
American states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York. It also shares 
maritime borders with the Territory of Nunavut, the Province of Prince Edward Island 
and the Province of Nova Scotia.  
In Canada, Ontario and Quebec which constitute central Canada both have 
strongly developed core-periphery structures, and while there is substantial 
interprovincial interaction within the Windsor-Quebec corridor, the two provincial 
hinterlands are relatively discrete, each primarily linked to its respective provincial 
core. It has been emphasized that the Quebec economy has a pronounced 
core-periphery spatial structure (Wallace 2002). 
From the provincial analysis in 5.2.1, it can be seen that Quebec constitutes 
almost a fifth of the Canadian economy. Quebec is the second most populated 
province in Canada, after Ontario. Québec has more than 7.75 million inhabitants 
(23.2% of national population), who form a mainly French-speaking society. Most 
inhabitants live in urban areas near the Saint Lawrence River between Montreal, the 
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largest city, and Quebec City, the capital. Over the last decade, Quebec has had a 
strong economic performance but with gradual shrinkage of national share. But it has 
experienced a slight decrease in its provincial share of total national GDP from 26% 
in 1961 to 20% in 2008. Its provincial population share of national population has 
also witnessed a decline from 28.9% in 1950 to 23.26% in 2008 due to interprovincial 
emigration and the decrease in natural increase, even though its population has 
increased from 3.969 million in 1950 to 7.75 million in 2008. 
In Quebec, the distribution of population is highly uneven. Most of the 
population lives in the south of province. Montreal has the highest population density 
at 3,769.1 km2 in 2008, and ranks first with a population of 1,877,693. Laval and 
Montérégie rank second and third with population densities of 1562 km2 and 127.4 
km2 respectively. Almost 48% of Quebec’s population is concentrated in the Montreal 
metropolitan area. Altogether, 67.3% of the population lived in the six metropolitan 
areas of Montréal, Québec, Gatineau, Sherbrooke, Saguenay, Trois-Rivières in 2007. 
If the population distribution is analyzed by the 17 administrative regions in Quebec, 
51.26% of the population is concentrated in three regions - Montréal, Montérégie and 
the National Capital region. The largest Canadian province in terms of area, Quebec 
has a GDP (the basic price in 2008) of about $248 billion Canadian, 69.6% of which 
was derived from the service sector in 2008.  
 
Figure 5.57A GDP per Capita  
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Figure 5.57B GDP Growth Rate 
 
Source: Statistic Canada, Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal, 2009. 
www.tableaudeboardmontreal.com.  
 
However, for many indicators, such as per capita GDP, personal income, 
provincial average weekly earnings, per capita disposable income, Quebec has stayed 
close but below the national levels (Section 5.2.1and Figure 5.57). It accounts for 
22.87% of national employment. Quebec ranks 5th in terms of average weekly 
earnings, 10th in per capita GDP, 9th in per capita personal income and 10th in per 
capita disposable income. 
Quebec's abundance of natural resources gives it a favourable position in the 
national global economy. It also stands out with its notable development of forestry 
resources. Currently, 60% of the newsprint consumed in the north-eastern United 
States originates in Québec11. Québec's territory is one of the largest reservoirs of 
drinking water on the planet. Its water table covers 10% of its total surface. This 
resource allows it to produce electricity at low cost and under ecologically safe 
conditions 12 . While the province's substantial natural resources, tourism and 
transportation have long been the mainstay of its economy, sectors of the knowledge 
economy such as aerospace, agri-food, automotive and ground transportation 
equipment, information technologies and software, life sciences, light metals, 
                                                              
11 http://www.gouv.qc.ca/portail/quebec/pgs/commun/portrait/economie/resourcesnaturelles/?lang=en 
12 http://www.gouv.qc.ca/portail/quebec/pgs/commun/portrait/economie/?lang=en 
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microelectronics, multimedia and telecommunications also play leading roles13. 
Quebec's international relations focus primarily on North America and Europe, two 
key areas (Table 5.7). Moreover, it maintains significant relations with various Asian 
nations. Quebec shares vital interests with the rest of North America, especially the 
United States. It also maintains diversified relations with several Latin American 
countries. Quebec’s trade relations with other countries in recent decades have given a 
boost to its economy. Quebec accounts for 20.5% of national trade (includes exports 
20.1% and imports 20.9%). In 2008, Quebec imported $178.0 billion (CAD) worth of 
goods and services, representing 58.6% of its GDP. International imports account for 
62.9% of the total as compared to 37.1% for interprovincial imports14. Meanwhile, the 
share of imports of goods stands at 75.5% as compared to 24.5% for services. Exports 
totaled $157.3 billion (CAD) in 2008, representing 51.8% of Québec’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Of this total, the share of international exports is 60.4%, 
whereas that of interprovincial exports stands at 39.6%. Moreover, goods account for 
75.7% of this trade while services represent 24.3%. These international exchanges 
underscore the strength of Québec's economy, particularly in terms of employment15. 
 
Table 5.7 Québec’s International Merchandise Exports and Imports for 2008 
 
Region Export % Import % 
United States $51.3 billion CAD 72.2% $27.3 billion CAD 31.1% 
Europe $10.2 billion CAD 14.4% $25.1 billion CAD 28.7% 
Asia $3.6 billion CAD 5.1% $15.0 billion CAD 17.1% 
Middle East $1.9 billion CAD 2.7% $10.3 billion CAD 11.7% 
Central America $1.7 billion CAD 2.3% $3.3 billion CAD 3.7% 
South America $1.3 billion CAD 1.9% $3.9 billion CAD 4.5% 
Africa $0.5 billion CAD 0.8% $1.1 billion CAD 1.3% 
Oceania $0.5 billion CAD 0.7% $0.6 billion CAD 0.7% 
(Source : Institut de la statistique du Québec, Comptes économiques du Québec). 
                                                              
13 http://www.gouv.qc.ca/portail/Quebec/ 
14 http://www.gouv.qc.ca/portail/quebec/pgs/commun/portrait/economie/importexport/?lang=en 
15 Institut de la statistique du Québec, Direction des statistiques économiques et du développement 
durable. Statistics Canada, International Merchandise Trade 
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Owing to Quebec’s aging population in recent and coming decades, immigration 
is one of the key factors in its economy and a key driver of population increase and 
labour force growth. However, based on the data of Statistic Canada (Division de la 
démographie 2008), Quebec has lost more than 665,602 interprovincial migrants over 
the period 1962-2007. From 1986-2008, Quebec gained about 678,237 international 
immigrants from other countries. But Quebec has had negative interprovincial 
migration since 1986, having lost 210,556 interprovincial migrants (Table 5.8). In 
total, Quebec accepted only 467,681 immigrants over this 25 year period. 
 
Table 5.8 International and Interprovincial Migration of Quebec, 1986-2008 
 
Source: Le bilan démographique du Québec ,2009 Institut de la statistique du Québec, Site Web : 
www.stat.gouv.qc.ca.  
  Quebec gained 354,370 net international immigrants from 1996 to 2008, 
during which time it lost a net 115,686 interprovincial migrants. If the data are 
analyzed sub-regionally in Quebec by its 17 administrative regions for the period 
1996-2008, 92% of net international migrants and 90% of net interprovincial migrants 
are concentrated in Montreal, Montérégie, Quebec city and Laval. Montreal attracted 
78.59% of net international migrants and 66.58% of net interprovincial migrants 
during this period.  
At the same time, the Montérégie received 5.67% of net international migrants 
and 13.12% of net interprovincial migrants, Quebec City received 4.07% of net 
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international migrants and 6.37% of net interprovincial migrants and Laval received 
3.66% of net internationalmigrants and 3.46% of net interprovincial migrants for this 
period. Abitibi-Témiscamingue, Côte-Nord, Nord-du-Québec, Chaudière-Appalaches, 
and Gaspésie–Îles-de-la-Madeleine are the principal losers in terms of international 
migrants. Meanwhile, the Outaouais lost 2.89% in terms of net interprovincial 
migrants (Figure 5.58). 
 
Figure 5.58 Quebec Sub-regional International and Provincial Net Migrants 
1996-2008 
 
Source: 2009 Institut de la statistique du Québec, Site Web : www.stat.gouv.qc.ca.  
In terms of sectoral share of national GDP, the goods producing industries of 
Quebec account for 20.79%, while the service producing industries take up 20.03%. 
The agricultural and related service industries occupy 15.2%, and the other industries 
account for almost a fifth of national GDP except for mining, and quarrying and oil 
well industries which only account for 1.99% of national GDP in 2008. If the sectors 
are analyzed for trends for the period 1984-2008, the manufacturing sector is the only 
sector that has maintained the same level while the other industries have undergone a 
gradual decline for the period. The fast decline has occurred in agriculture from 22% 
in 1984 to 15.2% in 2008. In economic activity by sector in Quebec, manufacturing is 
still a strong sector, accounting for 19% of Quebec’s total GDP. Finance and 
insurance, real estate and renting, and management of companies and enterprises 
account for 17.1% while the construction and wholesale and retail trade have 
increased to 5.7%, 5.4%, and 6.5% respectively by 2007 (Figure 5.59). 
 247
 
Figure 5.59 Quebec's Sectoral Share of National GDP, 1984-2008 
 Source: Calculated based on the Provincial and Territorial Economic Accounts Review, 2008 
Preliminary Estimates, Catalogue no. 13-016-X, Provincial Gross Domestic Product by Industry, 
1984-1999, Catalogue no. 15-203-XIB. 
In Quebec, 77.16% of employment was concentrated in the service producing 
sector while 22.84% of employment was in the goods producing sectors in 2008 
(Figure 5.60). In terms of specific sectors, the trade sector possesses the highest 
employment share at 16.09%, while the manufacturing and health care and social 
assistance rank second and third, accounting for 14% and 12.12% respectively. 
Agriculture only accounted for 1.58% of employment in 2008. 
 
Figure 5.60 Distribution of Employed People, by Sectors, Québec 2008 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table (for fee) 282-0008 and Catalogue no 71F0004XCB. 
The province of Québec which is divided into 17 administrative regions includes 6 
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metropolitans (namely Montréal, Québec, Gatineau, Sherbrook, Saguenay and 
Trois-Rivières), 104 RCM and equivalent territories and 1292 municipalities (Institut 
de la statistique du Québec (Québec Handy Numbers) 2009).  
 
Figure 5.61 Regional Proportion of Total GDP of Quebec, 1997-2008 
 
Source: Institut de la statistique du Québec. Direction des statistiques économiques et du 
développement durable, 2008. 
 
Variations in per capita income and economic structure among the administrative 
regions of Quebec demonstrate clearly the province’s core-periphery structure. Each 
administrative region differs from the others with regards to its geography, natural 
resources, inhabitable land, economy and industrial activities.  
In terms of its regional share of total GDP in Quebec, the Montreal region has 
dominated Quebec’s economy for the period 1997-2008 (but with a slight decrease), 
and accounted for 35.06% in 2008. The Montérégie, Quebec City and the Laurentides 
have seen a low increase in their shares, accounting for 15.38%, 9.59% and 5.36% 
respectively by 2008. The other 13 regions have not changed much in terms of 
regional GDP share, and together constituted 34.6% of Quebec’s total GDP in 2008 
(Figure 5.61). It can be seen that the change in regional total GDP has been steady in 
Quebec for the period. 
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Figure 5.62 Regional GDP Variation of Quebec, 1997-2008 
 
Source : Institut de la statistique du Québec, Site Web : www.stat.gouv.qc.ca 
 
However, there are strong differences in terms of regional GDP variation in each 
year from 1997 to 2008 (Figure 5.62). There is a decline in 2001 and 2008 in all 
regions. Most changes have occurred in Nord-du-Québec. It reached a maximum 
change of 26.5% in 2004 due to a substantial expansion in the construction industry. 
Its annual rate of change in GDP averaged 7%, while the average growth rate was 5.7% 
in Laval and 5.68% and 5.64% in Lanaudière and the Laurentides respectively for this 
same period. 
The regional disparity as a ratio between the highest and lowest per capita GDP 
in Quebec in 1997 was 2.56 between Montreal and Lanaudière. Montreal, Quebec city, 
Côte-Nord and Nord-du-Québec are the only regions above the average provincial 
level of per capita GDP of $24,980 in 1997 while the other regions are below the 
provincial level.  The large change occurred in Nord-du-Québec since 2003. Since 
then it has stayed at the top in terms of per capita GDP. In 2008, Nord-du-Québec 
ranks first with a $63,754 per capita GDP while Montreal ranks second with a per 
capita GDP of $52,883. The largest disparity between Nord-du-Québec and 
Lanaudière reached a ratio of 2.88 in 2008 (Figure 5.63). 
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Figure 5.63 Regional Per Capita GDP Change, Quebec, 1998-2008 
 
Source : Institut de la statistique du Québec, Site Web : www.stat.gouv.qc.ca 
 
Figure 5.64 Regional Per Capita GDP Growth Rate Change, 1999-2008 
 
Source : Institut de la statistique du Québec, Site Web : www.stat.gouv.qc.ca 
 
All the regions have increased their per capita GDP gradually over the period 
1997-2008 except for Nord-du-Québec (Figure 5.63). This is consistent with the 
regional GDP variation of Quebec for the period 1997-2008. Nord-du-Québec had a 
sharp increase of per capita GDP in 2004 then decreased to the average level in the 
following year. There was a substantial drop in growth rates in almost all regions in 
2008 due to the economic recession (Figure 5.64). 
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Figure 5.65 Regional Per Capita Disposable Income Change, 1998-2008 
 
Source : Institut de la statistique du Québec, Site Web : www.stat.gouv.qc.ca 
 
In terms of the total amount of regional disposable income, 60.58% of personal 
income comes from Montreal, Montérégie, Quebec City and the Laurentides.  
Montreal accounted for 25.22% in 2008, while the Montérégie, Quebec City and 
Laurentides accounted for 19.18%, 9.18% and 7% respectively. All regions have seen 
an increase in their per capita disposable income since 1997 except for the sharp jump 
in Nord-du-Québec due to the contribution of construction industries in 2008 (Figure 
5.65). Nord-du-Québec raised its per capita disposable income from $30,608 in 2007 
to $58,373 in 2008. 
In order to explain the changing trend of regional per capita GDP and personal 
disposable income in Quebec, σ-Convergence and Gini coefficients are calculated for 
all 17 administrative regions based on the short-term data from 1997 to 2008 (Figure 
5.66). 
The σ-Convergence of regional per capita GDP of Quebec has converged slowly 
between 1998 and 2003; then it experienced a divergence from 2003 to 2008. The 
σ-Convergence of regional per capita disposable income of Quebec converged 
gradually from 1998 to 2007 at a very low speed, and then it began to diverge after 
2007. The regional per capita GDP has a larger σ-convergence rate than that of per 
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capita disposable income for this period. The Gini coefficient change of regional per 
capita GDP and personal disposable income of Quebec is consistent with the change 
in the σ-Convergence of regional per capita GDP and personal disposable income for 
this period. The Gini coefficient of regional per capita GDP has increased since 2003 
and the Gini coefficient of per capita personal disposable income has increased only 
after 2007.  
 
Figure 5.66 Regional σ-Convergence and Gini coefficient of Quebec 
 
Sources: Calculated based on the data from Institut de la statistique du Québec, Site Web:  
www.stat.gouv.qc.ca. 
Figure 5.67 Lorenz Curves of Per Capita GDP and Per Capita Personal 
Disposable Income: Quebec 
Gini coefficient of inequality of Per Capita GDP Gini coefficient of inequality of Per Capita Personal Income 
    
If we compare the Lorenz curves of per capita GDP and per capita personal 
disposable income, the difference can be seen very clearly (Figure 5.67). The Lorenz 
curve line (green) between line of perfect equality (red) and the line of perfect 
inequality has approached the line of perfect equality significantly in per capita 
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personal disposable Income. From the regional σ-Convergence and Gini coefficient of 
Quebec, it can be concluded that regional per capita GDP disparity is greater than per 
capita personal disposable income. However, it should be clear that regional per 
capita income and per capita personal disposable income are not necessarily related. 
Here, the results only show the change of regional per capita income and per capita 
personal disposable income.  
Based on the absolute beta-convergence model 4.10 presented in Chapter 4, the 
regional beta convergence can be calculated:  
by regressing the average growth rate of per capita GDP between time t
beg 
= 1998 and 
time t
end 
= 2008 on initial income at time t
beg 
= 1998 where:  
(lnY
it(end) 
– lnY
it(beg) 
) = α + βlnY
it(beg) 
+ μ
i 
(5.3)  
Here, i is the index for each region where i = 1 to 17 in Quebec. Time is indexed 
by t where t(beg) = 1998 and t(end) = 2008. The sample period is indexed by T where 
T = 11 years for the whole period. (The Beta Convergence rateβis calculated based 
on the formulaβ=−ln(1−β1)/T.)  
lnY = natural log of real per capital income.  
α = constant term and μ
i 
= random error term. 
From this model, the absolute beta convergences for per capita GDP and per 
capita personal disposable income are calculated. There is a weak annual divergence 
rate of 0.011590229 in per capita GDP (LnY08-98=0.1197lnY98 -0.792481) and there 
is a not very significant convergence (LnY08-98= -0.1324 lnY98 + 1.747312) of per 
capita personal disposable income at an annual rate of 0.001059811 for this period. 
This is consistent with the σ-convergence change of per capita GDP and per capita 
personal disposable income for this period. 
    Another dimension of the convergence analysis is that the regional 
economic growth may follow a spatial pattern because of the uneven distribution of 
population and economic activities. Regional spatial dependence can be handled in 
beta convergence in alternative approaches by using the spatial error model (SEM), 
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the spatial lag model (SLM) and the spatial cross-regressive model (SCM) (see more 
in Chapters 2 and 4). 
 
Table 5.9 Beta Coefficient of Spatial Dependency Models 
Indicators Beta Coefficient Annual Rate  -Ln(1+b)/ T 
Models SEM SLM SCM SEM SLM SCM 
Per Capita GDP 0.118611 0.081955 0.081955 0.011477837 0.007773534 0.007773534 
Per Capita Personal Income -0.107203 -0.107203 -0.240933 -0.00925791 -0.00925791 -0.019623956 
Notes: Estimated for the period 1998-2008 for all models 
 
SEM, SLM and SCM Models are estimated by a non-linear version of the basic 
growth regression, for the period 1998-2008. From Table 5.9, it can be clearly seen 
that the beta coefficient β<0 for per capita personal disposable income during the 
whole period. There is a weak sign of convergence of regional per capita disposable 
income. This is consistent with the Beta Coefficient (-0.1324) of the absolute 
convergence value of per capita disposable income calculated earlier. In terms of 
regional per capita GDP, all the results of the SEM, SLM and SCM Models are 
similar to the absolute convergence value. All the results are significantly consistent 
with the σ-Convergence.   
 
Figure 5.68 GDP at Basic Prices, by Sector by Region, 1997-2007 
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As far as the regional GDP by industry is concerned, there are great disparities 
between regions in Quebec (Figure 5.68). In goods producing industries, 
Nord-du-Québec, Côte-Nord and Centre-du-Québec have the highest values of 
76.08%, 60.7% and 46.8% respectively while Outaouais, Quebec City, Montreal and 
Laval have the lowest values at 19.3%, 20%, 23% and 25.79% respectively in 2007. 
The trend of regional goods producing industries has increased in 
Nord-du-Québec due to the boom of the construction industries since 2003 while it 
has fallen slowly in many regions for the period 1997-2007. The regional GDP 
proportion of service producing industries has increased in all regions except 
Nord-du-Québec for this period. Outaouais, Quebec City, Montreal and Laval have 
the highest values of 80.69%, 79.94%, 77% and 74% respectively in service 
producing industries while Nord-du-Québec, Côte-Nord, Centre-du-Québec and 
Abitibi-Témiscamingue have the lowest values at 23%, 39.2%, 53.17% and 55.27% 
respectively in 2007. In agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, all the regions have 
experienced little change if we just consider the start and end points for this period.  
Gaspésie-Îles-de-la-Madeleine, Bas-Saint-Laurent and Abitibi-Témiscamingue have 
the highest values of 6.96%, 5.61% and 4.78% respectively while Montreal, Laval 
and Quebec City have the lowest values at 0.09%, 0.07% and 0.47% respectively in 
2007. Gaspésie-Îles-de-la-Madeleine increased its share from 6.91% in 1997 to 
12.05% in 2001, and then gradually dropped to 6.96% in 2007. All the regions saw a 
decrease in their share in the manufacturing sector slowly, except for the sharp drop in 
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Nord-du-Québec from 1997 to 2007. Centre-du-Québec, Chaudière-Appalaches, 
Estrie and Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean have the highest shares of manufacturing, while 
Nord-du-Québec, Quebec City, Outaouais and Gaspésie-Îles-de-la-Madeleine have 
the lowest shares. In mining and oil and gas extraction industries, 
Abitibi-Témiscamingue saw an increase in its GDP share from 10.2% in 1997 to 
15.65% in 2007, while Gaspésie–Îles-de-la-Madeleine saw its GDP share reduced 
from 3.13% to 1.27% for this period. Construction in Nord-du-Québec increased from 
12.11% in 1997 to 35.28% in 2007, indicating how this sector became an economic 
booster for this period 
 
5.2.4 The Case of Xinjiang 
 
China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is situated in the northwestern part of 
China, it has a surface area of 1.66 million km2 and occupies one-sixth of China's 
national territory and is China’s largest province. It neighbours eight countries 
(namely, Mongolia, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India) and provides a corridor to the Central Asian region. 
Within China, it adjoins Tibet, Qinghai and Gansu. Xinjiang is the largest 
administrative unit in China and is rich in mineral resources, especially oil and natural 
gas that could make it a major player in generating rapid economic growth in the 
western part of China and in the changing geo-strategic and geo-economic 
environment in Central Asia in coming decades. Central Eurasia also has huge oil and 
natural gas resources, which make it the second most important region after West Asia 
and China was provided an opportunity to enter the economic and strategic vacuum in 
the newly formed Central Asian republics in the early nineties. These make the 
location of Xinjiang strategically significant and economically an important potential 
player in the post-Cold War period. It is surrounded by possible sources of tension and 
conflict: the unresolved border between China and India; the India–Pakistan conflict 
over Kashmir; civil war in Tajikistan; the volatile Fergana valley bordering 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; and Afghanistan since the withdrawal of 
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Soviet forces from that country. Its proximity to Tibet has also made it an important 
strategic area from the Chinese security perspective. Its strategic value has increased 
with the assessment of huge oil reserves in Xinjiang (Clarke 2003) and oil 
transportation corridors from central Asia countries in the region. Petroleum, Natural 
Gas Extraction  and Coal Mining reached 5.6 million tons, 26.55×100 million 
m3/year and 1453.5×104 tons in 2008 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009). Xinjiang 
is not only far ahead of other western provinces in economic development after the 
1980s, it also has the advantage of a flourishing international trade with eight 
neighbouring countries as well as with other countries in West Asia. Thus, Xinjiang is 
a key area in China’s ambitious Western Development Strategy. It is more or less 
certain that it will be become a new economic growth centre in central Asia in the 
near future (Map5.5 and Map 5.6). 
 
Map 5.5 Strategic Location of Xinjiang       Map 5.6 Topographic map of Xinjiang  
   
Source: MapInfo Professional 8.0.     Source: http://www.chinatouristmaps.com/ 
 
In the past, Xinjiang was an economically backward, geographically landlocked 
region between the inner provinces of China and middle Asian countries. The famous 
ancient Silk Road passed on both sides of the Tangri Mountains. Half of the Silk Road, 
which wound along between ancient China's capitals Xi'an to the east bank of the 
Mediterranean, was located in Xinjiang. It was not only an important transportation 
route connecting the ancient world, but also a synonym for economic and cultural 
exchanges between the western world and the oriental world. The ancient Silk Road 
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helped to integrate the old Chinese, Indian, Turkish, Persian, Arabian, Greek and 
Roman cultures and promoted the exchange of the Western and Oriental civilizations. 
There were a few famous ancient trade cities (Kashgar, Hotan, Kuqa, Turpan, Ghulja) 
and other small cities and towns along the route. It played a very important role in 
forming the spatial structure and improving the social and economic development of 
this region. The traditional economic landscapes of this Silk Road region were based 
on herding, oasis agriculture and trade. Nowadays, most of the cities and counties in 
this region have been created from the ancient trade centres and routes have been built 
along the ancient silk route (see Maps 5.7 and 5.8).  
 
Map 5.7 Map of Ancient Silk Route in Xinjiang Map 5.8 Population Distribution of Xinjiang           
     
 
In the last several decades, after the founding of New China in 1949 and the 
establishment of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1955, China has carried out 
different regional development policies such as its centralization, reform and open 
door policy and western development policy. Each of these policies has had a 
different impact on socio-economic development in the province. These changes are 
closely related to the physical context, geo-strategic and geo-economic importance of 
this region and show great regional disparity in their spatial distribution. 
Xinjiang is situated far from any ocean. High mountains bar the approach of 
monsoons and wet winds from the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Only a small volume of 
wet cold air from the Arctic and Atlantic come through the mountain valleys and 
reach northern Xinjiang. Xinjiang thus has a dry continental climate with great 
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extremes of winter and summer temperature. Rainfall is scant, seldom exceeding 20 in. 
(60 cm) annually in most regions. There are several huge mountain ranges running 
east to west across Xinjiang. On its northern border are the Altai Mountains, while the 
Tangri Mountains in the middle of the region extends across its entire length dividing 
the province into northern and southern Xinjiang. Two enormous basins - the 
Jungghar basin in the north and the Tarim Basin in the south - each spread out from 
the Tangri Mountains (see Map 5.6). In the central part of the Tarim Basin is found 
the Taklimakan Desert, covering an area of 324,000 km2. It is the largest desert in 
China and the second largest desert with shifting dunes in the world. In the central 
section of the Jungghar Basin lies the Gurbantungghut Desert, the second largest in 
China covering an area of 48,000 km2, consisting largely of stable and semi-stable 
dunes. Around the Tarim and Jungghar Basins are alluvial fans that connect to form 
extensive sloping plains. The middle and lower parts of the plains have fertile land 
with plentiful water resources. These Oases are population centres where people have 
for thousands of years reclaimed land, planted crops and built their homes. The total 
oasis area in these two enormous basins is estimated to be about 70,000 km2. 
Xinjiang has for long been characterized by an underdeveloped infrastructure, 
inconvenience of transport and slow economic development. This situation is 
unquestionably related at least in part to its basic geomorphologic structure (see Map 
5.6). It affects the formation of spatial structure of economic activities to a large 
degree.   
First, Xinjiang is surrounded by mountains. It depends upon snow melt water from 
these mountains to irrigate its oases. Xinjiang's oases are isolated and separated from 
each other by large expanses of desert. Transportation is poor and expensive; as a 
result many regions are to all intents and purposes closed economies. Although 
Xinjiang covers a vast area, the whole area of oases only accounts for about 4% of the 
total area of Xinjiang. The main economic activities of Xinjiang are centred in small 
oases that are distributed among the frontiers of the two large deserts; the other parts 
are unsuitable as human habitat. The oases are so dispersed that the average distance 
between counties is 112 km, sometimes exceeding 400km (from Qitai to Qinggel), 
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and the average distance between each prefecture ( city or county) is 155 km, 
sometimes reaching 794 km (Korla to Qarqan). Even the average distance between 
counties and villages is 35km; with the greatest distance being 317km, increasing 
population in the oases has put great pressure on water resources, leading to loss of 
vegetation on the fringes of the oases, accelerating desertification and grasslands 
deterioration. Many of these poor counties in southern Xinjiang are trapped in a 
vicious cycle of poverty. In 2008, the average GDP in the Hotan prefecture was 3928 
Yuan/person and 5350Yuan/person RMB in Kizilsu prefecture, respectively the lowest 
and the second lowest per capita GDP among Xinjiang's regions (the average value is 
19,725 yuan/person) while Karamay has the highest per capita GDP of 100,216 
yuan/person.   
 
Map 5.9 15 Subregions of Xinjiang  
 
 
The distribution of natural resources, the great distances between the oases, and the 
degree of polarization and the province’s relative economic independence are all 
factors that underlie the differences in regional characteristics of the Xinjiang 
economy. Based on the characteristics of climate, natural resources, economic 
structure, ethnicity, social economic development levels and regional economic 
relationships, Xinjiang can be divided spatially generally into 15 sub-regions (Map 
5.9). These 15 regions include 2 cities at the prefecture level, 7 prefectures, 5 
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autonomous prefectures and 1 municipality (this number increased to 4 in 2008) 
directly under the control of the central government. They are Urumqi City, Karamay 
City, Turpan Administrative Offices, Kumul Administrative Offices, Changji Hui 
Autonomous Prefecture, Ili Prefecture, Tarbagatai Administrative Offices, Altay 
Administrative Offices, Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, Bayangolin Mongol 
Autonomous Prefecture, Aksu Administrative Offices, Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous 
Prefecture, Kashgar Administrative Offices, Hotan Administrative Offices, Shihezi 
(here, Administrative Offices means region). These 15 regions further include 19 
cities (this includes 4 cities under the direct control of the Autonomous region and 15 
cities under the prefectures), 68 counties (includes 62 counties and 6 autonomous 
counties) and 1000 townships and towns in 2008. For convenience, the 15 
administrative regions are selected as the spatial units to analyze the provincial 
economy and their first names are used in the following graphics and tables.     
In the provincial case of China in section 5.2.2, many indicators of Xinjiang are 
compared with other provinces. Fan (2005) discusses that Xinjiang is the only 
province in the western region that gained from a large amount of interprovincial 
migration. Xinjiang’s population increased rapidly from 4.33 million in 1949 to 21.41 
million in 2008 due to the large interprovincial in-migration since 1950. The net 
provincial migration to this province reached 926,000 from 1995 to 2000. Its national 
share changed from 0.8% in 1949 to 1.6% in 2008. Changes in population 
development in Xinjiang during the decades from 1949 to the present can be divided 
into four stages. The first stage was the developing period from 1949 to 1958. 
Xinjiang's population increased from 4.3334 million to 5.8235 million with the annual 
increase rate being 3.34%. The second stage was from 1958 to 1962 with an annual 
increase of 4.67%. The third stage was from 1962 to 1978 with an annual increase of 
3.61% and the fourth stage was from 1978 to the present, a period with a slow 
population increase. Generally speaking, the total population of Xinjiang increased 
from 4.334 million in 1949 to 21.03 million in 2000, a five-fold increase. Xinjiang is 
one of the provinces and autonomous regions with a lower population density in 
China, 13 persons per square kilometres on average. There are great differences in the 
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density of population distribution in Xinjiang. About 95% of its population is mainly 
distributed on oases which make up 3.5% of the total area of Xinjiang. Population 
density in these areas is as high as 207 persons per square kilometre. Population is 
understandably unevenly distributed (see Map 5.9). The area distribution between 
nationalities is quite obvious. The areas with multi-nationalities show all the 
characteristics of a multi-national area, and at the same time more prominently show 
that of an area inhabited by minority nationalities in a compact community. The south 
is mostly Uyghur; the central is more Chinese than Uyghur, while the north has a 
mixed population of Kazak, Uyghur and Han. 
Since 1949, the CPC has been encouraging Han settlements from China proper to 
the sparsely populated Xinjiang. This policy of population transfer is aimed at 
populating this Muslim dominated border region, reducing the minority problem 
through physical separation and creating an organized working force comprising of 
Han peasants, workers, experts and militia men. According to the inter-census data 
from 1953 to 1982 (Yuan 1990), Xinjiang ranked only second to the Heilongjiang 
province in terms of the rate of population increase (Chaudhuri, 2005). In 1945, the 
minority non-han population of the region accounted for 93.8% of the total population, 
which decreased to 59.7% in 1982, while the Han population increased to 40.3%. A 
large number of the in-migrant population has settled in the newly reclaimed areas in 
north Xinjiang and has effectively increased food grain production in the north. 
However, the growing population pressure has also created various environmental 
disorders in this water scarce region. Ninety-five percent of the population is 
concentrated in the oases of the region, which cover only 3.5% of the region’s land 
area. With only 11 persons/km2, the region ranks twenty-fourth in China, but the 
population density in the oases areas is more than 207 persons/km2 which, in terms of 
actually inhabited area, is nearly equal to that of the coastal regions. Until 1949, over 
70% of Xinjiang’s population lived in the south and only 25% of the population lived 
in the north. The change in regional population proportions is not very significant 
except Urumqi for this period 1978-2008. The population share of Urumqi has 
increased from 8.28% in 1978 to 11% in 2008. Kashgar ranks first in total population 
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and accounted for 17.7% of Xinjiang’s population while Urumqi ranks second with a 
population accounting for 11% of Xinjiand’s population in 2008 (Figure 5.69).  
 
Figure 5.69 Regional Population of Xinjiang, 1978-2008 
 
Source: 55 years statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook2009. 
 
Due to a population influx and development in the north, by 1980 its population 
had exceeded that of the south (Yuan 1990). The Han population accounted for 39.23% 
in 2008 and is concentrated in the three large cities of Urumqi, Karamay and Shihezi, 
as well as in Cangji, Bortala, Qoqek, Kumul and Bayangol prefectures far exceeding 
the minority population (Figure 5.70). The minority ethnic populations are dominant 
in Turpan, Ili, Targhabatay, Aksu, Hotan, Kashgar and Kizilsu regions. Xinjiang’s 
main minority groups are Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, Tatar, Salar, Hui, 
Mongol, Xibe, Manchu, Daur and Russian, all of which constituted 60.7% of the total 
population in 2008. In 2008, the largest ethnic group, Uyghur, accounted for about 
46.14% of the region’s population. The proportion of the Uyghur population in the 
south is still very high - in Khotan and Kashgar it is approximately 96.8% and 89% of 
the population of the respective prefectures. The Kazakh, Mongol and Kyrgyz mainly 
live in autonomous regions after their ethnic names. The majority of the region’s 
nomadic and semi-nomadic population comprised of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz 
communities and some of the Kazakh inhabited areas - Ili, Barkol and Mori - have the 
best pasture land in the region. The increase in the Han population is also responsible 
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for the rapid urbanization of the region. The proportion of non-agricultural population 
has generally increased in all regions gradually. The ethnic minority dominated 
regions have high levels of non-agricultural population while the Han-dominated 
regions have the lowest proportions of non-agricultural population. Shihezi (86%), 
Karamay (79%) and Urumqi (77%) have the highest share of non-agricultural 
population while the lower values are for Hotan (12.9%), Kashkar (19.2%), Kizilsu 
(23.3%), Aksu (28.2%) and Turpan (25.4%) (Figure 5.71). 
 
Figure 5.70 Regional Minority Population Proportion in each Region of Xinjiang, 
1978-2008 
 
Source: 55 years of statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009. 
This whole period after the establishment of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region of China in 1955 can be divided into three periods: the period of 
reconstruction (1955-1965) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1978); the period of 
reform and opening up (1979 to 2000); and Western Development Policy (from 2000 
until now).  
A balanced and equitable economic growth constituted the main objective in 
China until the reform period forward. The Kashgar centred region had had a long 
history of being open to the outside (a large trade centre) and possessed rich oasis 
farmland resources. Conditions of heat, soil, water and light are well suited to the 
needs of agricultural development in this region. So this region had a larger volume of 
agricultural production and had become an economic centre at this time. Based on the 
1949 GDP statistics, the GDP of Kashgar and Hotan Prefectures was 5.1643 
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×108Yuan, accounting for 46.97% of Xinjiang’s total GDP (Wu Yiding 2002). If the 
Kizilsu Autonomous Prefecture were added (data not available), the economic power 
would account for more than 50% of Xinjiang’ total. Its economic level and strength 
was much greater than that of any other region of Xinjiang, and it constituted an 
important economic centre of middle Asia at that time. The reason for the location of 
this original economic centre was that, in earlier times, high agricultural productivity 
and an oasis-based inner land closed economy was much more important. The bulk of 
western international trade at that time was conducted through the famous Silk Route 
which passed through the Kashkar and Hotan Region. 
 
Figure 5.71 Regional Non-Agricultural Population of Xinjiang, 1978-2008 
 
 
Source: 55 years statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009. 
 
Another more developed region was the Urumqi and Ili during this period. Ili 
and Changji had a better natural agricultural environment than any other place in 
North Xinjiang. Its climate is humid, with a plentiful rainfall, and it has extensive 
grassland resources suited to animal husbandry. Thus, this region also played an 
important role in Xinjiang’s economy before 1949. The rank of regions’ economic 
strength before 1949 was determined mainly by the volume of agricultural production. 
After the first few years of the establishment of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region in 1955, because of the great distances from the inner provinces and the 
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closed door policy in relation to neighbouring countries and poor transportation 
conditions, the traditional agriculture-based closed economy in the oasis had difficulty 
meeting the needs of an increasing population. This led to more and more farmland 
(called artificial oases) being developed to support the population. 
During the First Five Year Plan (FYP) (1953–57), total investment in fixed assets 
increased in Xinjiang, as in other parts of China, and was largely financed and 
directed by the USSR, when large-scale geological explorations were carried out and 
some important centres (such as Karamay and Urumqi) of the petroleum industry 
were set up. Throughout the fifties, the central government invested heavily in capital 
construction in Xinjiang. During this period, local army units restored the old 
transportation network and constructed new highways centred on Urumqi. By 1956, 
both countries had become involved in bitter ideological disputes that resulted in the 
complete withdrawal of Soviet economic aid and assistance to the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC). 
Following the period of reconstruction, the Cultural Revolution era lasted 10 years 
from 1966 to 1976. This was a period of political chaos, accompanied by systematic 
destruction of any type of capitalist business management, as well as other policies 
including sending urban dwellers to the countryside, known as the Rustication 
Movement. Deng Xiao-ping transformed economic policy into one of reform and 
opening the economy up to the outside world in 1978. Reforms started first in 
agriculture with the dissolution of people’s communes, while the government also 
pursued a policy of aggressively opening up to the outside world, e.g. through setting 
up special economic zones along the southern seaboard. 
As in other parts of China, the new agricultural policy and price reform was also 
introduced in Xinjiang in the early reform period. In the 1980s, the household 
responsibility contract system, poor weather and natural disasters in some areas and 
factionalism within regional leadership on the question of ideological legitimacy of 
Deng Xiaoping’s reform policy were also responsible for the bleakness of the region’s 
economy in the first few years of the reform period. Due to widespread uncertainty 
and the prevalence of a chaotic situation in the region, these policies failed to produce 
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expected results until 1983 (McMillen 1984). 
In fact, the main factor underlying the changing pattern of regional economic 
development was the differential progress of industrialization between regions. After 
Urumqi City was selected as the capital city because of the centralization policy, 
almost all of the investment centred on this region during the period. So it quickly 
became an economic, cultural, political and industrial centre for Xinjiang, and the 
industrial pattern across Xinjiang focused mainly on the Urumqi and Karamay region 
right from the very beginning. The reason was that the strategic position of Urumqi is 
more important than other frontier regions considering the interprovincial 
relationships of China and its closeness to the inner provinces on China during those 
times. Under the industrial location policy, a complete industry base in Urumqi had 
been formed initially, and another city - Karamay (meaning black oil) – was founded 
because of the discovery of abundant oil resources, turning it very rapidly into a base 
for oil exploitation and a processing centre. The industrialization of this region is what 
led to the shift in the economic centre of the province from the Kashgar region to the 
Northern region. The reason was that Urumqi city was convenient for economic 
communication with the other interior provinces of China after the founding of New 
China. With a rather distinctive geographic location, a harsh climate and great 
distances economically, it has become more and more inconvenient for the Kashghar 
region to communicate with the other regions of Xinjiang and other provinces of 
China and countries. With its traditional economy characterized by a closed oasis 
economy, and owing to the closed door policy of China after 1949, it became 
gradually left behind and could not take a leading role in the modern economy. 
The Chinese leadership in the reform period became more concerned about rapid 
economic growth and sought suitable locations for economic activities in coastal 
provinces in the east and south, rather than addressing issues of income or welfare 
differences across the country during the period of reform and opening up (1979 to 
2000). Hence with the economic reforms that started in 1978 the coastal regions 
became more prosperous than the other regions. In this process, the western region 
gradually became poorer relative to other parts of the country. The significant 
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characteristic of the western region is its demographic make-up - 70% of China’s 
minority populations are concentrated here. Therefore, the uneven development 
during the reform period mostly affected minority-populated areas, which in 1988 
constituted 74.5% of the poorest counties of China (Palmer 1997).  
In order to revitalize economic activities at the local level, the central leadership 
pursued decentralization in the early reform period. Deng Xiaoping’s policy of 
promoting growth in coastal regions during the sixth and seventh FYPs was based on 
the assumption that a spillover effect to the interior regions would be generated 
through an automatic process of technological transfers from the east. Owing to the 
policy of fiscal decentralization, the central government lost monopoly over revenue 
collection and fund allocation that made the centre less able to subsidize the minority 
regions.  
Throughout the 1980s considerable changes occurred in the relationship 
between the centre and local governments in China. In the area of the economy, local 
units enjoyed a greater scope to bargain with the centre. In the late 1980s, regional 
and provincial authorities rampantly used protectionist measures to restrict 
inter-provincial import distribution. The tenth FYP (2001–2005) specifically focuses 
on the ‘Great Opening of the West’. In 1999, the develop-the-west strategy was 
announced in China. Its purposes are not only to lessen the differences in economic 
development in the three regions, improving the functioning of the economic system, 
promoting social stability and strengthening national unity, but also for expanding 
domestic demand, stimulating economic growth and creating the conditions for the 
implementation of "the third step" in a “three-step” strategy. Policymakers hoped 
every region has an equal power and chance to participate in national economic 
activities from adjusting their spatial economic strategy and reducing differences of 
economic development, in order to promote the growth rate of their regional 
economies, and then improving the social and political stability. 
In the early 1990s, the central government paid attention to regional inequalities. 
During the eighth FYP (1991–95) period, infrastructure investment in Xinjiang 
increased from 7.3 billion yuan to 16.5 billion yuan and the region’s GDP in current 
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price doubled (Becquelin 2000). The ninth FYP (1996–2000) continued to emphasize 
reduction of regional economic disparities. Throughout these two plan periods, 
Xinjiang received billions in state subsidies and infrastructure investment.  
Despite all the difficulties, Xinjiang’s performance in economic development 
was far better and Xinjiang’s GDP grew faster in the 1990s than in the previous 
decade. In twenty-two years of reform, China’s GDP has grown at the annual rate of 
9.5%, whereas Xinjiang’s GDP rose even faster at 10.3% annually. 
During this period, Xinjiang’s regional economy has experienced five short 
sub-periods in development. Different economic development strategies for each 
sub-period played very important roles in regional economic development.  
From 1980 to 1985: Because this was the first period of the reform and opening 
up policy, regional economic development policy had not changed much from past 
central planning policy, and set out predetermined economic indicators to achieve in 
terms of objectives. During this period, the energy industry of the Tarim Basin was 
strengthened. From 1986 to 1990, a clear regional economic orientation plan was 
advanced, following the regional development strategy of “develop actively, make the 
focal [key] points stand out, forward sequentially”. The industrial status of the 
Urumqi, Karamay, Shihezi and Changji regions became strengthened. The new 
secondary industry zone of Urumqi-Karimay-Kumul began to emerge. Agriculture 
became a factor in these regions which became one of the agricultural bases in 
Xinjiang. The cropping, animal husbandry, and fruit and food processing industries 
began to be established, but cropping output was still very high, accounting for 72.15% 
of all agricultural output.  
From 1991 to 1995, the Urumqi-Karimay-Kumul region was strengthened by the 
coal, electric energy, petroleum processing, light industries and a strongly developing 
tertiary industry. The government supported the cropping and animal husbandry in the 
Kashghar, Hotan and Aksu regions, the food supplies production industry in the Ili 
region and the petroleum processing industry in the Bayingolin and Turpan region. 
Kashghar, Hotan and Aksu region only focused on the development of agriculture, so 
its secondary and tertiary sectors did not experience much development. The 
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Urumqi-Karimay and Sihezi regions developed their coloured metal processing 
industry, gold production and the fur industry. 
From 1996 to 2000, the Xinjiang Government implemented its “one black (oil), 
one white (cotton)” economic development strategy. The Kashghar, Hotan, Aksu and 
Bayingolin regions became the development centre of this strategy and developed 
very quickly. The Bayingolin region rose rapidly in the regional ranking to third place 
in 2008 from 8th place in 1990, based mainly on the new developed oil industry in 
Tarim Basin. The Urumqi-based Changji, Karamay and Shihezi region has become 
the economic belt of Xinjiang. 
Alongside regional imbalances in the economic development during the reform 
period, geographical as well as historical factors, long-term policy, a phenomenon of 
localized economic development and prosperity have also emerged as factors that 
have marginalized the minorities of Xinjiang to a great extent.  
The interregional disparity between the Han-dominated area and Minority 
dominated areas has become accentuated during this period in China. Addressing the 
problem of regional disparities and ethnic conflicts, the central government embarked 
upon the new regional development policy of the ‘West Development Strategy’ in 
1999. 
 
Figure 5.72 Regional Total Investment in Fixed Assets in Xinjiang, 
1978-2008 
 
 
Source: 55 years of statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2009. 
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The regional total investment in fixed assets in Xinjiang has concentrated in 
Urumqi, Karamay and Bayingolin since 1978 (Figure 5.72). However their 
investment proportion has gradually decreased while the investment in other regions 
has increased very slowly. This is one of the main factors causing large regional 
disparities. 
From 2001 until the present time, Xinjiang has benefited from large investment 
incomes from central and local government during the western development program. 
According to the Xinjiang development plan under the national strategy of western 
development, an amount of 900 billion Yuan in fixed assets will be invested in the 
next decade. By 2005, the region had invested more than 100 billion Yuan in seventy 
key projects, including infrastructure construction, environmental protection. In 
economic development, China's central government gave great support to Xinjiang in 
industrial distribution, infrastructure construction, finance, loan and opening up policy, 
which speeded up Xinjiang's economic development. However, Xinjiang has 
maintained the same position in national rank. In 2008, the total investment reached 
1797*108 Yuan (42.95% from central government, 57.05% from local government) 
and 60.8% of it was concentrated in secondary industry; 15.2% of the investment was 
invested in Urumqi while 12.79% and 11.82% were concentrated in Karamay and 
Bayingolin respectively. Primary industry experienced a lowering of its growth rate 
while the secondary and tertiary industry racked up a 10% growth rate for this period. 
The first rank of Urumqi was further strengthened while Karamay has followed more 
slowly. There were not many changes in the ranks of the regional economy in other 
regions during this period. Urumqi, Karamay, Bayingolin and Changji accounted for 
59.6% of Xinjiang GDP. 
 In over 50 years, Xinjiang has witnessed a drastic change in the communications 
and transport industry. Today, the Silk Road is surrounded by a road network, 
railways and airports, which has formed a completed network including land and air 
transportation lines. Roads now wind around the high Pamir and the Kunlun 
mountains and cross the Tarim and Jungghar basins. In 1963, the completion of the 
Lanxin (Lanzhou-Xinjiang) Railway connected Xinjiang with central China. A stretch 
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of 460 km was added to the western section of the Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway in 1990, 
reaching the Alatav Pass from Urumqi, thus completing the second Eurasian 
continental bridge. This meant that the new Silk Road extended to West Europe and 
places even further afield. In 1994, the Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway was 
double-tracked and opened to traffic. In 1999, the 975 km section of the Southern 
Xinjiang Railway was completed, extending from Korla to Kashgar, and plans made 
for its extension to Hotan. In 1949, Xinjiang had only several crudely built highways, 
with a total length of a mere 3,361 km, but by 2001, the region’s highways had been 
extended to 80,900 km, including 428 km of expressways, 230 km of Grade 1 
highways and 5,558 km of Grade 2 highways. The highway running through the 
Taklimakan Desert is a long-distance graded highway, the first one in the world built 
on shifting sands. Now, a highway network covers the whole region, with Urumqi as 
the centre and seven national highways as the backbone linking the region with the 
inner provinces of China to the east, the adjoining countries in Central and West Asia 
to the west and Tibet to the south. Xinjiang has 11 airports, either newly built or 
enlarged. In all, there are 92 air lines radiating from Urumqi to 65 cities in other parts 
of the country and abroad and to 12 prefectures and cities within the autonomous 
region. Now the new “Silk Road” increasingly has become an important channel for 
cultural and economic exchanges between Xinjiang and the rest of world. To satisfy 
the energy demands of China’s fast-growing coastal cities, China built a 2,600-mile 
natural gas pipeline from Bugur to Shanghai, and recently started to construct second 
pipeline. In 2005, China constructed the Kazakhstan-China cross-border oil pipeline 
which carries oil across eastern Kazakhstan into China's Xinjiang autonomous region, 
and then sent directly to China's booming east. 
Xinjiang has experienced great changes in regional development since 1950. 
Xinjiang accounts for only 1.28% of national GDP and ranked 27th in China’s 31 
provinces in 2008, while it accounted for 1.54% of national GDP and was ranked 25th 
in China’s 31 provinces in 1949.  From Figure 5.73, it can be seen clearly that the 
rank of total GDP has not changed since 1950. However, the ranks of per capita GDP 
and per capita disposable income have changed negatively in 31 provinces of China 
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even though these indicators increased at a high speed (Figure 5.74-A). 
The average growth rate of GDP reached 8.3% since 1953, 10.4% since 1979 
and 10.6% since 2001. The per capita GDP growth rate reached 5.3% for the period 
1953-2008, and 8.5% and 8.7% respectively for the periods 1979-2008 and 
2001-2008. Primary industry has not changed much while the secondary and tertiary 
industries have increased at a speed of more than 10% annually. The other indicators 
of investment, per capita disposable income, import and export have increased at an 
astounding speed in Xinjiang (Figure 5.74-B).  
 
Figure 5.73 Changes in Xinjiang's Rank, 1952-2008 
 
Source: 55 years of statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2009. 
 
Figure 5.74-A Growth Rates of Main Indicators of Xinjiang 
 
Source: 55 years of statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2009. 
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China’s trade volume with the Soviet Union through Xinjiang has dropped 
steadily since the disputes in the 1950s, and between 1961 and 1970 it declined to 
extremely low levels. China implemented a strong closed door policy for several 
decades since then. As a result, total imports and exports dropped dramatically. It has 
resumed since the opening door policy until the break-up of middle-Asia countries 
from Soviet Union. Then it dropped again and resumed once more since 2000 with 
the improvement of the trade relationship between China and these countries. The 
tertiary industry has increased faster than the secondary and third industries since 
1980 in Xinjiang.  
Figure 5.74-B Growth Rates of Main Indicators of Xinjiang during 1953-2008, 
1979-2008, 2001-2008 
 
Source: 55 years of statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook2009. 
In 1949 in Xinjiang, there was no modern industry and only a traditional 
agriculture-based economy. Agriculture accounted for 87.1% of overall GDP at that 
time. The composition of GDP in Xinjiang has changed obviously since 1978 (Figure 
5.75). The tertiary industry has increased from a share of 17.2% in 1978 to 33.9% in 
2008 while the primary industry dropped from 35.8% to 16.4% in 2008. Secondary 
industry has experienced a fall from 1978 to 1991 and then increased again to 49.7% 
in 2008 mainly due to the increase in the oil and gas extraction industry. Industry has 
increased from 37.1% to 42.6% in 2008 while the construction and other industries 
have not changed much.   
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Figure 5.75 Composition of GDP in Xinjiang, 1978-2008 
 
Source: 55 years of statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2009. 
    
The sectoral composition of the 15 regions has changed substantially. On the 
whole, primary industry has been gradually decreasing, while secondary and tertiary 
industry has been slowly increasing in importance. During the 50 year period, 
secondary industry became more important than primary industry after the 1980s (the 
beginning of China’s open-door and reform policy). The fastest change occurred in 
the Urumqi, Karamay and Bayingolin regions, especially in the primary and 
secondary industries. Karamay, Turpan, Kumul and Bayingolin have the highest value 
of secondary industries’ proportion due to oil, gas extraction industries while Shihezi 
and Altay also have a high share of secondary industry due to industry and mining 
respectively.  
 
Figure 5.76 Composition of GDP by region of Xinjiang, 2008 
 
Source: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009. 
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The other regions have the highest proportion of tertiary industry due to a weak 
secondary industry except for Urumqi. Urumqi has the lowest value in the primary 
sector while it has high proportion in secondary and tertiary sectors. Kashkar and 
Hotan have highest values in primary sectors (Figure 5.76)    
The overall production capacity of agriculture has risen notably. After 60 years of 
development and construction, and especially since the reform and opening policies 
were introduced, a complete farmland irrigation network in Xinjiang has been 
preliminarily formed, and the stock of modern farm equipment has risen. Specialty 
horticulture and crop planting have bounded forward in the past few years. Livestock 
breeding is being promoted with the use of the latest findings in agricultural science 
and technology. In addition, Xinjiang has become the largest producer of commodity 
cotton, hops and tomato sauce, and one of the major livestock breeding and beet-sugar 
producing centres in China.  
Figure 5.77 Employment by the Three Major Sectors, Xinjiang 1978-2008 
 
Source: 55 years of statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2009. 
 
Since China's economic reform and opening policy in 1978, especially since the 
implementation of China's Western Development Strategy in 2000, Xinjiang has 
witnessed a rapid development in its economy and a large adjustment in its industrial 
structure. The employment proportions of the three broad sectors have changed 
significantly since 1980 in Xinjiang. In the three decades of data on employment in 
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the industries in Xinjiang from 1978-2008, Xinjiang’s number of employed persons in 
the three major industry groups has been constantly modified. Employment in the 
tertiary industries has increased gradually while primary industry employment has 
dropped continuously since 1949. Primary, secondary and tertiary industries 
accounted for 49.71%, 14.16% and 36.13% of total employment in 2008, respectively, 
compared with 72.06%, 14.33%  and 13.61% in 1978 and compared with the data 
87.61: 7.29: 5.10 in 1949 (Figure 5.77). 
In 2008, the gross output value of farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 
was 16.4% of the region’s GDP, 66.7% of which came from farming and 27% from 
animal husbandry. The composition of total energy production in 2007 was coal at 
36.7%, petroleum crude oil at 34.7% and natural gas at 26% with water, wind and 
electricity at 2.6%. However, the composition of total energy consumption was coal at 
57.8%, petroleum crude oil at 23.9% and natural gas at 14.1%, with water, wind and 
electricity at 4.2%. The extraction of petroleum resources is considered one of the 
main economic activities for the future development of Xinjiang. In the last two 
decades, new oil and natural gas fields have been discovered in Tarim Basin, in the 
Jungghar Basin, in the Turpan-Hami Basin and in some smaller basins. According to 
the third national resource estimation report, Xinjiang’s total oil and natural gas 
reserves are about 20.92 billion tons and 10,790 billion m3 respectively 
(www.xj.gov.cn). It is clear that Xinjiang will play a dual role as a major domestic 
producer of petroleum and petro chemicals and as a transit route for Central Asian oil 
to the eastern and southern provinces of China in the twenty-first century. 
Kashgar once was the dominant regional economy with 27.84% of the total GDP 
of Xinjiang in 1949. At that time, Urumqi only accounted for 5.13% of the regional 
economy. Urumqi has increased its GDP share since 1995, reaching 22.89% in 2008. 
Karamay has increased its share of GDP since 1980 while Bayingolin raised its GDP 
proportion since 1990 with the development of the oil and gas industry of the Tarim 
basin in the Taklamakan desert (Figure 5.78). 
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Figure 5.78 The Change of Regional GDP Proportion of Xinjiang, 1949-2008 
 
 
Source: 55 years of statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2009. 
 
In terms of per capita GDP, the largest disparity of per capita GDP in 1949 was 
4.19 times between Urumqi and Kashkar (Figure 5.79). However, it increased to 
25.51 times between Karamay (100216Yuan) and Hotan (3928Yuan) due to the large 
amount of increase in oil, gas industry in Karamay. In 2008, the total investment in 
fixed assets was 229×108Yuan. But 56.7% of it was invested in mining while only 
0.13% of investment was concentrated in farming, forestry, animal husbandry and 
fishery. 
  
Figure 5.79 The Change of Regional Per Capita GDP of Xinjiang 
 
Source: 55 years of statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2009. 
   
The large regional disparities of per capita GDP have occurred since 1990; 
Karamay has advanced at a full speed while Urumqi and Bayingolin have followed at 
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a somewhat lower speed. Bayingolin surpassed Urumqi since 2005 due to the 
development of the oil and gas industry. Aksu, Hotan, Kashgar and Ili have increased 
at a very low growth rate during this period. Hotan has the lowest GDP of 3928Yuan 
in 2008. There is concern that the only the oil and gas industry contributed have 
contributed a large proportion to the regional GDP and that this is under the direct 
control of central government. Does it represent the real per capita income in this 
region? (Figure 5.79). Regional income inequality does not fully reflect personal 
income inequality. So the regional wage of staff and workers in urban area and 
regional disposable income of rural households of Xinjiang are compared from 1985 
to 2008 to more fully document regional per capita income. The wages have increased 
in all regions. The wage of staff and workers in Karamay, Urumqi and Turpan are 
higher than those in the other regions. The regional wage disparity in Xinjiang is 
much smaller than the regional per capita GDP disparity (Figure 5.80).  
 
Figure 5.80 Wages of Staff and Workers by Region in Xinjiang, 1985-2008 
 
Source: 55 years of statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2009. 
 
After six decades of development, there are still substantial disparities between 
per capita annual income of urban and rural households in Xinjiang. The ratio was 
2.68: 1 (319/119) in 1978, but it rose to 3.26: 1 in 2008 (11,432/3503Yuan). Shihezi, 
Changji and Urumqi have the highest per capita annual income for rural households 
while Hotan, Kizilsu and Kashgar have the lowest during this period (Figure 5.81). 
The rural per capita income of rural households is much lower than the per capita 
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income of urban households.  
     
Figure 5.81 Regional Disposable Income of Rural Households, Xinjiang, 
1990-2008 
 
 
    In order to fully understand the regional economic performance in Xinjiang, the 
different econometric methodologies of the Gini coefficient, Theil index, 
σ-convergence and beta convergence are calculated based on the long term data from 
1978-2008. 
Figure 5.82 Gini Coefficient, Theil Index and σ Convergence of Regional Per 
Capita GDP, 1978-2008 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data of 55 years of statistical data of Xinjiang and Xinjiang Statistical 
Yearbook, 2009. 
The Gini coefficient, Theil index and σ-convergence have decreased since 1978, 
showing the weak convergence for the whole period. However, they have different 
performance levels; the σ-convergence of regional per capita GDP indicates there is 
convergence trend for the period 1978-2003, then it begins to diverge (Figure 5.82). 
The Theil index and the Gini coefficient confirm the convergence from 1978 to 1990. 
 282
Then there is divergence until 2003.  
 
Figure 5.83 Gini Coefficient of Inequality 
Analysis for 1978:                          Analysis for 2008: 
 
 
If we compare the Lorenz curves of per capita GDP in 1978 and 2008, the 
difference can be very clearly seen (Figure 5.83). The Lorenz curve line in 1978 
(green) between the line of perfect equality (red) and the line of perfect inequality has 
approached the line of perfect equality slightly. However, it has not changed much for 
the whole period. From the regional σ-Convergence and Gini coefficients of Xinjiang, 
it can be concluded that the change of regional per capita GDP disparity is not very 
significant for the whole period. The disparity had decreased from 1978 to 1990, but 
since then has not varied much until 2004. The regional disparity has decreased again 
since 2004. 
Based on the absolute beta-convergence model 4.10 presented in Chapter 4, the 
regional beta convergence can be calculated as below:  
by regressing the average growth rate of per Capita GDP between time t
beg 
= 1978 and 
time t
end 
= 2008 on initial income at time t
beg 
= 1978 where:  
(lnY
it(end) 
– lnY
it(beg) 
) = α + βlnY
it(beg) 
+ μ
i 
(5.4)  
Here, i is the index for each region where i = 1 to 15 in Xinjiang. Time is 
indexed by t where t(beg) = 1978 and t(end) = 2008. The sample period is indexed by 
T where T = 31 years for the whole period. (The Beta Convergence rate β is 
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calculated based on β=−ln(1−β)/T.) 
lnY = natural log of real per capital income.  
α = constant term and μ
i 
= random error term. 
Model (5.4) is estimated by a non-linear version of the basic growth regression, 
for different periods: (i) the whole period 1978-2008, (ii) the first sub period 
1978-1990, (iii) the second sub-period 1991-2000 and (iv) the third sub period 
2001-2008. The regression results confirm a weak convergence with the “beta” 
coefficient being negative for the whole period 1978-2008 with an annual rate of 
0.008 (Table 5.11). But there are different outcomes for the sub-periods. For the first 
sub-period 1978-1990, there is significant convergence with an annual rate of 0.016 
while there is strong divergence for the second sub-period 1990-2000, at an annual 
rate of 0.0235. The result for the last sub period 2001-2008 confirms divergence 
with an annual rate of 0.002. 
Table 5.11: Regional Beta Convergence of Xinjiang 
Period Beta Annual Rate R  
1978-2008 -0.288701 -0.008181766 (r) = -.282305 (r2 = 0.079696) 
1978-1990 -0.234201* -0.016186446 (r) = -.58227 (r2 = 0.339039) 
1990-2000 0.228225 0.023551111 (r) = .301354 (r2 = 0.090814) 
2001-2008 0.018105 0.0020301 (r) = .079863 (r2 = 0.006378) 
Note: Significant at 5%. 
Regional spatial dependence can be handled into beta convergence by using the 
same approaches, the spatial error model (SEM), the spatial lag model (SLM) and the 
spatial cross-regressive model (SCM) in this case (see more in Chapters 2 and 4) 
(Table 5.12). 
Table 5.12 Beta Coefficient of Spatial Dependency Models 
Indicators Beta Coefficient Annual Rate  -Ln(1+b)/ T 
Periods SEM SLM SCM SEM SLM SCM 
1978-2008 -0.261644 -0.185929 -0.336686 -0.0075 -0.0055 -0.00936 
1978-1990 -0.229167 -0.188375 -0.24233 -0.01587 -0.01328 -0.01669 
1990-2000 0.229156 0.165476 0.177602 0.023661 0.016445 0.017776 
2001-2008 0.019973 -0.001305 0.019708 0.002242 -0.00014 0.002212 
Notes: Estimated for the period 1978-2008 for all models 
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The SEM, SLM and SCM models are estimated by a non-linear version of the 
basic growth regression, for the period 1978-2008. From Table 5.12, it can be clearly 
seen that the beta coefficient β<0 for the whole period in all three models. This 
indicates a weak sign of convergence in terms of regional per capita GDP at an annual 
rate of 0.0075, 00.55 and 0.00936 in the SEM, SLM and SCM models respectively. In 
the first sub period 1978-1990, there is considerable convergence apparent in all 
models. The rate of convergence is 0.01587, 0.01328 and 0.01669 respectively per 
year. However, in the second sub-period 1990-2007, there is significant convergence 
with an annual rate of 0.023661, 0016445 and 0.017776 respectively in the three 
models. The estimation results are not satisfactory nor significant for the third short 
period 2001-2008; a weak convergence exists with the SEM and SCM models at the 
different annual rates of 0.002242 and 0.002212 respectively while the SLM model 
rejects the convergence with an insignificant convergence rate of 0.00014. In terms of 
regional per capita GDP, all the results of the SEM, SLM and SCM models are similar 
with the absolute convergence value. This result is consistent with beta convergence 
and of per capita GDP except for the slight differences in the third short-period 
2001-2008.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, analyses of the broad regional, provincial and the cases of Quebec and 
Xinjiang are presented. These analyses provide an overview of the regional economic 
situation at different scales with particular attention to structural differences of both 
economies (China and Canada) based on recently released updated long-term 
statistical data in both countries. Different economic indicators were used such as 
population, GDP, employment, investment, labour force, migration, personal income 
and disposable income, annual disposable income of urban and rural households 
(China), total investment in fixed assets (China), wages, transfer payments (Canada), 
industrial composition and the contribution of the different sectors to GDP. The 
analysis was undertaken by using descriptive statistics, relative indexes and empirical 
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convergence analyses with the spatial models of SEM, SLM and SCM.   
The Canadian Economy has undergone significant change since 1950. But in 
terms of population and economic activities, the results differ greatly from region to 
region. Central Canada has been the economic core of Canada. Western Canada has 
gained both in terms of population, the regional share of GDP since 1981, with the 
rapid growth in trade with Asia which has enriched British Columbia and the creation 
of the oil wealth which has provided a major boost to Alberta and Saskatchewan. The 
changes in the cross-regional σ convergence and Gini coefficients are consistent with 
the broad trends in the Canadian economy. The analysis based on the Gini coefficient 
showed that regional disparity in Canada has not changed much since 1981. The 
analyses based on the Lorenz curves for 1961, 1981 and 2007 showed there was a 
weak convergence between Canadian regions for this period. The regional Theil index 
and the beta coefficient with β<0 showed a weak convergence for the whole period 
1961-2007. This is the reflection of steady and relatively insignificant provincial 
disparity in Canada over the long term. 
In the case of China, the Eastern Coastal Region is regarded as the core region of 
the Chinese economy with its advantageous geographic location, abundant human 
capital resources, concentration of industry, and the advantages of international 
economic relations for attracting. The Western Region on the other hand can be 
considered as a peripheral region with the disadvantages of a landlocked geographic 
location, the difficulty and costs of engaging in international economic activities even 
though some of its provinces border with other countries, its poor natural conditions 
which are generally mountainous and lacking in adequate water supplies; however, it 
does possess rich mineral, energy resources and mostly consists of minority ethnic 
peoples. Between these two regions lies the Central Region.  
The Coastal Region has diverged significantly with respect to the other two 
regions since 1980. The trend lines of the Regional Weighted and Unweighted σ 
convergence, the Theil Index and the Gini Coefficient for China have the same 
trajectory (in terms of the temporal patterns) and show the consistency of regional 
divergence for the whole period for the whole economy. The trajectories of the Lorenz 
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curve and the beta coefficient show there is weak divergence for the whole period 
1961-2007.  
Based on the long term data, provincial differences changed significantly for 
many indicators in Canada after 1960. But geographic unevenness remains across the 
country. Significant changes have occurred in Ontario, Quebec, Alberta and British 
Colombia. Ontario has almost retained the 40% level of total national GDP, while 
Alberta and British Colombia have increased their national GDP share while Quebec 
has seen a decrease in its total GDP share. Provincial industrial composition differs 
greatly in Canada. The majority of recent immigrants have settled in Ontario. The 
three most recent decades of development in Ontario, Alberta and British Colombia 
have seen these provinces attract more international and interprovincial migrants than 
Quebec and other provinces.  
Provincial disparity in China is larger than the regional disparity. National 
income and population were distributed unevenly between provinces. Provincial 
disparity has clearly emerged since the 1980s. Most employment is concentrated in 
the broad primary sector, mainly in agriculture. Living standards are actually 
improving in Central and Western China, but at a much slower rate than in the east 
as a result of large regional disparities. In relative terms, it reflects Myrdalian 
dynamics of cyclical cumulative causation with spatial core-prephery inequalities.. 
Quebec's abundance of natural resources gives it a favorable position in the 
national global economy. Quebec accounts for almost a fifth of the Canadian economy. 
Over the last decade, Quebec has had a strong economic performance while 
experiencing a gradual shrinkage of its national share. Variations in per capita income 
and economic structure among the administrative regions of Quebec demonstrate 
clearly the province’s core-periphery spatial structure. Each administrative region 
differs from the others with regards to its geography, natural resources, inhabitable 
land, economy and industrial activities. In Quebec, the Montreal region has dominated 
Quebec’s economy. The σ-Convergence of regional per capita GDP of Quebec has 
converged slowly from 1998 to 2003, and then it experienced a slight divergence 
between 2003 and 2008. The SEM, SLM and SCM models showed a weak 
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convergence of regional per capita disposable income.  
The natural, ethnic, economic and territorial landscapes combine in layers to 
make up the complex and diverse landscape of Xinjiang. In fact, the main factor 
underlying the changing pattern of regional economic development has been due to 
the differential progress of industrialization between regions, a number of 
geographical as well as historical factors, long-term policy, and a phenomenon of 
localized economic development and prosperity which have also emerged as factors 
that have marginalized the minorities of Xinjiang to a great extent. After six decades 
of development, there is still substantial disparity between per capita annual income 
of urban and rural households in Xinjiang. The Gini coefficient, the Theil index and 
the σ-convergence and “beta” coefficients confirm a weak convergence for the whole 
period 1978-2008. The SEM, SLM and SCM models indicate a weak convergence 
and all the results are significantly consistent with the σ-Convergence. It is clear that 
Xinjiang will be become a new economic growth centre in western China in the near 
future due to its rich resources, ethnic composition and its economic and political 
status in China. 
The next chapter, Chapter 6, treats the urban case of the two metropolitan 
centres of Montreal and Urumqi.  
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Chapter 6 
The Urban Case 
 
 
In this Chapter, after briefly dealing with the national, regional and provincial scales 
of analysis, emphasis is then placed on a smaller unit of analysis – Montreal in 
Quebec and Urumqi in Xinjiang which are selected as the metropolitan cases for 
comparison as the ‘core’ regions of their respective provinces. 
    The rapid increase of urban population in less developed countries and the 
changing demographic structures in more developed countries represent one of the 
world's most important challenges. According to the United Nations Population Fund, 
in 2008 the world achieved an urbanization milestone, with 3.3 billion people, more 
than half the world’s peoples, then living in cities. The world's urban population now 
exceeds the world's rural population. 
The world’s urban population will grow from 2.86 billion in 2000 to 4.98 billion 
by 2030, of which high-income countries will account for only 28 million of the 
expected increase of 2.12 billion. The world’s annual urban growth rate is projected to 
be 1.8% in contrast to the rural growth rate of 0.1%; and about 60% of the world’s 
population will live in cities (UN-HABI1 2004). Urban-based economic activities 
account for more than 50% of GDP in all countries, and up to 80% in more urbanized 
countries in Latin America, and even more in Europe (Tan vom Hove 2004).  
The urban system in most countries is influenced by market forces. Cities that 
produce goods and services that are in demand and attract people to live in them tend 
to have faster growth than those that do not. In most countries, government generally 
has had little direct influence on the development of the urban system. Since World 
War II, and especially in the past two decades, urban systems in western countries 
have been influenced by regional shifts in production as a result of the restructuring of 
the economy (Wallace 2002). 
 
6.1 The Urban System in Canada and China 
 
Cities play a very important role in countries with large territories because they are 
linked to urban population increase, centralization and distribution of economic 
                                                              
1 UN-HABI (2004/05), http://www.unhabitat.org/ 
289 
 
activities. They are the economic engines of a territory. Economic outputs are mostly 
based in cities in both China and Canada. However, there are important differences in 
their urban systems, urban size, distribution, definitions, and in their number and 
regional distribution between Canada and China due to differences in population size 
and economic activities (Map 6.1). In Canada, most cities are concentrated in the 
south, a short distance from the US, while in China the cities are strongly 
concentrated in the eastern coastal area, with an inland extension along the Yangtze 
and Yellow Rivers. It has been argued that rapid urbanization has been a characteristic 
of many developing countries in recent decades. Furthermore, urbanization is closely 
related with rural change and development. Generally, urbanization in China has 
experienced a higher growth rate than that of Canada.  
Map 6.1 The Distribution of Population of Canada and China 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated based on MapInfo 8.0 data source. 
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Based on the statistics2 of the 50 richest cities and/or their metropolitan areas in 
the world by GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP), there are two Canadian 
metropolitan areas listed. Toronto CMA ranks 22nd with a GDP of $253 billion and a 
population of 5.16 million, while Montreal CMA ranks 41st with a GDP of $148 
billion and a population of 3.216 million. There are three Chinese cities on this list. 
Shanghai ranks 25th with a GDP of $233 billion and a population of 12.63 million, 
Beijing ranks 38th with a GDP of $166 billion and a population of 10.85 million and 
Guangzhou ranks 44th with a GDP of $143 billion and a population of 8.5 million. 
Despite its vast territory and smaller population, Canada is one of the most highly 
urbanized nations in the world. Cities play a unique role in Canada, and most 
Canadians live and work in cities. Canada’s urban regions have been growing 
relatively fast. In 1961, about 50% of Canadians lived in large cities of 100,000 
residents or more (Census Metropolitan Areas - CMA). By 2001, this had grown to 
64%. The urbanization rate reached 80% in 2008, and has increased in all provinces 
(Figure 6.1). However, the rate of urbanization differs greatly between provinces. 
Ontario, British Colombia, Alberta and Quebec have the highest urbanization rates 
(85%, 85%, 82% and 80% respectively) while Nunavut, Prince Edward Island, New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia have the lowest urbanization rates (Nunavut 43%, 45%, 
51%, and 56% respectively). Among them, Alberta has the highest rate of 
urbanization. It ranked 7th with a 48% urbanization rate in 1951, and second in 2006 
with an urbanization rate of 82%. 
 
Figure 6.1 Provincial Urbanization Rates, Canada, 1901-2006 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Population, 1851 to 2006. 
                                                              
2 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009) 
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In Canada, the major urban areas are divided into Census Metropolitan Areas 
(CMAs) or Census Agglomerations (CAs). A CMA is an area consisting of one or 
more adjacent municipalities situated around a major urban core. A CMA must have a 
population of at least 100,000, and the urban core must have a population of at least 
50,000. The urban core is a large urban area around which the boundaries of a CMA 
or CA are defined. An urban area is an area with a population of at least 1,000 and no 
fewer than 400 persons/km2, and rural areas are the residual..  Canada currently has 
33 CMAs, up from 27 in 2001. The eight largest CMAs, in descending order by 
population size, are Toronto, Montréal, Vancouver, Ottawa-Gatineau, Calgary, 
Edmonton, Québec City, and Winnipeg (Turcotte 2008)3.  
The term ‘metropolitan’ is a new concept to China. In China, its urban system is 
more complicated due to its large population. There are three types of cities: a 
municipality as a provincial-level division (e.g. Shanghai, Beijing); a prefecture-level 
city which is governed by provinces or autonomous regions; and a county-level city 
which is a sub-unit of a prefecture-level administrative division. Due to the 
complexity of the administrative divisions, sometimes the difference between the 
administrative units in China called municipalities and what are real cities causes 
ambiguity. The criteria of designation have changed in different time-periods, 
reflecting prevailing urbanization policy, economic development and political 
ideologies. After 1949, there were no formal criteria for defining and establishing 
cities. As a result, many cities were established. To control the rapid increase in the 
number of cities, the State Council passed the "Decision on the Establishment of City 
and Town Government" in June 1955 (Ministry of Civil Affairs 1986: 461-464). 
Population size and economic and defence significance became the main criteria for 
granting city status. Urban centres with a population of more than 100,000 could be 
granted city status, whereas those of less than 100,000 could be granted city status 
only if they were an important industrial or mining base, the home of provincial 
institutes, a large market town or if they an important urban centre on the border. 
Cities established before 1955 that did not meet these criteria were to be downgraded 
from cities to towns. These criteria were used until 1963, when the State Council 
                                                              
3 For more details, please visit the following Web page:  
http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/reference/dictionary/geo009a.cfm  
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decided that there were too many cities in China. In some cases, the mainly rural 
population of a city's suburban districts was much larger than the population in its 
urban district. To correct for abuse of the population criterion, the State Council 
announced the "Instruction on the Adjustment of the Establishment of City and Town 
Government and the Reduction of the Areas of City Suburban Districts" in December 
1963 (Ministry of Civil Affairs 1986: 464-468). The proportion of agricultural 
population in a city was not to exceed 20%. If it was over 20%, it had to be reduced. 
These criteria for granting city status continued until 1978. They were relaxed after 
1978 to meet the demand for rapid economic development of the open policy and the 
concomitant changes in the characteristics of cities. The definition of urban 
population has been very problematic in China, particularly in 1983 when many 
counties were abolished and turned into cities and in 1984 when many townships were 
abolished and turned into towns (Chan and Xu 1985; Ma and Cui 1987). In 1983, a 
new set of criteria for granting city status were used internally by the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs. These criteria were finally formally adopted in April 1986 in the "Notice on 
the Report of the Adjustment of the Criteria of Establishing City Government and the 
Conditions for City Governing County" (Ministry of Civil Affairs 1986: 470-472). 
Compared with the previous criteria, more emphasis was given to the employment 
structure and economic development of the urban centre rather than to population size. 
An urban centre could be granted city status if it had a non-agricultural population of 
over 60,000 with an annual GNP of 200 million Yuan and had become an important 
economic centre. 
Before the adoption of the open policy in 1978, the Chinese government played 
an important role in urban system development. The ability of the government to exert 
a strong influence on urban development was mainly through population control and 
resource allocation. A household registration (hukou) system was established in 1954 
to stop unauthorized migration from the countryside to the cities and uncontrolled 
growth of large cities. With population control and resource allocation, the Chinese 
government was remarkably successful in shaping the urban system according to its 
public policy and ideology. The growth of large cities was successfully curtailed, 
small towns were developing rapidly, and cities and city population were successfully 
shifted from the coast to interior and border locations. This was the result of a 
centrally controlled government. 
Politics and public policy were the two most important factors shaping urban 
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development in China (Lo 1987). The centralization policy has greatly helped the 
formation of a large city in each of China’s provinces. Politics and public policy 
exerted a strong influence over the growth of the urban population (Xu 1984), urban 
system development (Xu 1984), city system development (Yeh and Xu 1990), the 
provincial distribution of the urban population (Yeh and Xu 1984) and interprovincial 
migration (Fan 2005). However, the importance of government’s role in shaping 
urban development has been reduced since the adoption of economic reforms and the 
open policy in 1978. Fan (2005) pointed out that the relaxation of migration controls 
in China since the 1980s has become a more effective factor of population 
redistribution and regional development. The recent and substantial surge in mobility 
in China signals that migration is playing an increasingly central role in shaping its 
demographic and economic landscape. 
Figure 6.2 Population Change of Census Metropolitan Areas:Canada 
1996-2008 
  
 
Source: Census of Canada 2006; Data for 1996 comes from Iain Wallace (2002). Data for 2008 comes 
from CANSIM, table (for fee) 051-0046 and Catalogue. 
 
Like many other industrialized countries, Canada is a very highly urbanized nation. 
Canada’s metropolitan areas are significantly distributed in regions that border the 
United States, particularly the southern parts of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia. 
In 2006, just over 80% of the population lived in urban areas, and roughly two-thirds 
of Canadians lived in Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA). Over three quarters of 
Canadians in 1996 resided in the 137 urban places of 10,000 inhabitants or more 
(McCann and Simmons 2000). Over a third (34.8%) of the total population resides in 
the three largest metropolitan areas of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver (11,553,000), 
53.27% of the population lives in the top 10 Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) and 
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68.5% of the population lives in the top 33 Metropolitan Areas (Statistic Canada 2009) 
in 2008. In Canada’s economy, the service sector plays a substantial role in the 
development of the national economy. It can be seen that the majority of Canadians 
live and work in towns and cities, and a large percentage of national economic output 
is based on these urban centres. There are six cities with a population over million in 
Canada, and they constituted 45% of Canadian population in 2008. They are Toronto 
(Ont.), Montréal (Que.), Vancouver (B.C.), Ottawa-Gatineau (Ont.-Que.), Calgary 
(Alta.) and Edmonton (Alta). There are 42 cities in Canada with populations of over 
100,000. 
 
In terms of CMA population change in Canada between 1996 and 2008, Calgary 
(43.8%), Oshawa 32.5%), Hamilton (31.3%) and Sherbrooke (30.2%) have the 
highest rate of population increase over that period, while Thunder Bay (-1.11%) and 
Saint-John (-0.16%)) (Figure 6.2). Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver also have high 
rates of increase of population 29.7%, 28.4% and 23.4% respectively during this 
period due to the large number of immigrants they have received in recent years. 
 
Figure 6.3 Labour Force Characteristics by CMA 
 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table (for fee) 282-0053 and Catalogue no 71-001-PIB 
 
In addition, in terms of labour force characteristics of the population 15 years 
and older by CMAs in Canada, the fastest growing CMAs have higher participation 
and employment rates and lower unemployment rates. For example, Calgary (77.1%, 
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74.4%, and 3.5%), Ottawa-Gatineau (73.3%, 69.7%, and 4.8%), Edmonton (73%, 
70.3% and 3.7) and Saskatoon (73.3%, 70.2% and 4 %) have the highest rates of 
labour force participation rates and employment rates and the lowest unemployment 
rates respectively. Windsor and Saguenay have the highest unemployment rates of 9.3% 
and 8.5% respectively in 2008 (Figure 6.3). 
Census Metropolitan Areas with a population of more than 500,000 accounted 
for more than half of Canada’s population. Of the 19% of Canadians living in rural 
areas, close to two-thirds were living in an area subject to the strong or moderate 
influence of one of Canada’s metropolitan areas. Thus, 60% of the rural population 
was living in areas in which at least 5% of the employed labour force was commuting 
on a daily basis to the city for work purposes. Thus, less than 8% of Canada’s 
population in 2006 was living in areas where direct metropolitan influence was low or 
non-existent. In 2006, more than four immigrants out of five (85%) choose to settle in 
Quebec, Ontario or British Columbia. Ontario alone received half of Canada’s 
newcomers in 2006, whereas the demographic weight of that province was less than 
40%. This situation is a result of the strong concentration of Canadian immigration in 
the country’s most urbanized areas. Indeed, the propensity of newcomers to settle in 
Toronto, Montreal or Vancouver is a major factor in the differential growth among the 
various provinces and territories. In 2006, immigrants to Canada were strongly 
concentrated in the country’s largest urban areas. In the 2006 Census, 81% of recent 
immigrants (i.e. those who arrived in the 10 years preceding the census) were living in 
Canada’s six largest urban areas. In 1981, 70% of all recent immigrants were living in 
these same six large cities, i.e. 11 percentage points less than in 2006. The 
concentration is especially strong in Canada’s three largest metropolitan areas, viz. 
Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal, which in 2006 were home to 70% of recent 
immigrants. The Toronto Census Metropolitan Area alone accounted for more than 41% 
of all recent immigrants to Canada4. 
On the other hand in China, most of the largest cities are distributed in the 
eastern coastal portion of the country. China has large numbers of cities because of its 
huge population. In 2008, there are 651 cities in China (which includes 283 prefecture 
level cities and 368 county level cities). The distribution of prefecture level cities and 
county level cities in the three broad regions is 34.63% and 44.03% in the Eastern 
                                                              
4 Canadian Demographics at a Glance, Catalogue no. 91-003-X, Minister of Industry, 2008, Statistic 
Canada. 
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Provinces, 35.69% and 33.97% in central provinces, and 29.68% and 22.01% in the 
Western provinces respectively.  Most of these cities have a population of over 
million, but the urbanization rate of China was only 45.7% in 2008, with therefore 
54.3% of its population living in rural areas.  
A lack of large and medium sized cities helps us understand the urbanization gap 
between regions. China has a population of 1.3219 billion but with 188 cities with a 
population size of one million and above, they only contain 27.38% of the national 
total population and 58.43% of the national urban population. Most of the cities are 
distributed in the high population density area in the eastern coastal provinces. There 
are 13 cities population of over 4 million, and 27 cities with a population of between 2 
million and 4 million, 148 cities with a population from 1 million to 2 million, 272 
cities with a population from 500,000 to 1 million, and 190 cities with a population 
from 100,000 to 500,000. Uneven urban development across different regions, and in 
particular, the widening wealth gap between urban and city residents is another issue 
of great concern.  
 
Figure 6.4 Provincial Urbanization Rate of China, 2008 
 
 
Source: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009. 
 
During the last few decades, urbanization in China has been accelerating. The rate of 
urbanization measured by the proportion of urban population in total has grown from 
17.9% in 1978 to 45.7% in 2008, a 27.8 percentage points increase. However, due to 
the institutional constraint inherited from the planned economy and the hukou system, 
the rate of urbanization in China is lower than not only the developed economies but 
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also other economies at the same level of development. There are also great 
disparities between the eastern, central and western provinces. Their proportion of 
urbanization is 60%, 46% and 36% respectively in 2007. The central and west regions 
have thus lagged behind in the process of urbanization. In 1982, the gap between the 
east and the west was 7.5 percentage points, growing to 24 percentage points in 2007. 
The provincial urbanization rate also differs greatly in China. Three of the four 
municipalities which are controlled directly by the central government, Beijing, 
Tianjin and Shanghai, have the highest urbanization rates of 84.9%,77.2% and 88.6% 
respectively while Tibet, Guizhou and Gansu have the lowest urbanization rates of 
22.6%, 29.1% and 32.15% respectively (Figure 6.4). Ravallion and Chen (2007) 
pointed out that almost one quarter of China’s poverty reduction over 1981-2001 can 
be attributed to urbanization of the population, even holding poverty measures 
constant in both urban and rural areas. It can be seen that urbanization has become a 
vehicle of economic growth of China since the economic reform of China. 
The largest 5 CMAs of Canada have raised their GDP continuously since 1997. 
Toronto raised its GDP faster than the others. These 5 Canadian CMAs have 
maintained a steady national share of GDP since 1998 with a slight increase from 29% 
to 31.2%. Calgary has increased its national GDP share while Montreal has gradually 
seen a decrease in its national share from 7.48 in 1998 to 7.19% in 2008 (Figure 6.5).   
Figure 6.5 GDP Change of 5 CMAs of Canada, 1997 - 2008 
 
    
Source: Calculated based on over 10 years of data released by the Conference Board of Canada, 
Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal (2010). 
 
Urban-based economic activities are highly concentrated in urban areas 
(naturally!) and account for most part of corresponding regional GDP. But the 
concentration rate differs greatly in both countries. The concentration of the 
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population and economic activities in cities is more pronounced in Canada than in 
China. This concept is consistent with the urban case of China where, for instance, the 
western poor provinces have higher concentrations of their population in their 
provincial capital cities in contrast to the eastern and central provinces.  
 In Canada, most of the CMAs have a leading share of GDP in their provinces. 
In 2006, the study of the Conference Board of Canada, “Canada’s Hub Cities: A 
Driving Force of the National Economy”, identifies eight economically-leading large 
cities that function as ‘hub cities’ for their province - Vancouver, Calgary and 
Edmonton, Regina and Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto and Montreal - and a ninth city, 
Halifax, that functions as a hub city for the Atlantic provinces. They released data for 
the hub cities and their provincial GDP shares; thus, Toronto accounted for 44% of 
Ontario's GDP and 18% of Canada’s GDP, and Winnipeg, Vancouver and Montréal 
accounted for 65%, 53.2% and 49% of their respective provincial GDPs. Calgary and 
Edmonton combined accounted for 64% of Alberta's GDP. Regina and Saskatoon 
combined account for 44.7% of Saskatchewan's GDP. Halifax is added as a hub city 
because it accounts for 46.3% of Nova Scotia's GDP5. 
 
Figure 6.6 National and Provincial GDP Share of Major Cities of China, (%) 
2007 
 
Source: China City Statists 2008. 
 
In China, the strong influence of government on urban development and the long 
term centralization of Chinese policy have helped the concentration of urban 
economic activities into the cities directly controlled by the state and provincial 
capital cities.  
                                                              
5 http://www.citymayors.com/politics/canada_hubs.html ; http://www.canadascities.ca/.   
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The four cities directly controlled by the state and the other 27 capital cities of 
China, account for 30.4% of national GDP. Among them, the four cities of Shanghai 
(4.42%), Beijing (3.39%), Tianjin (1.83%) and Chongqing (1.5%) that are directly 
controlled by the state, accounted for 11.14% of national GDP in 2007. In addition, 
Guangzhou City accounts for 2.58% of national GDP. In the share of provincial GDP 
accounted for by provincial capital cities, most of the provincial capital cities 
accounted for more than 20% of their provincial GDP. The capital cities of the 
western provinces and the traditional industrial base of the easternmost northern 
provinces have the highest GDP share - Yinchuan (45%, Ningxia Province), Xining 
(43%, Qinghai Province), Changchun (39.5%, Jilin Province) and Lhasa (35.6%, 
Tibet). The lowest GDP share of 9.87% is attributed to Jinan city in Shandong 
Province. It can be seen that the western provinces have higher GDP concentration 
rates than those of China’s central and eastern provinces (Figure 6.6). 
   Another way of looking at the role cities play in the regional economy is to 
compare the distribution of per capita income. In Canada, a frequently used indicator 
is the median family income of CMAs. Seychuk (2005) using this indicator measured 
the urban-rural income gap of Canadian provinces in 2001. He concluded that Ontario 
had the highest family income and also the highest CMA median income, Alberta had 
the highest rural median income of $47,500 and Oshawa had the highest median 
family income in 2001 in Canada6. 
In Figure 6.7, the median family income of major CMAs is compared for the 
period from 2002 to 2006. Ottawa–Gatineau (Ont. part), Oshawa (Ont.), Windsor 
(Ont.) and Calgary (Alta.) had the highest median family income of $73,400, $70,300, 
$67,100 and $66,700 respectively, while Trois-Rivières (Que.) and Sherbrooke (Que.) 
had the lowest median family income of $49,400 and $50,800 respectively in 2002. 
Calgary still led the ranking with a median family income of $83,500. In 2006. 
Ottawa-Gatineau (Ont. part), Edmonton (Alta.) and Oshawa (Ont.) had the highest 
median family income of $84,000, $79,300 and $78,900 respectively while 
Trois-Rivières (Que.) and Sherbrooke (Que.) still had the lowest median family 
income of $57,000 and $56,900 respectively in 2006. The disparity between the 
highest and the lowest median family income was $24,000 in 2002; it increased to 
$27,100 in 2006. 
                                                              
6 Available on the internet at: www.rbc.com/economics 
300 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Median Family Income by Census Metropolitan Area ($), 2002-2006 
 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table (for fee) 111-0009. 
Mittelstaedt (2010) assessed the disparity between the richest and the poorest and 
found that Oakville, Ont., has the highest income per person at $40,311, nearly double 
the bottom ranking figures of less than $22,000 in the Quebec cities of Trois-Rivières 
and Sherbrooke7.  
All of Canada’s metropolitan regions have been affected by the current recession. 
Montreal and Toronto, for example, have been hard hit by deteriorating world trade 
and major corporate restructurings. Regions in Western Canada have faced declines in 
raw materials prices, which have not only reversed the earlier wealth effect, but have 
also led to delays and cancellations of major private investments in the energy sector. 
With the exception of Ottawa, which will likely record very modest economic growth 
(+0.2%), it was expected that the economies of other metropolitan regions would  
likely shrink, including Toronto (-1.6%), Vancouver (-0.9%) and Montreal (-0.5%) in 
20098.  
In contrast, almost all the cities in China saw very rapid increases in population 
and GDP in recent years. The smaller cities had high growth rates while the larger 
cities had lower growth rates. The average GDP growth rate for the prefecture level of 
cities in China was 15.17% in 2007. The fastest one is Qingyuan City (Guangdong) 
                                                              
7 Martin Mittelstaedt, “Going Places? Big Cities aren’t best”, Globe and Mail, Jan 14,2010, A4 
8 Sources: Conference Board of Canada and Desjardins Economic Studies, www.desjardins.com/economie 
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which had a rate of 32.9% while Hengshui City (Hebei) had the lowest rate at 3.6% in 
2007. Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou had a growth rate of 14.3%, 13.3% and 14.9% 
respectively (Figure 6.8). 
 
Figure 6.8 GDP Growth Rates of Some Cities of China, 2007 
 
 
Source: China City Statists 2008. Note: In the figure, only the top 30 cities are listed. 
 
 GDP, per capita GDP, per capita disposable income of urban households or 
average wages of staff and workers in urban area are key indicators for measuring 
urban income distribution in China. Shanghai ($174 billion), Beijing ($134 billion) 
and Guangzhou ($102 billion) are the top three cities by total GDP in 2007 (Figure 
6.9). These three cities accounted for 10.4% of national GDP. They had been the key 
players in the development of the Chinese economy with Guangzhou being the 
manufacturing hub for China as well as the logistics hub for Hong Kong, Shanghai 
being China's commercial and service hub and Beijing gaining in status as the 
political hub. 
Figure 6.9 The GDP Comparison of Cities in China 
 
 
Source: China City Statists 2008. Note: In the figure, only the top 30 cities are listed. 
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In terms of per capita GDP by cities in China, Karamay (Xinjiang) had the 
highest value of $14,134 (98938Yuan) due to the oil industry while Dingxi (Gansu) 
the lowest per Capita value $485 (3398 Yuan), the disparity reached 29.1 times 
among prefecture level cities in China in 2007. Guangzhou ranked 7th with per capita 
GDP $10,258 while Shanghai and Beijing ranked 9th and 16th with per capita GDP of 
$9,481 and $8,314 respectively (Figure 6.10). 
Figure 6.10 Per Capita GDP of Some Cities in China 
 
 
Source: China City Statists 2008. Note: In the figure, only the top 30 cities are listed. 
The average wage of staff and workers in urban area is $3,558 (24,909 Yuan) in 
2007. If all 651 cities of the prefecture level and county level are compared by the 
average annual wage of staff and workers, there are 109 cities that are above the 
average wage level while the others are below it. Most urbanized areas have the 
highest average annual wage of staff and workers. Shanghai had the highest wage of 
$7044 while Wuchang City had the lowest wage of $186.5. The disparity is 37.7 times. 
Lhasa City is the only exception being ranked second with the highest wage level of 
$6707 due to its small population and large government contribution to the average 
annual wage of official staff and workers.  
     Another way of looking at urban-rural relationships is by stressing regional 
disparities – between urban areas and rural areas. Here the evidence shows quite 
clearly that the urban-rural gap in China is generally far more marked than for Canada. 
Urban regions have a higher income per capita than rural regions nationally and 
provincially in Canada. During the period from 1980 to 2000, the rural-urban gap at 
the Canada level has ranged from -$4073 (in 1980) to -$4370 (in 2000) as shown in 
Figure 6.11. It seems that the urban-rural disparity has been quite steady during this 
period in Canada. There were different rural-urban per capita income gaps across the 
provinces, ranging from -$2214 in Newfoundland to -$4690 in Manitoba (in 1980) 
and from -$2040 in New Brunswick to -$5273 in Nova Scotia in 2000.  
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Figure 6.11 Urban-Rural Per Capita Income Disparity of Canada, 1980-2000 
(1995$) 
 
 
Source: Calculated based on the data of Vik Singh (2002), Rural and Small Town Canada Analysis 
Bulletin Catalogue no. 21-006-XIE, Statistics Canada and Chalifoux et al (2004), Industry Canada.  
Note: PEI is not included in per capita income in urban regions due to it being designated as a 
predominantly rural region. 
 
    Nova Scotia and Alberta had the largest rural-urban gaps in per capita incomes of 
-$4654 and -$4690 respectively in 1980 and -$5273 and $4517 respectively in 2000 
again. The rural-urban income disparity is the smallest within New Brunswick and 
Newfoundland in 1980 and within Newfoundland and British Colombia in 2000. 
In 1980, British Colombia had the highest rural per capita income of $17,382 
while Newfoundland had the lowest rural per capita income of $10,376. Meanwhile 
Alberta had the highest urban per capita income of $21,060 while Newfoundland had 
the lowest urban per capita income of $12,590. The highest urban-rural gap was 
$10,684 (proportion 0.51) between Alberta and Newfoundland in 1980. In 2000, 
Ontario and Alberta had the highest rural per capita income of $19,710 and $19,144 
respectively and the highest urban per capita income of $23,771 and $23,661 
respectively in 2000. The highest urban-rural gap was $9502 (proportion 0.6) between 
Ontario and Newfoundland. It can be seen that the urban-rural gap has increased 
slightly in Canada since 1980.  If it is compared for the whole period, it has not 
changed much however (Figure 6.11). 
The urban-rural gap in China has been significant since 1978. There were smaller 
disparities of per capita disposable income of urban and rural households in 1978 in 
China. Shanghai (281Yuan), Beijing (225 Yuan), Guangdong (193 Yuan) and 
Liaoning (185 Yuan) had the highest per capita disposable income of rural households 
while Gansu (101 Yuan), Ningxia (115 Yuan), Henan (105 Yuan) and Shanxi (101 
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Yuan) had the lowest values. The largest disparity was 2.8 between Shanghai and 
Gansu in 1978. If the provinces are compared by per capita disposable income of 
urban households, Guangdong (412 Yuan), Shanghai (406 Yuan), Shandong (391 
Yuan), Beijing (365 Yuan) and Tianjin (388 Yuan) had the highest values while 
Guizhou (261 Yuan), Shanxi (301 Yuan) and Inner Mongolia (301 Yuan) had the 
lowest values of urban income in 1978. The largest disparity of per capita disposable 
income of urban households was 1.58 between Guangdong and Guizhou. The largest 
urban-rural gap of disposable income was 4.08 between Gunagdong and Gansu, while 
the ratio of national per capita disposable urban-rural income was 2.56 in 1978. This 
has increased continuously in China since 1980.  
Despite the three decades of fast growth of its economy after 1980, China still 
suffers from a considerable disparity between rural and urban areas. Shanghai (23,622 
Yuan), Beijing (21,988 Yuan), Zhejiang (20,573 Yuan), Guangdong (17,699 Yuan) and 
Jiangsu (16378 Yuan) had the highest values of per capita disposable income of urban 
households while Gansu (10,022 Yuan), Qinghai (10,276 Yuan), Xinjiang (10,313  
Figure 6.12 Annual Per-Capita Disposable Income of Urban& Rural Households 
(Yuan) 
 
  
305 
 
 
Source: Calculated based on China Statistical Yearbooks 2008 and 55 years statistical Yearbook 
 
Yuan) and Ningxia (10,859 Yuan) had the lowest values of per capita disposable 
income of urban households in 2007. In terms of per capita disposable income of rural 
households, Shanghai (10,144 Yuan), Beijing (9439 Yuan), Zhejiang (8265 Yuan) and 
Tianjin (7010 Yuan) had the highest values while Guizhou (2374 Yuan), Gansu (2328 
Yuan), Qinghai (2683 Yuan) and Yunnan (2634 Yuan) had the lowest values in 2007. 
The largest urban-rural gap was a factor of 10.14 times between Shanghai (23,622 
Yuan) and Gansu (2328 Yuan), while the ratio of national per capita disposable 
urban-rural income was 3.32 in 2007.  
The official data also demonstrate the striking urban-rural income gap in China. 
The income ratio between urban and rural residents was 3.33:1, which means that city 
dwellers' average incomes were 3.33 times greater than the average for farmers (rural 
residents). In 2008, the ratio was 3.31:1. In comparison, the income ratio was 2.56:1 
in 1978 when city dwellers' average incomes stood at 343 Yuan while that of farmers 
was 134 Yuan, based on Ma Jiantang (Director of the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS)) said9. The government figures also showed the net per capita income in urban 
China in 2009 was the equivalent of $2890 Canadian and in rural areas it was just 
                                                              
9 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/columnist/2009-08/12/content_8560816.htm 
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$79010. This high ratio data shows that the income gap between rural and urban areas 
is significant and that the income gap between rural and urban residents has kept 
growing in the past three decades and China has become one of the countries with the 
largest urban-rural gaps in the world. 
 
6.2 Urban Areas in Quebec and the Case of Montreal 
 
In section 6.1, Canada and China were compared in terms of their urban systems, 
urban size distribution, urban definitions, the number of cites by hierarchical level and 
their regional distribution and urban income in a national context, and urban-rural 
income gap in order to better analyze the selected smaller units of analysis, Montreal 
in Quebec and Ürümqi in Xinjiang, the metropolitan cases that represent the ‘core’ 
regions of their respective provinces. There are 6 CMAs in Quebec - Montréal, 
Quebec, Gatineau, Sherbrook, Saguenay and Trois-Rivières. Earlier in this chapter, 
these CMAs were compared with the other CMAs in Canada on the basis of 
population change, median family income and labour force characteristics. Variations 
in total income and per capita income, net migration and economic structure among 
the administrative regions in Quebec demonstrated clearly the province’s 
core-periphery structure.  
The dominance of Montreal reflects its strategic location at what were, until the 
opening of the St Lawrence Seaway in 1959, the head of ocean navigation and the 
focus of valley corridors linking the city to New York, the Great Lakes, and via the 
Ottawa Valley, to the Canadian West. It developed as an archetypal gateway city 
(Burghardt 1971), with major transportation and wholesaling functions that paved the 
way for an emergent diversified manufacturing sector. Until the 1950s, it was 
Canada’s largest city, financial hub and foremost industrial centre (Wallace 2002). Of 
the 29 metropolitan regions in North America with populations of more than 2 million, 
the Montréal metropolitan region ranked 28th in per capita GDP in 2007 (Cubin 2009: 
The Gazette 2009/05/21). 
Montreal is the second largest metropolitan centre in Canada based on size, 
population density and ethnic composition. Economic activities and population in 
Quebec are heavily concentrated in the Montreal metropolitan area (3.695 million 
                                                              
10 Aileen Mccabe, “China’s economy on pace to become world no.2”, Page B2, Gazette Montreal, 
January 22, 2010. 
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population). It is part of the Montreal-Toronto axis which connects to both the 
Canadian hinterland, particularly Vancouver and Winnipeg, and with the United 
States heartland, particularly New York and Chicago. If comparisons are made on the 
basis of the 17 administrative regions, Montreal is home to 1.8 million people, or a 
quarter (24.3%) of the population of Québec. It accounted for 23.85% of total 
employment in Quebec, 35% of total GDP (2008), 20.57% of capital expenditure 
(2009), 37.4% of exported merchandise (2006), and 43.13% of the number of 
manufacturing establishments of Quebec (2007). Among the top 10 principal cities in 
Quebec, Laval and Terrebonne had the highest annual growth rate of l.6%, Gatineau 
(1.2%), Longueuil (1.3%) and Sherbrooke (1.01%) for the period 1951-2006. The 
average annual growth rate of Quebec was 0.82% for this period. The population of 
Laval reached 400,000 in 2009 (Figure 6.13).  
If comparisons are made between the CMAs, the 6 CMAs constituted 68.03% of 
Quebec’s population in 2008. Among them, the population of Gatineau has increased 
15.5% since 1996, while Saguenay’s population diminished 5.12%. Montreal and 
Sherbrooke had 10% population growth rates while Quebec (City) and Trois-Rivières 
only had 7.44% and 1.48% rates from 1996-2008. The Montreal metropolitan area 
alone makes up 48.08% of Quebec’s total population. In employment, Montreal 
accounts for 49.95% of employment in Quebec, compared to 10% for Quebec City 
and 4.4% for Gatineau in 200811. 
Figure 6.13 Demographic Evolution of the 10 Principal Cities of Quebec, 
1951-2006 
 
Source : Institut de la statistique du Québec , Statistique Canada, Recensements du Canada.2008 
 
                                                             
11 http://www.stat.gouv.qc.ca/donstat/societe/march_travl_remnr/parnt_etudn_march_travl/pop_active/index.htm 
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Montreal is responsible for 78.58% of international net migration and 66.58% 
interprovincial net migration in Quebec for the period 1996-2008. Montreal accounted 
for 53.89% while the Quebec CMA accounted for 10.58% of total GDP Quebec in 
2008. Besides being an important scientific, intellectual and cultural centre, Montreal 
boasts major manufacturing and service sectors, which employ over 1,900,100 people. 
The region has made a successful shift to a knowledge-based economy focusing on 
telecommunications, aerospace, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and information 
technology. A cosmopolitan city known for its cultural activities, Montreal is a prime 
destination for tourists. A growing number of international organizations are based in 
Montréal. All the industrial activities are decomposed into 92 industrial sectors to 
compare the economic activities in the 6 CMAs in Québec from 1997 to 2007. 
Figure 6.14 Industrial Proportion of Montreal in Quebec, 2007 
 
Source: Institut de la statistique du Québec; Ministère des Affaires municipales, des Régions et de 
l'Occupation du territoire; Ministère du Revenu du Québec; Pêches et Océans Canada and Statistique 
Canada. 
 
The data show the strong core performance of Montreal in almost any type of 
industry in Quebec except some agriculture-related industries. All industries in 
Montreal produce 54% of Quebec’s GDP. Goods producing industries and service 
producing industries are responsible for 45.85% and 57.35% of Quebec’s GDP 
respectively. The strong economic activities of Montreal are clothing manufacturing 
(81.4%), drink and tobacco manufacturing (66.6%), textile manufacturing (52.1%), 
printing and associated support activities (68.3%), chemical products (73.2%), 
information and electronic products manufacturing (70.2%), transport materials 
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manufacturing (76.2%), electrical goods and components manufacturing (75.2%), 
other various products manufacturing (56.9%), manufacturing of metal products 
(50.2%), wholesale (67.5%) and resale (52%), transportation and warehousing 
(59.6%), information and cultural industries (75.8%), finances, assurances et services 
(59.9%), and professional, scientific and technical services (70.6%), education 
(47.7%), health and social assistance (49.8%), arts and entertainment (81.4%), 
administration services (65.3%) and other services (60.8%) sectors (Figure 6.14).  
They account for almost half or more of the province of Quebec. These indicators 
strongly confirm the obvious core position of Montreal in Quebec’s economy.  
The second contributor to the Quebec economy among the 6 CMAs is the Quebec 
CMA. As an administrative centre of Quebec with some resource processing 
industries, the Quebec CMA ranked second on most of the indicators and accou8nted 
for 10.52% of Quebec’s GDP. It accounted for 11.92% of service producing industries, 
7.27% of goods producing industries, 22.2% of public administration, 15.34% of 
restaurant and hotel services, 10.72% of construction, 11.46% of retail sales, 11.17% 
of professional, scientific and technical services, and 10% of administrative services 
in Quebec in 2007. The other 4 CMAs are not very significant except for Sherbrooke 
with its 8.52% share in manufacturing of plastic rubber products. The peripheral 
regions of Quebec have a high share of agricultural related industries. They account 
for 80.38% of agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 79.09% of crop and animal 
production and 87.54% of forestry and logging. They also account for a high 
percentage of some resource-based manufacturing industries in Quebec such as food, 
textile, paper and furniture manufacturing industries (Table 6.1).    
The Quebec CMA has increased its good producing industries share from 5.57% 
in 1997 to 7.27% in 2007 and its share of manufacturing of plastic rubber products 
from 3.38% in 1996 to 7.08% in 2007.  
Real GDP in the Quebec City region grew by 1.9% in 2008, compared to increases of 
0.5% in Canada and 1.0% in the province of Quebec, thereby outpacing the country’s 
largest metropolitan areas, including Edmonton (+1.5%), Calgary (+1.3%) and 
Montreal (+1.0%). A number of sectors helped reinforce the regional economy’s 
foundations in 2008, particularly the construction industry, which carried out several 
office tower projects. Quebec City’s 400th anniversary celebrations gave the tourist 
industry a significant boost, while a number of sectors of excellence recorded 
continued growth, including finance, insurance, life sciences, composite materials and  
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Table 6.1 Industrial Composition of CMAs in Quebec, 2007 
 
Source: Calculated based on Institut de la statistique du Québec; Ministère des Affaires Municipales, des Régions 
et de l'Occupation du Territoire; Ministère du Revenu du Québec; Pêches et Océans Canada and Statistique Canada. 
Blank spaces indicate missing data for some CMAs. 
 
Industry 2007 Saguenay Québec Sherbrooke  Trois- Rivières Montréal Gatineau 
Québec 
outside the 
CMAs 
All Industries 1.92 10.52 2.15 1.98 53.89 3.11 26.44 
Goods Producing Industries 2.47 7.27 1.83 2.86 45.86 1.82 37.89 
Services Produce Industries 1.68 11.92 2.28 1.60 57.35 3.67 21.50 
Industrial production  6.61   48.65  36.14 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and 
Hunting 1.50 3.81 0.99 1.13 11.18 1.01 80.38 
Crop and animal production 0.97 3.94 1.26 1.35 13.07 0.32 79.09 
Forestry and logging 2.76 2.13 0.22 0.58 4.09 2.71 87.54 
Construction  10.72   44.58  33.09 
Manufacturing 2.62 6.86 2.15 2.70 50.00 0.84 34.84 
Food manufacturing  8.56  0.99 44.86  43.73 
Beverage and tobacco product 
manufacturing     66.60  14.97 
Textile and textile product mills  1.67 4.87  52.13  40.18 
Clothing manufacturing     81.41  14.73 
Paper manufacturing  2.55   27.17  53.10 
Printing and related support 
activities  7.83 3.44  68.27 0.94 17.61 
Chemical manufacturing  5.60  1.30 73.22  16.93 
Plastics and rubber products 
manufacturing  7.09 8.52  46.48  37.20 
Non-metallic mineral product 
manufacturing  9.83  2.90 45.21  38.48 
Primary metal manufacturing     16.15  55.67 
Fabricated metal product 
manufacturing  8.06 2.08 3.28 50.91  33.04 
Machinery manufacturing   2.99 2.22 48.89  34.10 
Computer and electronic product 
manufacturing  7.93   70.25  16.98 
Electrical equipment, appliance 
and component manufacturing  6.63   75.23  15.47 
Transportation equipment 
manufacturing     76.20  19.58 
Furniture and related product 
manufacturing  7.11  1.85 37.19  50.29 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  11.63   56.98  22.40 
Wholesale Trade 1.28 8.01 1.55 1.05 67.53 1.04 19.54 
Retail Trade 1.97 11.46 2.50 2.05 51.99 2.67 27.36 
Transportation and Warehousing 1.42 9.00 1.32 2.00 59.62 1.97 24.66 
Information and Cultural 
Industries 1.02 7.81 1.74 1.56 75.78 1.59 10.51 
Finance and Insurance, Real 
Estate and Leasing and 
Management of Companies and 
Enterprises 
1.25 11.52 1.96 1.33 59.87 2.96 21.12 
Professional, Scientific, and 
Technical Services 1.49 11.17 1.52 1.02 70.64 2.34 11.81 
Administrative and Support, 
Waste Management and 
Remediation Services 
 10.10  1.35 65.32 3.08 16.73 
Educational Services  12.31 4.57 2.44 47.68  26.89 
Health Care and Social Assistance 2.36 11.91 3.70 2.20 49.88 3.18 26.76 
Arts, Entertainment and 
Recreation 1.04 8.10 1.34 0.89 67.67 3.06 17.90 
Accommodation and Food 
Services 1.52 15.34 1.94 1.61 45.55 2.49 31.55 
Other Services (except Public 
Administration) 1.42 9.35  1.54 60.80  22.51 
Public Administration  22.22  1.38 40.58  17.84 
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electronic component manufacturing, as well as information technologies and 
communications12. 
 
Figure 6.15 Industrial Comparison of CMAs Quebec (%) 
 
 
Source: Produit intérieur brut régional par industrie au Québec, 2008, www.stat.gouv.qc.ca. 
 
There has not been much change in the other CMAs except for slight changes 
such as Saguenay seeing an increase in its oil, gas extraction industry share from 1.69% 
in 1997 to 2.47% in 2007. If the industrial composition of each CMA is compared, the 
goods producing sectors in all CMAs have decreased and the service producing 
industries have increased from 1998 to 2007 except for the Quebec City CMA (Figure 
6.15). Manufacturing industries have diminished in importance in all CMAs since 
1998. This is the main cause of the decline of the Quebec provincial share at the 
national level, even though Trois-Rivières, Sherbrooke and Saguenay have a high 
manufacturing industries share in their economies. 
In terms of per capita income distribution in the 6 CMAs of Quebec from 
1998-2008, there has been a steady increase of per capita GDP and per capita personal 
income in all CMAs since 1998. In 1998, Montreal ranked first with a per capita GDP 
of $28,371 and personal income $25,201 in 1998. However, the Quebec CMA took 
the lead with per capita personal income of $36,002 while Montreal ranked first with 
a per capita GDP of $40,766 in 2008. The rest of Quebec except for the 6 CMAs had 
the lowest per capita GDP of $30,018 and personal income of $29,749 in 2008 
(Figure 6.16).  
                                                              
12 Desjardins Economic Studies Regional Studies, June 2009 Volume 1 / Number 1 
www.desjardins.com/economie. 
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Figure 6.16 Per Capita GDP and Personal Income Change of CMAS in Quebec 
   
Note: Gatineau 1 indicates Gatineau in Quebec Province13. 
Sources: Institut de la statistique du Québec; Ministère des Affaires municipales, des Régions et de 
l’Occupation du territoire; Ministère du Revenu du Québec; Pêches et Océans Canada;  
Statistique Canada. 2008, www.stat.gouv.qc.ca. 
 
The highest disparity of per capita GDP and personal income was $8591 and 
$3922 respectively in 1998. It changed to $10,476 and $5021 in 2008. From the Gini 
coefficient of inequality of per capita GDP and of personal income (Figure 6.17), it 
can be seen that the disparity of per capita GDP and personal income between the 6 
CMAs and the rest of Quebec has been steady from 1998 to 2008. The disparity of per 
capita GDP is larger than that of per capita personal income for this period. The 
analysis of σ-convergence shows that there is a very weak convergence of per capita 
GDP and personal income for this period. The σ-convergence rate of per capita 
personal income is faster than that of per capita GDP. The Lorenz curves analysis of 
1998 and 2008 for both indicators confirm the disparity of per capita GDP and 
personal income. The Lorenz curve line (green) between the line of perfect equality 
(red) and the line of perfect inequality has approached the line of perfect equality 
more significantly in per capita personal income than for per capita GDP (Figure 6.18 
and Figure 6.19). The absolute beta coefficients of per capita GDP and personal 
income are negative (-0.030713, -0.15095) for this 11 year period. The annual beta 
convergence rate of per capita personal income (-0.01278) is faster than that of per 
capita GDP (-0.0027) for this period. This result is consistent with the results of the 
Gini coefficient of inequality and σ-convergence of per capita GDP and personal 
income. 
                                                             
13 Compilation : Institut de la statistique du Québec, Direction des statistiques économiques et du 
développement durable. Chapitre 1 Vue d’ensemble des régions du Québec 
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Figure 6.17 Gini Coefficient of Inequality and σ-Convergence of Per Capita GDP 
and Personal Income 
 
Note: Calculation includes 6CMAs and the rest of Quebec from 1998 to 2008. 
Figure 6.18 Per Capita GDP Analysis for 1998 and 2008 
  
 
Figure 6.19 Per Capita Personal Income Analysis for 1998 and 2008 
 
 
 
6.3 Urban Areas in Xinjiang and the Case of Ürümqi 
 
Xinjiang ranked 5th among the 12 western provinces and 24th in China with a 39.64% 
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urbanization rate14 in 2008. It had a rural population of 60.36%. The urbanization of 
rural population and net interprovincial migration are the main causes of the 
increasing urban population in recent years in Xinjiang. But the problem is that there 
are only 2115 cities (includes 4 cities under direct control of the autonomous region 
and 17 cities under the prefectures) in such a large territory compared to the inner 
provinces of China. They are the largest city Ürümqi, 6 medium size cities (each with 
a population over 400,000) and 15 smaller sized cities. Sixty-one percent (61.9%) of 
the cities and 66.8% of the urban population are distributed in the northern part of 
Xinjiang (i.e. north of the Tangri Mountain range), and in this broad region, they have 
formed a more developed urban hierarchy including large, medium and small size 
cities. But in southern and Eastern Xinjiang, there are only 8 central cities, accounting 
for only 28.5% and 9.5% of the total number of cities in these two regions 
respectively, and 24.7% and 8.42% of total urban population in Xinjiang respectively. 
It can be seen from this that urban density, urban size and urban structure do not form 
an easily recognizable urban hierarchy. Thus,  south and east Xinjiang do not have a 
well-developed urban hierarchy and these cities cannot play the central role of 
economic centres due to the large distances between the urban centres.  
 
Figure 6.20 Population and Urbanization Rate of Xinjiang Cities, 2008  
 
Source: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that, in Xinjiang, there are more cities and higher city 
                                                              
14 Note: This population of “Urban” municipalities includes some agricultural population. In relation to 
Urban Population and Rural Population in China, Urban Population refers to all people residing in 
cities and towns, while Rural Population refers to population other than the Urban Population. 
15 The newly added three cities (Aral, Tumxuk and Wujiaqu) under direct control of the autonomous 
region in 2005 are not included in some of the data analysis due to missing data for previous years. 
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density in the north than in the south. The total population of 21 cities (8.48 million) 
accounts for 39.6% of Xinjiang’s population and took up 11.23% of the land area of 
Xinjiang. Urbanization rates are high in Karamay, Shihezi, Ürümqi and some newly 
built cities such as Kuytun, Wujiaqu and Tumxuk in Xinjiang. Some 11.1% of 
population of Xinjiang is concentrated in Ürümqi City while the other 20 cities 
account for 28.72% of the total population (Figure 6.20). 
 
Map 6.2 Urban Distribution of Xinjiang 
 
 
Source: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2009 and MapInfo8. 
 
In Xinjiang, the urban population has increased steadily in all cities except 
Ürümqi (Figure 6.21). The population of Ürümqi increased from 955,000 in 1975 to 
2.36 million in 2008. The proportion of the total population living in Ürümqi went 
from 2.49% in 1949 to 11.1% in 2008. As mentioned earlier, the main centres of 
economic activities are situated in the Han dominated north of Xinjiang. Most of the 
non-agricultural population is concentrated in Karamay (98%), Ürümqi (73.6%), 
Kuytun (89.9%) and Shihezi (86.3%) which have high proportions of non-agricultural 
population while Hotan, Aksu, Kashgar and Wusu have large proportions of 
agricultural population (map 6.2).  
The predominant minority16 population, mainly Uyghur and the other ethnic 
groups, dominated the five cities of Turpan (78.87%), Gulja (65.3%), Artux (90.3%), 
Kashgar (83%) and Hotan (88%) while the Han-ethnic population dominates the other 
12 cities, i.e. Kuytun (94.7%), Shihezi (94.4%), Karamay (75.3%), Ürümqi (75%), 
                                                              
16 Ethnic minorities in China refer to the non-Han Chinese population in mainland China. 
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Changji (74.4%) and Fukang (72.2%). The change in Kumul city is very obvious in 
recent years that the proportion of the ethnic minority population dropped from 43.7% 
in 1980 to 28.65% in 2008 (Figure 6.22). 
 
Figure 6.21 Population Change of Xinjiang Cities (10,000’s) 
 
 
Source: 55 years statistics of Xinjiang, Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009.  
 
Figure 6.22 Minority Population Proportion of Xinjiang Cities 
 
 Source: 55 years statistics of Xinjiang, Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009.  
 
Like other parts of China, widening urban income disparity was the main source 
of inequalities in Xinjiang during the reform period. The centralized development 
plan has contributed much to intra-regional disparities in Xinjiang. The total GDP of 
11 cities in the economic belt on the northern slope of the Tangri Mountains accounts 
for 52% of Xinjiang’s total GDP in 2008. The change in the GDP proportion of 
Ürümqi, Karamay and Korla Cities has increased since 1990 and diverged from the 
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other cities very clearly (Figure 6.23).  
 
Figure 6.23 GDP Proportion of Xinjiang Cities, 2007 
 
Source: 55 years statistics of Xinjiang, Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009.  
 
Figure 6.24 Per Capita GDP of Xinjiang Cities, 2008 ($) 
 
 
Note: Exchange rate of 2007. 1$=7 Chinese Yuan(￥). Source: 55 years statistics of Xinjiang, 
Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009.  
 
The sum of GDP of the three cities of Ürümqi (24.27%), Karamay (15.73%) and 
Korla (10.6%) alone account for half the GDP of Xinjiang. The five cities of Korla, 
Aksu, Kashgar, Hotan and Artux only accounted for 13.75% of total GDP of Xinjiang 
in 2008. Among them, Korla city accounted for 10.6% and became the economic 
centre of south Xinjiang. Changji, Fukang, Kuytun and Usu have seen their GDP 
proportion increase while Turpan, Kashgar, Hotan, Aksu and Artux have seen their 
share of the total GDP of Xinjiang decrease. 
In terms of per capita GDP of cities, per capita GDP has increased in all cities but 
at different growth rates. Karamay, Ürümqi and Korla Cities have diverged from the 
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other cities since 1980 while Changji, Kuytun and Fukang Cities have followed 
slowly since 1990. The other cities have seen their per capita GDP increase at a very 
slow rate. Most of the minority dominated cities, i.e. Gulja ($2213),Turpan ($2238), 
Kashgar ($910), Hotan ($885), Aksu ($1936) and Artux ($816), had the lowest per 
capita GDP and were below the per capita GDP level of Xinjiang $2841 in 2008 
(Figure 6.24). The disparity of the highest per capita GDP and the lowest per capita 
GDP in 1980 was 4.44 times between Ürümqi ($145) and Atux ($32.7). In 2008, the 
disparity of the highest per capita GDP and the lowest per capita GDP increased to 
17.5 times between Karamay ($14,316) and Artux ($816). Karamay ranked first with 
$14,316 (100216￥) not only in Xinjiang but also in the whole of China due to the 
mining and gas extraction industry. If the oil and gas city of Karamay is excluded, the 
disparity between the second highest per capita GDP of Ürümqi ($5334) and the 
lowest per capita GDP of Artux ($816) is a ratio of 6.53. 
Figure 6.25 Composition of GDP by Xinjiang Cities, 2008 
 
 
Notes: The three new cities are excluded due to missing data. Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009. 
 
One of the important features of the industrial development of the region in the 
reform period is that heavy industry has outgrown light industry. In 2000, in Xinjiang 
heavy extractive industry constituted 61% of the industrial share of the GDP. A similar 
situation existed in the manufacturing and light industry in the region. The 
technological renovation in the old industries and the establishment of technologically 
advanced industries has changed the industrial landscape of Xinjiang to a remarkable 
extent during the reform period. During the reform period, the production of 
petrochemical, textile, coal, electricity, iron and steel, chemical fertilizers and cement 
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has increased rapidly. According to 2006 statistical data, gross industrial output of the 
petroleum and natural gas extraction in the region was 66.4%% of the total gross 
industrial output in Xinjiang, centred on Ürümqi, Karamay and Korla cities. In terms 
of the composition of GDP by industry, by cities, Kashgar, Hotan, Aksu and Changji 
have the highest shares of 41.6%, 38.9%, 34.3% and 30.1% respectively in primary 
industry while Karamay, Korla, Turpan and Fukang are strong in secondary industry 
with  91%, 75.8%, 68.7% and 61.7% respectively in 2008 (Figure 6.25).  
Ürümqi is also the largest consumer centre in the region, recording $4.6 billion 
retail sales of consumer goods in 2007, an increase of 18.24% from 2006. Ürümqi 
ranked 7th in 2007 by disposable income for urban residents among cities in Western 
China. Ürümqi has been a central developmental target for the China Western 
Development project that the Central Government has been pursuing.17 
Ürümqi, Ghulja, Qoqek, Botala, Artux and Hotan had the highest share of tertiary 
industries while the share of the secondary sector in GDP in Aksu, Kashkar and Hotan 
is the lowest in the region except for Ürümqi. Aksu, Kashkar and Hotan are lagging 
behind in industry, construction, transportation, storage, post and telecommunications 
and wholesale, retail and catering trade in Xinjiang. Ürümqi had 41.7% and 56.5% 
shares of secondary and tertiary industries respectively and a 1.8% share of primary 
industry. Ürümqi, Karamay and Korla cities have been the focus of total fixed 
investment in Xinjiang since the 1980s, 40% of total fixed investment being 
concentrated in these cities in 2008. The disparity of average wage of staff and 
workers in Xinjiang cities is smaller than that of per capita GDP. The average wage of 
staff and workers has increased steadily in all cities since 1990.  Karimay has had the 
highest wage since 1995 while Ürümqi has seen a quickening of its growth rate since 
2000 and has surpassed Karamay city. The disparity between the highest and the 
lowest value wage is 2.31 between Ürümqi ($4799) and Usu City ($2077) in 2008 
(Figure 6.26). 
 Urumqi means ‘A beautiful pasture land’ in ancient Mongolian used by the 
Junggar tribe; 2000 years ago it was once an important town on the new northern 
route of the Silk Road, which made an important contribution in promoting 
Sino-foreign economic and cultural exchanges18. From the above data analyses, it can 
be seen that Ürümqi has become a major economic centre not only in western China 
                                                              
17  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/05/content_12001223.htm 
18 http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/English/chinatours/urumqi.htm 
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but also it has become one of the largest cities in central Asia countries. Ürümqi is a 
core industrial, economic, cultural and political centre in Xinjiang. Ürümqi City 
accounts for 11.07% of the population, 17.5% of employment, almost a quarter of 
GDP, 20.39% of secondary industry, 17% of industry and 40.46% of tertiary industry, 
30.45% of Gross Industrial output value, 17.51% of total imports and exports (18.3% 
export and 11.75% import), 15.2% of investment in fixed assets, 65% of regular 
institutions of higher education and 41% of specialized secondary schools in Xinjiang 
in 2008. Since the 1990s, Ürümqi has become gradually developed economically and 
now serves as a regional transport node and commercial centre even though it is the 
most "inland" city in the world - the furthest from any major body of water and it is 
far from any other major economic centres (from Beijing 3,270 km. or 2,050 miles or 
a four-hour flight) in China and in the world. 
 
Figure 6.26 Average Wage of Staff and Workers of Xinjiang Cities 
 
 
Note: Exchange rate of 2007. 1$=7 Yuan. Source: 55 years statistics of Xinjiang, Xinjiang Statistical 
Yearbook 2009.  
 
Figure 6.27 Gini Coefficient of Per Capita GDP Inequality 
Analysis for 1980 and 2008: 
  
 
In terms of income distribution, the Lorenz curves show the clear disparity 
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between cities if compared by per capita GDP. The curve point of Lorenz curve line 
(green) between line of perfect equality (red) and the line of perfect inequality have 
come closer together somewhat, but it is not very significant if we compare the 
Lorenz curves for 1980 and 2008 respectively. This means there has been a very weak 
convergence among Xinjiang cities for this period (Figure 6.27). 
Figure 6.28 Gini Coefficient of Inequality and σ-Convergence of Per Capita GDP 
 
 
If we compare the Gini Coefficient and σ convergence of per capita GDP for the 
period 1980-2008, the trend line of convergence indicates that they converged for the 
whole period, but that there is a significant but short-lived convergence from 1980 to 
1990, then there is weak divergence from 1990 to 2008. The Gini Coefficient more 
clearly indicates the last period of divergence than the σ convergence (Figure 6.28). 
Based on the absolute beta-convergence model 4.10 presented in Chapter 4, the 
beta convergence can be calculated as follows:  
- by regressing the average growth rate of per Capita GDP between time t
beg 
= 1980 
and time t
end 
= 2008 on initial income at time t
beg 
= 1980 where:  
(lnY
it(end) 
– lnY
it(beg) 
) = α + βlnY
it(beg) 
+ μ
i 
(1)  
Here, i is the index for each city where i = 1 to 18 in Xinjiang. Time is indexed by t 
where t(beg) = 1980 and t(end) = 2008. The sample whole period is indexed by T 
where T = 29 years for the whole period.  
lnY = natural log of real per capital income.  
α = constant term and μ
i 
= random error term. 
Model (5.1 – from Chapter 5) is estimated by a non-linear version of the basic 
growth regression, for different periods: (i) the whole period 1980-2008, (ii) the first 
sub period 1980-1990, (iii) the second sub-period 1990-2000, and (iv) the third 
sub-period 2001-2008.  
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From Table 6.2 it can be clearly seen that the beta coefficient β<0, and 
significant in Xinjiang during the whole period 1980-2008. It shows there is a 
convergence rate of 0.017 for the whole period, and strong convergence during the 
first sub-period 1980-1990 at the rate of 0.029 while there is weak divergence during 
the second sub-period 1990-2000 and the third sub-period 2001-2008 at the rate of 
0.0036 and 0.008 respectively. The result for the whole period is consistent with Gini 
Coefficient and σ convergence of per capita GDP for the whole period. 
Table 6.2 Beta Convergence Rate of Xinjiang Cities 
Period Equation Beta Coefficient Annual Rate 
1980-2008 LnY 08-80 = -.658611 LnY80 + 7.741064 -0.65861 -0.017447604* 
1980-1990 LnY 90-80 = -.382175 LnY80 + 3.753563 -0.38218 -0.029423486* 
1990-2000 LnY00-90 = .039803 LnY90 + .797787 0.039803 0.003692437 
2001-2008 LnY08-01 = .063356 LnY01 + .387594 0.063356 0.008181501 
Note: Significant at 5%. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
Overall, the above results show that urbanization (metropolitan areas and cities) has 
been a major factor contributing to the regional economy in large territories. There are 
sharp differences between Canada and China in terms of the nature of the urban 
system, urban size, definition, the number of urban centres at different hierarchical 
levels and their regional distribution; many of these differences are related to 
differences in population size and economic activities. However, economic outputs 
are mostly concentrated in the cities in both countries. The concentration rates of 
population and GDP are higher in Canada compared to China.  
China’s rural-urban income inequalities are very high compared with Canada. 
The most urbanized regions have the highest per capita income in both economies. 
Thus, one could conclude that the level of urbanization is positively associated with 
the level of economic development among the regions. Canada’s urban regions have 
been growing relatively fast. However, the rate of urbanization differs greatly between 
provinces. During the last few decades, urbanization in China has been accelerating. 
However, due to the institutional constraint inherited from the planned economy and 
the household registration system (hukou) system, the rate of urbanization in China is 
lower than not only the developed economies but also those at the same level of 
development. There are great disparities between the Eastern, Central and Western 
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provinces in China.  
Urban-based economic activities are naturally highly concentrated in urban areas 
and account for a significant regional share of GDP. But the concentration rate differs 
greatly in both countries. In Canada, most of the CMAs have a leading share of the 
GDP in their provinces. In China, the strong influence of government on urban 
development and China’s long term centralization policy certainly helped the 
concentration of urban economic activities into the cities directly controlled by the 
state and provincial capital cities. The capital cities of the Western provinces have 
higher GDP concentration rates than those of the Central and Eastern provinces of 
China.       
Figure 6.29 Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Quebec 
 
 
 
Source: Quebec’s Ministry of Durable Development, The Environment and Parks 
Montreal is the second largest metropolitan centre in Canada based on population. 
Economic activities and population in Quebec are heavily centred in the Montreal 
metropolitan area. The data show the strong core performance of Montreal in almost 
any type of industry in Quebec except for some agriculture related industries. In 
Xinjiang, the centralized development plan has reinforced intra-regional disparities in 
Xinjiang. Ürümqi is a core industrial, economical, cultural and political centre and the 
largest consumer centre in Xinjiang. In terms of the environment, there are sharp 
contrasts between Quebec and Xinjiang based on their resource development and 
energy consumption patterns. The environment of Xinjiang is more vulnerable 
compared to Quebec. It is also one of the large coal, oil and gas producers of China. In 
energy consumption, coal made up 57.8% while crude oil, natural gas and hydro-wind 
power constituted 23.9%, 14.1% and 4.2% respectively in 2007. The rapid increase of 
population with scarce water resources, the overexploitation of mineral products and 
water resources, has already brought about serious ecological and environmental 
problems such as water shortages, air and water pollution, threatening the ecological 
balance between society, economy and nature. Quebec’s greatest green energy resource 
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is its hydropower, which generates about 97% of the province’s electricity. Other 
sources of electricity include nuclear power, wind and thermal generation. Québec's 
forest areas are immense when compared with those in Xinjiang. Forests cover 
constitutes more than half of Québec19, i.e. 757 900 km² while it is only about 
2.94%20 in Xinjiang. However, greenhouse-gas emissions are up in Quebec despite the 
province’s large effort. After three years of decline, Quebec’s greenhouse-gas 
emissions rose by 3.7% in 2007. Emissions are now 5.6% higher than in 199021 (Figure 
6.29). Forbes Magazine ranked Montreal as the 10th cleanest city in the world and in 
the June 19th, 2008 edition of London based Monocle Magazine, Montreal was 
ranked 16th in a list of the world's 25 most liveable cities22. The Toronto Star recently 
listed China’s Urumqi as one of the top ten worst places to live in the world23, 
although Urumqi has made massive investments to clean up its dirty air24. Based on the 
statistical data of the National Bureau of Statistic China25 in 2007, Urumqi had the 
worst air quality, ranked last (31th) in sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide amount in air 
quality of cities26 in China. 
 
                                                              
19http://www.gouv.qc.ca/portail/quebec/pgs/commun/portrait/economie/ressourcesnaturelles/foret/?lang
=en 
20 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm 
21 Henry Aubin (2010), An Environmental Setback, Gazette, Thursday,A15, February 4, 2010. 
22 http://www.pulsejobs.com/canada/working-in-montreal.aspx 
23 http://alisonbate.ca/2009/01/14/winter-in-the-worlds-most-polluted-city/ 
24 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/6613153.html 
25 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm 
26 Note: On the list of the four city provinces and the other 27 provincial capital cities. 
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Summary and Conclusion  
 
Here, a synthesis of the research findings of previous chapters and the research 
conclusions of the thesis are presented. The discussion ends with a discussion of the 
research limitations of the thesis and some concluding remarks, particularly about 
future research directions. 
 
SC.1 Summary 
 
In previous chapters, based on the analysis of long term statistical data from Canada 
and China, the regional economic development trajectories of both countries since 
1960 were compared, in an attempt to examine systematically the changing patterns 
of regional disparities by using a multi-scalar approach and multivariate measurement 
methods at four scales – national (cross-country and within country), regional, 
provincial and urban areas (based on some short term data), the last of which also 
provided some insights on the rural peripheries. Four dimensions (Natural, Economic, 
Social and Environment) were explored with respect to the different socio-economic 
indicators available.  
In its focus on regional disparity, regional development policy and cross-country 
comparisons, the study used two empirically-based approaches – “sigma” and “beta” 
convergence – for measuring convergence between countries and across regions; it 
also included a form of spatial analysis. 
To summarize:  
In the introduction, the general framework of the study was presented. In Chapter 1, 
the theories and concepts used in the principal theoretical literature relevant to the 
study were reviewed. Chapter 2 outlined the research methodology. Chapter 3 
presented an overall perspective of the regional economic development policies and 
programmes of Canada and China in different periods at different scales. In Chapter 4, 
the patterns of cross-country convergence between Canada and China at the national 
scale and within country provincial convergence for each country were examined 
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using different measurement methods such as traditional statistical methods, beta 
convergence and sigma convergence. The spatial dimension was taken into 
consideration in the beta convergence analysis in this chapter. 
In the most complex chapter, Chapter 5, regional and provincial comparative case 
studies were presented to further provide an overview of regional economies with 
particular attention to structural differences in both economies based on recently 
released updated long-term statistical data for both countries. In Chapter 6, this was 
complemented by an analysis of selected urban regions which also provided insights 
on the more peripheral regions. Different economic indicators were used such as 
population, GDP, employment, investment, labour force, migration, personal income 
and disposable income, annual disposable income of urban and rural households 
(China), total investment in fixed assets (China), wage, transfer payments (Canada), 
industrial composition and its contribution to GDP and a number of analytic 
approaches were used involving the application of descriptive, absolute, relative 
indexes and empirical convergence approaches with the spatial models of SEM, SLM 
and SCM. In the research proposed for this thesis, policy, population, income, 
employment, industrial composition and its contribution, investment, trade and 
migration factors were taken into account as important factors of regional analysis 
given the territorial size of the two countries and the population differences between 
them.  
 
SC.2 Research Findings 
 
Through cross-national, national, regional, provincial and urban case studies and an 
appreciation of regional development policies and statistical analyses of convergence 
and regional disparities, the research objectives of this thesis were to attempt to 
provide an explanation of the different processes and patterns of regional economic 
development in large territories (countries) using Canada and China as examples, to 
undertake an analysis of the different factors and driving forces underlying regional 
development in both countries, and to explore both the apparent successes and failures 
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in regional development policy through comparing and contrasting the regional 
development experiences and models of these two countries. From the analyses 
undertaken, several research findings can be identified. They are as follows: 
 
1. Both economies have some parallels in the implementation of regional 
economic development policies, but there are important differences.  
Geographically large territories invariably face the problem of regional disparity 
because natural endowment, climate and physical conditions differ significantly 
across their regions (even though the analyses in this thesis also show that there are 
significant regional disparities within smaller territorial units, such as within a 
province). However, regional development policy can either reduce or aggravate the 
disparities. Regional development policies should be adapted to the specific 
conditions prevailing in each country or region. In the context of a strong demand for 
direct government intervention to reduce regional disparities in various spheres 
because of the substantial lagging regions frequently encountered in a large territory, 
it is important to identify those factors and determinants of regional disparity that can 
be directly influenced by government policies.  
The complex pattern of federal-provincial relations has become a central element 
of Canadian government and policymaking, and a fundamental characteristic of 
Canadian federalism. In China, fiscal policy and economic reform are also always 
affected by the relationship between central and provincial powers. It is certain that 
central power dominates everything (fiscal power) while Eastern provinces have 
much greater bargaining power than the other provinces.   
Canada and China have both implemented development policies based on 
growth centre theory. After the failure of the growth centre strategy in Canada in 1972, 
Canada implemented more selective and flexible measures in a so-called 
decentralization policy to address the specific problem of regional disparity. To 
equalize disparities and enable comparable service delivery nationwide, the federal 
government had already engaged in pooling and transferring moneys through 
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equalization payments. Since then, Canada’s ten provinces and three territories have 
exhibited relatively high GDPs with relatively small variation among them. 
China implemented an egalitarian and centralized policy at first, then pursued a 
high growth rate by uneven investment, then promoted the welfare of urban and rural 
people differently and later implemented the Western and Northeastern Development 
program to reduce regional disparity. But it is likely to be far too early to identify its 
effectiveness. It seems that China achieved great success in economic development 
after the implementation of the open door policy by building economic growth centres 
and zones. So, the coastal provinces that were the object of favorable regional 
development policies tended to grow faster than the others.  
The results showed that Canada has a smaller and steady level of regional 
disparity while China has had a large and fluctuating level of regional disparity. Five 
decades of data showed that although there were some slowdowns and stagnation in 
Canada’s economy, it has been steadier and regional disparity has attained a more or 
less steady state. Canada has experienced relatively good economic performance 
compared to other OECD countries, even since 2008 when a global economic crisis 
has been affecting most economies of the world. China has succeeded in obtaining 
more national economic efficiency with high growth rates while losing ground in 
terms of regional equality since 1980. Hence, there has been recognition of the need 
to address regional disparities but little by way of policy specificity, which suggests 
that the long-standing problem is unlikely to be reversed in the near future unless 
there is direct government intervention to reduce regional disparities. Though there 
have been successes over the years, more often than not regional development 
policies have not reduced disparities in either country. Thus, it is hard to believe the 
effectiveness of regional development policy in either country. Canadian regional 
development policy, at least, has avoided further regional divergence, while Chinese 
regional development policy has slowed the achievement of regional convergence. 
 
2. Regional disparity depends on the economic characteristics of the territory 
itself, not on size. 
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The results of this study demonstrated that disparity in regional income is a reality in 
every geographically large area, the causes of which are numerous and complex. It 
has been argued that a geographically large territory has more difficulty compared to 
small ones in achieving more balanced patterns of economic and social development. 
It is also true that small countries can be regionally more homogenous while large 
countries can be regionally more heterogeneous. However, there is no reason to 
expect that territorially large countries will exhibit larger regional disparities. 
Depending on agglomeration affecting economic activities, openness to external trade, 
government structure, regional development policy, central-provincial relationships 
and regional divisions, the outcome of regional development may be uncertain, 
leading in either direction - both towards regional divergence (the case of China) and 
convergence (the case of Canada). It is also apparent however that smaller territories, 
such as provinces, are also characterized by significant regional disparities. So it can 
be concluded that the different economic characteristics of territories will produce 
different results.  
   
3. Both economies have developed since Second World War but China has 
grown faster than Canada on many indicators since 1980.  
In Chapter 3, both countries were compared by using many indicators in the 
cross-country analysis section. It must be admitted that China has achieved impressive 
successes in a catching-up effort on a range of general economic indicators on the 
world stage while Canada has experienced solid, steady economic growth with several 
ups and downs. The thesis attempted to answer the question whether China could 
converge with Canada on some key economic indicators. In terms of per capita GDP 
(at current US$), China matched the per capita level for 1970 in Canada. However, 
China is now faced with a number of economic and social problems, including 
pronounced regional disparity, an increasing rural-urban income gap, an aging 
population, unemployment, poverty and rapid environmental degradation with 
ever-increasing energy demands. Moreover, it will likely still remain a very poor 
country by international standards. But significant gaps also remain in terms of 
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standards of living between China and Canada, with regional standards of living being 
much higher in Canada than China. Though the growth in gaps between the regions in 
each country or between both countries may be improved, convergence of the two 
countries is not likely to be achieved in the near future. 
 
4. There are significant differences between the two countries’ economic 
structure. The service sector appears to have played a significant role in the 
economy of Canada. 
The differences in population composition, geography, industrial structure, 
government policies, and productivity all result in different economies in both 
countries. The data on economic structure reflects a significant disparity in terms of 
labour productivity between Canada and China. The results showed that high income 
regions in both economies are characterized by larger shares of the service sector. 
However, this reaches much higher levels in Canada than in China. The service and 
agriculture sectors in each country are very different in terms of their sectoral 
contribution to GDP and the labour force. Canada's service sector is an economic 
strength for this nation. More than two-thirds of the country's output is related to the 
services sector, which employs 76% of the working population and accounts for 
nearly 67.9% of GDP. In China, at present, 43% of the population depends on 
agriculture for its living. However, surprisingly enough, the GDP share of 
manufacturing industry in China has remained fairy stable since 1978 while the 
decrease of the share of primary industry from 30% level has been compensated by an 
increase in the relative importance of the tertiary sector. Agriculture's contribution to 
GDP has remained low at only 10.6%. This reflects the dual economic structure with 
both traditional and modern sectors and the lower labour productivity of agriculture in 
China. China is still in the early stage of development. It is difficult to explain this 
through the “stages” theories without mentioning the fast developing skill and 
knowledge oriented industries in China. 
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5. Regional economic development in China is more unbalanced than in 
Canada.  
The empirical results (Chapter 4) showed that there are substantial variations in 
growth across the regions of the two economies and that they are very different in 
economic status and level. The results showed that in Canada, provincial disparity has 
gradually decreased since 1960, while in China provincial disparity decreased during 
the period 1981 to 1990, then increased until 2003, and finally decreased or kept the 
same level. In the case of the cross-country analysis for the whole period, there was 
weak convergence between both economies while the weighted σ convergence 
showed significant divergence between the two countries. In the case of Canada, the 
estimation results of β-convergence showed weak convergence in Canada during the 
whole period. In the case of China, per capita provincial income converged for the 
whole period from 1981 to 2007, but this was not very significant. All the results of 
the β-convergence analysis are consistent with those of the sigma convergence 
analysis. 
The spatial analysis including Global Moran’s I and Local Moran’s I were 
calculated and the spatial error model, the spatial lag model and the spatial 
cross-regressive model were also taken into consideration in the beta convergence 
analysis of each country individually. The Global Moran’s I statistic showed that 
there has been a stronger tendency for spatial dependence among the regions in 
Canada than in China since 1997 and that there has been a gradual increase in spatial 
interaction among the Chinese regions, but the speed of change has been very slow. 
The Local Moran’s I analysis confirmed the more positive spatial autocorrelation in 
China. The spatial clustering trend in China’s provincial per capita income reflects the 
significant provincial disparity of China, while it is insignificant due to relatively 
small provincial disparities in Canada. The estimated results of the spatial SEM, SLM 
and SCM analyses for Canada are mostly consistent with the beta convergence results 
of other researchers, e.g. Sala-i-Martin (1996b), Colombo (1996) and Shiller (2009). 
The empirical results as reported in Chapter 5 showed that the regional economy 
of Canada has undergone significant change since 1950. But in terms of population 
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and economic activities, there are important differences from region to region. The 
Canadian equalization program has played a key role in reducing regional disparity to 
some degree and has undoubtedly helped avoid greater divergence. Central Canada 
has been the economic core of Canada, dominates the national economy on the basis 
of almost any indicator and is regarded as the core region of the Canadian economy 
based on the Toronto and Montreal economic centres, while the other regions have 
been described as ‘peripheral’ regions (certainly a debatable category!). Western 
Canada has gained both in terms of population and its regional share of GDP since 
1981 with the rapid growth in trade with Asia which has enriched British Columbia 
and the oil wealth which provided a major boost to Alberta and Saskatchewan. The 
Centre has dominated the goods producing industries and service producing industries 
except for mining, quarrying and oil well industries for the whole period while the 
West has increased gradually.  
A sluggish economic performance has characterized the Atlantic Provinces for 
many decades. This region is far from the most dynamic regional markets of North 
America, the Pacific Rim and the main domestic economic centres. A low 
urbanization rate and slow growth below the national average are the main 
characteristics of the Eastern Region’s recent economic performance. The Northern 
economy has been characterized by high costs and a narrowly based market economy. 
Long distances from manufacturing centres, sparse population spread over a vast 
territory, limited transportation and climatic restrictions severely limit its economic 
development. In recent years, diamond, gold and copper production surges have 
improved the economy of the Northwest Territories. 
The regional economy has kept a relatively steady trend in Canada since 1980. 
Regional per capita personal income and disposable income converged for the period 
1961-2008, but there was a significant divergence in 1981 due to the economic 
challenges of Canada at the time and there has been a slight divergence in both 
indicators since 1999 due to the increasing disparity between the Northern and 
Atlantic regions. The change of cross-regional σ convergence and Gini coefficients is 
consistent with the trends in the Canadian economy. The Gini coefficient analysis and 
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the Lorenz curves for 1961, 1981 and 2007, and Theil index showed there is a weak 
convergence between Canadian regions for this period.  
In the case of China, the Eastern Coastal Region is regarded as a core region of 
the Chinese economy (39.2% of its population and 59.3% of national GDP on only 
13.8% of the national territory) with its advantages of a better geographic location, 
favorable policy, abundant human capital resources, concentrated industry and the 
advantages of international economic relations that have helped attract FDI. On the 
other hand, the Western region is considered as a peripheral region (27.5 % of the 
population, producing only 17.3% of national GDP on 56.8% of the national territory) 
with the disadvantages of its landlocked geographic location, the difficulties and costs 
of engaging in international economic activities although some of its provinces border 
on other countries, and poor natural conditions which are generally mountainous and 
lacking adequate water supplies, even though it has rich mineral and energy resources. 
Between these regions lies the Central region which occupies 29.4% of the national 
territorial area with a national population share of 31.7%, contributing 23.4% of 
national GDP. The Coastal region has diverged significantly with the other two 
regions since 1980. The trend lines of the Regional Weighted and Unweighted σ 
Convergence, the Theil Index and the Gini Coefficient of China share the same 
trajectory and show the consistency of the divergence for the whole period for the 
whole economy. Investment was highly centralized through centralized planning, 
centralized administration and state-controlled banks. The control of the state over 
investment has been declining during the reform period, and the influence of local 
factors and foreign direct investment in capital formation has risen. The Chinese 
Government has attempted to control the investment rates since the end of the 1990s 
to reduce regional disparities, but owing to local investment and market force-induced 
foreign direct investment, the regional disparity in terms of investment has been 
further enlarged. As a consequence, China quickly promoted the “Western 
Development” program and “Northeast Industry Base Strategy” program to catch up 
with the coastal regions. It is hard to believe these programs have played a role in 
reducing disparities, but it is clear that the absolute disparity between regions is 
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moving towards divergence.  
The Lorenz curve analysis showed that there was divergence among Chinese 
regions for this period. This result is consistent with the results of most other studies 
that have confirmed these patterns of divergence and convergence in China’s regional 
economy. 
In the provincial cases based on the long term data, provincial differences have 
changed significantly for many indicators in Canada after 1960. But unevenness 
remains across the country. Significant changes have occurred in Ontario, Quebec, 
Alberta and British Colombia. Ontario has almost succeeded in maintaining its 40% 
level of national total GDP, while Alberta and British Colombia have increased their 
national GDP share and Quebec has seen a decrease in its total GDP share. Eighty-sex 
per cent of Canada’s population is concentrated in the four provinces of Ontario, 
Quebec, Alberta and British Colombia. Provincial industrial composition differs 
greatly across Canada. The service industries in Ontario, British Colombia and 
Alberta have increased gradually while they have decreased in Quebec. Mining, 
quarrying and oil well industries are extremely strong in Alberta due to the boom of 
the oil industry and gas extraction. Manufacturing industries have remained at about 
the same level in Quebec (about 26%) while it has diminished in Ontario. The 
distribution of employed people by industries obviously differs between provinces in 
Canada. The proportion of manufacturing employment is high in Quebec and Ontario 
while the proportion of construction employment is high in Alberta and British 
Colombia. Employment in professional, scientific and technical services is highly 
concentrated in Ontario, Quebec and Alberta. In terms of per capita GDP, Alberta and 
Ontario have kept the level above the national average together with the Yukon since 
1980, while the other provinces increased slowly. This is also consistent with the 
patterns of provincial per capita Transfer Payments and Investment Income of Canada. 
Equalization payments have played an important role in reducing fiscal and income 
disparities among provinces. 
Provincial disparity in China is larger than broad regional disparity. National 
income and population are distributed unevenly between provinces. Provincial 
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disparity has emerged since 1980s. Living standards are actually improving in Central 
and Western China, but at a much slower rate than in the east as a result of large 
regional disparities. It is obvious that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer in 
relative terms. The change in the provincial share of total GDP and per capita GDP 
change are highly correlated with the provincial total investment in fixed assets in 
China. The average wage of staff and workers by province is an important indicator to 
compare with provincial per capita income because it is mostly controlled by the state. 
Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangsu have the highest salary 
levels while the Central provinces have lower salaries and the Western provinces have 
the lowest ones. Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangdong are the province-level 
administrative units which have the highest non-agricultural population in China. This 
is highly consistent with the provincial GDP, per capita income, investment, Engel’s 
Coefficient and salary data. This is also closely related with industrial employment 
and provincial GDP by industry. In China, most employment is concentrated in the 
primary industries, mainly in agriculture. 
 
6. There are significant differences and disparities in the economic and spatial 
structure of Quebec and Xinjiang. Sub-provincial disparity is larger than 
provincial and broader regional disparities. 
Quebec is territorially the largest province in Canada while Xinjiang is also the largest 
administrative region in China. Each region has its own distinctive spatial structure 
and economic linkages. In most aspects they are different, but there are similarities in 
other respects. Their spatial structures are mostly affected by their geographical nature, 
society and economy; politics is also an inescapable component of the formation of 
these complex regional patterns. Quebec has a more complex spatial economic 
structure than Xinjiang. Quebec is one of the economic centres, not only of Canada, 
but also in North America, while Xinjiang is only a peripheral region in China. They 
both have ethnically and/or culturally stronger identities than the other provinces. 
Quebec has more political and economic bargaining power in relation to the central 
government than Xinjiang. Xinjiang has a greater population and more in-migrants 
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than Quebec. Economic activities in Quebec are more centred in the south, while in 
Xinjiang they are centred in the north (in itself not a significant factor). The 
environment of Xinjiang is more vulnerable compared to Quebec.  
Each of them has one very large urban area, Montreal in Quebec, Urumqi in 
Xinjiang that are substantially greater than the next largest urban area. Quebec has a 
more advantageous geographic location than landlocked Xinjiang. Quebec’s main 
energy resource is water power while water-scarce Xinjiang has huge natural gas and 
oil resources, and consumes substantial amounts of coal (57.5% of energy 
consumption) which is partly responsible for its environmental pollution. Quebec has 
a much higher per capita GDP than Xinjiang and Quebec’s average annual GDP 
growth rate was 2.3% between 1981 and 2006 (Marcel 2007), compared to the 10.3% 
for Xinjiang between 1977 and 2005. 
One similarity in spatial structure between two regions is that economic activity 
and population are centred in a limited number of specific economic centres. 
Economic activities and population in Quebec are heavily centred in the Montreal 
metropolitan area. In contrast, economic activities and population in Xinjiang are 
centred in Urumqi. Quebec's abundance of natural resources gives it a favourable 
position in the national global economy. Quebec accounts for almost a fifth of the 
Canadian economy. Over the last decade, Quebec has had a strong economic 
performance albeit with gradual shrinkage of its national share. In many indicators, 
such as per capita GDP, personal income, provincial average weekly earnings and per 
capita disposable income, Quebec has stayed close to but below the national levels. 
Variations in per capita income and economic structure among the administrative 
regions of Quebec demonstrate clearly the province’s core-periphery spatial structure. 
Each administrative region differs from the others with regards to its geography, 
natural resources, habitable land, economy and industrial activities.  
The σ-Convergence analysis of regional per capita GDP in Quebec shows slow 
convergence from 1998 to 2003, and then followed by slight divergence again from 
2003 to 2008. From the analysis of regional σ-Convergence and Gini coefficients for 
Quebec, it can be concluded that regional per capita GDP disparity is greater than per 
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capita personal disposable income. The absolute beta convergences for per capita 
GDP and per capita personal disposable income showed a weak annual divergence in 
per capita GDP and there is not a very significant convergence of per capita personal 
disposable income.The SEM, SLM and SCM Models showed a weak convergence of 
regional per capita disposable income.  
Xinjiang is rich in mineral resources, especially oil and natural gas that makes it 
a major player in generating rapid economic growth in the western part of China and 
in the changing geo-strategic and geo-economic environment in Central Asia. The 
natural, ethnic, economic and territorial landscapes combine in layers to make up the 
complex and diverse landscape of Xinjiang. Xinjiang had for long been characterized 
by an underdeveloped infrastructure, inconvenience of transport and slow economic 
development. This is at least in part related, to its basic geomorphologic structure. The 
distribution of natural resources, the great distances between the oases, and the degree 
of polarization and the province’s relative economic independence are all factors that 
underlie the differences in regional characteristics of the Xinjiang economy. The 
ethnic minority dominated regions have the higher proportion of agricultural 
population while the reverse is true for the Han-dominated regions. In fact, the main 
factor underlying the changing pattern of regional economic development was the 
differential progress of industrialization between regions. Geographical as well as 
historical factors, long-term policy, and a phenomenon of localized economic 
development and prosperity have also emerged as factors that have marginalized the 
minorities of Xinjiang to a great extent. The new regional development policy of the 
‘West Development Strategy’ has increased the investment share in the energy 
industry of Xinjiang, mostly concentrated in Urumqi, Karamay and Bayingolin. The 
number of state-owned enterprises is still very high, amounting to 75% of all 
enterprises (mainly oil, gas industries) in Xinjiang. The dominant role of 
state-controlled heavy extractive industries and the underdevelopment of light 
industries are the major weaknesses of Xinjiang’s resource-based economy.  
The Gini coefficient, the Theil index and the σ-convergence coefficient have all 
decreased since 1978, and show weak convergence for the whole period. The SEM, 
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SLM and SCM models indicate a weak sign of convergence in regional per capita 
GDP and all the results are significantly consistent with the σ-Convergence and 
Moran's I analyses of per capita GDP. 
Xinjiang has experienced great changes in regional development since 1950. 
However, the rankings in terms of per capita GDP and per capita disposable income 
have lowered its ranking in the 31 provinces of China even though these indicators 
increased at a high speed. After six decades of development, there are still acute 
disparities between per capita annual income of urban and rural households in 
Xinjiang.  
 
7. Urbanization (metropolitan and cities) was found to be the most active factor 
contributing to the regional economy in large territories. 
Cities play very important roles in countries with large territories in supporting and 
encouraging increase in urban population, centralization and distribution of economic 
activities. They have become the economic engines of a territory. Nonetheless, the 
rural economy cannot be ignored.  
There are sharp differences in the nature of the urban system, urban size, 
definition, the number of urban centres at different hierarchical levels and their 
regional distribution between Canada and China due to differences in population size 
and economic activities. However, economic outputs are mostly based on the cities in 
both countries. China’s rural-urban inequalities are much greater compared with 
Canada. Canada has 80% urban population while China had only 45.7% in 2008. As 
expected, the most urbanized regions have the highest per capita income in both 
economies. Thus, one could conclude that the level of urbanization is positively 
associated with the level of economic development among the regions. Canada’s 
urban regions have been growing relatively fast. However, the rate of urbanization 
differs greatly between provinces. Immigrants to Canada have been strongly 
concentrated in the country’s largest urban areas. The different characteristics and 
experiences of urbanization in both countries make generalization about urbanization 
processes and their relationships to economic conditions difficult. The sharp 
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urban-rural income difference in China reflects the early stages of a Hirschman-type 
concentrated development. It also can be explained by Myrdalian dynamics of 
cumulative causation and so-called backwash and spread effects between core and 
periphery. In China, the backwash effects dominate in the early stages of development, 
so there is increasing urban-rural disparity which underscored divergence. In Canada, 
it seems spread effects dominate and there has been a decreasing gap between core 
and periphery which is translated into convergence. However, there are differences 
between regions in each country. 
During the last few decades urbanization in China has been accelerating. The 
rate of urbanization measured by the proportion of urban population of the total 
population has grown from 17.9% in 1978 to 45.7% in 2008, a 27.8 percentage points 
shift. However, due to the institutional constraint inherited from the planned economy 
and the household registration system (hukou) system, the rate of urbanization in 
China is lower compared not only to the developed economies but also to other 
countries at the same level of development. There are great disparities in urbanization 
between the Eastern, Central and Western provinces in China.  
Urban-based economic activities are highly concentrated in urban areas and 
account for the greater part of the corresponding regional share of GDP. But the 
concentration rate differs greatly in both countries. In Canada, most of the principal 
CMAs have a leading share of the GDP in their provinces. Investment is extremely 
concentrated in capital cities but there is some rural investment. It is a well-known 
fact that the urban-rural income gap has widened in China. In China, the strong 
influence of government on urban development and China’s long term centralization 
‘China policy’ certainly helped the concentration of urban economic activities into the 
cities directly controlled by the state and provincial capital cities. The Western 
provinces have higher GDP concentration rates than that of the Central and Eastern 
provinces of China. All of the cities in China have increased very fast in population 
and GDP in recent years. The smaller cities had high growth rates while the larger 
cities had somewhat lower growth rates. Shanghai had the highest wage of $7044 
while Wuchang City had the lowest at $186.5. The disparity is 37.7 times. Shanghai 
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($174 billion), Beijing ($134 billion) and Guangzhou ($102 billion) are the top three 
cities by total GDP in 2007.  They have been the key players in the development of 
the Chinese economy as Guangzhou is the manufacturing hub for China as well as the 
logistics hub for Hong Kong; Shanghai is China's commercial and service hub while 
Beijing has been gaining immensely in status as the political hub of the country.  
Montreal is the second largest metropolitan centre in Canada. Economic activities 
and population in Quebec are heavily centred in the Montreal metropolitan area. The 
data show the strong core performance of Montreal in almost any type of industry in 
Quebec except for some agriculture related industries. In Xinjiang, the urbanization of 
the rural population and net interprovincial migration are the main causes of 
increasing urban population in recent years. The south and east parts of Xinjiang do 
not have a fully developed urban hierarchy and the cities there cannot play the central 
role of economic centre due to the huge distance between urban and urban, and even 
between urban and rural. Like other parts of China, widening urban-rural income 
disparity has been the main source of inequalities in Xinjiang during the reform 
period. Furthermore, the centralized development plan has reinforced intra-regional 
disparities in Xinjiang. Ürümqi is a core industrial, economical, cultural and political 
centre and the largest consumer centre in Xinjiang. The higher economic performance 
for Urumqi noted earlier further confirms its hub city position in Xinjiang’s economy. 
The most "inland" city in the world has become a major economic centre not only in 
western China but it has also become one of the largest cities in central Asia 
countries.  
 
8. Openness has played a significant role in the economies of both countries.  
Trade openness is closely related with convergence or divergence of spatial income 
disparity across regions in large territories. China has just moved from a lesser 
developed economy to a lower-middle-income economy on the basis of per capita 
GDP along with the transformation of the Chinese economy from the centrally 
planned system to a more market-oriented system since the onset of economic reform 
and opening policy. The reforms included the liberalization of prices and the process 
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of fiscal decentralization. China's integration into the world economy has been 
astonishingly rapid. It is estimated that exports represent some 20% of China's GDP 
growth while exports account for nearly 45% of Canada’s GDP. China also opened its 
economy to the world only for the eastern provinces for the purposes of trade and 
attracting direct foreign investment. The role played by China in international trade 
has also increased and the world’s most populous economy has benefited from global 
trade and investment after it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. As 
a result, the Chinese economy has been boosted by FDI and international trade giving 
rise to an increase in regional disparity. But China has been criticized for not 
permitting a more flexible currency exchange rate of Yuan, which is viewed as 
artificially cheap, boosting the competitiveness of Chinese exports and accumulating 
a vast amount of foreign-exchange reserve since 1990.  
Canada has had a much more open economy than China. Trade accounts for 
roughly a third of Canada’s GDP. Canada has signed two agreements with the US – 
the 1989 US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the 1994 North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has brought about a trade boom for Canada. 
The US and Canada have the world's largest trading relationship and the US absorbs 
more than 85% of Canadian exports. In 2008, the country also agreed to a 
Canadian-European free trade association that has further developed its economy. The 
most important indicator of openness could be the Economic freedom1 indicator of 
countries. Based on the 2010 statistics of the Heritage Foundation, China’s economic 
freedom score is 51, making its economy the 140th ‘freest’ in the 2010 Index. Its 
overall score is lower than the global and regional averages. Canada’s economic 
freedom score is 80.4, making its economy the 7th ‘freest’ in the 2010 Index rankings. 
Its overall score is almost unchanged from the previous year. Canada is ranked 1st out 
of the three countries in the North America region on this index. It can be concluded 
                                                              
1 Note: The Economic Freedom score is calculated based on the 10 economic freedoms of countries, 
i.e. business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, 
investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, and freedom from corruption and labour 
freedom. For more information see http://www.heritage.org/index/Country/ 
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from this that it may be better for the future of China’s economy if China had a more 
open economy than is currently the case. 
 
9. Migration is a major factor in boosting the economy in both countries but in 
different ways. 
It is well-known that migration has often been an important factor in regional 
economic development. Migration is mainly linked to large income disparities, 
employment opportunities and unemployment and other social, political and natural 
problems. The major trend is from poorer regions to richer ones, the so-called 
migration from periphery regions to core regions. Mobility of the labour force is 
usually considered as one of the key pre-conditions for regional convergence and 
growth. It can be argued that interregional migration equalizes differences and factor 
prices across regions and lead to more even regional development, although 
cumulative processes of growth and decline can complicate this substantially.  
Canada is a country that receives a large number of immigrants compared to its small 
population. Internally, migration tends to occur from poorer provinces with high 
unemployment to rich regions with low unemployment in both countries. In Canada, 
the increase in international immigrants and interprovincial migrants shows a high 
correlation with the increase in total GDP in the provinces. The recent three decades 
of development in Ontario, Alberta and British Colombia have attracted more 
international and interprovincial migrants than Quebec and the other provinces. It 
seems it has spurred the convergence of the western provinces.  
In the case of China, China does not accept immigrants. On the contrary, millions 
of people (including students) have emigrated to other countries such as the USA, 
Canada, Australia and various European countries 2 . In China, the relationship 
between migration and regional development has become stronger over time, with 
migration flows from the Central and Western regions to the Eastern region increasing 
dramatically from the beginning of the new reform era. It can be concluded that 
                                                              
2 People's Daily Online, January 04, 2009. For example, since the opening-up of overseas study 30 
years ago, a total of 1.36 million Chinese students have studied abroad. Of these students, only 370,000 
returned to China after completing their studies. 
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migrant workers have played a substantial role in the urban labour market. This cheap 
labour force moving to the coastal provinces of China has been a main factor in 
attracting FDI and foreign assembly line enterprises to China in recent decades. 
However, the mobility and direction of inter-provincial and urban-rural migration is 
still controlled in China. For the coastal provinces, limitations on in-migration are 
much stricter than inland provinces. Restraints on the transfer of labour out of 
agriculture could be expected to slow down in per capita income convergence. Thus, 
in this event it is reasonable to suggest that migration restraints induce a divergence in 
terms of the increase in per capita GDP in China. 
  
SC.3 The Limitations of this Research  
 
The lack of high-quality and comparable cross-section data has always constituted a 
major barrier in the study of cross-country and multiregional economic issues. 
Comparing regional development performance between Canada and China poses a 
challenge because of differences in governmental systems and data collection 
processes. The differences in the classification systems of economic activity between 
the two countries pose a challenge in terms of data comparability. In Canada, the 
sectors of the economy can be regrouped to form five largely goods-producing 
industries (NAICS3 11 to 31-33) and fifteen services-producing industries (NAICS 41 
to 91) (see Appendix 2.1). But, in China, the sectors of the economy are divided into 
three industries by the standard of industrial classification of the Material Product 
System (MPS): Primary industry - agriculture (including farming, forestry, animal 
husbandry and fishery); Secondary industry - industry (including mining and 
quarrying, manufacturing, production and supply of electricity, water and gas) and 
construction; and Tertiary industry - all other industries not included in primary or 
secondary industry such as telecommunications and commerce. This ignores many 
so-called “non-material” service activities which were considered “non-productive”. 
                                                              
3 Note: The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) was a new industry classification 
system that was introduced in the North American countries (U.S.A, Canada and Mexico) in the 1990s 
to more fully represent industry sectors, especially the service sector. 
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In this study, the primary and secondary industries of China can be compared with the 
goods producing industries of Canada without difficulty. However, the tertiary sector 
cannot be fully compared due to the difference in the statistical systems between the 
two countries. 
Since the mid-1980s, China has started compiling national income statistics 
according to the United Nations System of National Accounts - ‘SNA’. Many 
theoretical and practical problems on how to adopt the SNA to Chinese economic 
accounting, however, still remain unsolved. For instance, the sum of the regional 
GDPs may not equal the national GDP published by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB), 
the reason for which is that the statistical data compiled by the SSB are derived from 
the records of the various ministries in charge of their related sectors whereas the 
regional statistical data are compiled by the regional statistical offices.2 
In 1992, these Soviet-style MPS measures were dropped in favour of SNA 
principles, showing slower growth. There have been various adjustments following 
industrial and service censuses. The most recent adjustment was made in 2006 after 
the First Economic Census in 2004 (Madison and Xu 2006). Madison and Xu (2006) 
argued that the MPS standard of industrial classification is agriculture, industry, 
construction, (production-side) transportation and telecommunications, and commerce. 
Such a grouping is consistent with Marxian theory and common in the practice of 
centrally planned economies.  
Contrary to the common theoretical perception, the MPS does not completely 
ignore the contribution by “non-material services”. In calculating Non-Material 
Product (NMP), those “non-material services” that are used (and paid) by the material 
sectors5 are kept together with newly added value by “material production”, e.g. 
banking or financial services, which were of course insignificant under central 
planning, and (enterprise-level) educational, medical and housing services for 
employees. Note that the “non-material services4” that are consumed by the material 
                                                              
4 “Non-material Services”- In the old Soviet-style national accounts “non-material services” were 
excluded from “material product”. These are banking, insurance, housing services, administration of 
real estate, social services, health, education, entertainment, personal services, R & D activities, the 
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sectors are only a small part of the total “non-material services” of the economy, 
which means that the majority of “non-material services” is ignored in the national 
accounting process under MPS. Another example is given by Holz (2007) who argued 
that National GDP should equal the sum of provincial GDP (provincial gross value 
added). But prior to the 2006 benchmark revision, the sum of provincial GDP 
routinely exceeded national GDP in China. The discrepancy between the sum of 
provincial GDP and the NBS’s national GDP figure increased continuously from 1996 
through 2004. By 2004, the sum of provincial GDP was 19% larger than the national 
value reported by the NBS. The national values are consistently lower than the sum of 
the provincial values in the secondary and tertiary sector5. 
Thus, this ‘third’ industry data of China and the goods producing industries of 
Canada must be analyzed independently except for the national case. Another 
difficulty of data comparability is in the personal income data. In China, there is no 
personal tax reporting system, so it is difficult to measure personal income. The only 
way is through official urban or rural disposable income data or the average wage of 
staff and workers. Hong Kong and Macao are not included in this research due to 
missing data for earlier years. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Group in 
Xinjiang is under the direct control of central government of China. The economic 
data of this group are not included in this study independently because their data are 
included in Xinjiang’s regional economic data.  
 For China, in addition, some care must be taken when one uses official data to 
estimate and compare China’s economic performances for the pre- and post-reform 
periods during which different statistical systems were employed (Rongxingguo 
2007). Many problems therefore still exist when one tries to apply the officially 
published data to compare the Chinese economy multi-regionally. However, the 
Statistical Bureau of China has tried to meet the international statistical standards 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
armed forces, police, government and party organizations. They are now incorporated in the Chinese 
accounts, but the estimates are not shown explicitly. Official estimates show an estimate for the 
“tertiary” sector as a whole, and a breakdown for two component sub-sectors (transport and commerce). 
The estimate for non-material services is a residual which the reader has to derive for him or herself. 
5 The China Quarterly, March 2008. 
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since 1990. The research data environment has been increasingly improved since the 
release of complete sets of data on regional economic performances such as the FAO 
Database, the UNSD Database, the World Bank Database, the IMF Database, the 
UNDP Human Development Report and the Penn Data Table. 
The accessibility of official statistical data in China is relatively easy and most of 
the recent statistical data are published online. However, there is still some debate 
about China’s statistical data. Rongxingguo (2007) argued that the Chinese economy 
could have been underestimated if the international statistical standards had been 
applied. For example, according to the evidence released by the State Statistical 
Bureau (SSB), China’s actual GDP could have been over 30% larger than the current 
figure. There are also some other discussions about the exaggeration of Chinese GDP 
(Wang and Meng 2000; Madison and Xu 2006; and Scissors 2009)6. As for the period 
1978-2003, Maddison and Wu calculated the growth rate at 7.85% per year compared 
with the official rate of 9.6%. As another example, according to the 2008 estimates by 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the total number of the urban 
unemployed was 8.30 million. The country’s total unemployment rate stood at 4.0%. 
The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences also undertook a sample survey of 7,000 
people in mid-2008. Their findings were in stark contrast to the official estimates and 
9.4% of the sample size was classified as unemployed7. However, in any case, it is 
true that China has become a new economic power in the world with a high economic 
growth rate. In contrast, in Canada accessing long term statistical data is difficult and 
expensive. For example, Statistics Canada does not publish related income data (GDP, 
personal income or other related data) of CMAs and CAs or rural areas. 
In both countries, there are some difficulties in obtaining environmental data at 
the sub-national level. So these data are not considered in the regional and provincial 
cases. 
In sum, there was much difficulty in performing structural analyses of regional 
and provincial comparisons between service producing industries of Canada and the 
                                                              
6 http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/wm_2238.pdf 
7 http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/china/unemployment.html 
347 
 
‘third’ industry of China in this study. The lack of CMAs’ and MAs’ or rural areas’ 
annual economic statistical data for Canada also affected the analysis of the 
core–periphery structure and the spatial analysis to some degree.  
 
SC.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this study, a detailed analysis of regional growth, policy and disparity of the 
economies of China and Canada starting from the 1960s until the present time has 
been provided, mainly in a descriptive and empirical way. This study has shown the 
complex mosaic of regional development in both countries through comparing and 
contrasting the different processes and patterns of regional economic development 
experiences and models of these two countries. Natural resources, international trade, 
metropolitan area (cities) and migration are major factors that have affected both 
economies in different ways. Clearly, much has happened in both countries since 
1960 and to provide a thorough description would require even more detailed work. It 
can be seen from the analyses reported in this thesis that there were more stories of 
success than failure in the Canadian case while the reverse was true for in China.  
In brief, Canada's economy is both mature and diverse, benefiting from an 
advanced services sector, an abundance of natural resources and free trade agreements. 
Canada has enjoyed solid economic growth, and has avoided a significant widening of 
regional disparity, but has not been able to avoid the negative impacts of the 
economic recession. However, Canada has experienced greater stability, and even 
growth, while a global economic crisis has been affecting most economies in the 
world. 
From an economic point of view, China is still in a marginal position when 
compared with Canada. The Chinese economy faces numerous economic 
development challenges even though it has become the second biggest economy in the 
world. China is still taking advantage of the growth centre strategy with some 
additional development strategies. However, the Central and Western regions do not 
seem to be catching up with the East. The Chinese economy is still not fully 
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transformed from the centrally planned system to a market-oriented system since the 
onset of economic reform and the opening policy. The state still controls most 
economic activity. The government is struggling to manage environmental 
degradation, demographic pressure and an aging population, and the world’s 
largest-ever migration from rural to urban areas, all of which contribute to social 
unrest. At present, more than half of the population depends on agriculture for a living. 
However, agriculture's contribution to GDP has remained low. Furthermore, many 
factors affect China’s economic development seriously including a number of 
political, financial, social, and environmental problems (pollution, loss of arable land), 
as well as low labour and product costs, ethnic tensions (Tibet, Xinjiang), poverty, 
health care and unemployment. 
In the Western provinces, minority areas have been marginalized. China's poor 
showing on the Human Development Index shows the economic disparity between 
urban China and the rural areas. Chinese minorities constitute less than 10% of the 
Chinese population yet they constitute 40 to 50% of the poor. It is somewhat 
paradoxical that the autonomous regions (where a large proportion of minorities live) 
are often quite rich in natural resources but their populations remain quite poor 
(Bhalla and Shufang Qiu 2007). The recent introduction of a 5% resource tax 
increased from zero % in the resource-rich Xinjiang represents the start of central 
government aiming to increase revenue for the local government. 
The Chinese government seeks to add energy production capacity from sources 
other than coal and oil. The global economic downturn began to slow foreign demand 
for Chinese exports for the first time in many years. The government vowed to 
continue reforming the economy and emphasized the need to increase domestic 
consumption in order to make China less dependent on foreign exports for GDP 
growth in the future. However, developing a successful regional policy in such a 
populated and large territory is not an easy task. The policies of regional economic 
development of China are facing many conceptual, practical difficulties and new 
challenges. If China chooses to follow past strategies in regional economic 
development, and if there is no immediate action and intervention appropriate for 
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lagging regions, the economic disparity between regions will almost certainly be 
enlarged. There should be more holistic and specific regional development policies 
and urban planning strategies accompanying the whole process of national economic 
development. China urgently needs further systematic reform and new regional 
development policies. 
Despite being an affluent, high-tech industrial developed society, there are also 
some issues in Canada which cannot be overlooked in the current situation. 
Significant challenges lie ahead. Although the equalization program has played a key 
role in reducing or hiding regional disparity to some degree and in avoiding further 
divergence, regional disparity cannot be ignored. In addition, economic activities are 
excessively (according to many observers) concentrated in the core regions of Toronto 
in Canada and Montreal in Quebec and the CMAs more generally, while the other 
regions are seen as peripheral regions. This is also one of the reasons underlying an 
unbalanced regional economy. Central Canada dominates the national economy by 
almost any indicator. The sluggish economic performance of the Atlantic Provinces 
and the high costs of the Northern economy cannot be overlooked. If they are, the 
chances are that regional disparity will be accentuated again. Total government 
expenditures, including consumption and transfer payments, are relatively high in 
Canada. In the most recent year, government spending equaled 39.1% of GDP. It 
increased slightly due to the implementation of a significant stimulus package due to 
the economic downturn in 2008. Future Canadian economic weakness could stem 
from the deficits of -2.3 % in the budget, and -2.8% in the current account balance. 
These budget deficits will lead to net government debt rising and economic slowdown. 
Sustainable economic growth also requires successfully addressing the problem of 
climate change and environment, notably in the important energy sector. 
Demographic ageing is putting significant pressure on public spending mainly 
through rising health-care expenditures. The problem of poverty, unemployment and 
the income gap8 between aboriginals and other Canadians exists also, but on a world 
                                                              
8Canwest News Service (2009) Shannon Proudfoot, aboriginals ‘astoundingly poorer’. The Gazette 
March 31, 2009, p. 8. Economist Pendakur says the income gap between aboriginals and other 
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scale they do not appear to be very significant.. 
 
SC.5 Future Research Directions 
 
This study has tried to explain the patterns and processes of change of both economies 
as well as presenting case studies which illustrate and examine the differences in both 
economies from the national to regional and provincial scales and some urban areas. 
This study has focused on trying to answer the research questions presented in the 
Introduction to this thesis, the answers to which were summarized previously in 
section SC2.  
Regional development is undoubtedly a complex and highly debated topic. It 
is affected by many factors. Explanations have to be sought in the domains of 
geography, economics, sociology, politics, trade, international relations, history, 
migration, openness…. This thesis has assessed whether government policies have 
succeeded in inducing regional convergence or have further widened regional 
disparities, thus necessarily involving an evaluation of the sustainability of regional 
development. This study also focused on regional disparity and regional development 
policy, cross-country comparisons, measuring convergence between countries and 
across regions including spatial analysis, identifying the most influential factors such 
as population, resources, policy, urbanization, migration, openness and their different 
roles in the economic development of large territories (in Canada and China). The 
empirical results and the process of convergence and divergence offered an interesting 
framework for examining the regional development trajectory and regional disparity 
in both economies. 
In this study, the ‘core’ regions of their respective provinces have been 
stressed as one of the major, if not the major, reason for provincial disparities. 
Absolute regional equality is impossible. Regional disparity cannot be avoided, it 
exists almost everywhere. There is not a specific universal formula for every region. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Canadians is so wide it should trump concerns about other ethnic disparities in this country 
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But it appears possible for national and regional policy makers to try to keep the level 
of disparity at a reasonable scale to avoid social instability and to maintain national 
unity. It is certain that there is much more left for future research due to problems of 
data comparability and data availability for both of these different economic systems, 
especially in relation to the service sectors, and some other social and environmental 
indicators for sub-national spatial units at the provincial and urban (cities, 
municipalities) levels as well as for rural areas. Further micro economic analysis is 
certainly required to obtain a more detailed picture of the regional development 
trajectory of both economies. The comparability of service sectors of China and 
Canada requires further attention. Due to limited data for sub-provincial units (CMA 
and municipalities of Canada, county-level data of China) and rural areas, some 
spatial and environmental factor analyses must be left for future research.   
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Appendices (Appendix A) 
A.1. Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Per Capita GDP of China 
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A.1. Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Per Capita GDP of Canada (10 provinces) 
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A2. Lorenz Curve 
The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation of the cumulative distribution 
function of a probability distribution; it is a graph showing the proportion of the 
distribution assumed by the bottom y% of the values. It is often used to represent income 
distribution, where it shows for the bottom x% of households, what percentage y% of the 
total income they have. The percentage of households is plotted on the x-axis, the 
percentage of income on the y-axis. It can also be used to show distribution of assets. In 
this situation, many economists consider it to be a measure of social inequality. It was 
developed by Max O. Lorenz in 1905 for representing income distribution. 
 
Source: 
 A3. Calculation of the Gini coefficient of inequality 
 
This method calculates the Gini coefficient (G) of inequality with bootstrap confidence 
intervals. A Lorenz plot is produced when a single variable is specified for analysis; 
otherwise the summary statistics alone are displayed for a group of variables. 
    The Gini coefficient was developed by the Italian Statistician Corrado Gini (Gini 1912) 
as a summary measure of income inequality in society. It is usually associated with the 
plot of wealth concentration introduced a few years earlier by Max Lorenz (Lorenz 1905). 
Since these measures were introduced, they have been applied to topics other than 
income and wealth, but mostly within Economics (Cowell 1995, 2000; Jenkins 1991; Sen 
1973). 
     G is a measure of inequality, defined as the mean of absolute differences between all 
pairs of individuals for some measure. The minimum value is 0 when all measurements 
are equal and the theoretical maximum is 1 for an infinitely large set of observations 
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where all measurements but one has a value of 0, which is the ultimate inequality (Stuart 
and Ord 1994). 
   When G is based on the Lorenz curve of income distribution, it can be interpreted as the 
expected income gap between two individuals randomly selected from the population 
(Sen 1973). 
 The classical definition of G appears in the notation of the theory of relative mean 
difference: 
  
- where x is an observed value, n is the number of values observed and x bar is the mean 
value. 
 If the x values are first placed in ascending order, such that each x has rank i, the some of 
the comparisons above can be avoided and computation is quicker: 
  
- where x is an observed value, n is the number of values observed and i is the rank of 
values in ascending order. 
 Note that only positive non-zero values are used. 
 The small sample variance properties of G are not known, and large sample 
approximations to the variance of G are poor (Mills and Zandvakili 1997; Glasser 1962; 
Dixon et al. 1987). therefore confidence intervals are calculated via bootstrap re-sampling 
methods (Efron and Tibshirani 1997).  
 StatsDirect calculates two types of bootstrap confidence intervals, these are percentile 
and bias-corrected (Mills and Zandvakili 1997; Dixon et al. 1987; Efron and Tibshirani 
1997). The bias-corrected intervals are the most appropriate for most applications. 
 In order for G to be an unbiased estimate of the true population value, it should be 
multiplied by n/(n-1) (Dixon 1987; Mills and Zandvakili 1997). This corrected form of G 
does not appear in most of the literature, but there are few situations when it is not the 
most appropriate form to use. 
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A4. Spatial Models 
 
A4.1 Spatial Error Model 
 
Country Period  Equation δ (R) R²(%) F P ρ 
Canada 
81-07 Log(Yit/Y0) =  1.930208 -.418118 LogY0 +.040926 W 
-0.418118 0.416351 17.334791 1.048494 0.386 0.040926 
81-90 Log(Yit/Y0) =  .506796 -.094568 LogY0 -.00598 W -0.094568 0.435476 18.963929 1.170092 0.3495 -0.00598 
91-00 Log(Yit/Y0) =  .464108 -.083692 LogY0 -.001701 W -0.083692 0.470436 22.130983 1.421039 0.2863 
-
0.001701 
01-07 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  -.316555 
+.074079 LogY0 +.012671 
W 
-0.316555 0.652898 42.627594 3.714991 0.0622 0.012671 
China 
81-07 Log(Yit/Y0) =  1.607607 -.050355 LogY0 +.024622 W -0.050355 0.383468 14.704809 2.413587 0.1079 0.024622 
81-90 Log(Yit/Y0) =  1.099619 -.203154 LogY0 -.007002 W -0.203154 0.538294 28.975991 5.711644 0.0083 
-
0.007002 
91-00 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  .167416 
+.144622 LogY0 +.008127 
W 
0.144622 0.364627 13.295285 2.146757 0.1357 0.008127 
01-07 Log(Yit/Y0) =  .353123 -.027899 LogY0 +.022999 W -0.027899 0.65827 43.331989 10.705296 0.0004 0.022999 
 
A4.2 Spatial Lag Model 
 
Country Period  Equation δ (R) R²(%) F P ρ 
Canada 
81-07 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  2.175499 -
.476003 LogY0 +.204891 
w*Log(Yit/Y0) 
-0.476003 .855034 73.108279 13.593083 0.0014 
0.2048
91 
81-90 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  .664743 -
.146172 LogY0 +.266215 
w*Log(Yit/Y0) 
-0.146172 .845332 71.458541 12.518376 0.0019 0.266215 
91-00 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  .63049 -
.127604 LogY0 +.105087 
w*Log(Yit/Y0) 
-0.127604 .606303 36.760306 2.906427 0.1011 0.105087 
01-07 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  .347684 -
.071866 LogY0 +.198671 
w*Log(Yit/Y0) 
-0.071866 .969254 93.945385 77.581632 < 0.0001 0.198671 
China 
81-07 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  1.379086 
+.013448 LogY0 +.023501 
w*Log(Yit/Y0) 
 
0.013448 .528537 27.935155 5.426948 0.0102 0.023501 
81-90 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  .843991 -
.132257 LogY0 +.014701 
w*Log(Yit/Y0) 
 
-0.132257 .543658 29.556394 5.874054 0.0074 0.014701 
91-00 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  -.309962 
+.245982 LogY0 +.038508 
w*Log(Yit/Y0) 
 
0.245982 .647832 41.968649 10.124891 0.0005 0.038508 
01-07 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  .345673 -
.017103 LogY0 +.057646 
w*Log(Yit/Y0) 
 
-0.017103 .827574 68.487828 30.427278 P < 0.0001 0.057646 
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A4.3 Spatial Cross-Regressive Model 
 
Country Period  Equation δ (R) R²(%) F P τ 
Canada 
81-07 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  3.680054 
-.942018 LogY0 
+.085691 w*LogY0 
-0.942018 0.810913 65.758039 9.601967 0.0047 0.085691 
81-90 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  .497292 -
.092583 LogY0 -.001288 
w*LogY0 
-0.092583 0.434079 18.842454 1.160857 0.3521 -0.001288 
91-00 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  .471868 -
.085734 LogY0 -.000272 
w*LogY0 
-0.085734 0.468568 21.955613 1.406611 0.2895 -0.000272 
01-07 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  -2.223744 
+.468023 LogY0 
+.021318 w*LogY0 
0.468023 0.850707 66.84429 13.096431 0.0016 0.021318 
China 
81-07 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  1.638268 
-.065913 LogY0 
+.010284 w*LogY0 
-0.065913 0.399338 15.947103 2.656178 0.0878 0.010284 
81-90 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  1.066221 
-.192486 LogY0 -.002246 
w*LogY0 
-0.192486 0.533571 28.469828 5.57216 0.0092 -0.002246 
91-00 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  -.123803 
+.20297 LogY0 +.003821 
w*LogY0 
0.20297 0.488417 23.855101 4.385998 0.022 0.003821 
01-07 
Log(Yit/Y0) =  .497062 -
.055646 LogY0 +.005838 
w*LogY0 
-0.055646 0.668214 44.651058 11.29407 0.0003 0.005838 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
B1 Differences in Statistical Methods of Both Countries 
 
Sectors of the Canadian Economy 
The sectors of the economy can be regrouped to form five largely goods-producing 
industries (NAICS 11 to 31-33) and fifteen services-producing industries (NAICS 41 
to 91).  
Goods-producing industries are primarily associated with the production of goods (e.g., 
growing of crops, generation of electricity, the manufacturing of computers). however, 
these sectors may also produce some services (e.g., pest control services, plumbing 
services, land subdivision, house-painting, support services for mining operations).The 
20 economic sectors specified by the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) 2002 are listed below. Links are to the official NAICS Canada 2002 definition 
of each sector.  
Goods-producing industries  
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting (NAICS 11)  
Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction (NAICS 21)  
Utilities (NAICS 22)  
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Construction (NAICS 23)  
Manufacturing (NAICS 31-33) 
Services-producing Industries  
Wholesale Trade (NAICS 41)  
Retail Trade (NAICS 44-45)  
Transportation and Warehousing (NAICS 48-49)  
Information and Cultural Industries (NAICS 51)  
Finance and Insurance (NAICS 52)  
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing (NAICS 53)  
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services (NAICS 54)  
Management of Companies and Enterprises (NAICS 55)  
Administrative and Support, Waste Management and Remediation Services (NAICS 56)  
Educational Services (NAICS 61)  
Health Care and Social Assistance (NAICS 62)  
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation (NAICS 71)  
Accommodation and Food Services (NAICS 72)  
Other Services - except Public Administration (NAICS 81)  
Public Administration (NAICS 91) 
Source: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cis-sic.nsf/eng/h_00007.html 
 
Sectors of the China Economy 
 
Three Industries   Industry structure has been classified according to the historical 
sequence of development. Primary industry refers to extraction of natural resources; 
secondary industry involves processing of primary products; and tertiary industry 
provides services of various kinds for production and consumption. The above 
classification is universal although it varies to some extent form country to country. 
Industry in China comprises: 
Primary industry:   agriculture (including farming, forestry, animal husbandry and 
fishery). 
 378 
 
Secondary industry:   industry (including mining and quarrying, manufacturing, 
production and supply of electricity, water and gas) and construction. 
Tertiary industry:   all other industries not included in primary or secondary industries. 
Due to the fact that tertiary industry involves in a large variety of industries in China, it is 
divided into two sectors: the circulation sector and the service sector and further into four 
levels: 
The first level: circulation sector, including transportation, storage, postal and 
telecommunications, wholesale and retail trade, and catering trade. 
The second level: service sector providing services for production and consumption, 
including banking, insurance, geological survey, water conservancy management, real 
estates, service for residents, service for agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery, 
subsidiary services for transportation and communications, comprehensive technical 
services, …. 
The third level: service sector for upgrading scientific, educational and cultural level of 
the people, including education, culture and arts, broadcasting, movies, television, public 
health, sports, social welfare and scientific research, …. 
The fourth level: sector providing services for public needs, including government 
agencies, political parties, social organizations, military and police service.  
Source : 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/programsandindicators/currentsurveysindicators/index.htm 
 
 
B2 Table: Economic Freedom Scores of China and Canada, 2010 
 
           Table1: Economic Freedom Scores of China and Canada, 2010 
 
Freedom Indicators Canada China Freedom Indicators Canada China 
Business Freedom 96.5 49.7 Investment Freedom 75 20 
Trade Freedom 88.1 72.2 Financial Freedom 80 30 
Fiscal Freedom 76.7 70.2 Property Rights 90 20 
Government Spending 54.1 88.1 Freedom from Corruption 87 36 
Monetary Freedom 75.4 70.6 Labor Freedom 81.5 53.2 
Data Source: http://www.heritage.org/index/Country/  
 
 
 
